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ABSTRACT 
 
It is generally considered that sumptuary law is an archaic form of governmental 
intervention that targeted the personal lives of people living in the early modern 
period in Europe, and has no modern significance. This thesis examines the post 
Federation period, between 1901 and 1927, to reveal that the sumptuary impulse was 
alive and well in modern Australia. This impulse was now transmuted by a new 
patrician elite into a form of social and legal regulation in order to control the 
clothing and entertainment choices of working Australians. The impulse was 
sustained through taxation and fiscal legal mechanisms (ie: tariffs), wage cases, and 
through the agency of wartime regulations. All of these measures recall the 
sumptuary laws of early modern Europe. 
 
This period saw the fabric of Australian society undergo enormous social and 
political change. To a large extent, this change was prompted by the availability of 
unprecedented economic opportunities and personal freedoms. An increase in the 
attraction and availability of imported luxuries led the government to increase tariffs 
as part of their settled policy of protectionism. This thesis argues that, during this 
period of socio-economic development, protectionism shared many of the discursive 
features of the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. This association became 
even more evident during World War I, when government often relied on moral 
regulation to constrict the consumption practices of the Australian people to address 
wartime shortages and to provide for the military needs of the Empire.  
 
 
 
 
This thesis accepts that protectionist policies did not aim to control the moral and 
personal behaviour of the individual but rather sought to protect nascent or struggling 
domestic industries. It was in the effect of these policies where the sumptuary 
impulse was apparent. By the beginning of the 1920s, this policy of protectionism, 
with frequent increases in tariffs on imported clothing, changed the language and 
method of the sumptuary impulse into one of rationality. These types of measures 
existed in a direct line back to the early sumptuary laws, one facet of which sought to 
protect industries. However, by the mid-1920s, the association began to wane when 
moralisation served a secondary role in protectionist discourse. By 1927, the 
regulatory objective became pure rational protectionism rather than the moralisation 
that was evident throughout the first two decades following Federation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Sumptuary laws did not so much ‘die’ as undergo a process of transfiguration or 
metamorphosis such as the original is barely recognizable in the resultant, just as the 
butterfly can barely be imagined from the chrysalis.1 
 
 
1.1  Purpose of the chapter 
 
This chapter introduces this thesis, sets out the thesis argument and  marks 
out its place in the literature in the field of sumptuary law.2 This literature serves as 
the backdrop to the original research conducted as part of this thesis. It lays out the 
thesis’ framework, and sets out its scope and limits. It also outlines its structure and 
methodology. In doing so, it sets out how the sumptuary impulse,  reminiscent of 
the sumptuary laws of the early modern period in Europe, re-emerged in the early 
years of post-Federation Australia in the transformed sense as identified by Alan 
Hunt.  
The period under examination, between 1901-1927, shows that the 
sumptuary impulse was alive and well in modern Australia. This impulse was now 
transmuted by a new patrician elite into a form of social and legal regulation in 
order to control the clothing and entertainment choices of working Australians. The 
impulse was sustained through taxation and fiscal legal mechanisms (ie: tariffs), 
wage cases, and through the agency of wartime regulations. All of these measures 
recall the sumptuary laws of early modern Europe. As will be seen, the timeframe is 
not accidental. It begins with Federation and ends with the move of government to 
                                                 
1 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passion: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press, 
1996) 361. 
2 From the Latin sumptuariae lex. 
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from Melbourne to Canberra, and with the emergence of a more formal institutional 
setting in which government took place. It also charts the impact of legal and extra-
legal actors who exerted influence on law and policy in the period, especially the 
Melbourne-based elite that sought to control social movements, economic policy 
and the law. This interconnected set of actors spoke to the sumptuary impulse 
revealing that, whilst sumptuary law had been rescinded, its pull remained alive 
within Australian society and law during the post-Federation period.  
 
1.2  Introduction to this thesis 
 
This thesis examines how ideas based within long-discarded sumptuary laws 
re-emerged in Australia in the period 1901-1927. This thesis argues that during this 
period, many of the laws, policies and interventions, successful and unsuccessful, 
were aimed at regulating the private and public lives of the Australian people through 
interventionist processes that were closely akin to the interventionist sumptuary laws 
of the early modern period. These measures were often exercised through seemingly 
rational policies that were under the guise of the war effort, wage management, and 
economic policy, but were also practically designed to interfere in, and regulate, the 
public and private social and economic lives of the population. 
But there was something different about this population that frustrated some 
of these interventions. Unlike the populations of early modern Europe, or indeed 
some of their contemporaries in Europe in the first two decades of the 20th century, 
Australians, including women, had suffrage. Attempts to regulate the conduct of a 
population who could vote meant that the sumptuary impulse was not always 
successful. For instance, it will be seen in chapter 6 how the Hughes government 
established the ill-fated Luxuries Board as part of its policy to control the importation 
of luxuries, especially women’s apparel. It also attempted to adjust social behaviour 
through the imposition of taxation on amusements pursuant to the Entertainments 
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Tax Act 1916 (Cth), and when it sought to impose taxation on unmarried men; the so-
called Bachelors’ Tax.3 Flurries of letters to newspapers decried these interventions 
as a return to the sumptuary era. Other interventions into female dress also revealed 
that patrician women were prepared to control the desires of working class women to 
emulate styles of fashionable dress in a clear return to the language of the sumptuary 
laws of the early modern period.4 
Later, by the beginning of the 1920s, a policy of protectionism, with frequent 
increases in tariffs on imported clothing, changed the language and method of the 
sumptuary impulse into one of rationality. These types of measures existed in a direct 
line back to the early sumptuary laws, one facet of which sought to protect industries, 
such as the English wool industry of the 16th century.5 This thesis argues that during 
this period of socio-economic development, protectionism shared many of the 
discursive features of the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. This 
association became even more evident during World War I, when government often 
relied on moral regulation to constrict the consumption practices of the Australian 
people to address wartime shortages and to provide for military needs. It is accepted 
that protectionist policies in Australia did not so much aim to control the moral and 
personal behaviour of the individual but rather sought to protect nascent or struggling 
local or domestic industries. However, by the mid-1920s, the association began to 
wane when moralisation served a secondary role in protectionist discourse. 
The 1921 Greene Tariff6 and the establishment of the Tariff Board in 1922 
were expected to alleviate concerns about national security and economic viability by 
motivating industrial development and increasing Australia’s workforce.7 However, 
this was not always the case because of increased tensions between government and 
                                                 
3 Income Tax Assessment Acts 1915-1916 (Cth). 
4 See below Chapters 3 and 8. 
5 See below Chapter 2. 
6 This Tariff was named after Sir Walter Massy-Greene (1874-1952), the Minister of Trade and 
Customs in 1921. 
7 Leon Glezer, Tariff Politics: Australian Policy-making 1960-1980 (Melbourne University Press, 
1982) 8. 
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the Tariff Board regarding the efficacy of imposing prohibitive tariffs to support 
inefficient industries at the expense of the consumer. The increased controversy over 
protectionism culminated in 1927 with the appointment of the Brigden Committee8 
to report to the Bruce Government on the effects of the tariff.9   
By 1930, the Federal Government had introduced a new taxing regime.10 It 
seems that by this time prohibitive tariffs were not only continuing to adversely 
affect the consumer but were also occasioning a substantial a loss of revenue. 
Government accepted that it was no longer able to depend on customs duties to raise 
revenue and decided to look to other more formal and dependable sources of 
revenue.11 Faced with a budget shortfall and “a financial depression without parallel 
in the 30 years’ life of the Commonwealth”,12 the Scullin Government, in 1930,  
introduced a sales tax of 2 ½ per cent on the sale prices of commodities sold in 
Australia.13 This manoeuvre, and the shift to rational language of formal regulatory 
mechanisms seemingly buried sumptuary concepts, but as Hunt suggests,14 
sumptuary law will transform and metamorphose, and as will be briefly noted at the 
end of this thesis, it has now returned in another new guise in the 21st century. 
 
1.2.1 The Journey 
 
When I commenced my doctoral studies, I had planned to investigate the 
broad question of whether taxation on clothing had a sumptuary effect on certain 
sections of the Australian population. Initially, I planned to focus on researching 
archival material concerning the taxation of dress from Federation until 2000, when 
the GST regime (with its implications for private forms of regulation vis-a-vis 
                                                 
8 Hunt, above n 1. 
9 Glezer, above n 7, 11. 
10 Sales Tax Assessment Act (No 2) 1930 (Cth). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 July 1930, 3888 (Mr Scullin). 
13 Sales Tax Assessment Act (No 2) 1930 (Cth). 
14 Hunt, above n 1. 
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intellectual property laws) was introduced. As a taxation specialist, I had a deep 
interest in ‘sumptuary law’. It seemed that there might be some potential for 
exploring the question of whether the taxation of clothing in Australia (via tariffs on 
imported clothing) could have a sumptuary effect. In other words, could taxation of 
clothing regulate the type of clothing that certain people could afford to wear or limit 
what was available for them to purchase?  
It became apparent through archival and documentary research that the 
language of sumptuary law was being used in Australia in the two decades following 
Federation until about 1927 when its effect began to noticeably wane. My research 
unearthed evidence of sumptuary-like forms of regulatory intervention sparked by 
the exigencies of war and by the contestation over female dress in early female living 
wage cases.15 My thesis question expanded to include other manifestations of 
sumptuary regulation as well as the taxation of dress during the period from 
Federation until the move of the Commonwealth government to Canberra in1927.  
The period from the end of First World War to 1927 saw great social and 
economic developments surrounding the regulation of clothing: the establishment of 
the Tariff Board, a dramatic increase of tariffs on imported clothing and in some 
cases, the absolute prohibition into Australia of certain types of clothing during the 
period leading up to the Great Depression. The archived records of the Tariff Board’s 
Apparel Hearings, which took place in the mid-1920s, revealed the regulatory effect 
of increases in tariff duties on clothing on the lower classes and in particular, on the 
working man. It was through these documents that the influence of two people - one 
a Tariff Board member and the other his wife - on the law and policy relating to the 
clothing choices of working people became apparent. This couples’ influence was 
both extra-legal and informal as well as formal and influential. 
Herbert Brookes, an inaugural member of the Tariff Board who sat on the 
Board from 1922 until 1927, was one of these members of the Board who 
recommended that tariffs on imported goods such as machinery, clothing and luxury 
                                                 
15 See below Chapter 5. 
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items be increased.16 He was well connected by his marriage to Alfred Deakin’s 
daughter, Ivy and his political and social network was extensive and powerful. The 
Melbourne-based Herbert and Ivy Brookes were involved in the political, economic 
and social movements of their time. Ivy was a highly influential advocate for 
patriotic causes and was involved with socio/political organisations such as the 
Housewives Association. The story of this couple now sits as a thread through this 
thesis, their influence cutting across the time period of the study as exemplary 
exponents of the sumptuary impulse that shaped law and non-legal regulatory 
mechanisms of this era. 
 
1.3 Originality and significance of this study 
 
This thesis shines a new light on the forms of law that took shape in the first 
three decades of a federated Australia. It reveals how seemingly rational law returned 
to ideas based on sumptuary concepts, now not exercised by an undemocratic ruler, 
but through the actions of patrician and elite members of the community over other 
less well-off individuals. In doing so, it brought class and economic distinctions 
within the seeming egalitarian character of the Australian polity, by limiting and/or 
discouraging access to luxury items. 
The thesis reveals the attitudes underpinning the law of this period. It shows 
the gendered effects of Federal protectionist taxing polices, the prescriptive 
regulation of female dress in early wage cases,17 and a number of war-time measures, 
some successful and others not, were unequivocal sumptuary projects.18 The thesis 
reveals material that has been previously unexamined, such as Prime Minister 
                                                 
16 See below Chapters 3 and 8. 
17 Gail Reekie, “Decently Dressed? Sexualised Consumerism and the Working Woman’s Wardrobe 
1918-1923” (2006) 61 Labour History 42. Gail Reekie has examined the debates before the NSW 
Board of Trade about what constituted appropriate attire for working women.   
18 Including the establishment of the Luxuries Board in 1917 and the enactment of the Entertainments 
Tax Act 1916 (Cth). The Anti-Shouting laws were proposed in the last years of the war but were never 
enacted. 
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Hughes’ personal and confidential files concerning the establishment of the Luxuries 
Board.19 Furthermore, most of my research derives from previously unexplored 
archival material and newspaper articles accessed through the online Trove database. 
This material yielded new connections between government policy and the 
sumptuary imperative. 
As a result, the thesis adds to the present conventional account of Australian 
tax history. It demonstrates that the protectionist objectives of early tariff policies 
were often accompanied by sumptuary imperatives. It reveals that during the early 
decades following Federation that the logic and practices behind the taxation of dress 
were remarkably similar to sumptuary regulation: taxation not only underpinned 
protectionism and generated revenue but it also regulated social behaviour. This 
study shows that taxation acted as a powerful, intrusive and often inequitable tool to 
effectively modify or discourage taxpayers’ behaviour to reflect both government 
policy objectives, as well as to act as a device to preserve a hierarchy of social place 
or status that is usually marked by wealth, power and class.  
This thesis also goes some way to unpick the past rhetoric of masculinist 
tariff policy and repopulates the previously narrow narrative of taxation history by 
[re]placing women, albeit sometimes as victims, within its discourse.20 Whilst 
feminist scholars such as Judith Grbich, Clare Young and Miranda Stewart21 have 
done much to restore women’s presence in fiscal discourse, this thesis unearths a lost 
account of the sumptuary effects of regulatory measures on women’s lives in the 
early twentieth century. On the other side of the ledger, this thesis provides a fresh 
body of knowledge about the role that Australian institutions, such as the Arbitration 
Court and The Tariff Board, and individuals played in the regulation of women’s 
dress  in the early post-Federation period. At the same time, it shows that upper-class 
                                                 
19 See below Chapter 6. 
20 See below Chapters 5 and 9. 
21 Judith E Grbich, “Taxation Narratives of Economic Gain: Reading Bodies Transgressively” (1997) 
V Feminist Legal Studies 131; Claire F L Young, “What’s Sex got to do with it? Tax and the ‘Family’ 
in Canada” (2006) 2 Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 16;  Miranda Stewart, 
”Are You Two Interdependent?’ Family, Property and Same-Sex Couples in Australia’s 
Superannuation Regime” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 437. 
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women were actively engaged as moral regulators of working class women through 
dress, and this thesis links the private and public connections between the Brookes’ 
through the institutional and personal interventions into law. 
 
1.4 Methodology and Scope of the study 
 
1.4.1 Introduction 
 
The thesis is framed against Genovese’s concept of jurisography.22 Genovese 
argues that “we need more than the traditional records of law to tell an adequate 
history of jurisprudence”. 23 She suggests that the duties that attach to the office of 
jurisographer “involve examining how jurisprudence was written, thought and 
practiced in time and place, and paying attention to how those traditions have been 
inherited.”24 As such, this thesis is a genealogical study that draws upon taxation 
history, social history, cultural history, legal history, biography, as well as the 
assumed form through which law takes place, the economic and political, in order to 
uncover and reveal the forms through which law is created. The thesis builds upon 
Hunt’s contention that legal regulation and government are situated within a larger 
framework of moral, economic, social and political mechanisms.  
Thus, whilst law “traditionally insisted on [its] own formal integrity”,25 a 
characteristic of most taxation law scholarship,26 it must be recognised that to fully 
understand the purpose and effect of the interventionist sumptuary impulse in 
Australia after Federation, one must accept that law is a product of culture. Law is 
inseparable from the interests, goals, machinations and motivations that meld and 
                                                 
22 Ann Genovese, “Critical decision, 1982: remembering Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen” (2014) 23  
Griffith Law Review 1. 
23 Ibid  4.  
24 Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh, “Nineteen eight three: A jurisographic report on 
Commonwealth  v Tasmania” (2015) 24 Griffith Law Review 1, 2. 
25 Naomi Mezey, “Law as Culture” (2001) 13 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 38.  
26 See below Chapter 4. 
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influence social life.27 To understand the law relating to the interventionist 
sumptuary measures, one must appreciate that law and government policy, although 
open to conventional legal analysis, may be more usefully interpreted and critiqued 
in the context of the social and cultural world in which they arise, exist and resist. 
 
1.4.2 Sources 
 
The key objective of my study is to examine and assess the sumptuary effects 
of government interventions in Australia in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Data for this study was collected from both primary and secondary sources. 
However, whilst this study draws upon the earlier work of Alan Hunt, Frances 
Baldwin, Shann and Margaret Maynard,28 it relies primarily on data, including 
published and unpublished letters, diaries and reports, collected from archival 
depositories such as the National Archives and the National Library, Canberra. 
Archived records used in this study provide some degree of contemporaneity and 
authenticity. Further data was extracted from Parliamentary debates and media 
reports that were sourced from online Hansard and Trove databases. A search of the 
case law proved unfruitful though there is at least one case that makes an express 
reference to sumptuary law.29 The few cases that touch peripherally on the taxation 
of clothing do not reference policy or provide commentary on this relationship.30 
This thesis draws upon a broad range of historical material. Much of it can be 
categorised as the [un]picked threads of discourse (evidence) hidden within oft 
forgotten archival boxes and overlooked texts, images, official records, repealed 
                                                 
27 Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns,  The Cultural Lives of Law  (Stanford University Press, 1998) as 
quoted in Mezey, above n 25, 38.  
28 Alan Hunt, above n 1; Frances Baldwin, Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation in 
England (Johns Hopkins Press, 1926); Edward Shann, An Economic History of Australia (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed, 1948); Margaret Maynard, Fashioned from Penury: Dress as Cultural 
Practice in Colonial Australia (Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
29 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433.Griffith CJ noted that sumptuary laws have been common war 
measures noting that ‘The legislative act now in question is in substance a sumptuary law’. 
30 W & A McArthur Ltd v Queensland (1920) 28 CLR 530; Ince Bros v Federated Clothing & Allied 
Trades Union (1924) 34 CLR 457. 
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legislation and newspaper reports. These threads constitute “[t]he surviving residues 
of past thoughts and things [that] represent a tiny fraction of previous generations’ 
contemporary fabric.”31 These threads are then interpreted and rewoven into a 
narrative tapestry that depicts and explains some of the manifestations of sumptuary 
regulation that occurred in Australia between 1901 and 1927. Some of the threads of 
this narrative are taken from official publications such as statistical records and 
parliamentary speeches relating to the imposition of tariffs on clothing.  Other 
contemporaneous material exists within academic journals such as The Economic 
Record and within the social commentary found in popular newspapers and 
magazines. In drawing upon these materials, Tosh’s caution has been heeded with 
respect to certain of the materials as they were not only composed with a view to 
their impact on contemporary opinion but they often only contain what governments 
were prepared to reveal.32  
Throughout the thesis, I have given voice to the many people who feature 
significantly within my account of sumptuary regulation. In many instances, their 
opinions and actions were so important that they were recorded in Hansard and in 
newspaper reports. However, time has often forgotten them and their contributions, 
and the reports contained in these publications documents remain the only vestiges of 
their public and private lives. I have extensively used newspaper reports because they 
are documents rich in information and because often there is no other extant research 
material available. These primary sources have proved to be inherently fruitful for 
my research.  
There are of course limitations with relying upon historical records, most of 
which are more than one hundred years old. Neuman suggests33 that a major issue 
with archived materials is “that only a fraction of everything written or used in the 
                                                 
31 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 191-192. 
32 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern 
History (Longman, 5th ed, 2010) 65. 
33 W Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Pearson 
Education, 6th ed, 2006) 435. 
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past has survived into the present”34 and often, more importantly, is that “what has 
survived is a non-random sample of what once existed.”35 No narrative can fully 
recover the totality of any, or all, past events. However, whilst evidence used in this 
study might be incomplete, elusive or somewhat non-representative of all sides of the 
story, this form of historiography seeks to give some explanation and understanding 
of the past and context in which early Federal governments used sumptuary 
regulation to intervene in the lives of the Australian people. 
Though certain material is easily available in digital form, in particular 
Hansard and newspapers that are available through Trove, other material can only be 
located in the original handwritten or typed form. There are limitations to this type of 
research, including the practical limitation of time that restricted the amount of data 
discovered and analysed. The search and location of primary documents was a time-
consuming task because relevant documents were sometimes stored under unrelated 
subject names and often stored in an arbitrary or ad-hoc manner. A further problem 
was found with the filing of duplicated documents in ancillary files of the Tariff 
Board for the Apparel Hearings in 1925. In addition, many of the papers archived by 
the National Archives, the National Library and other institutions may have been 
culled, and some documents were faded36 and fragile.  
Other material drawn upon was the recollections, statements and files of 
some of the stakeholders in the tariff regime.  These writings took the shape of 
memoirs, autobiographies and archived personal papers of Herbert and Ivy 
Brookes.37 Tosh suggests that it is in such materials that “men and women record 
their decisions, discussions and sometimes their innermost thoughts, unmindful of 
the eyes of future historians.”38 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Many of these documents were very faint. It was not possible to copy them and t often hey were 
almost impossible to read. 
37 Rohan Rivett, Australian Citizen: Herbert Brookes 1867-1963 (Melbourne University Press, 1965) 
96-99. 
38 Tosh, above n 32. 
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These documents (and biographies) could be said to have limited value, as 
memory is imperfect and recollections are sometimes distorted, selective or self-
serving. For instance, Rohan Rivett’s biography of his brother-in-law Herbert 
Brookes painted the latter in a very sympathetic light.39 Rivett’s account focused 
more on Brookes’ largesse, his public service and his synergetic relationship with his 
wife rather than his astute ability to influence leaders such as Hughes and Deakin to 
embrace policies that furthered Brookes’ own political and business interests.  
Despite these limitations, these sources have immeasurable worth because of 
their contemporaneity and because it was possible to extract key elements from them 
of personal and public past experience that contributes to an informed, albeit partial, 
explanation of the economic, political and social reality that existed at the time.  
 
1.4.3 Beyond the scope of the thesis 
 
Originally the scope of my thesis was much broader than it is at present. 
Early into my research it became obvious that it was necessary for me to limit the 
scope of my research into the incidence of sumptuary regulation to the period 
ranging from Federation in 1901 until 1927, as noted above, though the sumptuary 
impulse has ‘erupted’ in Australia at other times.40  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this study cuts across many disciplines. 
It necessarily draws on scholarship based in Australian history, politics, economics 
and social/cultural studies as source materials. Though there is a large body of 
scholarship on dress, costume and fashion, the thesis again draws on this scholarship 
rather than seeking to undertake a study of the field in areas such as psychology,41  
fashion theory,42 class,43 law44 or costume studies.45 Similarly, whilst much of the 
                                                 
39 Rivett, above n 37. 
40 During World War II, the sumptuary impulse manifested itself in legislation concerning the 
regulation of amusements, clothing and other consumption practices. See below Chapter 7. 
41 J C Flugel, The Psychology of Clothes (Hogarth Press, 1966). 
42 Roland Barthes, The Language of Fashion (Bloombury, 2004). 
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study examines the sumptuary effect of the imposition of tariff taxation on imported 
clothing, this study will not explore the broad issue of taxation of ‘textiles’ in a 
doctrinal sense as it relates to clothing, fashion, accessories and ornamentation. 
 
1.5 Literature Review  
 
For the purpose of this literature review I will discuss the existing literature under 
separate ‘threads’. 
 
Sumptuary Law 
 
The current literature on sumptuary law,46 is shaped largely by Alan Hunt’s 
influential The Governance of Consumption: sumptuary laws and shifting forms of 
                                                                                                                                          
43 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Harvard University Press, 
1984). 
44 Gary Watt, Dress, Law and Naked Truth: a cultural study of Fashion and Form (Bloomsbury, 
2015). 
45 Margaret Maynard, Fashioned from Penury: Dress as Cultural Practice in Colonial Australia 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
46 Hunt, above n 1; Frances Baldwin, Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation in England 
(Johns Hopkins Press, 1926); Lucille M Ponte, “Echoes of the Sumptuary Impulse: Considering the 
Treads of Social Identity, Economic Protectionism, and Public Morality in the Proposed Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act” (2009) 12 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 48; Peter 
Goodrich, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Community, Identity, and A History of Sumptuary Law” (1998) 
23 Law and Social Inquiry 725; Wilfred Hooper, “The Tudor Sumptuary Laws” (1915) 30 English 
Historical Review 433; Reed Benhamou, “The Restraint of Excessive Apparel: England 1337-1604 
(1989) 15 Dress 27; Maria Giuseppina Muzzarelli, “Reconciling the Privilege of a Few with the 
Common Good: Sumptuary Laws in Medieval and Early Modern Europe” (2009) 39 Journal of 
Medieval and Early Modern Studies 597; Catherine Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Law in Italy 1200-
1500 (Clarendon Press, 2002); James Brundage, “Sumptuary laws and prostitution in late medieval 
Italy” (1987) 13 Journal of Medieval History 343; Donald Shively, “Sumptuary Regulation in Early 
Tokugawa Japan” (1964-65) 25 Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 123; Stella Mary Newton, The 
Dress of the Venetians 1495-1525 (Scolar Press, 1988); Paul Raffield, “Reformation, Regulation and 
the Image: Sumptuary Legislation and the Subject of Law” (2002) 13 Law and Critique 127; Noel 
Cox, “Tudor sumptuary laws and academical dress: An Act against wearing costly Apparel 1509 and 
an Act for Reformation of Excess in Apparel 1533” (2206) 6 Transactions of the Burgon Society 15; 
Herman Freudenberger, “Fashion, Sumptuary Laws, and Business” (1963) 37 Business History 
Review 37; N B Harte, “State Control of Dress and Social Change in Pre-Industrial England”, in D C 
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regulation. This foundational scholarly work, along with Frances Baldwin’s 1920s 
study of English sumptuary law,47 marks out the field. The key concepts that emerge 
from this literature reveal that sumptuary law is both a political, social and economic 
intervention, and one that is worthy of consideration as a form of law. The contrary 
view is that sumptuary law was a form of governance that was both anomalous and 
bizarre,48 and has no significance in more modern times.49 This view suggests that 
the “dusty historical relics of pre-industrial societies”50 are to be seen as 
characteristic of the way early unenlightened governments controlled the private 
lives of their citizens.  
Indeed, during the latter phases of the timeframe of this study in 1926, the 
American scholar Frances Baldwin argued that sumptuary regulations as 
“ordinances”51 were paternal, and “from a modern point of view…burdensome and 
unnecessary.”52 In 1996, Hunt suggested that such an imposition of such restrictions 
on personal behaviour and expenditure “would strike…twentieth century citizens as 
objectionable in principle and faintly ridiculous.”53  
Baldwin and Hunt justify their position in part by pointing to the demise of 
sumptuary laws. Each explore reasons why sumptuary laws in their early forms seem 
to be ineffective and prone to failure.54 Hunt suggests that one of the main reasons 
that these sumptuary laws regulating dress failed was that there was a lack of 
consistent enforcement.55 The records show very few prosecutions for breaching 
these laws.56 Hunt attributes much of the problem with ineffective enforcement of 
these laws with the lack of public support and suggests that they often they provoked 
                                                                                                                                          
Coleman and A H John (eds), Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976). 
47 Baldwin, above n  46. 
48 Hunt, above n 1.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ponte, above n 46, 48. 
51 Baldwin, above n 46, 9. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Hunt, above n 1. 
54 Ibid 325-356; Baldwin, above n 46. 
55 Hunt, above n 1, 93. 
56 Ibid 325-356; Baldwin, above n 46. 
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a converse effect;57 the more some consumables were prohibited for certain classes, 
the more they became attractive to them. 
 
The limitations of this sumptuary account 
 
However, it seems as if the demise of sumptuary concepts is overstated, as 
Hunt himself acknowledges that sumptuary regulation continued to coexist with 
readily distinguishable economic protectionism58 and that “the sumptuary ethic 
remained intact long after the waning of sumptuary legislation.”59 Whilst he 
considers that the connection between protectionist and sumptuary law continued to 
play an important part in the later history of sumptuary regulation he treats 
protectionism and sumptuary law as remaining located “within distinct discursive 
traditions”.60 He argues that whilst sumptuary law focuses on consumption, 
protectionism is instead concerned with the control of consumption as a means “to 
some politico-economic objective such as protecting domestic industry or starving 
some enemy of import revenue.”61 Hunt made no attempt to examine the sumptuary 
effect of protectionism, nor did he explore taxation of dress as a sumptuary project. 
He insisted that a study of protectionism was ‘”outside”62 the concerns of his 
research. However, these observations suggests that there is scope to consider the 
relationship between sumptuary law and protectionism, and this thesis moves to 
consider if there is a link. 
This thesis reveals that the close link between protectionism and other forms 
of state intervention mean that it is difficult to delineate between these forms of 
                                                 
57 Hunt, above n 1, 325-356. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 359. 
60 Ibid 302. 
61 Ibid 302. Similarly, Baldwin examined the incidence of price-fixing in the early modern period and 
suggested that price fixing regulations were neither sumptuary laws nor attempts at personal 
regulation. See Baldwin, above n 46, 174. Whilst I acknowledge that price-fixing of food was 
historically and economically significant during the period of sumptuary regulation, I will not address 
this topic any further in this research. 
62 Hunt, above n 1, 367. 
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regulatory activity and sumptuary regulation. It is notable that preoccupations with 
morality, luxury, extravagance and, in some instances, social hierarchy were central 
discursive features of these interventionist policies in Australia in the period studied. 
While protectionism may not overtly seek to regulate what individuals could wear or 
how they chose to appear to others, the thesis suggests that protectionist measures 
concerning the importation of imported clothing often had this same sumptuary 
effect. Similarly, whilst the decisions of arbitration courts in early female living wage 
cases were made ostensibly to set a ‘living wage’ for female workers in various 
industries, these decisions also had a sumptuary effect. The process of setting a 
female living wage was concomitant with judicial officers setting prescriptive 
sumptuary standards for women’s dress. 
Consequently, it is mostly in the effects of government policies and 
legislation where those similarities or parallels with the assumptions and tenets of the 
traditional sumptuary law paradigm can be observed. This is not to say that the 
Australian government was not also actively engaged in overt sumptuary projects 
during this period. For instance, the establishment of the Luxuries Board and laws 
proposing to curtail the practice of standing treat for servicemen were both 
unequivocal interventionist sumptuary measures that sought to curtail private 
wartime spending and to modify consumption practices, particularly those of women 
and the lower classes.63  
As will be seen in chapters 4, 6 and 7, Australian policy makers, legislators 
and the judiciary were often not only concerned with economic, industrial or other 
public projects, but also displayed a desire to, both consciously and less consciously, 
protect public morals in the sense of seeking to determine forms of conduct.  
Moralising threads were often seamlessly interwoven into legislative and other 
interventionist projects.  For instance, in Chapter 7 we see that the Australian 
Government ostensibly sought to use the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) to raise 
tax to support the war effort. However, the Act also had the effect of discouraging the 
                                                 
63 See below Chapter 6. 
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lower classes from ‘wasting’ their resources on frivolous and ‘unworthy’ 
entertainment, particularly during the sombre war years. Indeed, this form in which 
sumptuary regulation appears and reappears bears out Peter Goodrich’s observation, 
suggesting that: 
It is that law of manners, the moral and the symbolic capital of the good citizen, the 
daily constraint of violence and desire, that the history of sumptuary law foretells and 
in some measure subtends. 64 
 
This research reveals that tariffs on imported clothing in an Australian 
context proved to be much more effective than the sumptuary laws of the early 
modern period in controlling the type of clothing that people wore. There was less 
opportunity for those targeted by prohibitive tariffs to resist the machinations of the 
administrative and legal machinery that implemented the imposition of tariffs on 
third party clothing importers. Furthermore, the lower classes, unlike the wealthy 
classes, had little or no opportunity to access cheaply-made apparel from overseas 
sources via alternative means. 
 
Taxation 
 
As an object for research, taxation can be seen to represent an interdisciplinary problem. 65 
 
The study of taxation law and its history appears to have remained mostly 
one-dimensional. Prebble asserts that tax law is ectopic or anomalous in that “the 
usual relationship between law and the activity it regulates is absent in the area of 
taxation.”66  Vosslamber suggests that taxation studies can be ectopic in another 
sense because “they often fail to locate taxation within the human, social context 
                                                 
64 Goodrich, above n 46, 725. 
65 Margaret Lamb (ed), Taxation: Interdisciplinary taxation research (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
3. 
66 John Prebble, “Income taxation: A structure built on sand” (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 301. 
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within which it is legislated, assessed and paid.”67 He further contends that taxation, 
sometimes described as “a prime mover of history”68 is ignored in the discussions of 
history. In other words, the study of taxation is often dislocated from the world in 
which it exists. 
According to Vosslamber, “history and taxation rarely mix.”69 History books 
rarely only mention taxation except in passing or in terms of some archaic tax that 
might amuse the reader. Taxation texts, on the other hand, concentrate mainly on the 
analysis and application of fiscal legislation without reference to the social and 
political context that prompted or fostered such legislation. Occasionally, a few 
pages at the beginning of a taxation text are sacrificed to provide a thumbnail, 
cursory and somewhat inadequate sketch of the history of taxation. More often than 
not, the sketch is a bare “list or narration of facts, generally with little interpretation 
or analysis.”70 For instance, in Australian Taxation Law71 the authors only devote 
two pages to the complete history of taxation in Australia (1788-2015). 
As suggested by Lamb, mono-disciplinary approaches to the study of taxation 
are likely to appear linear and lacking perspective or context.72 It is the contention of 
tax academics such as Harris and Prebble, that to properly understand the aims and 
effects of taxation, the researcher must focus not only on the context within which 
taxation arises but also on those who enact such laws, as well as those affected by 
them. Vosslamber argues that: “the focus moves from the ‘what’ of tax to such 
questions as why a particular tax arose or changed when it did, and who was affected 
by it and what they thought.”73 
                                                 
67 Robert Vosslamber, ‘Putting taxation in its place: personal income taxation and history (A work in 
progress)’ (Paper presented at Australasian Tax Teachers’ Association Conference, University of 
Tasmania, 23-25 January 2008) 7. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid 5. 
70 Ibid 8.  
71 Robin Woellner, Stephen Barkoczy, Shirley Murphy, Chris Evans and Dale Pinto, Australian 
Taxation Law (CCH Australia Ltd, 25th ed, 2015) 8-10. 
72 Lamb above n 65. 
73 Vosslamber, above n 67, 9. 
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Little has been written specifically on taxation history in Australia. Harris 
confirmed the dearth of material that specifically deals with Australian taxation 
history.74 He suggested that he found the ‘best book’ to be Stephen Mills’ Taxation 
in Australia that was published in 1925.75 This iconic text is surprisingly ‘modern’ in 
its language and perspectives. It provides a contemporaneous account of the taxing 
policies of the post Federation period and devotes a chapter about those who 
shoulder ‘the burden of taxation’. The lack of scholarship in this field means that this 
study will open up new perspectives in taxation law and it provides an expanded 
account of taxation law literature in this period. 
 
Dress 
 
Strip us totally nude and you would see us as equal; reclothe us in your dress and you in 
ours, and we would, without a doubt, seem noble and you base; because only poverty or 
riches makes us unequal.76 
 
Whilst there have been many recent studies concerning the history and 
cultural function of dress by dress historians such as Margaret Maynard and Lou 
Taylor, there have been no comprehensive studies that specifically address the 
effects of the taxation on dress. Lou Taylor has observed that up until recent years, 
dress and fashion were not considered “in the once largely male academic world of 
‘real history’ to be subjects worthy of study.77 Taylor contends that “dress/textile 
history…was seen to be inward looking, amateur, non-professional and basically a 
non-academic field.”78 Because clothes were customarily considered “to be a 
                                                 
74 Peter Harris, ‘Metamorphosis of the Australian Income Tax 1866-1922’ (Research Study No 37, 
Australian Tax Research Foundation 2002) 7. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Niccolo Machiavelli, Le istorie fiorentine – The Ciompi, quoted in Carole Collier Frick’s Dressing 
Renaissance Florence: Families, Fortunes, and Fine Clothes (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) 
1. 
77 Lou Taylor, The Study of Dress History (Manchester University Press, 2002) 64. 
78 Ibid 2. 
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frivolous and ephemeral characteristic of society”,79 it was thought that to study them 
would “therefore be to trivialise history itself”80 and that the subject was therefore 
not one for serious academic research. Taylor, however, suggests that this blinkered 
attitude to the history of dress is now changing.81  
Negley Harte points to the lack of research concerning the economic 
motivation behind legislation controlling fashions and dress. Most often, dress is 
only referred to as an aside in historical and economic texts. Harte demands that 
social historians look at clothing, because in his opinion, “[t]he production, 
distribution and consumption of textiles cannot…be ignored by any serious 
economic and social historian…”82 Harte argues that clothing should be studied in a 
more scholarly manner because it is related to “wide matters of concern to the 
historian of social change and movements in the standard of living and patterns of 
expenditure and consumption.”83 Harte’s insights about the state control of dress 
provide a broad sketch of the economic and social issues of dress legislation; 
including its aims, origins, enforcement and effects.  
Maynard, in Fashioned from Penury: Dress as Cultural Practice in Colonial 
Australia, provides a solid historical and cultural basis of dress scholarship  in 
Australia. Whilst she does not deal with taxation of dress in any depth, she does 
however highlight, in an Australian context, the relationship in colonial times 
between taxation of dress and sumptuary law.  She examines the variety of clothing 
worn by colonists, and also investigates the meanings encoded in dress in respect of 
social status of the inhabitants of colonial Australia as well as examining how 
clothing was central to ways in which class and status were negotiated. She suggests 
that “[d]ifferences existed which can be partly attributed to the somewhat limited 
kinds of clothing available”84 and that “[p]rotectionist duties and freight costs 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 N B Harte, ‘Reviews’ (1976) 7 Textile History 198. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Maynard, above n, 45, 161. 
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discouraged the purchase of high quality imported goods and acted…like a kind of 
sumptuary tax.”85 
Maynard also details the various ways in which the lower and/or poorer 
classes strove to emulate the higher classes and change their position in “the 
hierarchy of acceptability.”86 To avoid onerous customs duties, fashionable and 
expensive clothing was copied by local manufacturers and home dressmakers and 
there was a significant trade in second hand clothing.87 I have drawn on Maynard’s 
work on colonial dress to investigate the sumptuary effects of taxation of dress in the 
early decades following Federation. 
 
Feminist historiography 
 
Whilst feminist historians, including Marilyn Lake,88 Patricia Grimshaw89 
and Susan Magery,90 have made significant contributions in the last few decades to 
the historiography on gender relations and the link between gender and nation-
building, there is little scholarship about the regulation of dress in the early decades 
following Federation.  
However, Gail Reekie has undertaken a comprehensive account of sexualised 
consumerism in the early years following the First World War when women were 
experiencing a “new and increasingly visible freedom”91 in their personal, social and 
political lives. As part of this account she examines the prescriptive approach of the 
NSW Board of Trade (1918-1923) towards female dress.92 Her comprehensive study 
suggests that during the early years after World War I men sought to objectify 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid 162. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Marilyn Lake, ‘Mission Impossible: how men gave birth to the Australian nation’ (1992) 4 Gender 
& History 305. 
89 Philippa Levine, ‘Review of Patricia Grimshaw et al, Creating a Nation’ (1996) 21 Social History 
372. 
90 Susan Magarey, Passions of the First Wave Feminists (University of New South Wales Press, 
2001). 
91 Reekie, above n 17. 
92 Ibid. 
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women as sexually attractive objects of desire.93 She contends that this 
characterisation helped to diffuse male anxieties about what appeared to be women’s 
growing sexual and economic independence.94 Whilst Reekie does not consider the 
sumptuary effect of the Board of Trade’s approach to female dress, this work reveals 
a similar set of assumptions and practices to those found in the decisions of 
arbitration court judges in female living wage cases when they arbitrarily assessed 
what constituted appropriate attire for working women.95 
Mark Hearn’s examination96 of the narratives of gender and nation in the 
Arbitration Court decisions seeks to interrogate Higgins J’s views on women’s dress 
and his masculinist treatment of female witnesses in Fruitpickers and Archer.97 
 
1.6 Outlining the structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 charts the direction of this 
thesis and frames its scope in order to demonstrate how legislation, executive 
directives, judicial opinion and moralising discourse were used in post-Federation 
Australia as sumptuary tools to modify the behaviour of some sections of the 
Australian population. Chapter 2 provides a brief account of the key facets of English 
sumptuary laws of the early modern period. An understanding of the patterns and 
objectives of these earlier laws is important, as later chapters will examine how these 
foundational features of sumptuary law re-emerged in Australia in the post-
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid 42-57.  
95 See below Chapter 5. 
96 Mark Hearn, “Securing the Man: Narratives of gender and nation in the verdicts of Henry Bournes 
Higgins” (2008) 37 Australian Historical Studies 3; “Making Liberal Citizens: Justice Higgins and his 
Witnesses”, (2007) 93 Labour History 57; “Sifting the Evidence: Labour history and the transcripts of 
industrial arbitration proceedings” (2007) 93 Labour History 3. 
97 The Rural Workers’ Union and South Australian United Labourers’ Union v The Employers, 
Parties to the Temporary Agreement referred to in the Order of the President, dated the 1st December, 
1911 (1912) 6 CAR 70 (‘Fruitpickers’) and The Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of 
Australia v Archer (1919) 13 CAR 647 (‘Archer’). 
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Federation period. Chapter 3 reveals that some individuals, associations and 
institutions, sought to control the behaviour of certain sections of society by using 
sumptuary practices to exert confluent pressure on them and it provides an 
introduction to their significant role in later chapters. 
Chapter 4 offers an account of the taxing policies in Australia from the first 
white settlement in 1788 up until the beginning of World War I. The chapter details 
the strong symbiotic relationship that developed between taxation and protectionism. 
It demonstrates that the Federal government’s policy of imposing protectionist tariffs 
on imported clothing was decidedly ‘a project’ of sumptuary regulation.  
Chapter 5 explores the contestation over female dress in female wage cases in 
the first two decades following Federation. It illustrates the linkages between the 
foundational tenets of early sumptuary law and the prescriptive and normative 
practices of these early arbitration courts. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the establishment of the Luxuries Board and its role, 
albeit brief, in serving the government’s moralised wartime measures of thrift and 
sober sacrifice.  It argues that the Board was an interventionist project that was 
implemented to quell traditional sumptuary anxieties concerning waste, extravagance 
and mimesis. 
Although most of the thesis focuses on the sumptuary regulation of women’s 
dress, Chapter 7 explores two other manifestations of sumptuary regulation that 
occurred in the context of wartime conditions in Australia: proposals for Anti-
Shouting legislation and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth). This digression into 
other aspects of Australian life aims to highlight the persuasiveness of those 
sumptuary threads that acted at the time as a hierarchical net to safeguard and 
regulate all aspects of social life. 
During this time, authorities and the press were particularly anxious about the 
enormous increase of women’s fashion apparel that was being imported into 
Australia. Chapter 8 reveals a contrast between the regulation of imported women’s 
and men’s clothing in the years following Federation. The chapter demonstrates that 
imported female fashion apparel, often characterised by authorities and the press as 
luxury goods, persistently sparked moral condemnation and motivated the regulatory 
reflex. On the other hand, the sumptuary regulation of imported men’s clothing by 
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the imposition of prohibitive protectionist measures was prompted not by moral 
anxieties but rather by pure ‘unashamedly’ protectionist motives. 
 Chapter 9 examines two individual clothing industries that were faithfully 
protected by governments committed to protecting nascent industries at the expense 
of consumers. The chapter illustrates the noticeable discursive shift towards rational 
economic motives that underpinned the regulatory reflex within the discourses 
concerning these industries. What is seen here is an increased focus on economic 
regulation rather than on moral regulation and a critique of luxury. The chapter 
reveals that prohibitive tariffs on imported hosiery and corsetry during the war period 
and the early 1920s evolved into a form of sumptuary intervention that was mainly 
stimulated by a concern with the creation of internal markets rather than with a 
concern with moral standards. Chapter 10 draws together the conclusions of this 
thesis and reflects on current manifestations of the sumptuary impulse.  
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2 SUMPTUARY PATTERN MAKING: USING THE ENGLISH DESIGN 
 
We must always recollect that humanity has a habit of throwing back to its old practices. 
Since a couple of hundred years ago we have been tolerably free from sumptuary laws. But 
there is, in many quarters, a great disposition to take to these laws again, and we may, 
before many years have passed be overwhelmed with them…”1 Edmund Barton 
 
2.1 Purpose and structure of this chapter 
 
In order to understand the pattern of 20th century regulatory interventions 
recalling the sumptuary impulse of the early modern period that is to be considered 
in this thesis, this chapter will set out an account of the key facets of English 
sumptuary laws that returned to prominence in post-Federation Australia.  It will 
mark the contours and patterns of that impulse as it emerged in a decidedly modern, 
regulatory guise. This new sumptuary impulse was found in legislation and executive 
directives and it was advanced through the interaction between a set of key 
individuals who shaped both public discourse and formal legal interventions. To 
understand how interventions, ranging from the regulation of apparel to the 
prohibition of imported luxury items, bore the mark of the sumptuary impulse, it is 
necessary to understand what those impulses were, and their original shape and 
texture.  
That these patterns resurfaced in Australia in the post-Federation period 
seems remarkable, but sumptuary impulses were, in this period, alive and well 
throughout the English-speaking world. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries there was a world-wide revival of interest in the old sumptuary laws, 
particularly during the First World War years, when governments began to ‘cast 
back’ to sumptuary law as a potential means to compulsorily curtail luxury and 
                                                 
1 Letters to the Editor, “The Reform of Society”, Brisbane Courier, 8 July 1914, 20. See also Official 
Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 1104. 
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extravagance.2 English sumptuary laws of the early modern period became a popular 
topic of discussion in the community: 
Like old inventories and wills, they have helped to make past history live again by furnishing 
interesting details concerning the social life and the differences obtaining between different 
ranks of society, in the centuries that lie behind us.3 
 
The topic stimulated close examination by scholars in the second and third 
decades of the 20th century. Baldwin, Hooper and Miller all wrote iconic histories 
and commentaries on English sumptuary law.4 Hooper’s paper entitled The Tudor 
Sumptuary Laws was, often without acknowledgement, disseminated internationally 
in the press in a piecemeal manner.5 Press editors, church officials and politicians 
frequently made reference to sumptuary law when discussing the efficacy of modern  
laws such as those designed to increase tariffs on imported clothing, the taxation of 
amusements, rules relating to drinking practices and female living wage cases.6 
These were thoroughly modern regulatory responses that bore the memory and echo 
of a very different world: early modern England. In returning to older sumptuary 
laws, early 20th century Australia was itself repeating earlier repetitions of these 
laws. 
Western sumptuary laws have existed since ancient Greece and Rome.7 The 
Roman State in particular, created a sumptuary template, regulating everything from 
food to clothing and other forms of conspicuous consumption.8 It was pre-occupied 
                                                 
2 “Rations in Germany”, Border Watch, 15 August 1917, 3; “Clothes and the Woman”, The 
Australasian, 24 March 1917, 36. 
3 “Dress Extravagance in the Olden Days”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 3 May 1918, 14. 
4 Frances Baldwin, Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation in England (Johns Hopkins Press, 
1926); Wilfred Hooper, “The Tudor Sumptuary Laws” (1915) 30 English History Review 433; Sylvia 
A Miller, “Old English laws Regulating Dress”, The Journal of Home Economics, 20 (1928) 89. 
5 “The Fops of Past Centuries: Extravagances of Masculine Dress”, Freeman’s Journal, 13 July 1916, 
35. 
6 See below Chapters 5 and 7. 
7 Lucille M Ponte, “Echoes of the Sumptuary Impulse: Considering the Treads of Social Identity, 
Economic Protectionism, and Public Morality in the Proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act” (2009) 
12 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 52. Sumptuary laws had their roots in 
ancient Greek, Roman and Confucian societies and these earliest laws focused mainly on funeral rites.  
8 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passion: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press, 
1996) 19. For instance, early Roman laws often provided minute details concerning the restrictions on 
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with the preservation of ‘external symbols of class hierarchy’,9 and moral and 
familial features of Roman life. 10 Authorities targeted the consumption practices of 
women,11  who were forbidden from wearing jewellery, cosmetics, perfume, or dyed 
clothing.12 These interventions, which sought to restrain extravagance and various 
manifestations of excess, particularly in relation to the consumption of luxury 
goods,13 next manifested themselves in Europe and Asia in the early modern period.   
This chapter considers two periods relating to English sumptuary law. The 
first period from 1336-1604 marks the apotheosis of sumptuary law in England. 
During this period, the discursive features of sumptuary interventions in England 
were established and their remnants manifested in socio-cultural imagery that would 
eventually make its way, centuries later, into social and legal attitudes in Australia. 
Sumptuary regulation waned from 1604, although efforts were made to reintroduce it 
up until 1758. The second period reflects the shift from moralisation and hierarchical 
concerns to rational protectionism that was increasingly noticeable in the Elizabethan 
period.  
The chapter begins by providing a brief account of the major English 
sumptuary period that ranged from 1336 until 1604. It then chronicles the patterns of 
sumptuary regulation during this period: the social impulses, the language and the 
themes that delineated a unique form of interventionist regulation. The chapter then 
considers the demise of sumptuary law. Finally, the chapter explores the worldwide 
revival of interest in sumptuary regulation in the early twentieth century, including 
within Australia in the post-Federation period. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
food consumed at funerals and the mourning attire of female mourners, while later laws regulated 
“conspicuous display by women and the extravagant food consumption”. 
9 Ibid 31. 
10 Ibid 21. 
11 Catherine Kovesi Killerby, Sumptuary Law in Italy 1200-1500 (Oxford Clarenden Press, 2002) 9. 
12 Ibid 9. 
13 Leah Kirtio, “The ‘inordinate excess in apparel”: Sumptuary legislation in Tudor England’ (2011) 3 
Constellations 18. 
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2.2 Sumptuary Patterns and Themes 1336-1604 
 
In reading over the numerous laws of this sort which were passed in England, one is struck 
by the fact that at least three different kinds of motives seem to have led to their enactment: 
(1) the desire to preserve class distinctions; … 2) the desire to check practices which were 
regarded as deleterious in their effects, due to the feeling that luxury and extravagance were 
in themselves wicked and harmful to the morals of the people; (3) economic motives… Sheer 
conservatism and dislike of new fashions or customs might be mentioned as a fourth factor 
which led to the passage of the English sumptuary laws.14  
 
Although ancient regimes had used sumptuary laws to address the problem of 
conspicuous displays of wealth and luxury, sumptuary legislation was uncommon in 
early modern Europe prior to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.15 The earliest 
English sumptuary laws were enacted during the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) in 
an attempt to curb the rapidly increasing luxury and extravagance of the period.16 
Baldwin suggests that these forms of laws were not unusual in the context of the 
period, for the habit of regulation was “deep-rooted in England”17 and the population 
was accustomed to the public regulation of “many matters pertaining to everyday 
life.”18 It was an epoch marked by ‘regulatory lawmaking’19 relating to wages, 
prices, clothing, religious observations and commercial relationships:20 “[i]n general 
the desirability of sumptuary regulation was part of the taken-for-granted conception 
of the proper role of government.”21 
 
 
                                                 
14 Baldwin, above n 4, 10. 
15 James Brundage, “Sumptuary laws and prostitution in late medieval Italy” (1987) 13 Journal of 
Medieval History 343. 
16 Baldwin, above n 4,  21. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 12. Edward III came to the throne in 1327. 
19 See generally Hooper, above n 4. 
20 Ponte, above n 7, 60. 
21 Hunt, above n 8, 358. 
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2.2.1 The Ordering of Appearance and Social Hierarchy 
 
The Acts of Apparel gave tangible expression to an hierarchical ideal…it was assumed that 
there was a ‘great chain of being’, an hierarchical order, in which individuals like 
everything else had a determined place.22 
 
Clothing has been traditionally a distinctive and pervasive social marker that 
could signal discernible information about the social class and economic standing of 
the person wearing it.23 Class and status sits behind the key sumptuary interventions 
that took shape during Edward III’s reign. During the early modern period, there was 
a clear demarcation and hierarchy in status. The lowest class of society included 
carters, ploughmen, ox-herds (sic), cow-herds (sic), shepherds, dairymen, grooms 
and those involved with husbandry, the equivalent of the modern day ‘working 
class’.24 This class was followed in hierarchical rank by esquires, gentlemen, 
merchants, citizens and burgesses below the rank of knight.25  There were different 
categories of knights: those that possessed and income of less than 200 marks, those 
with income over 200 marks but less than 400 marks and knights with incomes from 
400 to 1000 marks per year.26 On the next social level were, at various times, earls, 
dukes, marquis, viscounts, barons and finally at the apex of the social scale was the 
royal family.27 
  Even before the early modern period, English fashions had been heavily 
influenced by new French fashions emanating from the French Court.28 However, 
most of the new French hairstyles, millinery, footwear and dress were available only 
                                                 
22 N B Harte, “State Control of Dress and Social Change in Pre-Industrial England”, in D C Coleman 
and A H John (eds), Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1976) 139. 
23 Beverly Lemire, “Second-hand beaux and ‘red-armed Belles’: conflict and the creation of fashions 
in England, c 1660-1800” (2000) 15 Continuity and Change 391. 
24 Baldwin, above n 4, 48. 
25 Ibid 49. 
26 Hunt, above n 8, 297. 
27 Ibid 297. 
28 Baldwin, above n 4, 21. 
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to the higher ranks.29 The English aristocracy continually looked to purchase the 
costly fashion clothing that was regularly imported from the continent.30 At the same 
time that ‘aristocratic luxury’ was being introduced into England, there was also a 
parallel general growth in material prosperity in England that was typified by the 
growth of manufactures and the progress of goldsmithing and jewellery-making.31 
Baldwin suggests that during the fourteenth century, this growth in prosperity and the 
resultant increase in luxury and extravagance was “largely, if not primarily, due to 
England’s success in foreign wars”.32 
This flood of costly articles into England, according to contemporary 
chroniclers and satirists, moved both women and men to become “haughty and vain 
in their attire”,33 so much so that all levels of society endeavoured “to outstrip each 
other in the brilliance of their appearance.”34 In particular, the lower classes, 
although transgressing fundamental social order and customs of medieval society, 
sought to emulate the nobility both in the manner of living and in their dress.35 It was 
suggested that it was difficult to distinguish “the poor from the rich, the servant from 
the master, or a priest from another man.”36  
Those, whose station and rank was based on bloodline, insisted that such 
affectation was a sign of spiritual corruption and the corrosion in their society’s 
consumption-based system of social distinction.37 It was believed that each man’s 
place was appointed to him as part of natural law and that he must be content to live 
in “that state of life unto which it had please God to call him at his birth.”38 To allow 
the lower classes complete sartorial freedom would cause the elite to forego their 
exclusive symbol of status in society. By tradition, dress enabled them to display 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 22. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Thomas Walsingham, Historia Anglicana 168 quoted in Joseph Strutt, A Complete View of the 
Dress and Habits of the People of England (Henry G Bohn, 1842) vol 2, 134; Baldwin, above n 4, 23. 
34 Baldwin, above n 4, 23. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid 69. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid 23. 
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their wealth and social rank to the world.39 To permit all manner and rank of people 
to dress above their station by assuming the appearance of the superior classes40 
would cause blurring and erosion of those class distinctions that sometimes could 
only be discerned when observing what an individual wore.  
Moreover, the upper classes considered that fashion and ostentation, as actual and 
symbolic demonstrations of wealth and rank, were deigned by God and the State to 
be the exclusive right of the noblesse oblige and the royal class.41 As social custom 
dictated each man’s place in life, such transgressions were considered by those in 
authority as unacceptable and requiring restraint. Unable to solve these pervasive 
violations of moral and social values, upper-status individuals sought to maintain the 
traditional social status quo by demanding the assistance from the monarch, the 
government and the Church.42 There was a move to rein in pernicious luxury and the 
extravagance of dress by the passage of sumptuary legislation:43 
It was heresy for him to attempt to rise above his class either in his manner of living or in his 
dress. It was therefore, inevitable that those in authority should consider it necessary to take 
some steps to curb the extravagance which prevailed in the reign of Edward III.44 
 
The 1336 statute was to be the first sumptuary response from English 
authorities and dealt only with food.45 It cautioned people about the evil of imitation, 
which the act claimed had caused “many mischiefs” affecting the people of the 
Realm. 46 It warned that “lesser people”,47 who attempted to imitate “the great 
ones”48 in matters of costly meats consumption practices, could be expected to be 
greatly impoverished in both body and soul.49  
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Hunt, above n 8, 295-324. 
41 Ibid 23. 
42 Ibid 23-24. 
43 Hunt, above n 8, 108-141. 
44 Baldwin, above n 4, 23-24. 
45 Sumptuary Law 1336, 10 Edw 3, st 3. 
46 Hunt, above n 8, 299. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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The first, shortest and least complicated of the nine major ‘Acts of Apparel’ – 
a sumptuary law dealing with dress and fashion - was enacted in 1337.50 It was a 
comprehensive and detailed sumptuary statute, entitled A Statute Concerning Diet 
and Apparel 1363,51 which targeted extravagance in dress and condemned the evil of 
‘luxury’.52 However, its objectives were plainly protectionist in that it prohibited all 
men and women of all ranks, with some exceptions, from wearing fur and imported 
cloth.53  This act was the first sumptuary act that focused on the regulation of those 
in the ranks of the nobility and it sought to divide them into three broad categories: 
the Royal Family, Dukes and Earls.54 
The 1363 act aimed to correct “the outrageous and excessive apparel of 
divers people against their estate and degree”.55 It sought to preserve eight clear class 
distinctions via the dress of various classes.56 It not only directly attacked ‘excess of 
apparel’ but it strongly chastised those who dressed beyond their status.57 Its 
preamble claimed, through the invocation of a common ‘dearth’ trope, that such 
extravagance had led to “the great destruction and impoverishment of all the land.”58 
It proclaimed  that  those belonging to the lowest class in society, including 
ploughmen, ox-herds (sic), cow-herds (sic), swine-herds (sic), shepherds and 
dairymen and those who possessed goods valued at less than 40s, could not wear 
anything but blanket cloth and russet costing no more than twelve pence per item.59 
The penalty for failure to conform to the ordinance was forfeiture to the King of all 
prohibited apparel. 60 The 1363 act earnestly complained of the extreme danger in 
the use of outrageous and excess apparel, and provided more detail linking class 
                                                 
50 Harte, above n 22, 134. 
51 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Harte, above n 22, 134. 
54 Hunt above n 8, 297. 
55 A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14. 
56 Hunt, above n 8, 300. 
57 Baldwin, above n 4, 47. 
58 A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14. 
59 Ibid; Hunt, above n 8, 424. Hunt explains that ‘blanket’ and ‘russet’ were cloths woven from rough 
red-brown wool. 
60 A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14. 
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distinctions and the control of dress.61 However,  the Act was repealed in 1364.62 It, 
along with many of the later sumptuary acts, had for various political reasons, 
relatively short lives.63 
The purpose of these early sumptuary laws was to ensure that clothing 
continued to be treated as an indicator of social class and occupation, and that social 
hierarchy would continue to be faithfully echoed in hierarchies of appearance. For 
instance, grooms and servants were not to wear “for their vesture or hosing”64 items 
that cost more than two marks or garb themselves in anything made of gold or silver, 
or embroidered, enamelled or made of silk.65 Esquires and gentlemen below the rank 
of knights, not possessing land or rents to the value of a hundred pounds a year, were 
ordered not to wear cloth costing more than four and a half marks.66 However, those 
who possessed lands or rents to the value of two hundred marks per year were 
permitted to wear cloth worth five marks, as well as silk, cloth of silver. Similarly, 
their female relatives were allowed to use limited types of fur and apparel, except for 
headdresses trimmed with precious stones.67 Knights who possessed an income of 
less than 200 marks a year were allowed to wear cloth worth not more than 6 marks, 
but could not wear cloth of gold, apparel furred with miniver,68 ermine nor apparel 
embroidered with precious stones.69 Lords with lands worth 100 marks could wear 
anything they pleased.70  
Luxury and extravagance of dress was prevalent amongst the nobles and rich 
during the reign of Richard II (1377-1399). At the same time, members of all but the 
poorer strata of society had become obsessed with fashion, novelty and ostentation in 
                                                 
61 Ibid cc 8-15. 
62 Control of Dress 1364, 38 Edw 3, c 2. 
63 Reed Benhamau “The Restraint of Excessive Apparel: England 1337-1604” (1989) 15 Dress 27, 28. 
64A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14; Baldwin, above n 4, 47. 
65 A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14; Baldwin, above n 4, 47. 
66 A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Miniver is unspotted white fur of the stoat. This type of fur was used on the robes of lords. 
69 A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel 1363, 37 Edw 3, cc 8-14. 
70 Ibid. 
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dress.71 The hierarchy of appearance was threatened when the lower classes put aside 
their old plain dress and began to adopt fashionable, albeit cheaper, versions72 of the 
same type of apparel, ornamentation and accoutrements that were usually only worn 
by the patrician elite.73  Servants emulated their masters and wore “absurd, long toed 
shoes, called cracows and pokys”74 and favoured enormous sleeves.75 Even serving 
women of “low estate”76 imitated upper class women by wearing fur around their 
collars and hems.77 
A century after Edward III’s first sumptuary act, Edward IV (1442-1483) 
reintroduced a similar elaborate scheme of dress control78 in response to a petition 
from the House of Commons requesting the enforcement and renewal of legislation 
against ‘inordinate array’.79 The preamble of the 1463 act highlighted concerns of 
public morality and the need for economic protectionism80 and complained that 
excessive and extravagant dress was being worn without distinction. It declared that 
this extravagance was both displeasing to God and likely to impoverish the realm.81 
By employing hierarchy of dress, the act aimed to allay the fears of those who 
considered that extravagant dress affronted God and that the waste of financial 
resources on dress was impoverishing England whilst  “enriching other strange 
Realms and Countries”.82 Whilst it’s paramount objective was to force people to 
dress “according to their degrees,”83 its hierarchic dress restrictions and detailed 
provisions remained, in the most part, similar to the 1363 act.84 However, it did 
                                                 
71 Ibid 73. 
72 Ibid 68. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid 68. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 68. 
78 Baldwin, above n 4, 79-82. Earlier appeals to the monarch in 1378, 1402 and 1406 for sumptuary 
intervention were unsuccessful.  
79 Exportation, Importation, Apparel Act 1463, 3 Edw 4, c 5. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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contain provisions that only the wealthy and those of noble birth were entitled to 
enjoy new fashions.85 For instance, knights below the rank of lords were prohibited 
from wearing any gown, jacket or coat that was so short that it did not extend below 
the hips.86 To ensure compliance with the regulation, tailors were forbidden to make 
any gown or jacket shorter than the proscribed length or to stuff any doublet contrary 
to the statute.87  
The act also sought to reinforce the practice of using of colour, particularly 
purple, to reflect the hierarchy of appearance.88 It barred all English subjects, except 
the royal family to wear any cloth of gold or purple silk, “upon pain of having to pay 
a fine of £20 for every offence.”89 Similarly, the act acknowledged a corresponding 
hierarchy in the value of fabric and the complexity of woven textures that contributed 
to the identification of the social status.90 Expensive fabrics and weaves were to be 
reserved for the upper ranks.91 For instance, no one below the rank of a lord could 
wear plain cloth of gold.92 Those below the rank of esquire and gentlemen were 
forbidden to wear velvet in their doublets or any velvet, damask or satin in their 
gowns.93 If anyone offended this provision, a fine of forty shillings was payable to 
the authorities.94 However, Baldwin suggested that this act proved to be ineffective 
as it did little to check extravagance in dress.95 
Dress, as a visible marker of class distinction, would remain under statutory 
control continuously from the 1463 act until 1604.96 During Henry VIII’s reign 
(1509-1547), for instance, four further sumptuary apparel statutes were enacted and 
they all sought, in various ways, to implement a hierarchical dress regime for the 
                                                 
85 Ibid; Baldwin, above n 4, 105. 
86 Exportation, Importation, Apparel Act 1463, 3 Edw 4, c 5; Baldwin, above n 4, 105. 
87 Exportation, Importation, Apparel Act 1463, 3 Edw 4, c 5; Baldwin, above n 4, 105. 
88 Baldwin, above n 4, 115. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid 163-164; Harte, above n 22, 134. 
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whole population.97 The first three statutes of Henry VIII’s reign focused on the 
prohibition of particular ostentatious clothing fashions that customarily marked a 
man of rank and wealth.98 In 1510, an Act against Costly Apparel99 repealed all 
previous sumptuary laws and proceeded to prohibit “any garded or pleated shirt or 
pleated ruff”100 worn by those under the rank of a knight.101 Its preamble moralised 
about the ‘evil consequences’ produced by the “great and costly array and apparel 
used within this Realm”102 which were at the time contrary to earlier sumptuary 
laws.103  
This was a lengthy and complex sumptuary act that aimed at supporting the 
domestic textile industry and was clearly modelled on the acts of apparel of 1463 and 
1483.104 It closely resembled them in the grading of ranks and classes as well as the 
various prohibitions that were attributable to each rank and class.105 Just as with 
earlier acts, the 1510 act prohibited or restricted the colour, quality, quantity, price 
and style of dress materials on a graduated basis according to the rank and class of 
the wearer.106 Hooper suggests that the Act also contained “three novel features”.107 
It not only, ‘in most cases’, prescribed forfeiture of the “obnoxious apparel”108 and 
fines, but it provided for the opportunity for an individual to sue for the recovery of 
the forfeited apparel and fines.109 In addition, the act empowered the King to grant 
licences of exemption.110 It was also remarkable because, unlike the 1483 Act, it 
excluded all women from its operation.111 
                                                 
97 Hunt, above n 8, 309. 
98 Act Agaynst Wearing of Costly Apparrell 1510, 1 Hen 8, c 14; Act of Apparell 1514, 6 Hen 8, c 1; 
Thacte of Apparell 1515, 7 Hen 8, c 6. 
99 1 Henry VIII, c 14 (1510). 
100 Act Agaynst Wearing of Costly Apparrell 1510, 1 Hen 8, c 14. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Hooper, above n 4. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Act of Apparel 1510, 6 Hen 8, c 14. 
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The 1514 apparel act was, with slight modifications, very similar to the 1510 
act.112 It forbade the wearing of sable fur by all persons below the rank of an earl and 
specifically stated that servants were permitted to wear garments trimmed or lined 
with lamb’s fur.113 Anyone below the rank of knight was not permitted to wear any 
chain “or other thing of gold about his neck or bracelets of the same.114 Presumably 
those who drafted the act were optimistic and expected that the hierarchic rules 
would completely and finally resolve the issues of excessive dress; it was not to be a 
temporary regulatory regime but rather was, in the words of the statute to “last for 
ever”.115 
Despite this optimism, the Act was repealed in 1515. It was replaced in that 
same year by another apparel act that again was very similar to the 1510 and 1514 
acts except that the list of classes of persons permitted to wear certain fabrics were 
augmented and fines were lower than those previously imposed for breaches of 
sumptuary laws.116 The act also allowed an exemption to the fellows of the Inns of 
Court to wear satin, damask and camlet.117 The act of 1515 again made provision for 
the recovery of forfeited apparel and fines.118 Despite it having what Hunt describes 
as a “more realistic approach to enforcement”,119 it was more restrictive in that 
“sable furs were reserved exclusively for the royal family, lynx and black genet furs 
for dukes, earls and barons.”120 The King was also permitted to issue licences 
authorizing the wearing of prohibited apparel.121 However, only a gentleman or 
above was permitted to wear imported fur of a variety not produced in England.122 
Another noteworthy feature of this sumptuary legislation was that its bill had been 
                                                 
112 Hooper, above n 4, 434. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Act of Apparel 1510, 6 Hen 8, c 1; Baldwin, above n 4, 149. 
115 Stat R vol 3, 123, quoted in Baldwin, above n 4, 249. 
116 An Act of Apparel 1515, 7 Hen 8, c 6. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Baldwin, above n 4, 150. 
119 Hunt, above n 8, 311. 
120 An Act of Apparel 1515, 7 Hen 8 c 6. 
121 Baldwin, above n 4, 151. 
122 An Act of Apparel 1515, 7 Hen 8 c 6. 
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initiated and drafted by the King and his advisors rather than it emanating from the 
House of Commons. 123 
The final apparel act of Henry VIII’s reign was enacted in 1533 and was 
entitled An Act for Reformacyon of Excesse in Apparayle.124  Its preamble reflected 
the sovereign’s determination to ensure that the “good and politic order”125 by 
demanding that all classes in their dress should ‘keep their place’.126 Furthermore, 
the act decreed a revised hierarchy of appearance and sought to protect those 
“inexpert and light persons”127 who faced “utter impoverishment”128 because of their 
inclination to “pride, the mother of all vices.”129 The act specifically denigrated the 
use of “great and costly array and apparel” that was alleged to have provoked 
“diverse of the King Subjects… to rob and do extortion and other unlawful deed to 
maintain thereby their costly array”.130 
The 1533 act also abolished the restrictions on shirts and stomachers. Its 
sumptuary motives were clearly mixed with protectionist concerns. However, it 
made concessions to permit any Englishman to wear any foreign linen cloth and for 
“any person being of the degree of a gentleman”131 to wear a shirt embroidered in 
thread or silk, so long as the garment was “wrought”132 within the realm.133 There 
were also some concessions provided to the nobility in relation to the wearing of 
“cloth of gold of tissue”134 and the wearing of bonnets made of foreign cloth.135 
Whilst the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and those of similar social distinction 
were permitted to wear velvet, satin and silk, they were, nonetheless, prohibited from 
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wearing purple or black genet fur.136 The clergy were not permitted to wear any kind 
of fur, except black and grey coney, grey biche, fox, lamb, otter or beaver.137 The act 
contained a notable variation to earlier acts. The King’s privilege of licensing the 
wearing of forbidden apparel, which has been provided for in the previous three 
statutes, was divested from him, except with regard to those who served the royal 
family.138 However, Hoover suggests that the act remained a “dead letter” as it was 
neglected and generally condemned.139 
Although only four apparel statues were enacted during Henry VIII’s reign, 
dress was also regulated through the use of executive sumptuary regulations and 
royal proclamations.140 The latter were also utilised to extend the scope of the 
statutes and to remind people of the existence of sumptuary regulation.141 At times, 
they targeted specific sections of society. For instance, in 1536, prescriptive 
regulations were issued prohibiting inhabitants of Galway in Ireland from shaving 
their moustaches and ordering them to grow their hair to cover their ears.142 
Furthermore, Galway people were forbidden from wearing mantles in the streets, 
and, instead, were commanded to wear cloaks, gowns, doublets and hose “made in 
the English fashion”.143 Furthermore, the use of the Irish style of dress was also 
prohibited144 and people were banned from wearing garments dyed with saffron or 
made with more than “five standard ells of cloth”.145 During the first half of the 
sixteenth century sumptuary regulation targeted other areas of social behaviour 
besides dress. For instance, in 1517 there was a proclamation seeking to control 
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excessive fare at feast.146 It decreed that the number of courses served at a feast 
should be regulated according to the rank of the highest person present at the feast.147  
In 1554, a further act of apparel was passed in the reign of Philip and Mary 
(1553-58). Hooper suggests that this act, together with the 1533 act, was to remain 
“the basis of sumptuary policy for the next half-century”.148 The 1554 Act was much 
shorter and less detailed than any of the four passed during Henry VIII’s reign.149 It 
primarily affected the lower poorer classes and was mainly concerned with 
amendments to the existing law.150 Even though it abstained from laying down “an 
exhaustive code for all classes”,151 it also substantially increased the penalties for 
non-observance and forbade all natives of England and its dominions, below the rank 
of knight or those with an annual income of £20 pounds, from wearing silk upon 
their hats, bonnets, nightcaps, girdles, hose, shoes, scabbards or spur leathers.152 
What is notable in this act is that Mary, like her predecessor Edward IV (1461-70, 
1471-83), attempted to regulate the absurd styles of footwear that ‘fashionable’ men 
wore:153 she sought, by proclamation, to limit the “prodigious breath of square toed 
shoes”.154 
Although only two short sumptuary acts (both aimed to foster the local cap 
industry) were passed during Elizabeth I’s reign (1558-1603) she issued twenty 
proclamations on matters of apparel over a period of forty years.155 Baldwin suggests 
that the reason why this form of executive power was used to regulate extravagance 
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had much to do with the “absolutism of the Tudor sovereigns who dispensed with 
Parliament whenever it suited their purposes to do so.”156  
 
 
2.2.2 The Moralisation of Luxury and Extravagance 
 
Luxury came to be viewed through the metaphor of moral contagion, involving the idea that 
there is a sequential linkage between vices and sins which accumulatively cause social 
harms or bring down the wrath of God.157 
 
During the early modern period, authorities sought to invoke moral regulation 
by through the moralisation of luxury goods. Hunt argues that luxury had come to be 
“conceived as both the cause and symptom of an evil that was both personal and 
social”.158 Throughout this epoch, ‘luxury’, ‘extravagance’ and the follies of fashion 
continued to be persistent concerns with the King and with Parliament.159 Most 
sumptuary Acts’ preambles and Royal proclamations described luxury as being 
linked to the sin of pride, which at the time was regarded as the “mother of all 
vices”.160 Authorities considered that it was their moral and lawful duty to protect 
their people from ‘wasting’ their own resources and as well as the national wealth161 
through the ‘dissipation of capital’.162 They also sought to ‘guard’ their subjects 
against improper behaviour and the worldly sins of carnal imitation, social 
competition and licentiousness.163  There was a widespread apprehension that 
inappropriate or boastful displays of clothing would lead to spiritual corruption 
because such displays breached the religious ideals of modesty, thrift and virtuous 
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behaviour.164  In an attempt to counter such evils, the Statutum de Cibariis Utendis 
of 1336 was enacted, with its primary intention being to check idle extravagance and 
to promote thrift.165  
Baldwin argued that by the end of Edward III’s reign, England had become 
“an intensely national state”166 and was a realm where new fashions and clothing 
styles were being rapidly being promoted amongst the nobles and other persons of 
high degree.167 Baldwin described the level of luxury in dress as sumptuous:  
The tunics of the aristocracy were made of the most gorgeous materials: cloth of gold or silver, 
velvet, silk, satin, etc., the use of some of which were forbidden in certain instances by the 
sumptuary laws. Gold, embroidery, pearls and other jewels were used in ornamenting them.168 
 
During the Lancastrian period (1399-1485),  little was done to curb the excess 
and extravagance in apparel. This was despite the numerous petitions that were 
presented to Henry IV, Henry V and Henry VI seeking ordinances demanding 
regulation of the extravagant apparel worn by various classes.169 By the reign of 
Henry VI (1422-1461, 1470-1471), absurd, fantastic and extravagant styles were at 
their peak. 170 It was a time that witnessed “lavish display, surpassed in quaintness, 
color (sic) and variety only by the time of Henry VIII”.171 Contemporary satirists and 
moralists attacked those who wore extraordinary fashions including stuffed sleeves, 
mandarin hats, streamers, shoes with enormously long toes and bizarre 
headdresses.172 Even Chaucer used strong religious overtones when he sermonized 
against contemporary dress in the Parson’s Tale: 
As to the first sin, that is in superfluity of clothing, which that makes it so dangerous, to the 
harm of the people; not only the cost of embroidering, the elaborate indenting or barring, 
ornamenting with waved lines, paling, winding or bending and semblables waste of cloth in 
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vanity, but there is also the furring in their gowns, so much punching with chisels to make 
holes, so much dragging of shears.173 
 
Religious leaders were particularly scathing of horned headdresses which 
they condemned as fashionable foibles.174 On occasion, their wearers were even 
described as being ‘satanic’.175 
The ‘better classes’ favoured “fantastic hats”176 of felt and fur as well as cloth 
of gold, coloured hose (or ‘chausses’) and long-toed shoes that buttoned up the front 
or buckled over the insteps.177 These shoes, made from “rich materials,”178 had 
become increasingly ornate. Furthermore, the length of the toes eventually became so 
extenuated and extravagant that church officials considered that it was necessary to 
regulate them by law.179 Despite the enactment of a number of what Hunt refers to as 
“quasi-statutory”180 statutes and proclamations, it was not until 1463 that a detailed 
sumptuary dress code was decreed to check excess in dress.181 It was only when 
Edward IV came to the throne and through the duration of the Wars of the Roses 
(1455-87) that a more strenuous effort was made to curb extravagance and luxury.182 
Throughout Edward IV’s reign three new sumptuary laws relating to apparel were 
enacted.  
This 1463 act was significant because it was one of the ‘rare’ English 
sumptuary laws that prescribed the clothing to be worn by various classes rather than 
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being prohibitive in its decree.183 This act was reinforced in 1477.184A third 
sumptuary statute was passed in 1483 in response to a fresh petition from the 
members of the House of Commons who claimed to be anxious about “the excessive 
apparel of the people of [the] realm.”185  They maintained that poverty and misery 
stemmed from the lack of compliance with previous sumptuary laws.186  Obviously, 
those who drafted the 1483 act were also keen to uphold a certain standard of 
decency in male dress. The act prohibited a man from wearing “any Gown or mantle 
unless it be of such Length, that, he being upright, it shall cover his privy members 
and Buttocks”.187 Baldwin contends that the “diatribes of ecclesiastics and 
contemporary satirists”188 were especially directed against garments “of the dagged 
or slashed variety”189 and those with patterned and scalloped hems.190 
Elizabethan proclamations include protestations about the disorder, confusion 
and subversion of all good order within society, particularly in cases when people 
were judged as dressing outside their rank or class.191 This was an immoderate 
period when dress, both male and female, was “variegated and extravagant”192 and 
changed with much rapidity.193 For example, women wore towers of hair 
underpropped with forks and wires “like grim stern monsters, rather than chaste 
Christian matrons.”194 Perukes, false and dyed hair were popular along with French 
hoods, hats, caps and kerchiefs of velvet, taffeta and wool.195 Some women were 
criticised for being so ‘wanton and lewd’ as to appear in doublets and jerkins.196 
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These proclamations employed moralistic language and condemned new fashions 
and extravagance in dress.197   
Ruffs of all different styles, size and forms were popular with both men and 
women.198 Later in Elizabeth’s reign, ruffs would become even more 
disproportionate in size when it was discovered that starch could be used as a means 
to stiffen their folds, and the use of wire frameworks to afford additional support.199 
Fashionable men and women were prone to wearing all forms of exaggerated 
dress.200 For instance, the farthingale was particularly popular. It was a hoop-like 
arrangement, intended to be worn inside women’s wide skirts and was accompanied 
by a long stiff and pointed stomacher.201 Men, on the other hand, favoured 
exorbitantly expensive hats that had pointed crowns like steeples that often rose more 
than a quarter of a yard above their heads.202 Some men preferred to wear shirts 
made from the finest embroidered material costing as much as £10.203  
Although Elizabeth I was acknowledged as a fashion trendsetter, she was 
nevertheless determined that her sumptuary proclamations were to be strictly 
observed. To this end, she included provisions within them for a widespread system 
of surveillance and enforcement.204 For instance, gate watchmen were to be 
employed to keep a “diligent eye” out for offenders, who would then be hauled 
before magistrates for punishment.205  Successive Elizabethan proclamations focused 
on the curtailment of new sumptuary abuses as well as the appointment of distinct 
officials who were to be responsible for the enforcement of the Queen’s detailed 
sumptuary regulations.206 For example, the 1562 proclamation denounced the “the 
monstrous and outrageous greatness of hosen… [that had] crept a late into the 
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Realm.”207 It foretold of users of extravagant hose who might become so 
impoverished that they would have to resort to “unlawful ways.”208 It was suggested 
that this form of criminality would then lead them to ruinous “destruction”.209 Hunt 
suggests that this attack on male hose exhibited a “classical sumptuary motif”210 in 
that it criticised the quantity of material employed in the construction of item of 
apparel.211 
Queen Elizabeth’s proposal to curtail excessive dress was also well supported 
by a proliferation of censorious material attacking the fashions of the period.212 For 
instance, in 1583 Philip Stubbs’s Anatomie of Abuses decried the “execrable sin of 
pride and excess in apparel”213 and sought to reinforce the customary view that class 
distinctions should be preserved by clear difference in costume.214 Stubbs used the 
dialogue between Philoponus and Spudeus to attack extravagance in dress on moral 
grounds as offensive to God and leading men to sin: 
         Spudeus: How is pride of apparel committed? 
Philoponus: By wearing of apparel more gorgeous, sumptuous and precious than our state, 
calling or condition of life, required, whereby we are puffed up into pride, and forced to think 
of ourselves more than we ought… This sin of excess in apparel remains as an example of evil 
before our eyes and is a provocative to sin…215 
 
Critics regularly censured and lamented over Elizabethan consumption 
practices and the waste.216 One commentator, described the Elizabethans to be the 
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“laughing stock to all the world for their pride, and very caterpillars to themselves in 
wasting and consuming their goods and treasures upon vanities and trifles.”217 
 
2.2.3 Protecting Domestic Industries 
 
Sumptuary law emerged in a period in which there was already an established tradition of 
economic intervention: the regulation of the quality of protection and the associated basic 
terms of trade such as weights and measures already existed.218 
 
Sumptuary laws frequently aimed to closely regulate the English economy by 
protecting local industries, particularly the wool, cap and stocking industries, against 
aggressive overseas competition.219 Protectionism was mainly noticeable in 
Elizabethan legislation and proclamations which sought to encourage the growth of 
local industries by prohibiting the importation of luxury apparel from ‘alien’ 
countries such as France.220 This type of protectionist legislation foreshadowed 
similar protectionist measures in Australia in the first decades after Federation. 
Protectionism was endorsed by government of both eras in an attempt to alleviate 
anxiety about national security and to promote economic independence by relying on 
a xenophobic and parochial discourse.221 
Hunt argues that the 1336 act, a “brief alimentary [sumptuary] statute,”222 
was introduced as a result of rising trade, economic prosperity and increasing conflict 
with France.223 Hunt characterises its discourse as “typically alarmist”.224 Its 
preamble condemned the use of “outrageous and too many kinds”225 of costly food 
which it claimed were disrupting social order and creating mischief in the 
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kingdom.226 It suggested that the ‘landed class’ were ‘much inconvenienced’ and 
could potentially be impoverished by such extravagance.227   
The 1337 act, as the first English sumptuary law regulating dress, had two 
main objectives.228 First, as mentioned above, it sought to restrain extravagance in 
dress229 and secondly, it aimed to promote the consumption of English manufactures 
by forbidding the wearing of foreign cloth.230 Furs were particularly targeted as a 
form of sartorial extravagance because they were, according to Baldwin, the most 
important single article of luxury at the time.231 The act sought to protect the English 
wool industry from imported furs, prohibited anyone under the rank of a knight or of 
a lady from wearing any fur on their clothing.232 Baldwin contended that this type of 
economic protectionism or ‘national project’233 not only contributed to a strong 
growth of national spirit but also incidentally created a national costume.234  
By the beginning of Henry VIII’s reign there was, throughout Europe, a 
renewed interest in sumptuary regulation as a method of economic protectionism:235  
Sumptuary legislation was … frequently inspired by commercial protectionist policies, as 
when in England, for example, the use of silk was forbidden in order to protect the domestic 
woollen industry.236 
 
Even though Harte suggests that economic motives behind the Acts of 
Apparel were only secondary, he notes that the 1510 act had very obvious 
protectionist objects.237 For instance, it forbade any man under the ‘degree of a lord’ 
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to wear any woollen cloth made outside England, Wales, Ireland, or Calais.238 
Hooper argues that the whole act was underpinned with protectionist ideology: 
Indeed, the whole of it is indirectly conceived in the interests of native industry, for all the 
richer fabrics mentioned came from abroad, and the trading classes would hardly have 
submitted to the passing of these vexatious restrictions unless they had anticipated some 
substantial benefit in return for the limitation on their own style of apparel.239 
 
In 1511, Henry VIII issued a proclamation that was understood to be a war 
measure.240 It ordered against excess in apparel and also had a protective object.241 It 
forbade all Englishmen, except lords and knights to wear silk, and directed that 
doublets should only be made from camlet, a woven fabric probably made from 
wool.242 In 1533, a further proclamation sought to secure “good peax”243 and was 
aimed at regulating, amongst other things, unlawful games and excess in apparel.244 
In 1566, Elizabeth issued a fresh attack on the use of hosiery, which in part 
sought to protect local hose industry but it also acted as a traditional hierarchic 
edict.245 Her royal proclamation decreed that the lining of hose was to be made from 
English cloth and it restricted the use of velvet and satin to the sons of barons or 
above.246 In 1567, Parliament passed the first Elizabethan act on apparel.247 It was a 
purely protectionist measure concerning the supply of foreign wares on credit.248 
Hunt argues that it was specifically directed against tailors and those in related 
trades.249 In 1571, the eponymous ‘Cap Act’ was passed in an attempt to revive the 
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English cap-making industry and protect it for foreign competition.250 It was a 
prescriptive and an “unashamedly”251 protectionist piece of legislation that required: 
that every person above the age of six, residing in any of the cities, towns, villages or hamlets 
in England were to wear on Sundays and holidays a “a cap of wool knit, fulled and dressed in 
England made within this realm, and only dressed and finished by some of the trade of cappers, 
upon pain to forfeit for every day of not wearing 3 s. 4d.”252 
 
It is notable that many Elizabethan apparel proclamations had mixed motives. 
They contained strong moralising tones that spoke of the evil of excessive dress as 
well as pointing to the need for protectionist measures to shelter local industries.253 
Elizabeth’s apparel proclamations, in the latter part of her reign, showed an 
increasing trend to invoke protectionist policy against ‘unnecessary foreign wares’, 
particularly those made outside the Queen’s dominion.254 Hunt explains that 
proclamations during this period were “set against a background of sharpening 
internal conflict alongside rising fear of external invasion.” 255 Hooper suggests that 
the rapid growth of trade and commerce during this period, and the prosperity 
associated with agriculture brought “an increase of domestic and personal comfort 
and luxury that made the attempt to keep dress within artificial barriers more and 
more hopeless”.256  
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2.3 Entertainments and popular pastimes 
 
We see in [the] medieval regulation of games and pastimes the birth of one of the most 
persistent fields of moral regulation, one that is as alive and controversial today as it was in 
the late Middles Ages, namely the overlapping association with idleness, popular recreation, 
drinking and gambling.257 
 
Although the preservation of hierarchy of appearance appeared to be the main 
target of sumptuary regulation during the early modern period, it was not its only 
target. Sumptuary regulation also targeted amusement and popular social activities. 
In 1363, Edward III issued a royal order against those who eschewed archery on 
public holidays in favour of other sports such as football, quoits, club ball, handball, 
hurling of stones and cockfighting.258 The playing of such sports, particularly those 
that involved gambling, was considered by the church and others as promoting 
idleness, theft and debauchery amongst the lower classes, and the “sudden ruin, 
desolation and suicide amongst the upper classes.”259  
Baldwin argues that the most important law dealing with unlawful games was 
enacted in 1541-42.260 She suggests that not only was the act concerned with the 
encouragement of archery, but it also sought to restrict how an individual used their 
leisure time and the manner in which they disposed of their income.261 During this 
period, there had been a shift from an interest in ball games towards those that had 
provided the occasion for gambling.262 The act aimed to veto games that impinged 
on a citizen’s duty to maintain his skill with the long bow. Furthermore, it directed 
people to avoid those activities that might distract them and cause them to waste 
money on gambling.263  
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Hunt suggests that the act may have been enacted as the result of commercial 
pressure from bow-makers for it specified that bows were not be made from yew but 
rather to be made of mostly costly materials such as elm, witch hazel or ash.264 The 
act also tried to reinvigorate the practice of archery. It extended the age of those 
required to keep and practice using a long bow to include every able-bodied person 
who were under sixty years of age (except the clergy).265 Hunt claims that this push 
for compulsory archery began to lose its impetus in the mid-sixteenth century.266 
There was only one archery related proclamation in Elizabeth’s reign (1572), and the 
final proclamation on unlawful games was decreed in 1608.267 Hunt suggests that 
attempts to compel people to practice archery and to prohibit popular games 
eventually “ran out of steam”.268 The focus of regulatory activity changed: for 
instance, legislation relating to alcohol and gambling moved away from targeting the 
individual and began to focus on the regulation the licensing of drinking and 
gambling establishments.269 
Many Elizabethan statutes and proclamations sought to restrict or eradicate 
many popular pastimes, particularly those involving ‘unruly’ games such as football 
and those that provided opportunities for gambling and the consumption of 
alcohol.270 Baldwin suggests that it was not just the Parliament and the monarch who 
were determined to curtail gambling.271 The clergy were also very vocal in their 
condemnation of those who participated in “the playing at cards, dice, tables, or any 
other damned or unlawful games”.272 It appears that neither the civil authorities nor 
the clergy were successful in banning games they considered were so closely linked 
with the ‘evils’ of idleness, disorder and vagrancy.273 
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2.4 The erosion of the sumptuary impulse: 1604-1758 
 
Henry VIII could blow hot and Elizabeth I could blow cold, but neither could weaken the 
force of social emulation… The process of social emulation was taken further in England 
than in any contemporary society. It was facilitated by growing wealth, increasing 
urbanisation, and especially by the growth of London and the increasingly dominant role 
that the metropolis came to play in English society.274 
 
Hooper argues that “[p]erhaps the strangest episode in the history of the acts 
of apparel”275 was their sudden and final disappearance in 1604 when all extant 
English sumptuary acts were repealed, “a century or more before such laws 
disappeared in other countries”.276 However, he denies that this sudden repeal 
sumptuary law had anything to do with the perception that they such laws were futile 
or that it was attributable to any hostility towards sumptuary regulation.277 Rather, he 
argues that their disappearance was attributable solely to the opposition “excited on 
constitutional grounds,”278 and in particular to the resentment of the House of 
Commons at the King’s claims to legislate by proclamation.279 Nevertheless, Hooper 
contends that the sumptuary “feeling”280 or impulse continued to survive and 
permeate social opinion for generations to come.281 
After 1604, little attempt was made by either the English Parliament or the 
monarchy to regulate the population’s dress, even though “the stream of sumptuary 
legislation continued to flow fast and strong”282 on the continent.283 Between 1610 
and 1628 a series of bills were put before the Commons that were attempts to 
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reinforce some form of state control of dress.284 However, they were mainly 
concerned with the balance of trade and the protection of local industries.285 In 1640, 
1643, 1650 and 1656 three bills and one proclamation were introduced, without 
success, seeking to prohibit the wearing of gold and silver lace, fine linen and ‘other 
excess in apparel”.286 By the 1690s, the security of the woollen trade “was eroding in 
the face of a seemingly unquenchable demand for light floral novelties in dress.”287 
Lemire argues that between 1719 and 1720 the campaign against imported calico 
reached a peak and consequently calls was made for a return to sumptuary laws.288 
Between 1721 and 1758, further unsuccessful attempts were made to protect English 
industries by forbidding the importation of such items as French cambrics and 
lawns.289  However, these calls, Lemire says, “fell on deaf ears”.290  
It seemed as if this would be the end of sumptuary law. It was to remain a 
relic and remnant of the early modern period that seemed to have no place in a 
democratic, liberal social and legal environment.  Reed Berhamou suggests that the 
sumptuary goals became more difficult to attain as the “stability of the Middle Ages 
gave way to the volatility of the early Renaissance.”291 Moreover, even when 
accompanied with threats of punishment, they were ‘doomed to failure’.292 Records 
reveal very few prosecutions for breaching these laws.293 A range of reasons have 
been suggested for the demise of the sumptuary impulse. These include the rise of a 
new form of bourgeoisie, which brought conspicuous consumption within a wider 
reach and “rendered attempts at restraint even more difficult to secure”,294 and the 
effect of economic realism and national interest that undermined “the grip of 
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paternalism that lay at the core of the sumptuary ethic.”295 Ponte suggests that a lack 
of consistent enforcement and a failure substantial public support for these laws were 
to blame for their failure.296 Harte argues that sumptuary laws could not weaken “the 
social force of emulation”,297 and that they might have even had a counter-productive 
effect as the prohibition of an article “could give it a special appeal:”298  
Hunt maintains that whilst early sumptuary laws were concerned with 
disciplinary power “acting on the detailed choices made by individuals about their 
appearance or consumption”,299 laws in the later phase, were less concerned about 
personal regulation than with economic strategies affecting the protection of public 
welfare:300 moralising tones abated to some extent and the sumptuary discourse 
shifted from a purely didactic impulse to be viewed in more explicitly ‘economic 
terms’.301   
What this means for the regulatory pattern that came after will be considered 
later in this thesis – as a set of economic imperatives that reflected the temper of the 
modern era.  But despite this, the ‘moralising tone’ did not disappear. Hunt argues 
that the sumptuary impulse has never been entirely extinguished “despite the 
disappearance of overt projects directed towards dress.”302 Furthermore, he suggests 
that sumptuary laws “have lived on in the ubiquitous quest for moral regulation”303 
that has continued to find expression in the modern era.304   
 
 
 
                                                 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ponte, above n 7, 60. 
297 Harte, above n 22, 153. 
298 Ibid 154. 
299 Hunt, above n 8, 11. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid 79. 
302 Ibid 8. 
303 Ibid 9. 
304 Ibid. 
 
56 
 
2.5 Gone but not Forgotten: The Australian Sumptuary Experience 
 
And so we are warned that as a result of national extravagance in luxury the Government is 
now considering the revival of sumptuary laws to restrict out intake and limit our 
expenditure.305 
 
Although the apogee of sumptuary regulation had long passed, the sumptuary 
ethic, which was so strong in England during the early modern period, continued to 
survive in the collective memory of  colonial and post-Federation Australians. This 
memory was particularly ‘alive’ in the first three decades after Federation and was 
constantly being refreshed by the press, politicians and church officials. Politicians 
often harked backed to the protectionist objectives of the sumptuary laws enacted 
during the reign of Elizabeth.306 Congregations were ‘spoken to’ about the need for 
women to be more modest and to lengthen their skirts and heighten their bodices.307  
Newspapers regularly featured didactic commentary and chatter that 
reminded and amused Australian readers about the history, the objectives, the 
language and curiousness of English sumptuary regulation.308  Some commentators 
characterised sumptuary laws as necessary regulations imposed by paternal 
governments who “were so considerate and so anxious for the welfare of their 
subjects.”309 Others reflected that such laws were dictatorial and acted as compulsory 
fiats that impinged upon “the personal liberty of the subject.”310 Furthermore, they 
considered that it was unfathomable as to why ‘modern’ Australians should be forced 
to endure laws that had proved ineffective in the past.311  
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In the post-Federation period, much of the commentary concerning fashion 
and luxury took the form of moralising venomous diatribe and drew on early 
sumptuary edicts when inveighing against increased displays of luxury and 
extravagance.312 Women’s apparel, gambling and drinking habits were especial 
targets.313 Just as in the early modern period, women in the early twentieth century 
were also admonished for wearing “gigantic millinery”314 and for using gold lace.315 
In the comparatively ‘modern’ sumptuary act of 1711, Queen Anne had absolutely 
forbidden the importation for this same type of opulent lace, the demand for which at 
the time was said to have become “exceedingly extravagant.”316 Women were also 
reminded that luxurious forms of boots, shoes, stockings, gloves and veils were was 
reprehensible and inappropriate.317 By the early decades following Federation, it was 
obvious that the sumptuary impulse had permeated social opinion and was to 
influence social commentators, legislators and the general public. Even the new 
arbitration system initiated by Higgins J in 1907, that was based on ‘a fair and 
reasonable wage’, was defined as a form of ‘sumptuary legislation’.318 
The privations of First World War caused Australians to become even more 
focused on past sumptuary laws. One female commentator suggested during the war 
that Australian women were still being subjected to the imperatives of these laws and 
that they remained inherently imprinted within contemporary dress customs and 
practices: 
The recent cable stating that British Government is likely to fix dress allowances is simply a 
revival of the Sumptuary Laws which were passed over a period of three hundred years, one 
piling on another or varying it, and it is through the ‘mentality’ left against dressing above our 
position and against others who, while we are decorous, transgress.319 
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Another woman mused, “in the midst of war time restrictions and 
Government control of food and clothing supplies,” 320 that it was fascinating to 
“look back into past times when lands and enactments governed many of the details 
of daily life”.321 Others laconically insisted that the exigencies of war and “the 
extravagant tendencies of the times” 322 would require the Federal government to 
follow the lead of England, the United States, France and Germany by resurrecting 
sumptuary laws in the form of the imposition of a heavy tax on amusements and 
luxuries.323 In Farey v Burvett, Griffith CJ even declared that that sumptuary laws 
“have always been common war measures.”324  
During wartime hostilities, dress again became one of the main targets for the 
revived sumptuary intervention: there were calls for uniformity of dress for men and 
women as well as a demand for the imposition of fixed prices for fabric, clothing and 
for tailoring.325 The plea to revive sumptuary regulation was heeded. As we see in 
Chapter 6, the Hughes government established the short-lived Luxuries Board to 
repress extravagance and forestall ‘national ruin’ by curtailing the importation of 
luxury goods. Furthermore, the War Precautions Act 1914-18 (Cth), which the 
Hughes government used to implement wartime efficiency measures, was defined by 
the High Court as “in substance a sumptuary law.”326  
In the 1920s, there was growing concern that Australian women were 
becoming too enamoured with wearing the latest fashions and luxury fabrics such as 
‘georgette’. It was feared this behaviour not only challenged the traditional 
hierarchies of appearance, but it also risked personal and national impoverishment.327 
It was suggested by one commentator that the community would benefit if women 
were “obliged to gown themselves according to their station in life only, and were 
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thereby inculcated with a desire to save some of their hardly-earned wages to enable 
them to look forward to a future of partial independence.”328 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The critique of luxury exhibited remarkable resilience and lasted well into modernity; it is 
arguable that the condemnation of luxury did not lose both its conventional and its moral 
force until the late modernity of the twentieth century.329 
 
This chapter accounted for the imperatives and themes that characterised the 
English sumptuary laws during the period from 1337 until 1604. Authorities sought 
to regulate social stability and order, and to maintain ‘the common weal’ by the 
imposition of hierarchic dress codes reflecting what Hooper calls the “pyramid view 
of society.”330 It was expected that sumptuary laws would chart a hierarchical order 
of appearance that would combat the excessive and wasteful consumption of the 
lower classes that was thought to threaten both private and public economies. Most 
English sumptuary laws of the early modern period were meticulous regulations. 
They normally detailed the colours and types of fabrics that various ranks and 
occupations could wear and regulated the type of clothing or textiles that could be 
imported into Great Britain.331 Thus, colour, style and fabric of apparel all became 
part of a codification of appearance and they acted as social markers to distinguish 
social and economic status.332 The dress rules and class distinctions were exactingly 
described in the legislation. For instance, luxury goods such as silk, lace, precious 
gems, gold and silver fabric and exotic furs could only to be worn by royalty or 
highly ranked families.333 
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Whilst sumptuary laws were concerned with the regulation of expenditure on 
entertainment, food and ceremonies, their primary focus throughout this period was 
on with the regulation of dress. The sumptuary impulse was particularly evident in 
the moralisation of luxury and in economic regulation and in attempts to preserve 
hierarchy of appearance by the creation of specific dress codes. These same 
sumptuary imperatives were robustly discernible in countries such as Australia in the 
early twentieth century. There was also a palpable movement, particularly during the 
First World War, to resurrect these ‘antique’ laws to curtail luxury and extravagance, 
and to protect local industries from aggressive overseas competition. Later chapters 
will examine how these foundational tenets of sumptuary laws re-emerged in altered 
manifestations in Australia during the early post-Federation period. We will now 
move on to Chapter 3, which will examine some of the significant Australian 
personalities, ideologies and institutions that  were responsible for the revival of and 
inextricably linked to the evolution of these fresh manifestations of sumptuary 
regulation. 
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3 SHAPING THE AUSTRALIAN SUMPTUARY EXPERIENCE: 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
The Parliament shall sit at Melbourne until it meets at the seat of Government 
Australian Constitution s 125 
3.1 Purpose and Structure of this chapter 
The idea that a sumptuary impulse could return in a new guise during the first 
years of the 20th century in Australia seems remarkable.  A set of laws imposed by 
absolute monarchs would seem to be out of step with the new modernity of the 20th 
century, especially in a nation that prided itself on its (near) universal suffrage of 
both women and men.  In these circumstances, any sumptuary impulse would have to 
manifest itself in a very different fashion, in particular through formal fiscal 
measures – tariffs, taxes, and national wage determinations.  But to account for these 
interventions only through formal legal means only goes one small part of the way to 
understand the role that the sumptuary impulse played in these formal legal 
interventions – some successful, others not.   
To understand the sumptuary impulse means to draw on the threads already 
illustrated in Chapter Two – its moral component, implicit nationalism, formal 
protectionism, and the formal acts of war – and pull them across time and space to a 
set of influential individuals who continued to draw on  warp and weft in an 
attempt to shape law in this new society – and to shape society directly.  In the first 
formative decades of the post-Federation Australian polity, the sumptuary impulse 
originally shaped law in ways that belie expected conventions of formal law-making 
through the interventions and manoeuvres of a tightly knit group of individuals and 
associations that coalesced around the Melbourne elite of the first two decades after 
Federation. 
To understand how this happened in the Australia in this era is to rethink the 
assumed geographic and physical setting of law and government with which later 
generations of Australians have become familiar.  At Federation, the Parliament and 
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institutions of law and government were located in Melbourne.  Canberra, later to be 
the nation’s capital and seat of these institutions, was selected in 1908, and planning 
and construction began in 1913, before the seat of government moved there in 1927.  
Melbourne’s influence, during the period with which this thesis is concerned, looms 
large, and the role of the individuals and organisations who actively participated in 
the formation of the newly formed polity were from Melbourne. But, as will become 
clear as this thesis unfolds, it is possible to locate a shift from a set of fairly informal 
means by which patrician individuals created the conditions through which law was 
formed or advocated, to the more formal conditions under which law was created by 
the end of the period under examination. This shift matched the move away from the 
local and informal location of Melbourne to the centralised and more bureaucratic 
city of Canberra, which was to serve as the formal national capital.1  
Because of their influence and their recurring appearance throughout this 
period, this chapter will be devoted to sketching the individuals and their connections 
and allies. They feature prominently in the following chapters, as fragments of a 
uniquely Australian account of the revival of sumptuary regulation during the early 
decades following Federation. As discrete fragments, they stand only to explain a 
portion of the story of a fledgling nation in a period characterised by sweeping social 
change and wartime disturbance. Stitched together with threads of gender, class, race 
and hegemony, these fragments intertwine to form a patchwork narrative showcasing 
the same patterns and themes that were evident in early modern sumptuary laws. 
Whilst these accounts will be teased out in greater depth in each of the later 
chapters of this thesis, this chapter seeks to understand the role that influential 
individuals and institutions played in the return of the sumptuary impulse in the early 
20th century in Australia. The chapter begins by providing a brief overview and 
account of the circumstances surrounding post-Federation Australia. It describes how 
Melbourne was the locus of social and political activity during this time. The chapter 
then considers the role and influence of the ‘power couple’ of the day, Herbert and 
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Ivy Brookes, and the role they played in shaping the fledgling nation across the 
board, but in particular as advocates of protectionism which was the pre-eminent 
economic policy for the newly federated nation. While the Brookes’ were influential 
in various social and political milieus throughout this period, Herbert Brookes also 
had a role in the institutional life of the nation.  
The chapter moves on to consider the role of one of these bodies, the Tariff 
Board, of which Herbert Brookes was a member. The Board was the institutionalised 
voice of Protectionism in Australia and was created to implement and justify the 
government’s ‘settled economic policy’. His wife, Ivy, on the other hand, as a 
feminine agent of protectionism, worked tirelessly through the institutions she helped 
establish and run. The chapter also briefly accounts for the role that women’s 
organisations played in advocating gender reform and promulgating moral 
regulation. That form of moral regulation found its way into a surprising forum – the 
formal wages mechanisms created in the first few years of Australia.   
The chapter considers the role that Henry Bournes Higgins J, one of 
Australia’s first High Court Justices, and his fellow Arbitration Court judges, played 
in regulating and ‘normalising’ Australian workers, including acceptable forms of 
spending permitted on dress, that were the subject of concern of patrician moral 
campaigners like Ivy Brookes.  It also details how the affiliation between the unions, 
the arbitration courts and manufactures detrimentally affected consumers – those 
who wished to express themselves as they chose through their style of dress and 
choice of clothing. 
Finally, the chapter reveals that  the press, largely based in Melbourne,  
played a significant role in influencing government policy and in reinforcing sexual 
stereotypes and masculinist hegemony.  
 
3.2 Federation  
 
 In 1901, the former British colonies on the Australian continent were 
federated as a new nation, Australia.  Upon Federation, the imperial connection 
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remained strong and most of the population continued to be fiercely loyal to the 
British throne and to the Empire. Even native-born politicians such as Alfred Deakin 
were convinced that trust in the newly formed nation was compatible with it 
remaining a vital part of the British Empire and that Federation would provide 
Australians with a more effective voice in the Empire’s activities. Prior to 
Federation, Australia was a set of fractious alliances designed to deliver trade 
between the former colonies. After Federation, there was distribution of powers 
between the Commonwealth and the newly formed six States.2 The Constitution 
reflected responsible democratic parliamentary government based on the British 
model.3 It was envisaged that there would be a central government, with Parliament, 
Executive and High Court. Although British Parliamentary practice was adopted, 
early Federal Parliaments had to formulate their own procedure.4  
Parliament was also challenged with other major foundational tasks, 
including the selection and creation of the site for the Federal capital, the 
establishment of both the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
Court and the High Court. Section 125 of the Constitution empowered the 
Commonwealth Parliament to determine the location of seat of government in New 
South Wales. This proved to be a difficult task. The choice of the site was the subject 
of many resolutions, visits, inspections and a Royal Commission. Although the 
Federal capital was chosen in 1908, it was not until 1927 that Parliament sat in 
Canberra, the new nation’s Federal capital.  In the meantime, Federal Parliament sat 
in Melbourne.  
The Second Federal Parliament (1903-1906) passed the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), which established a system of compulsory judicial 
arbitration of industrial disputes. It has been suggested this was to have profound 
effects on Australia’s social and economic structures.5 It not only encouraged trade 
                                                 
2 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law: 1901-1921 (Melbourne University Press, 2nd 
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union development on a national scale, but it also had consequences for wages and 
hours fixation.6 The Court’s principal registry was located in Melbourne. Section 71 
of the Constitution empowered the Commonwealth Parliament to create a High Court 
consisting of a Chief Justice and at least two other justices. The Court was to be 
“keystone of the federal arch”7 and was to decide the orbit and boundary of every 
Federal power and to protect the Constitution.8 There was much debate about 
whether it was an unnecessary luxury and whether that “under Australian conditions 
the task of constitutional interpretation could safely be left to the State Courts and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London”.9 The Court’s primary registry 
was located in Melbourne.10 It was only when the High Court building was finished 
in 1980 that the Court’s administration was transferred to Canberra. 
Federation proved to be a momentous political experiment and required 
expertise, leadership and vison from those involved in its execution. There continued 
to be concerns about the practicalities of Federal governance, such as the 
establishment of a bureaucracy to serve and administer government, and the limits of 
executive power. Furthermore, there were some ongoing anxieties regarding 
concurrent laws such as income tax, which continued to operate in parallel with 
States laws. For instance, all States had previously adopted State income taxes and it 
was not until 1915 that the first Commonwealth Income Tax was adopted.11 The 
parallel State and Commonwealth income tax laws remained in effect until 1942 
when the Commonwealth achieved exclusive power through formal measures.12  
The new Federal powers accorded to the Commonwealth upon Federation 
meant that elected officials became responsible for shaping a unique framework of 
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7 Ibid. 
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legislation and for initiating key features of Australian national policy.13 The first 
Commonwealth Parliaments were given the task of implementing a program of 
responsible government in the face of continuing resistance from the States and 
fractious disputes between protectionists and Free Traders. States such as New South 
Wales and Victoria continued to squabble about the brand of economic policy that 
should be adopted by a new federal government. Before Federation, Victoria had for 
several decades adopted an economic policy of protection while New South Wales 
remained steadfastly loyal to free trade. Finally, after many heated debates, 
protectionism became the ‘settled policy’ of all governments. It was argued that it 
offered the best “weapon of defence against that dangerous world outside which 
struggled for profit”.14  
Parliament was charged with shaping the structure of the federal government 
and attending to making a profusion of laws relating to a host of new Federal powers. 
The Commonwealth had been given the power with respect of naval and military 
defence15 as well as external powers.16 It had power to control immigration, 
naturalisation and aliens,17 as well as the power to provide for the settlement by 
conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes extending beyond one State.18 
Besides enacting legislation covering these and other powers, Parliament had to deal 
with fiscal issues of appropriation, supply and taxation, with social service issues 
such as the implementation of a  national system of old-age and invalid pensions,19 
as well as with all aspects of trade and commerce between States and with foreign 
countries.20 Government departments had to be established and administrative 
regimes needed to be implemented to assuage the social, economic and political 
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aspirations and interests of the States and those prominent individuals and 
institutions that had played a part in the struggle for Federation. 
In many cases, the ‘Federal experiment’ proved to be difficult for those 
inexperienced in national governance. The executive often lacked expertise in 
particular areas of administration and were forced to seek ‘expert’ assistance in their 
administration of government.21 It became common practice for the executive branch 
of government to delegate ad-hoc regulatory power to quasi-legal Boards such as the 
Commonwealth Board of Trade, the Luxuries Board, the Repatriation Board and the 
Tariff Board. As Australia was without a class “on whom birth conferred legal and 
political privileges”22 it became common for government to appoint prominent 
middle class lawyers, business men and scholars to constitute such Boards. This type 
of appointment hinted at cronyism. So small was the pool of Australian experts in 
matters of finance, business and law it was not unusual for eminent men such as A B 
Piddington, N C Lockyer and Herbert Brookes to be appointed, at various times, to 
these Boards, and in some instances to more than one Board. Some members, such as 
Brookes were appointed because of their expertise and their political standing, whilst 
it seems others, such as Piddington23 and N C Lockyer24 may have received their 
appointments, as amends for failed career opportunities. It would take many years 
before Australia would adopt a more formalised and unbiased approach to the 
administration of government. 
 
                                                 
21 See below Pt 3.4 and Chapter 6. 
22 Clark, above n 8, 241. 
23 Sawer, above n 2, 106. Piddington was offered High Court Judgeship. However, he received 
enormous hostility from his fellow barristers who passed resolutions objecting to his appointment on 
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3.2.1 A new society 
Leading up to Federation, there appeared a noticeable shift in attitudes 
towards imperial notions of class distinction and aristocratic privileges based on birth 
and rank.25 Australia had become increasingly immune to British hierarchical 
imperatives. Australians had developed their own social hierarchy based upon 
material wealth and social position associated with commercial enterprise, primary 
industry and public service.26 By Federation, Australia’s unique form of democracy 
was continuing to be further shaped amidst a general climate of racial, moral and 
economic insecurity. The first Commonwealth Parliament had passed the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth)  which had granted universal adult 
suffrage.27 Whilst Australian governments were anxious about the necessity to 
increase population, public discourse idealised the ‘true’ Australian as male, 
productive, moral and white.  
There was a general move to create a unified society that was to be 
dominated by ‘white’ Australians. This ‘ideal’ was to be achieved by prohibiting 
‘coloured’ migration and by discouraging interracial marriage.28 Deakin suggested 
that a united Australia was one that was characterised by a people possessing the 
same general cast of character, tone of thought and the same constitutional training 
and traditions.29 Australian primary producers were nervous about the continuing 
viability of overseas markets for Australia’s two chief exports of wool and wheat, 
even though Australia’s trade position in the early twentieth century had been greatly 
                                                 
25 Clark, above n 8. 
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bolstered with increased sales.30 Australia’s economic prosperity depended largely 
on what prices she could receive for these staples in uncertain world’s markets.31 
Federation proved to be a boon for feminists who had been actively seeking 
franchise for some time. The Australian Constitution extended women’s freedom to 
participate more fully in the government of this new nation. South Australian and 
Western Australian women had already had the vote and the right to stand for 
parliament and this proved to be a powerful inducement to members of Federal 
Parliament to accept  female franchise for the whole of the Commonwealth and they 
thus ensured that women were accorded the same rights under the Commonwealth 
Franchise Act 1902 (Cth).32  
 
3.2.2 Melbourne 
The centralisation within Melbourne of these significant federal foundational 
institutions contributed to making it the locus of Australian political power in the 
post-Federation period. Discriminatory tariffs led to Melbourne having the highest 
concentration of manufacturing amongst the capital cities.33 In 1901, Melbourne had 
a population of 501 580 compared to 496 990 in Sydney.34 Melbourne was already 
home to many leading politicians and members of Australia’s wealthy elite. After 
Federation, it also became the temporary abode of a large number of politicians and 
bureaucrats who were involved significantly with constructing Australia’s domestic 
and international identity.  From the latter part of the nineteenth century, the city had 
become renowned as a centre of wealth, culture, fashion, education and Liberal 
politics. Wealth from the goldfields had made it a hub of finance and industry. R E N 
Twopeny had observed that Melbourne in the 1880s boasted more culture and sport 
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than Sydney.35 Manning Clark claimed that its intellectual life had developed 
“during the golden age of the bourgeoisie” in Australia (1861-1883).36  
Melbourne had also become the hotbed of protectionism and home to fervent 
protectionists including Alfred Deakin (1856-1919) and David Syme (1860-1908), 
the newspaper magnate and ‘father of protectionism’. Its philanthropic and liberal 
culture spawned numerous middle class women’s associations; their members  
busied themselves with social issues such as the cost of living and poverty. These 
quasi-political organisations included the Australian Women’s National League and 
the Housewives Association. Their members mixed in the same social circles and 
were linked “through a network of philanthropic causes.”37 Many had husbands or 
close male relatives who were firmly entrenched in politics, farming and business.38  
It was not unexpected that a large section of Australia’s governing class 
would be located in Melbourne and that national policy and Federal legislation 
would be influenced by its privileged elite. Herbert and Ivy Brookes typified the type 
of middle class, affluent, white, Protestant and Anglo-centric Melbournians who 
played a crucial role in shaping Australia’s domestic and foreign policies. Manning 
Clark located the couple in the heart of ‘Yarraside’- a term he used for the home of 
ruling class in Melbourne.39 Even though their contributions were often directly 
interrelated with their own vested interests, their personal motives were frequently 
mixed with altruistic ones.  The Brookes’ for instance considered that, as members of 
Australia’s wealthy and prominent elite, it was incumbent upon them to wield their 
paternal and evangelical influence to help shape the political, social and moral order 
of the fledgling nation. Members of this tightknit privileged network were linked 
privately and publically in multifarious ways: socially, politically and through 
religion, education and ‘good works’.  
                                                 
35 Richard Twopeny, Town Life in Australia (Penguin Colonial Facsimiles, 1983). 
36 Clark, above n 8, 233-276. 
37 Margaret Fitzherbert, Liberal Women: Federation to 1949 (Federation Press, 2004) 43. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Clark, above n 8, 233- 276. 
 
71 
 
 Men and women of social distinction and position, such as the Brookes, 
Alfred Deakin, David Syme and Higgins J were frequently involved together in a 
plethora of civic and ‘patriotic’ causes. As part of the ‘establishment’, they were 
especially concerned with economic initiatives, civic virtue and social compliance in 
the face of rapid social and political changes, particularly in the shadow and, then in 
the reality, of world conflict. The old hierarchical social regime, that had previously 
been securely stitched into place by traditional ‘rules’ of appearance, consumerism 
and privilege, was becoming frayed. During the war, these ‘rules’ became even more 
blurred. The governing class saw it as a perilous time when moral values and 
traditions were being constantly challenged by the exigencies of war, political 
division and industrial strife. It was perceived to be a period of national emergency 
that warranted interventionist measures, such as the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth), 
to bring people under political, legal and moral control. 
 
3.3 Ivy and Herbert Brookes - their political and social mission was to 
rid society of ‘evils’ 
 
The common thread throughout [his biography] is Brookes’ belief in the Empire, his sense of 
duty to God and his conviction of the necessity for an informed, pious elite to lead the way.40 
 
The first decades after Federation saw the rise of a distinctive breed of social 
leaders and political patricians who sought to fashion a new Australian identity. This 
new identity would be garnered from a fresh spirit of independence and self-
sufficiency that accompanied Federation and Australia’s significant participation in 
the Great War. Some public figures such as Herbert Brookes (1867-1963) and David 
Syme became the forerunners of new political parties, the leaders of industry and had 
                                                 
40 Peter Cochrane, “‘Australian Citizens’: Herbert and Ivy Brookes” (Newsletter, National Library of 
Australia, March 1999) 21. 
 
72 
 
created powerful social and political networks. They were often closely associated 
with business, political and landed dynasties. They exerted enormous power during 
the period when Australia was emerging from a fledgling nation to a leader in world 
trade. They counselled Ministers and manipulated Prime Ministers; they directed 
public policy and were closely involved with promoting their idealised notion of 
Australia’s future identity.41 Ivy and Herbert Brookes were two such powerful public 
figures. 
The Ivy and Herbert narrative provides a rare insight into a powerful familial 
alliance that exerted enormous influence in shaping Australian social fabric and 
economic policy in the first part of the 20th century. Married in Melbourne in 1905,42 
the Brookes’ not only attempted to shape economic policy but they were also 
energetically involved in regulating the private lives of ordinary Australians. Herbert 
used his enormous wealth to secure a network “tied into powerful social and 
economic circuits in the British Empire.”43 He held executive roles in the newly 
formed Liberal Party and served as the President of the Chamber of Manufactures.44 
Brookes was a clever power-broker and a confidant of Prime Ministers. He had much 
in common with Prime Minister William Hughes (1862-1952) - he was a militant 
Protestant and Anglophile and a fervent ‘conscriptionist’.45 Herbert’s influence over 
Hughes was so great that Manning Clark labelled Herbert “the king-maker of 1916-
17.46  
 Brookes had a glowing career in business and served in a number of wartime 
committees and in government-appointed positions after 1918. He was one of the 
first appointees to the Tariff Board and later, from 1929 until 1930, he served as the 
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first Commissioner-General for Australia in the United States.47 In 1922, he was 
appointed to the Tariff Board that was established in 1921 to implement the 
government’s ‘settled policy of Protection”.48 As a hard-line Protectionist, he played 
a central role as an agent of Federal institutional power in creating and administering 
tariffs to protect Australian manufacturers and he paid scant heed to the needs and 
choices of the working classes. Brookes was a hard-nosed right wing conservative. 
He had directly influenced Hughes in the banning of the Sinn Fein flag and the red 
flag during 1918.49  In the same year, he was actively involved in the formation and 
leadership of the right wing Protective League that sought to quell ‘disloyal protest’ 
in Queensland.50 The League was established by “the watchdogs of loyalty”51 to 
counter the impact of ‘insidious, subversive propaganda’ in Australia.52 It was the 
face of vigilante activism and its xenophobic policies sought to “crush the growing 
element of disloyalists (sic), traitors and scum of Australia.”53 
Ivy Brookes (1883-1970) was the eldest daughter of Alfred Deakin and her 
political lineage gave her formidable social and political cachet. She had been 
exposed from an early age to her father’s powerful reformist rhetoric and was well 
versed in his views on topics such as the White Australia policy, eugenics and 
nationalism.  54 Ivy was a confident public speaker, a successful fund raiser, an 
energetic lobbyist and a committed women’s advocate.55 She was actively engaged 
on the executive in a plethora of women’s political and social organisations including 
the Women’s Liberal League, the Housewives Association and the Imperial Defence 
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League.56 Ivy mostly remained outside the mainstream of official politics and 
institutional power. She did venture into the public sphere when campaigning to 
women on behalf of her father during elections, when she promoted her husband’s 
political projects, and later when she became an iconic female voice of 
protectionism.57  She attended manufacturing conferences and political rallies with 
Herbert. She was a dedicated and energetic member of prominent women’s civic 
organizations such as the Housewives’ Association and the National Council of 
Women.58 It was within these roles that she played a crucial, influential and highly 
visible and yet informal role in the creation of social policy. Her extra-parliamentary 
political activism centred on moral regulation and social reforms pertaining to 
women, children and the domestic sphere.59 However, whilst she presented to some a 
respectable, articulate and maternal image; Manning Clark depicts her as a narrow-
minded ‘wowser’ who possessed lofty religious and hierarchical ideals and promoted 
austerity and simplicity in dress: 
She took comfort from Christ’s rider, that with God all things were possible. She 
believed God had a plan, and that the British were the instruments of Divine 
Providence. Australia mirrored God’s plan. There was no need for any change in 
society: the industrious, the talented and the frugal could rise to the top in Australia… 
She thought some modern women went too far with their jewels, their powder and 
their painted pomp.60 
Whilst Ivy became an influential voice for female consumers61  she 
nevertheless remained a passionate supporter and iconic advocate62 for those 
protectionist ‘buy-Australian’ policies so keenly espoused by her husband and father, 
and which proved so problematical for these female consumers and their families.63 
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Although Ivy worked from a more marginalised and domestic locus than her 
husband, she nevertheless became, during the decades following Federation, an 
important influential participant in so many activities and associations that sought to 
influence and intervene in the private lives of consumers. 
In 1918, she was appointed as President of the Empire Trade Defence 
Council and as a member of the Women’s Executive of Australian Industries 
Protection League.64 Towards the end of the war she became the official female 
voice of protectionism and led a campaign of propaganda in support of protection for 
local industries.65 This campaign pressured female consumers to publicly 
demonstrate their patriotism by giving their preference to Australian goods and by 
boycotting “enemy goods”.66 Ivy skilfully applied her immeasurable political skills 
and her popularity with the press to harness ‘patriotic’ Australians to participate in 
interventionist economic and social projects that sought to create a ‘loyal’ and 
closely regulated population.  Ivy cleverly linked protectionism with nationalism. 
Her rhetoric often demonised Germans, Japanese and other aliens, and she frequently 
sought to ostracize Australians who were so unpatriotic as to purchase goods from 
them.67  
The Brookes’ made a formidable political couple and presented “an 
extraordinary unity”.68 They were both staunch supporters of the Empire and 
believed in a life dedicated to God, ‘plain’ living’ and ‘high thinking’.69 They 
fervently believed that they had a paternal and pastoral duty “to be stewards to their 
community, their culture and to the less fortunate.”70 They saw themselves, and were 
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seen, as deeply committed social crusaders who sought through their ‘evangelical 
efforts’ to promote the common good and to  save Australians from social ‘evils’: 
The missionary spirit is strong in all the Deakins. The Prime Minister himself a man of 
creed and enthusiasm: Mrs Deakin, is a social worker, whose benevolent work is 
greater than many people know; and Mr Herbert Brookes, their son-in-law ….is 
similarly inspired by altruistic emotion.71 
 Herbert and Ivy used their individual and joint talents and opportunities to 
influence and regulate private consumption and to shape a society that nurtured 
‘home grown industry’. Both zealously promoted economic protectionism as a form 
of regulatory sumptuary intervention that targeted the governance of consumption 
via the application of tariff imposts on the importation of consumables such as 
clothing.72 
 
3.4 The Tariff Board 
Protection…is now received as the settled fiscal policy accepted by all political parties.73 
 
Shortly after Federation, Australia firmly adopted a protectionist stance 
towards it manufacturing sector.74 By 1904, it was proposed that a ‘non-political’ 
advisory body be appointed to assist Parliament and the government in making the 
Tariff.75 In August 1913, an Inter-State Commission had been appointed to 
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investigate the tariff, amongst other things.76 However, as the Commission’s 
recommendations were based on pre-1914 ‘normal’ circumstances, they proved to be 
“quite irrelevant”77 in coping with a greatly altered post-war situation.78 Even though 
the Commission followed a “general protectionist line”,79 its findings proved later to 
have little influence on the 1921 Greene tariff debates that were concerned with the 
danger of isolation, defence and the inability of Australian manufacturers to receive 
industrial supplies should there be another war.80  
After the First World War, the ‘cry’ for an independent Tariff Board became 
more incessant.81 In Australia, a “more developed sense of nationhood”82 had 
evolved during the war along with increased feelings of isolation and vulnerability. 
This produced a heightened demand for tariff revision to protect nascent industries, 
particularly those born in the war years, from persistent post-war overseas 
competition.83 It was argued that the tariff should not be left to “amateur”84 members 
of Parliament with no qualifications in the framing of tariffs and that tariffs should 
no longer be the partisan “tools of parties”.85 Instead, it was argued that tariff 
adjustments should be “suggested”86 by disinterested experts who would have proper 
regard for the interests of all concerned.87 It was also argued that a permanent board 
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would be an advantage when different goods became available, especially when new 
industries were commenced.88  
Whilst Hughes sought a mandate vis referendum in 1919 for increased 
legislative power to provide for remedies to protect the consumer against those 
manufacturers who might use the tariff to exact unduly high prices,89 his request was 
refused by the public.90 By 1921, Prime Minister Hughes’ Nationalist Party had 
resolved to experiment91 with the establishment of the Tariff Board as an 
independent statutory authority that would hold, at the request of government, public 
inquiries into tariff issues and that was “to act as a buffer between it and the various 
interested groups.”92 
The Tariff Board Act 192193 had a stormy passage through Parliament as it 
was opposed from both the right and the left.94 Nevertheless, general support for 
protection continued and all tariff debates in Parliament continued during the 1920s 
to reflect the predominantly protectionist attitude of all parties.95 The Government 
promised that it would institute a Board to act as a check on the validity of claims for 
increased protection.96 In addition, the Board was to serve as a precaution against 
monopoly practices, the exploitation of consumers and the ‘sweating’ of workers by 
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industries that were provided with protection.97 The Government hoped that this new 
authority would make the tariff both “scientific” and “elastic”.98 RC Mills suggested 
in 1927 that the government, by empowering the Tariff Board to administer its policy 
of protection, was “definitely and deliberately [handing] over to the executive 
considerable power and discretion in tariff matters.” 99 Many complaints were made 
inside and outside of Parliament to the effect that the Board was effectively usurping 
the functions of Parliament and had become an independent tariff-making 
authority.100 
The Hughes’ government promised that the new Tariff Board was to be 
staffed by a group of “disinterested experts”.101 The Board’s early appointees were 
businessmen, like Herbert Brookes, and government employees.102 All were key 
stakeholders in the promotion of Australian protectionist policy.103 They were neither 
disinterested and, in the main, had little expertise in Tariff revision. The Board, this 
“creature of Parliament,”104 was seen and saw itself from its inception as “the 
institutionalised voice of protectionism”105 and the Board exercised its powers to 
deliberately protect Australian manufacturers.106 In its early days, the Board believed 
it was “bound to recommend protective duties whenever possible.”107 It has always 
looked upon its functions as being to carry out, not to question, the settled policy of 
protectionism.108 
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Hall declared in 1923, that the remarks of the Board “leave little doubt as to 
the uncritical outlook on the question of protection.”109 In a letter written in 1926, 
Herbert Brookes, described the paternal and elitist approach of the Board members as 
a form of religious dogma that was intertwined with protectionist ideals: 
Although we are a fact-finding and non-partisan body, our facts are sought with the 
object of improving the protectionist system our Country has adopted and not with the 
idea of improving it out of existence. We are non-partisan because we have been 
selected by a Government of a country, 95% of whose representatives are 
protectionists. We are four protectionists-God helping us, and you will add, God 
helping our Country.110 
During the Board’s early years, its members when overseeing tariff revisions, 
strictly adhered to the cannons of the ‘settled policy of protectionism and endorsed 
massive tariff hikes on imported clothing and ‘luxuries’.111 Others saw the Board as 
being at the “very centre of Australia’s Protectionist system”.112 
This was a period that saw the Board’s systematic extension of the umbrella 
of protection resulting in a rapid rise and widening of tariff.113 However, little was 
heard during this period about the protection of the consumer.114 Working class 
consumers were especially disadvantaged by the very large increases in tariff rates 
on apparel in 1925-26.115 By 1928, there were 259 items with duties greater than 40 
per cent.116 Senator Kingsmill suggested that the high tariffs on imported clothing 
might be described as “inverted sumptuary laws.”117 He pointed out that whilst under 
the ‘old sumptuary laws’ people of a certain status were not allowed to wear 
expensive garments, the high duties imposed in 1926 prohibited “the wearing of 
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inexpensive garments.”118 No protection was accorded to consumers against 
artificially raised domestic prices on essential goods, and instead, they suffered 
declining access to growers and producers.119 Most importantly, they were denied the 
option of purchasing cheaper imported goods.120 
Despite exhibiting zealous loyalty protectionist ideals, the Tariff Board 
sustained heavy criticism from all quarters. Whilst one critic referred to it, as “that 
egregious excrescence on our constitutional and political system,”121 others argued 
that it failed dismally to provide sufficient protection for Australian industries.122 
Some, “inside and outside Parliament”,123 argued that the Board had usurped the 
functions of Parliament and had become an independent tariff-making authority.124 
One of the most persistent complaints levelled against it during the early years after 
its establishment was that its decision-making processes lacked transparency and 
impartiality.125 In particular, the Board was rebuked for its practice of holding its 
hearings in private.126  
Its recommended Tariff Schedule was considered unfair, and the manner in 
which the Board formulated the Tariff was thought to be “seriously open to 
question”.127 One journalist, incensed about the Board members’ blatant bias towards 
manufacturers, insisted that once the members of Parliament and their voters were 
apprised of the level of the Board’s partiality, it would be inconceivable that the 
public could expected to be “taxed so heavily for the benefit of a small section of the 
community”.128 Similarly, Mr Mann MP questioned whether the Board, in taxing the 
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public in order that “private industries be bolstered up”129 had “functioned in a right 
and proper manner.”130  
The complaints against the Board intensified after its hearings were opened to 
the public. Many were especially shocked by the “cupidity of applicants,”131 whose 
admissions, relating to their inability to meet ordinary completion, in fact, amounted 
to confessions of inefficiency.132 Others were concerned that whilst the government 
nurtured Australian industries “under hot-house conditions,”133 the working class 
was being called upon to carry the economic burden of an increased cost of living134 
and were “helpless against Melbourne and Sydney protectionist vampires.”135 
Furthermore, it became manifestly obvious that the Board was not comprised of a 
group of “disinterested experts”136 who were expected to determine Australia’s 
tariffs “on a scientific basis”137 in place of the “usual empiricism.”138 The Board was 
expected to only have a temporary life. However, the Board’s term was extended for 
an extra year in 1923 and the Tariff Board Act 1924 (Cth) had the effect of making 
the Board a permanent body. 
 
3.5 Women’s Associations 
The housewife… represents the small purse, and artificially inflated prices for daily rations 
that are not luxuries waken her indignation into active protest.139 
During early twentieth century, the Australian women’s movement actively 
challenged patriarchal and maculininst ideologies and institutions.140 Their feminine 
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brand of political activism, although centred on genteel and tasteful ‘at home’ 
functions and edifying forums, nevertheless prompted the politicization and 
mobilisation of previously dependent and home-bound women.141 The movement 
saw the proliferation of progressive women’s organisations, such as the Housewives 
Association and National Council of Women. Whilst the membership of these 
organisations grew rapidly to became a “vital force,”142 they  were mainly comprised 
of middle class and politically conservative women143 who were not deeply 
concerned with mainstream politics but were rather involved with gendered 
interventionist philanthropic activities “in an increasingly urban society:”144 “[t]he 
Woman Movement was a broad and multifaceted expression of local and specific 
concerns with non-Aboriginal women’s legal, industrial and sexual 
disadvantages.”145 
The National Council of Women addressed such gendered issues as women’s 
work in the industrial world,146 women’s work in charity and philanthropy, women’s 
work in rural industries and educated motherhood.147 During the war years, the 
topics extended to ‘patriotic’ causes such as war savings and thrift campaigns.148 
Male experts such as Herbert Brookes, the then President of the Chamber of 
Commerce, were often invited to enlighten ‘uninformed’ female members on 
mainstream political issues and debates.149 Members of women’s organisations were 
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also publically engaged in discussions about the “causes of the ills and evils that 
confronted the poor.”150 They promulgated a shared or collective belief in the value 
of positive social intervention151 to eradicate those ‘social evils’ that ‘threatened’ the 
lives of ‘decent’ and respectable citizens.152  
The Housewives Association, led by Ivy Brookes, was established in mid-
1915 in Victoria in response to “wartime freezes, the failure of price-control 
measures, and widespread unemployment and distress.”153 The Association fervently 
supported the government’s protectionist policies as being in the national economic 
interest.154 Nevertheless, the Housewives Association, along with other organisations 
such as the National Council of Women,155 sought to alleviate the problems faced by 
female consumers with the rise in the cost of living by encouraging co-operative 
buying and the marketing of produce directly from the producer to the consumer.156 
However, this consumer project proved unsuccessful. Smart argues that its main 
activity was then “reduced to preaching patriotism and thrift between 1917 and 
1919.”157 
In July 1917, the National Council of Women demanded that women 
sacrifice more when supporting the war effort.158 It proposed a campaign to “to 
foster among womenfolk such a strong patriotic spirit that any women buying 
luxuries whose manufacture deprived the country of money that should be released 
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for national purposes, must be regarded as lacking in patriotism”.159  Whilst ‘luxury’ 
excited moral condemnation and stimulated the regulatory impulse, ‘thrift’ was 
extolled as an idealized and commendable feminine virtue. Denying oneself luxuries 
was considered to be a trivial female sacrifice compared to the part Australian men 
had played at the front; for they have played their part “nobly, generously, and 
marvellously unselfishly.”160 The Council argued that “[s]urely it is only ‘up to us’ 
women to play our part equally as well, and by doing without luxuries is one way in 
which we can help.”161 
Women of influence often used their powerful positions in these 
organisations and acted as agents of the dominant male hegemony. For instance, Ivy 
Brookes cleverly sought to convince other women to forego imported luxuries by 
appealing to them via their traditional roles as mothers and wives.162 It was 
suggested that women were ideally suited to make personal sacrifices on behalf of 
the nation because they had a superior and natural capacity for selflessness and 
personal restraint. On one occasion, Ivy persuasively suggested to women that this 
capacity for self-sacrifice was what defined their extrinsic female characteristic: 
“[w]omen in general are more ready to make sacrifices, since they are so often called 
upon to make them in their every-day life.”163  On another occasion, she insisted that 
women had a duty to their country to make a palpable sacrifice to shore-up 
Australia’s economy.164 In a further speech, Ivy posits: “[w]hat woman is there who 
is loyal to her country, who would not give up buying luxuries to help Australia? So 
this is one way in which we women can help.”165 
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3.6 The Commonwealth and State Arbitration Courts 
I am safe in saying that this interesting Australian experiment is so far a success, and that 
there is not the slightest indication of any movement to revert to the old anarchic state.       
Henry Bournes Higgins166 
 
The constitutional framers of the new Constitution were determined that the new 
nation should “reach out into a new province and replace barbarous [industrial 
relations] practices”167 with orderly practices through the machinery of conciliation 
and arbitration: a uniquely “Australasian social experiment”.168 This innovative form 
of state intervention in industrial relations was led by Henry Bournes Higgins J 
(1851-1929),169 who has been described as “the founder and principal architect of the 
system of conciliation and arbitration.”170 Yet, Higgins J had no experience in 
industrial matters when he was first appointed to the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Court.171  
            Higgins J had been born in Ireland on 30 June 1851. His father was a 
Methodist minister and the family emigrated to Australia in 1870. He was educated 
at Wesley College Ireland and Melbourne University where he graduated in law. He 
had a lengthy career at the Melbourne Bar and in politics before his appointment to 
the High Court. Higgins J had been one of the ten chosen from Victoria to meet in 
Adelaide for the convention for framing the Federation Bill. Whilst he studying law, 
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he tutored students including the sons of David Syme (the Victorian Newspaper 
magnate who heavily influenced the promotion of Protectionism).172 Alfred Deakin 
was one of Higgins’ closest friends.173 
          Higgins served as the federal member for North Melbourne, a working-class 
seat. In 1904, he served as Attorney-General in the first and short-lived Watson 
Labor government, but he was not a member of the Australian Labor Party. In 1906, 
he was appointed as a Puisne Justice of the High Court of Australia, and in 
September 1907, he was appointed as second President of the Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration, whilst simultaneously maintaining his position on the High Court.174             
During the decades following Federation, government had sought to more formally 
regulate and ‘normalise’ the population through new forms of institutional power. 
The creation of the Federal arbitration court system was one of the most notable 
examples of the government’s regulatory impulse. The arbitration courts’ ‘living 
wage’ hearings not only diffused industrial conflict but were real attempts to control, 
“in the whirling confusion of the times,”175 what Hunt calls the “visible 
manifestations of rising social groups either challenging or undermining the 
incumbents of advantaged social positions.”176 
The  Harvester case177 was Higgins J’s first case and he had to decide 
whether the manufacturer Hugh McKay was paying a ‘fair and reasonable’ wage to 
his employees as required by the ‘New Protection’ legislation. In this case, after 
Higgins had calculated a family budget for a household of ‘about five persons’, he 
settled on seven shillings a day as the minimum wage for an unskilled labourer. 
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Higgins J believed his task178 was to set prescribed nationwide standards179 for the 
working classes whilst at the same time providing for the “normal needs of the 
average [male] employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised 
community.”180 Marriage was always to be the cornerstone of this ‘living wage’ 
paradigm.181 Higgins argued that it was not his duty to fix a high wage “but a fair 
and reasonable wage: not a wage that is merely enough to keep body and soul 
together, but something between these two extremes.”182 This ‘living wage’, as the 
basis of his “pioneering nation-building work”,183 was to cover the basic 
requirements of shelter, food, clothing and some measure of ‘frugal comfort’ for a 
man, his wife and three notional children.184 This ‘normality test’ was to become 
Higgins J’s “primary test”185 in ascertaining the minimum wage in the case of male 
‘unskilled labourers’.186 This form of normalisation became binding as a code that 
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was subsequently adopted and validated as “just and proper”187 by other arbitration 
judges and Boards of Trade.188 
The Harvester minimum wage was considerably higher than that allowed by 
most State tribunals. Trade unions sought to bring their disputes within the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court whilst employer organisations vilified the 
court and its president. Yet, Higgins J’s decision in this case won “him world-wide 
renown as an innovator in the field of social justice”189 and he was to become an 
important influence on the state arbitration judges, including Justice William Jethro 
Brown, who closely followed Higgins J’s lead.190 The Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration offered Higgins J a unique opportunity to make his visionary stamp by 
using a pioneering form of dispute resolution that involved a civilised191 and 
scientific192 approach towards dispute resolution. On a broader level, he intended to 
use the Court to play a role in the building of the new nation193 and “to uphold 
managerial prerogative while acknowledging a selective range of rights for a 
predominately white male workforce.”194 He provided working-class men and 
women with an unprecedented opportunity to express their “demands for justice”195 
and to give to the public an account of their personal trials and tribulations as 
members of the workforce.196 Nevertheless, Higgins’s ‘normalising’ objectives were 
motivated to a large extent by his paternalistic desire for national industrial 
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uniformity and to set prescribed nationwide standards197 on consumables including 
his vision of ‘civilized’ social conformity.198  
 
3.7 The Unions 
 
The protection of manufacturers and of labour marches in one indissoluble unity, and in this 
matter, at least, the two lions of employer and employed lie down at the same feast, with the 
same “lamb”, consuming the consumer.199 
In 1914, about one Australian in every nine was a trade unionist, whilst in 
1927 it was approximately one Australian in seven.200 Conditions were immensely 
favourable for the growth of trade unionism during the first decades after Federation. 
This was mostly because its members were made up to a large extent from “the great 
mass of [British] immigrants”201 who were of a class that had been accustomed to 
‘craft organisations’ or guilds.202 Whilst unionism underpinned the creation of the 
Labour Party, it was, according Hancock, also to a considerable degree, a product of 
industrial arbitration.203 Not only did the state protect unionism, the judicial 
regulation of industry practically compelled the creation of trade union organisations, 
as the “only organised bodies [that could] approach the courts.”204 
K J Hancock suggests that the expansion of federal coverage into areas of 
employment appeared to have been instigated by the unions, particularly during the 
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period between 1912 until the 1920s.205 He suggests that Higgins J was “probably 
the strongest exponent of the notion of pursuing industrial peace by enforcing a code 
of wages and salaries that was founded upon clear principles of industrial policy.”206 
In the early years after Federation, the trade union-backed Labour Party, which had 
at first held the balance between Free Traders and Protectionists, began playing what 
W K Hancock calls the profitable bargaining game of “support in return for 
concessions.”207 The party started to drift towards the Protectionist side which 
pandered to their fears about “the competitive strength of frugal Orientals”208 that 
might result in lower wages and conditions for Australian workers.209 The Labour 
Party reached a highpoint of political power in 1915, when it held Federal control 
and governed five of the six states.210 Despite this affiliation between unionists and 
protectionists, there was a period of acute industrial unrest during the latter part of 
World War I.211 However, notwithstanding some divisions, trade unionists generally 
continued to support the existence of arbitration. 212 
On the other hand, the relationship between government and the arbitration 
system had become, at times, highly volatile.213A crisis occurred in the 1918-21 
period when “open conflict emerged”214 between Higgins J and Hughes about 
Higgins J’s apparent sympathy with union claims for a 44-hour week.215 Hughes was 
frustrated by the failure of Higgins J and Powers J “to secure quick settlements of 
damaging strikes”216 and proposed to replace Higgins J’s arbitration system with a 
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number of specialised tribunals.217 Higgins J immediately resigned, claiming that 
such a proposal was a reckless concession that would only multiply future industrial 
troubles.218 
During 1921-22, when the Tariff Board was being established, there was brief 
economic recession, when unemployment rose to 11.2 per cent.219 Even though there 
was no union represented on the Tariff Board, union representatives, without concern 
for the consumer, nevertheless continued to seek the rewards of protection to allay 
what were seen as worsening standards of living for their workers:  
Their strategy was to support the manufacturer’s claims for higher tariffs before the Tariff 
Board, and after the increase had been granted, to apply to the Arbitration Court for higher 
wages.220 
In its 1926 Annual Report, Tariff Board members expressed their alarm about 
the actions of the unions in applying to the Arbitration Court for increases in wages 
whenever the tariff was increased.221 It seems that unionists supported protectionism 
because they considered that it helped protect wages in sheltered industries and that it 
could even guarantee them high wages.222 Whilst the Board conceded that it was 
natural for workers to want to share in the benefits of protection, the Board suggested 
that the unions’ claims were in fact defeating the effect of any increase in duties.223 It 
suggested that this passing back and forth between the Federal Arbitration Court and 
the Tariff Board for increments in wages and duties would have the effect of 
continuously raising the cost of living and bringing about ‘industrial paralysis’.224  
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3.8 The Press 
 
The public of Australia are more dependent on the daily press for information than the 
public of any other country in the world…225 Henry Bournes Higgins 
 
Even before Federation, newspapers such as the Bulletin, The Age, The 
Sydney Morning Herald and The Argus were popular and influential mouthpieces of 
Australian “literary, economic, and political nationalism”.226 There was fierce 
competition between newspaper proprietors.  During the peak year of 1923, Australia 
had 26 metropolitan dailies and 21 separate newspaper proprietors.227 Syndication 
and mass-circulating newspapers were common, and this resulted in political, social 
and cultural issues being widely disseminated, in various guises, across the nation.228 
The press had real control over public opinion. It could educate and entertain readers.  
It could to sway public opinion by sensationalising, criticising, endorsing or 
moralising any contemporary social issue or governmental policy. The press could 
reassure readers in times of crisis or it could publish alarmist propaganda. The 
influence of the press on the masses was so great that it prompted one editor to 
declare: “Its influence is destined to supersede that of the pulpit and Parliament as a 
means of advancing the moral and material welfare of humanity, and spreading the 
blessings of civilisation…”229 
Newspaper proprietors, including James Fairfax (1863-1928) and David 
Syme, exercised enormous influence over government policy before and after 
Federation. Syme, in particular, used his proprietorial and editorial influence at the 
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Age in Melbourne to voice his form of male-dominated liberalism230 that was 
serious, progressive and moral.231 He was a persuasive communicator and an astute 
political commentator who clearly influenced government policy, particularly when 
he zealously championed tariff protection and land reform. He was considered to be 
not only the ‘father of protection’ but also the “the maker and unmaker of 
Governments.”232 Syme made clever use of new technologies of communication, 
such as the rotary press, to significantly increase his readership and his circle of 
influence. His biographer claimed that for almost fifty years, Syme was the most 
powerful person in Australia.233  
He and his son Geoffrey (1873-1942) both proved to be valuable allies to 
influential men such as Higgins J,234 Herbert Brookes,235 and Alfred Deakin, who 
was said to have an “almost filial intimacy”236 with the newspaper magnate. Deakin, 
who had been converted to the cause of Protection,237 declared in Syme’s biography, 
that Syme’s newspaper “was a power because [Syme] was a power”.238 Morrison 
suggests, however, that whilst Syme took a prominent part in the politics leading up 
to Federation, it was more often politicians such as Deakin who sought to influence 
Syme in order to have certain views advocated in the Age.239 
The male-dominated Australian press used gendered discourse to reinforce 
sexual stereotypes and social customs. News coverage was primarily written for men, 
by men and scant attention was given to women’s issues except when they related to 
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dress, appearance and moralisation. At a time when women were seeking a more 
public role in society by entering the workforce and pursuing roles in government, 
the press insisted on describing and defining them in gendered and often trivial  or 
idealised terms: by their dress, their physical appearance or in caricature. This type of 
misogynist media coverage was particularly vitriolic when issues were raised 
concerning women’s rights or social projects including suffrage, the temperance 
movement, and female wages and working conditions.240 Women activists were 
mocked, abused and insulted.241 They were often portrayed by the press, in words, 
and often in cartoons, as unfeminine, frigid and hysterical. 242 
We see in later chapters that femininity and women’s fashions became a 
public site of conflict and contestation.243  The press was complicit with religious 
officials and Parliament in the condemnation of female consumers who favoured 
imported fashion clothing and eschewed Australian manufactured lines.244 These 
women were not only accused of being unpatriotic but they were considered to be 
responsible for all manner of social and economic ills.245 It is ironic that, at the same 
time women were being denigrated for their consumption practices, these 
newspapers carried a plethora of special sexualised messages and fashion 
advertisements that were especially aimed at enticing a feminine public.246 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a brief contextual background for the chapters that 
follow. It provides some understanding of the personalities, institutions and 
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ideologies that contributed to the revival of sumptuary regulation in Australia during 
the early decades following Federation and that feature so prominently in the 
following chapters. The chapter illustrates the extent that patricians such as the 
Brookes’ and institutions such as the Tariff Board played in shaping social and 
economic policy Australia as a fledgling nation. 
Chapter 4 will examine the birth and expansion of Protectionism in Australia 
up until 1914. Protectionism was firmly embraced by early post-Federation 
governments and touted by many as the panacea to protect nascent local industries 
from aggressive overseas competition. It was a sumptuary policy that was closely 
intertwined with notions of patriotism, nationalism and moral regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
4 TAXATION IN AUSTRALIA UP UNTIL 1914: THE WARP AND WEFT 
OF PROTECTIONISM 
 
4.1 Purpose and Structure of the chapter 
 
The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based. It is 
as necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the air he breathes to the 
natural man. It is not only the power to destroy, but the power to keep alive.1 
 
This chapter offers an account of the taxing policies in Australia from 1788 
up until the beginning of World War I, when the exigencies of the First World War 
forced the Australian government to reassess its tax policies. During the period from 
1788 until 1914, Australia transitioned from being a collection of provincial colonies 
with their own economic objectives and taxing policies to a Federation with 
centrally-directed taxing authority. Whilst this political transition was taking place 
there was also a transition occurring in government policy concerning the function of 
taxation in Australia. 
 Government no longer used taxation just for revenue-raising but began to use 
it more as an intrusive tool to modify the private behaviour of Australians to reflect 
its own economic policy of protectionism. As a result, a strong symbiotic 
relationship developed between taxation and protectionism and, by the end of the 
first decade after Federation, Australia had become almost uniformly Protectionist. 
This chapter argues that at the same time taxation was taking on this decidedly 
protectionist character, the federal government’s policy of imposing high tariffs on 
apparel began to markedly resemble what Hunt calls “a project”2 of sumptuary 
regulation. The federal government’s policy of imposing high tariffs on imported 
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apparel had assumed a marked ‘sumptuary effect’. This meant that the Australian 
government controlled what type and quality of clothing certain classes of people 
could wear. 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the framework for one of the central 
issues of my thesis; that taxation of clothing in Australia in the first three decades 
after Federation can be regarded as a form of sumptuary regulation. This chapter 
provides a textural3 surface on which I can lay out the warp and weft of my narrative. 
As I begin to lay out the threads of Australia’s early taxes, and then overlap them 
with the newly spun strands of protectionism it’s not long before they all start to 
intertwine and form a (con)textual fabric reflecting the social, economic and political 
concerns that faced Australia as a transitioning nation. My fabric, at this stage in the 
weaving process, begins to look like a fragment of a previously archived sumptuary 
text(ile). In the following chapters, I will continue to lay other new and different 
threads across the surface of this foundational fabric; including threads of 
nationalism, of war precautions legislation and increasing government intervention. 
By then, the fabric will have become an even more tightly woven replica of 
sumptuary regulation. It will not be until chapters 9 and 10 that we notice this fabric 
weaken and begin to lose its sumptuary character. 
Following on from the introduction in Part 1, the second part of the chapter 
looks at the main source of taxation in the early Australian colonies. It also argues 
that at the time of the first white settlement there were some commonalities between 
these early colonial taxes and sumptuary regulation. Part 3 begins by providing some 
background to the taxation regime that came to be introduced at Federation. This part 
also suggests that the form of protectionism that developed in the first three decades 
                                                 
3 The words “text” and “textile” both derive from the Latin texere, to weave. Oxford English 
Dictionary, Text <http://www.oed.com>. 
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after Federation had its roots in the colonial taxing policies implemented in the first 
three decades of white colonial settlement in Australia.  
Part 4 describes the move from an Imperial-administered colonial taxing 
regime to one where the colonial governor was in a position to impose local customs 
duties. It shows that it was not until each colony had its own representative 
government that it was in the position to implement its own taxation policy. Part 5 
briefly explores how the original revenue-raising role of taxation in the colonies 
morphed into a combined fiscal and protective device that was then used by colonial 
governments to promote their social and economic objectives. Further, this part will 
also show that protectionist duties provoked a spirit of provincialism in the colonies 
which eventually became one of the main motivating factors behind the move 
towards Federation, which, it was hoped, would solve inter-colonial trade disputes.4 
Part 6 deals with the shift of taxing powers from the colonies to the Federal 
Government. It details the emergence of a centrally-directed taxing regime that 
sought to provide funds to the States and to provide for the costs of the Federal 
Government. This part also illustrates that although most of the revenue collected 
during the first two decades after Federation came from customs and excise, these 
same duties had also quickly become highly protectionist in character. Part 7 
examines the second Deakin government’s attempt to attract labour supporters to its 
protectionist ideology by linking protection with the provision of ‘fair and reasonable 
wages’ for workers.   
Part 8 attempts to proffer some explanations why, by the end of the first 
decade after Federation, Australian politicians began to take on a more uniform 
approach to protectionism. This part also provides a brief sketch of the political 
discourse that was not only preoccupied with the potential effects of protection, but 
which also had adopted a more pro-protectionist advocacy and fervour. Part 9 briefly 
describes how government continued to increase tariffs on clothing after the failure 
of the ‘New Protection’ to link protection with ‘fair and reasonable wages’. It also 
                                                 
4 A J Reitsma, Trade Protection in Australia (University of Queensland Press, 1960) 11. 
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provides an overview of the functions of the Inter-State Commission which the 
Federal government established as part of its continued experimentation with trade 
protection. 
 
4.2 Early Colonial taxes-a faint sumptuary pattern 
 
This was the state of things in England at the time of the first settlement in Australia.5 
 
This part of the chapter looks at the main source of taxation in the early 
Australian colonies. It also argues that even at the time of the first white settlement 
there were some commonalities between these early colonial taxes and sumptuary 
regulation. This part also suggests that the form of protectionism that developed in 
the first three decades after Federation had its roots in the colonial taxing policies 
implemented in the first three decades of white colonial settlement in Australia.  
Australia’s earliest6 colonial taxes on spirits, wine and beers7 were ‘indirect’ 
consumption taxes in the form of customs8 and excise duties. The fact that taxation 
took this form in the Australian colonies was not an unusual phenomenon. By the 
time of white colonization in Australia, most countries and colonies had taxation that 
tended to be indirect.9 In 1925, when Mills published his iconic Taxation in 
                                                 
5 Stephen Mills, Taxation in Australia (MacMillan Press, 1925) 11. 
6 Ibid 24. Mills states that in 1791 Governor Phillip suggested the imposition of a duty on spirits; 
which the King afterwards imposed.  
7 Ibid 22. 
8 Ibid 4-6. Although customs (portoria) existed at the time of ancient kings of Rome, it was during the 
reign of Augustus and his successors when the trade in riches and exotic merchandise from Syracuse, 
Carthage, Macedonia and Asia increased enormously, that customs and excise duties were then 
imposed on every kind of imported and exported goods. These same types of taxes were maintained in 
the British Isles after the Romans departed. It was commonplace for the English sovereign to impose 
import duties on luxuries including textiles such as lace, silk and scarlet and other dyed cloth, as well 
as export duties on items such as wool and leather. 
9 Woellner et al, Australian Taxation Law (CCH, 24th ed, 2014) 1-40. Woellner et al suggest that, by 
1755, such taxes provided 82% of total English revenue: at 5. It is also suggested that the reason why 
there was the lack of any real broad-based system of taxation was the lack of the administrative 
infrastructure and expertise necessary for the efficient control of this type of tax system: at 6. 
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Australia, these types of indirect taxes”10 were continuing to provide the largest 
single item of revenue for the Commonwealth of Australia.11 Mills argues that the 
introduction of this type of “impost”12 during the early stages in the history of 
maritime countries such as Australia is “a priori probable”13 because it was 
commonly the first form of taxation levied by a young community. Historically, this 
type of taxation also reflected the need for royal or State protection in light of the 
real risks from piracy14 that  importers and merchants faced with the transit of 
precious and rare merchandise, such as wine, wax and cloth.15  
There is an interesting parallel between these types of colonial taxes and the 
English sumptuary laws.16 Both types of legislation depended to a large extent on the 
economic control and security of maritime spaces and territorial borders. This meant 
that it was often necessary, when protecting local industry, to regulate the ingress and 
egress of foreign domestic goods.17 In the Australian context, the perilous journey 
involved in the importation of necessities and luxuries from the Motherland to 
Australia during the colonial period caused persistent anxieties for both government 
officials and merchants. However, when the goods finally arrived at the few 
established deep-water ports, the exaction of tax was efficacious and did not require 
sophisticated infrastructure for assessment and collection.18  There are a number of 
other commonalities between these early Australian colonial customs duties and 
                                                 
10 Mills, above n 5, 3. Mills suggests these types of taxes had their roots in Roman and Medieval 
English taxing policy. 
11 Mills, above n 5, 3. 
12 Ibid 5. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid 5. Mills suggests that in some instances customs taxation was introduced in England during the 
interval between the departure of the Romans and the Norman Conquest.  An important consideration 
were the risks of transit incidents in those earlier ages when the rule of law on ocean highways was 
either entirely unknown or was generally disregarded. Mills suggests that the tax was a toll paid to the 
King for the “necessary protection of merchants and their merchandise ‘ineundo morando et 
redeundo’ on land and sea”. In other words, it was a premium paid to the King at ports for insurance 
and royal protection on imported and exported cargo, particularly in predatory times when pirates 
frequently attacked merchant vessels. 
15 Ibid 5. 
16 Ibid 8. Customs duties were at various times called “Aliens Duty”. 
17 Ibid 8.  
18 Mills, above n 5, generally. 
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sumptuary laws. Both were consumption-based and both involved restrictions on the 
expenditure on dress, food and other items of consumption. They were also both 
based on a plethora of ad hoc and often inconsistent legislation and regulations.  
At the time of the first white settlement in Australia, not only was the 
management and collection of Customs revenue subjected to “incredible abuses”19 
but “[t]he Statute Book was crammed with innumerable Acts relating to the Customs, 
overlapping, chaotic, unintelligible.”20 Mills suggests that it was this jungle of 
legislation, concerning the imposition and collection of Customs duties, which 
became the basis of the tax system applicable at the time of the first white settlement 
in Australia.21 
For many decades, the colonies’ taxing policies were motivated by the need 
to raise revenue to supplement those often meagre funds that were provided by 
England to establish and maintain both a penal colony and a free settlement in a land 
that was not only isolated by vast distance from ‘the homeland’ but which also 
lacked any of those comforts and industries found at the time in England.22 During 
this period the British government provided food and clothing for most of the 
convicts, their guards, some civilians and Aborigines.23  Some taxes, in the form of 
customs (tariffs) and excise duties, were also raised by the colony’s administrators to 
ostensibly supplement the official stipend which was aimed at mere subsistence 
husbandry.24  It was expected that this stipend would continue to be provided by the 
British Government until such a time that each colony, with its cheap prison labour, 
could ‘keep itself’.25  In fact, until 1824, public expenses for the Colony of New 
South Wales consisted chiefly of expenditure connected with the support and 
                                                 
19 Ibid 10. 
20 Ibid 10. According to Mills there were 1300 laws of Customs passed between the first and fifty-
third years of the reign of George III. 
21 Ibid 10. 
22 Margaret Maynard, Fashioned from Penury: Dress as Cultural Practice in Colonial Australia 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994) 28. 
23 Ibid 27. 
24 William Hancock, Australia (Ernest Benn, 1930) 11. 
25 Ibid. 
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management of British convicts26  and were borne almost entirely by the “Imperial 
Government.”27 
This form of financial assistance helped to shore up both Britain’s need to 
establish and maintain colonies in which it could relocate surplus convicts28 or 
‘human riffraff’. It also allowed her to continue to carve out colonial outposts where 
resources, both human and natural, could be regulated and turned to an advantage in 
building up the expanding Imperial Empire.29  Britain not only ‘owned’ the new 
colonies and all their natural resources, but the Imperial government deemed itself to 
be in the best position to minutely regulate and guide the activities of all British 
colonial subjects. At the same time, it maintained public order and established a 
clearly defined hierarchical social order. During the transportation period, for 
instance, the British government regulated what clothing that most inhabitants could 
wear.30 Early convicts were in most part identifiable by a uniform that was made 
distinctive by a coloured stripe.31 
This form of paternalism,32 where the Imperial Government was the universal 
provider, also created a widespread dependency that discouraged local enterprise and 
eventually fostered strong reliance on cheap ready-made imported clothing and 
accessories, particularly those of British origin.33 The flood of ready-made clothing 
into the colonies not only became a boon to British manufacturing, but also provided 
colonial governments with an opportunity to alleviate economic insecurity by raising 
substantial revenue on this imported clothing.34 These social and economic bonds 
and associations with Britain and the indefatigable crossing and re-crossing of the 
oceans from one hemisphere to another in the transportation of convicts, government 
                                                 
26 Mills, above n 5, 26. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 20. 
29 Maynard, above n 22, 10. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 14. 
32 Ibid 27; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 May 1901, 15 
(James McColl).  
33 Mills, above n 5, 26-27. 
34 Maynard, above n 22, 27. 
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officials, free settlers and merchandise continued to ensure that there was a constant 
flow of goods that would attract customs and excise duties; particularly imported 
clothing and exported materials such as wool.35 After the 1790s, there was also a 
vigorous private trade in fabric, leather, sewing accessories and low-cost readymade 
clothing for men and women 36 with British colonies, such as India.37 Not only did 
these goods supplement the supply of British-made clothing but it also meant more 
money for the colonies’ coffers. 
However, the collection practices and value of these taxes were nothing more 
than an ad hoc exercise during a period when the Colonies’ administrators had to 
deal with many exigencies: an uncertain economy, a disinterested British 
government, unrest and dissatisfaction of prisoners and settlers, the irregularity of 
shipments and the lack of local industries and businesses.38 Harris suggests that the 
Colonies “did not have a great need for revenue during the first half of the 19th 
Century”.39  Whilst most of the costs of transportations and the establishment and 
running of the penal settlements were borne during this period by the Imperial 
Governments, through the raising of funds from the London markets and the sale of 
public land to free settlers, local tax collection in the colonies was still significant. 
Not only did the added revenue help fill some of the gaps not covered by these fiscal 
procedures but it could be argued that  this type of taxation became the foundation 
stone upon which the colonial tax regime and later the early Federal tax systems 
were built. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Reitsma, above n 4. For example, there was, according to Governor King, who initiated the tariff 
system in New South Wales, a 5% duty on “all wares and merchandise brought from any port to the 
east-west of the Cape”.  
36 Maynard, above n 22, 27. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid 27-32. 
39 Peter Harris, ‘Metamorphosis of the Australian Income Tax: 1866 to 1922’ (Research Study No 37, 
Australian Tax Research Foundation, 2002) 201. 
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4.3 1819-1859- the formalisation of tax policy in the Australian Colonies 
 
In 1819 the affairs of New South Wales received more than the usual amount of attention 
and publicity in England.40 
 
This part of the chapter describes the move from an Imperial-administered 
colonial taxing regime to one where the colonial governor was in a position to 
impose local customs duties. However, it was not until each colony had its own 
representative government that it was in the position to implement its own taxation 
policy. 
In 1819, the British Parliament legalised41 the collection of duties in the 
colony of New South Wales. The New South Wales Governor was thus authorised to 
impose customs duties of 10 shillings per gallon upon British spirits or British West 
Indian rum shipped from Britain; of 15 shillings upon foreign spirits; of 4 shillings 
per pound on tobacco and 15 per centum ad valorem duties upon non-British 
manufactures and upon the importation of all goods, wares and merchandise not 
being the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United Kingdom.42  
The first steps in establishing representative government were made with the 
passing of a British Act43 in 1823. This Act provided a very simple form of 
legislative governance for the colony. It was not until 1842 that provision was made 
for elected members to participate in the legislative council. The Australian 
Constitutions Act (No 1) 1842 (Imp) established a blended Legislative Council that 
consisted of thirty-six members, of whom two-thirds were to be elected and one third 
to be appointed by the Crown. Responsible parliamentary government was finally 
achieved in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia in 1856. In 
                                                 
40 Mills, above n 5, 29. 
41 Duties in New South Wales Act 1819, 59 Geo 3, c 114. 
42 Mills, above n 5, 29. 
43 New South Wales Act 1823, 4 Geo 4, c 96. Mills suggests that the enactment of this Act marked the 
end of the ‘purely military government’ that had subsisted since the establishment of the Colony. 
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New South Wales, the existing Legislative Council was replaced by a bicameral 
legislature that consisted of  a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly. 
Under the 1923 Act, the Governor exercised legislative powers on the advice 
of a small legislative council constituted of five to seven members appointed by the 
Crown.44 Whilst the legislators envisaged a colonial constitution and court system 
for New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, they did not consider expanding the 
colonial taxing powers.45 The  colonial council could only levy taxes or duties “as it 
may be necessary to levy for local purposes.”46 Notwithstanding, these limited 
colonial taxes and duties, which were mostly on imports of alcohol and luxuries,47 
became very profitable and the revenue raised by import duties increased from £28 
763 in 1824 to £195 080 in 1840.48  
By 1850, the European population in the colonies was less than half a 
million49 and most of the tradeable goods were connected with primary production, 
whilst most manufactured articles, including clothing, were imported mainly from 
Britain.50 By 1858-1859 the population in the colonies had increased to one million51 
and there was a very noticeable growth in the market for imported clothing and other 
domestic goods and luxuries.52 This growth in imported items reflected a period of 
rising trade and the increase in economic prosperity of the colonies and the spending 
capacity of their populations. In New South Wales, for instance, the total amount of 
imported British-made clothing more than quadrupled between 1848 and 185353 and 
much of the colony’s prosperity was generated by the rapid growth in exports of 
                                                 
44 R D Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States (University of Queensland Press, 1972) 11-
20. See Mills, above n 5 46. 
45 Mills, above n 5, 29.  
46 Ibid 31. The Councils were constituted of between five and seven members who held office by 
appointment. They could not over-ride the Governor in matters of legislation. 
47 Kym Anderson and Ross Garnaut, Australian Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects (Allen & 
Unwin, 1987) 40-41. 
48 Ibid 41. 
49 Ibid 40. 
50 Ibid 40-41. 
51 Australian Bureau of Statistics Yearbook [2001] 2. 
52 Maynard, above n 22, 122. 
53 Ibid. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics the population increased to two million in 
1877. 
 
107 
 
primary-produced tradeable goods.54 There was also an enormous spike in the 
demand for imported clothing during the gold-rush period when “a rising population 
of prosperous consumers”55 spent their newly found wealth on all sorts of imported 
luxurious and superior ready-made fashion apparel, even though these goods 
attracted high customs duties.56 This rapid growth in exports and the dramatic 
increase in disposable income in this period also soon resulted in a rapid expansion 
of banking and commerce.57 
Colonial tariff policies continued to be controlled by ‘the Mother Country’ 
until self-government was granted to five of the six Australian colonies between 
1855 and 1859.58 From then on, and in a relatively short period, these colonies, albeit 
in different degrees, began to achieve some economic and political independence. In 
1850 the Australian Colonies Government Act, 1850 (Imp)59 was passed and 
provided for the formation of government in New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, 
South Australia, and to Victoria as a colony separate from New South Wales. The 
Act also provided for future application to Western Australia.60 New South Wales 
and Victoria subsequently achieved responsible government in 1855; Tasmania in 
1856; and Queensland, which separated from New South Wales, in 1859. It was not 
until 1890 that Western Australia achieved responsible government.61 
                                                 
54 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 40. The value of gold exports surpassed wool exports as 
Australia’s major export during the 1850s and 1860s: see Australian Bureau of Statistics Yearbook 
[2009-10]. 
55 Maynard, above n 22, 122. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Australian Bureau of Statistics Yearbook [2009-10] 1. 
58 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 40. 
59 Australian Colonies Government Act 1850 (Imp) 13 & 14 Vic, c 59.  
60 Reitsma, above n 4, 5. 
61 Ibid. For each separate colony the English Parliament passed a ‘constitution’ act which gave each 
colony some measure of independence and self-government. However, the Colonial Office in London 
retained control over foreign affairs, defence and international shipping. The Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865 (Imp) ss 2 – 3 defined the relationship between the ‘colonial’ and ‘imperial’ legislation and 
gave the colonies the right to amend their own constitutions and the opportunity for them to enact 
legislation without necessarily applying English domestic law, provided that no English statute 
directly applied to the colony in question. 
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There was a high degree of economic and political tension and competition62 
between these newly formed colonies and their governments and Allin suggests that 
the history of the tariff relations between them can be read as “a sorry record of inter-
colonial jealousy and strife.”63  One of the burning political issues in the colonies 
before Federation was centred on the fact that each of the colonies raised their 
revenue by not only imposing taxes on overseas imports but also on inter-colonial 
traded goods;64 it was their most “elastic and most important source of revenue.”65  
The colonies, with their pre-federation rivalries had “scattered Customs houses along 
their land frontiers.”66  However, the great difficulty in the fifteen years prior to  
Federation was “in working out exactly what would be the fair way(sic) and 
sustainable way” 67 to return revenue to the States once a future federal government 
acquired the sole power to impose customs and excise duties. 
 Despite the passing of the Australian Colonies Government Act 1850 (Imp), the 
colonies were slow in taking on national status. Not only were they “small, isolated 
communities in the pioneer stage of social and political organization”68 but each 
colony was oblivious to what was going on in “the contiguous but far distant 
communities.”69 Each colony was only focused on the development of its own 
resources and to the furtherance of their own immediate political and economic 
interests.70 Their efforts were without the support of the British Parliament which 
only took a spasmodic interest in the affairs of these distant colonies. Besides, the 
                                                 
62 Cephas Allin, A History of the Tariff Relations of the Australian Colonies (University of Minnesota 
Bulletin, 1918) 1. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 May 1901, 5673 (Sir 
George Turner, Treasurer). 
66 Hancock, above n 24, 76. 
67 ABC Radio National, ‘Plucking the goose: a history of taxation in Australia’, ABC Rear Vision 17 
June 2007, 2 (Julie Smith and Neil Warren). 
68 Allin, above n 62, 1. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Mills, above n 5, 20-199. 
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colonial office was “too ill-informed to be able to supervise the policy of 
administration of the struggling settlements.”71 
As the colonies became more economically self-reliant and idiosyncratic in their 
economic ideologies they also began to develop even more divergent social, political 
and economic policies and rivalries. For instance, the two major colonies, Victoria 
and New South Wales, had, for various reasons,72 adopted radically different 
commercial and revenue policies. New South Wales had a steadfast adherence to 
Free Trade which was largely supported by the sale of public land,73 whilst Victoria 
exhibited a “doctrinal fervour”74 for the theory of Protection.75  Whereas New South 
Wales’s consistent adherence to Free Trade was largely motivated by Sir Henry 
Parkes, who was “for a long period was the most striking figure”76  in Australia’s 
political life, Victoria’s obsessive stance on Protection, which resulted in very high 
tariffs, was fuelled by “the continuous and passionate advocacy”77 of David Syme.78  
As the proprietor79 of the Melbourne morning journal (The Age) he exercised 
                                                 
71 Allin, above n 62, 5. 
72 Alford suggests that the reasons why Victoria turned shapely towards Protection after 1860 were 
that there was sharp decline in the output of gold which fell by one-half between 1856 and 1866; 
unemployment grew to a disturbing extent and the outlook for the Colony became grave. At the time 
David Syme (The Age) entered into a powerful advocacy of the adoption of a protective policy to 
enable industries to provide employment. See Fred Alford, The Greater Illusion: A Critical Review of 
Australia’s Fiscal Policy (Marchant, 1934) 23.  
73 Harris, above n 39, 166. 
74 Mills, above n 5, 201. 
75 Fred Perry, ‘The Australian Tariff Experiment’ (1888) 3 Quarterly Journal of Economics 87. Perry 
states that the number employed in the woollen industry in Victoria (1886-1888) was considerably 
larger than in New South Wales. However, Victoria had not at that stage made the manufacture of 
woollens profitable. The Victorian industry was protected by duties ranging from 7.5% to 30%, whilst 
New South Wales woollen industry had no protection at this time. The manufacture of boots and 
shoes was also protected in Victoria: at 92-4. 
76 Mills, above n 5. Mills argues that the “phenomenon of Free Trade in one Colony among six, five of 
which had adopted Protection as their fiscal policy...is not readily explained.” He asserts that one 
cause of this phenomenon was that “the spirit of Free trade was incarnate in the person of Sir Henry 
Parkes”: at 202. 
77 Ibid. 
78 David Plowman, ‘Industrial Relations and the Legacy of New Protection’ (1992) 34 Journal of 
Industrial Relations 48. Plowman suggests that Syme was Deakin’s mentor and saw the state as an 
instrument of social change: at 50. 
79 Mills says that Syme was “a man of strongly marked personality”. See Mills, above n 5. 
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powerful influence over local politics.80 All these factors prompted, as between the 
colonies, the creation of contrary self-referential interests and conflicting fiscal 
legislation.81  Each colony framed its taxing legislation with an aim to foster its own 
particular economic and social needs and with little regard to the interests of the 
other colonies.82 This meant that each colony adopted “the easiest and readiest means 
of taxation without regard to economic principles.”83 Consequently, this 
individualistic type of economic and financial policy throughout the colonies laid the 
groundwork for economic discrimination in the form of a variety of inter-colonial 
differential and preferential tariffs. Allin summed up the relationship between the 
colonies when he stated : “[i]solation begat provincialism, provincialism begat protection, 
and protection begat colonial envy, bitterness, and strife.84 
 
4.4 1860-1900-taxation and protectionism85 
 
It is true that a considerable number of Customs duties aim openly at revenue, but there is 
also an unmeasured and a very large return to the Treasury from duties which are 
intentionally, though clumsily, Protectionist.86 
 
This part of the chapter will briefly explore how the original revenue-raising 
role of taxation in the colonies morphed into a combined fiscal and protective device 
that was then used by colonial governments to promote their social and economic 
objectives. Further, it will also show that protectionist duties provoked a spirit of 
                                                 
80 It is interesting that Syme, in his argument for a high enough tariff to enable Victorian 
manufacturers to pay workers a ‘fair, living wage’, foreshadowed the introduction of ‘New Protection’ 
and Justice Higgins’ basic wage determinations which are both discussed later in this chapter. See 
Mills, above n 5, 202; Alford, above n 72, 24. 
81 Allin, above n 62, 5. 
82 Ibid.. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid 171. 
85 This heading is a play on Hunt’s statement. He says that since 14thcentury “sumptuary regulation 
had existed in a close symbiotic relationship with protectionism”. See Hunt, above n 2, 324. 
86 Hancock, above n 24, 90. 
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provincialism in the colonies that eventually became one of the main motivating 
factors behind the move towards Federation, which, it was hoped, would solve inter-
colonial trade disputes.87 
Before the 1860s, colonial duties were “nearly always mainly for purposes of 
revenue”.88 Whilst protective motives were not always absent, Reitsma argues that it 
would go too far to say that the infant colonies had established any commercial 
policy at all at that stage, particularly in relation to a preference for free trade or a 
structured tariff regime.89  By the latter part of the 1800’s this position had obviously 
changed substantially, for in 1883, Richard Twopeny,90 whilst visiting the various 
colonies, makes the observation that “[p]rotectionist duties and heavy freights form 
an effectual sumptuary tax” resulting in “first-class articles” being “heavily 
handicapped” and “a premium put upon the importation of shoddy91”.92 
Just as sumptuary regulation from its earliest inception in the fourteenth 
century had existed in a “close symbiotic relationship with protectionism”,93 in 
Twopeny’s remark we see the same development of a close symbiotic relationship in 
Australia between taxation tariffs and protectionism. And just as the discourse of 
‘sumptuarism’94  later became integrated within, and then submerged within the 
discourse of protectionism we can see the same integration and submersion of tariff 
discourse within the discourse of protectionism. It is also at this time that we begin to 
see within these protective policies the threads of the sumptuary impulse which were 
                                                 
87 Reitsma, above n 4, 11. 
88 Ibid 1. 
89 Ibid. Reitsma argues that until the middle of the eighteen-sixties the various tariffs in the colonies 
were all free-trade tariffs. The local merchants favoured a simple revenue tariff because of its 
administrative advantages. Protection was not an issue for these merchants because they relied on 
imported goods rather than locally produced goods: at 5-6. 
90 R Twopeny, Town Life in Australia (Penguin Colonial Facsimiles, 1983) 110. Twopeny was the son 
of a South Australian archdeacon and was the editor of his own journal: the Pastoral Review. It seems 
that Twopeny wrote a number of letters for publication in English periodicals. This is an unauthorised 
collection of these letters. 
91 Poor quality items; often where wool is adulterated with cheap cotton materials. 
92 Twopeny, above n 90, 110. 
93 Hunt, above n 2, 324. 
94 Ibid 325. This is Hunt’s term. 
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woven into the protective economic blanket which the Federal Government wrapped 
around clothing manufacturing industries in the 1920s.  
From the 1880s, Australian manufacturers and primary producers faced 
heavy competition from the massive increase in all forms of imported goods from 
Britain and Europe.95 The first ostensible protectionist tariff introduced96 in the 
colonies was presented to the Victorian Assembly in 1865 with the objective97 of 
protecting new industries and overcoming the problem of expensive, but poorly 
made imported goods98 being ‘dumped’99 on the Victorian market.100 Reitsma 
suggests that the relentless force behind protectionism, particularly in Victoria, was 
the “newspaper dictator” and ardent Protectionist, David Syme.101 Even though 
protection had a popular following in Victoria,  colonies such as New South Wales 
continued to embrace free trade which “fitted in with pastoral and financial 
opinion”102 in the colony. These diverging policies contributed significantly to “the 
                                                 
95 Maynard, above n 22, 122. This competition continued well into the 1930s. 
96 Dorothy Clarke, ‘The colonial office and the constitutional crises in Victoria, 1865-68’ (2008) 5 
Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand 160. The Tariff Bill was attached to the annual 
Appropriation Bill. This mixed Bill was rejected by the Legislative Council (by ‘laying it aside’) on 
the basis that the Bill for raising revenue should not be “tacked” onto the Bill for the appropriation of 
this revenue. This issue caused an enormous amount of controversy about the legality and 
constitutionality of this practice of tacking: at 160-71.  
97 Perry, above n 75. Perry argues that “[t]he protective system is intended specially to diminish 
importation, and is also expected to prevent money from going out of the country.” These objectives 
are inherently sumptuary in nature: at 86. 
98 Edward Shann, An Economic History of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 1948) 266. Shann 
states that such goods included apparel, textiles, boots, saddler and earthenware. 
99 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1921 (Melbourne University Press, 
1956) 42. Often the ‘dumped’ goods were poorly made clothing lines (sometimes called shoddy) 
which were being produced in other countries, particularly Britain and Japan, at a cost that was far 
less than Australian manufacturers could achieve. 
100 Reitsma, above n 4. At the general election held in the colony of Victoria in November 1864, the 
McCulloch ministry was returned to power. On his campaign platform he had pledged a policy of 
protection to native industry: Rietsma, above n 4, 9. 
101 Ibid. Reitsma even goes so far as to call him the “father of protectionism”: at 10. He continued to 
exercise his political power through his newspaper, ‘The Age’ for the remainder of the century and 
until his death in 1908. 
102 Ibid 9. Much of the impetus for the protective tariff in the colony of Victoria came from Syme, 
who argued that the ‘naked competition” of free trade meant that manufacturer were prevented from 
making a beginning “of opening up new sources of industry” in Victoria. See Shann, above n 98, 265. 
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inter-colonial custom troubles that characterized the period”103 and the often difficult 
debates plaguing the introduction of Federation. 
By the end of the nineteenth century each of the six colonies had distinct tax 
systems which were almost entirely reliant on customs and excise duties.104  Not 
only did Customs duties or tariffs underpin the newly emerging colonial economies, 
but they also acted as barriers against overseas imported goods as well as effective as 
trade barriers between the colonies.105 Reinhardt and Steel106 suggests that one of the 
“significant results of Federation in 1901” was the removal of all duties on goods 
traded between Australia states.107 Federation was to be used as an effective 
apparatus of economic intervention to relieve the colonial governments’ intense 
rivalry and provincialism whilst at the same time providing a new paradigm of power 
relationships between the colonies. 
Although, as previously mentioned, each colony initially framed their tariffs 
primarily for revenue purposes, gradually protective characteristics became more 
pronounced.108 Despite enormous protests from their ‘sister colonies’ about the 
“growing evil of inter-colonial duties”109 and the passing of hostile, retaliating or ‘tit-
for-tat’ legislation, each colony went on its merry way in exacting, often 
complicated, inter-colonial duties as a ‘necessary’ measure for the protection of their 
local industries. For instance, even though South Australia was mainly dependant on 
primary industry and strongly in favour of inter-colonial free trade, the colony still 
remained protective of its clothing and woollen industries.110 The result was this 
“strange melange of tariff anomalies” that completely ignored the “general welfare of 
                                                 
103 Reitsma, above n 4, 10. 
104 Perry states that “[e]ach colony is entirely satisfied with its own fiscal system”: Perry, above n 75, 
87. 
105 Sam Reinhardt and Linda Steele, ‘A brief history of Australia’s tax system’ (Paper presented at the 
22nd APEC Finance Minters’ Technical Working Group, Kanh Hoa, Vietnam, 15 June 2006) 2.  
106 Ibid 2. 
107 Australian Constitution s 92. This section refers to free trade between states. 
108 Allin, above n 62, 10. 
109 Ibid 11. 
110 Reitsma, above n 4, 10. 
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the Australian group and the empire.”111 It would be many decades and much 
political lobbying and vitriolic debates before Federation finally settled the question 
of inter-colonial tariffs.  
It has also been argued112  that the very isolation of the colonies engendered 
the spirit of provincialism. Not only were the colonies cut off from the outside world 
by “both time and space”, they had no external relations and no more than a passive 
interest in what was happening in Europe for they “lived in a little world of their 
own, a world with a distinct set of interests and problems from those of Europe or 
America.”113 Even their relationships with other colonies were strained and far from 
intimate;114 the Australian land mass was huge there was great distance between 
settlements, with little interconnecting transport systems. The tariff, more than any 
other issue had “aroused the latent spirit of provincialism in all the colonies... [i]t was 
‘the lion in the path’ of all federal measures.”115 It was the major cause that 
contributed to the failure of imperial and colonial governments in their attempts to 
improve the political and economic relations of the colonies.  
Finally, on 8 October 1901 the first Federal tariff was introduced116 by the 
first Federal Parliament117 and effectively ended inter-colonial tariff wars.118 It was a 
compromise between the revenue tariff of NSW and the protectionist tariffs of 
Victoria119 and was mildly protectionist by comparison with the level of protection 
existing twenty years later.120 
                                                 
111 Allin, above n 62, 13. 
112 Ibid 167. 
113 Ibid 167. 
114 Mills, above n 5, 201. 
115 Allin, above n 62, 170. 
116 It became known as the Customs Tariff Act 1902 (Cth). 
117 There were three parties in the new Parliament: the Free Trade Party, which drew much of it 
strength from New South Wales, the Protection Party and the Labor Party (which had no settled policy 
on protection). See Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 43. 
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1870-2002: Is there a Paradox?’ (Working Paper No 2007/08, Division of Economics, Research 
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Australia’s Trade Policies (Oxford University Press, 1995) 53. Pincus said they were ‘weakly’ 
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4.5 Federation –taxation, tariffs and morals 
 
But the day of small things was passing away. A new Spirit of Australian nationalism was 
beginning to find lodgement in the hearts of the younger generation. New imperial problems 
come upon the scene. The political and economic life of the colonies gradually loses its 
purely local significance and begins to take on a true national character.121 
 
This part of the chapter deals with the shift of taxing powers from the 
colonies to the Federal Government and the emergence of a centrally directed taxing 
regime that sought to provide funds to the States as well as to provide for the costs of 
the Federal Government. It illustrates that although most of the revenue collected 
during the first two decades after Federation came from customs and excise, these 
same duties had also quickly become highly protectionist in character. 
The provincialism mentioned above meant that there was no unity of taxing 
policy between the various colonies until Federation when the Federal Parliament 
occupied the dominant position in Australian politics. Taxation policy had always 
been at the centre of the pre-Federation debates122 because the colonies were 
concerned that Federation would mean that they would lose their major tax base 
when they were no longer able to impose tariffs on imported goods. The Constitution 
was designed to give the Federal Government the sole authority to impose customs 
and excise duties.  However, the colonies were placated to some extent by drafters of 
the Constitution allowing the States to maintain their taxing powers in relation to 
other taxes such as income tax.123 
To understand how the tariff grew so rapidly both outwards and upwards, one 
must first look at the sources of the Commonwealth’s taxing power. This taxing 
                                                 
121 Allin, above n 62, 171. 
122 Julie Smith, Taxing Popularity: The Story of Taxation in Australia (Federalism Research Centre, 
1993) 40. 
123 Ibid. Smith says that the states viewed “the infant federal government as their child. And like most 
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power is contained mainly in s51 (ii) of the Constitution;124  it gives the Federal 
Government a general and unlimited power to raise taxes for the peace, order and 
good Government of the Commonwealth. Section 55125 provides that laws imposing 
taxation shall deal only with the imposition of taxation. Section 90 not only removed 
certain taxing powers from the colonies but it provided the Federal government with 
the exclusive power to set and impose Customs and Excise duties.126 This provision 
was to have a significant impact on the taxing powers of the colonies; at the time of 
Federation, approximately 75% of colonial revenues came from Customs and Excise 
duties.127 This provision was to have a significant impact on the taxing powers of the 
colonies; at the time of Federation, approximately 75% of colonial revenues came 
from Customs and Excise duties.128 After Federation tariffs would only apply in the 
case of imports to Australia, and inter-State trade was thus free of tariffs, pursuant to 
s 92 of the Constitution. 
                                                 
124 See Australian Constitution s 51(ii). ‘The [Commonwealth] Parliament shall…have power to make 
laws with respect to: 
(ii) taxation; but not so as to discriminate between States or parts of States’. 
 
125 Woellner, et al, above n 9. Section 55 limits laws imposing taxation to dealing only with the 
imposition of taxation and only one subject of taxation. Laws imposing duties of customs and excise 
must deal only with duties of customs or excise respectively: at 45. 
126 Australian Constitution s 90 states: 
1.1.1  Exclusive power over customs, excise, and bounties 
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power of the Parliament to impose duties 
of customs and of excise, and to grant bounties on the production or export of goods, shall 
become exclusive.  
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs all laws of the several States imposing duties 
of customs or of excise, or offering bounties on the production or export of goods, shall cease 
to have effect, but any grant of or agreement for any such bounty lawfully made by or under 
the authority of the Government of any State shall be taken to be good if made before the 
thirtieth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and not otherwise.  
 
127 Smith, Taxing Popularity, above n 123, 60. Most of this revenue came from customs duty. The 
remaining revenue generally came from Crown land sales, income tax, death duties, sale of gold and 
land tax. 
128 Ibid. Most of this revenue came from customs duty. The remaining revenue generally came from 
Crown land sales, income tax, death duties, sale of gold and land tax. 
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At first, the scheme of Commonwealth finance was almost wholly based on 
the revenues to be derived from Customs and Excise duties.129  To give support for 
this objective, s 88 of the Constitution required that “uniform duties shall be imposed 
within two years after the establishment of the Commonwealth.”  The Minister for 
Trade and Customs, Mr Kingston proposed that stimulants and narcotics would raise 
the most revenue (£1 959 306) and they attracted the highest rate of duty (145.21%). 
It was expected that apparel and textiles would raise £1 441 863 with an average rate 
of 17.73% duty.130 Jewellery and fancy goods were expected to raise £120 580 at an 
average rate of 21.03% duty.131 
Section 86 of the Constitution gave the Commonwealth, as central 
government for the emerging nation state, the power to take control of the collection 
and administration of these duties.132  For at least ten years after Federation the 
Commonwealth had to return to the States “three-fourths of the net revenue from 
Customs and Excise, one-fourth133 only being available for Commonwealth 
expenditure” (The Braddon Clause).134  Not only was “the paramount object of 
Federation”135  inter-State free trade with a uniform Tariff in the importation of 
overseas goods but the preparation of a ‘uniform’ Tariff became the “most urgent 
task of the new Commonwealth Government.”136   
The use of customs and excise duties, as the Commonwealth’s main source of 
revenue, proved to be a very lucrative means137of raising revenue and these taxes 
                                                 
129 Mills, above n 5, 200. 
130 Ibid. The rate of duty on apparel and attire ranged from 25% on wool and silk apparel down to 
15% on cotton and linen goods: at 220. 
131 Ibid. These estimates are set out in a table issued by Charles Kingston, Minister for Trade and 
Customs. The table can be seen in Mills’ book: at 209. 
132 Ibid. Mills contends that the State tariffs remained temporarily in operation until the 
Commonwealth Government had established a uniform tariff. No evidence was found to support this 
contention, except what is said in s 88 about uniform duties imposed within 2 years: at 200.  
133 Australian Constitution s 87. This practice was reversed after the expiration of cl 87 (Braddon 
Clause) on 31 December 1910. 
134 This was known as ‘the Braddon Clause’, named after its author, Sir Edward Braddon, Premier of 
Tasmania 1894 to 1899 in the inaugural Commonwealth Parliament 1901 until 1904. 
135 Mills, above n 5, 201. 
136 Ibid 201. 
137 Ibid. In 1901-1902 the Commonwealth’s total revenue £18 million was derived from Customs and 
Excise Duties: at 201. 
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fitted in neatly with the growing nationalism138 which spread throughout the colonies 
and later the Commonwealth.139  These taxes were easy to exact.  They could also be 
readily utilised to protect the interests of those local manufacturers, industrialists and 
farmers who were worried that their wealth and reputation could be endangered by 
the proliferation of cheap imported goods. They were also concerned the 
‘dumping’140  of ‘end of season’141  clothing by an “outside world which struggled 
for profit and cared nothing for Australia’s adventurous quest for justice.”142  
Protection had gained popularity as an economic policy because it promised 
to be a policy of plenty.143 The very word appealed to ordinary Australians because 
they believed “in their hearts that both their enjoyments and their existence need[ed] 
to be protected against extraordinary dangers.”144 During the 1890s there had 
emerged a number of ‘extraordinary’ factors that had adversely affected the lives of 
most Australians and were subsequently instrumental in creating a general economic 
climate which favoured protectionist tariff policies. Labour turmoil, falling prices for 
agricultural and pastoral commodities such as wheat and wool, the failure of a 
number of banks and a decline in consumer spending all contributed to a widespread 
economic depression.145  At the same time, the new labour movement began to seek 
a high wage economy. This would particularly affect those thousands of agricultural 
workers severely affected by ‘the worst and widest drought the white man had 
seen’.146 These workers had been moving to the cities in large numbers in search of 
employment, in newly emerging manufacturing industries.147 In the early years after 
Federation, trade unionists, who had at first held the balance between Free Traders 
and Protectionists, began playing what Hancock calls “the profitable game of 
                                                 
138 Allin, above n 62, 171. 
139 Hancock, above 24, 89. 
140 Ibid 83; House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Parliament of Australia, Customs 
Tariff (1910) 1. 
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‘support in return for concessions.’”148 The unionists finally started to drift towards 
the Protectionist side which pandered to their fears that “the competitive strength of 
frugal Orientals”149 might result in lower wages and conditions for Australian 
workers. 
So, whilst it seemed inevitable that the 1902 Australian Tariff would be of the 
Protectionist type150  questions remained about how much money was needed to 
support local industry and how it was proposed to raise it. The Treasurer, Sir George 
Turner,151 argued in the first Commonwealth Budget speech, that “neither the Free 
trader nor the Protectionist can have his own way entirely. The Tariff is a 
compromise Tariff.”152 The objects of the first Federal Tariff were manifold. Policy 
makers such as Turner argued that the Tariff should be framed to raise revenue to 
fund Commonwealth obligations to the States so they could maintain their solvency, 
as well as to cover Federal expenditure. They also argued that the Tariff was meant 
to keep faith with the States by providing “for moderate protection, particularly 
avoiding unnecessary destruction of existing industries whose magnitude and 
suitability rendered them worthy of fiscal protection.”153 So whilst this first object of 
this early Federal tariff was revenue-raising, it is very clear that protection, at least 
for existing industry, was also of high importance in the government’s plan for the 
new nation.154 
However, this ‘compromise tariff’ failed to please all stakeholders, mainly 
because it was not a compromise between those who supported Free Trade and those 
on the Protectionist side. Rather, it was only a compromise between what Mills calls 
“the high” and “moderate” 155 Protectionists. In addition, there was no ‘Compromise 
                                                 
148 Hancock, above n 24, 83. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Mills, above n 5, 201. 
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152 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 October 1901, 5698 
(emphasis added); Editorial, Advertiser, 9 October 1901. 
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Cabinet’, because there were no ‘free traders’ in the Ministry.156 The Commonwealth 
taxation policy, from the beginning of Federation, had “been unmistakably 
Protectionist, and every subsequent dealing with the Tariff … affirmed that policy, 
with a deeper emphasis each time.”157 Certain members of Parliament believed that 
the tariff was neither a compromise nor a moderate Tariff because “the aggregate of 
taxation on the working man” on items of apparel such as hats, woollens and boots, 
was “enormous”. 158 
 
4.6 A sumptuary tariff 
 
In the first year after Federation, the Commonwealth raised £8.9 million from 
customs and excise out of a total of £11.3 million and in accordance with s87 of the 
Constitution £7.6 million was paid out to the States.159 Under this 1902 tariff, duties 
were imposed on luxury items, such as furs, and necessities, such as blankets. 
However, it soon became apparent160  that there were many anomalies and 
inequalities “that bristled in the old Tariff”; 161 for example, for some time there was 
a lower rate of duty on furs162  than on blankets.163 
There were politicians who considered that protection meant the protection of 
the privileged class, as it did not advance the wages “of the great industrial classes of 
the community one farthing.”164  They considered protectionism socially distasteful. 
They likened it to the harsh interventionist sumptuary laws of the early modern 
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159 Stuart Macintyre, The Oxford History of Australia: 1901-1942 – The Succeeding Age (Oxford 
University Press, 1986) vol 4, 81. 
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163 Ibid Blankets, as manufactured items, attracted a protective duty of 25%. 
164 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 March 1902, 6 (Alfred 
Conroy). 
 
121 
 
period that authorised “men in parts of London to cut the ruffle from women’s 
dresses when they exceeded a certain length and that also regulated the style of boots 
to be worn.” Some parliamentarians, particularly the Free Traders, considered tariff 
taxation to be an overt method of regulating the affairs of the lower classes by 
“depriving the poor man or woman of practically everything, except proved 
necessities.”165 They questioned whether clothing and accessories were still 
necessities of life for the poorer classes.166 High protective duties had even made 
socks167 and hat pins168 luxury items. 
On the other hand, there were some Protectionists who took a vastly different 
view as to the economic effect of these old laws.169 They strenuously argued in 
favour of the value of the English protective sumptuary laws, which had compelled 
the wearing of English goods and prohibited the exportation of raw materials. They 
contended such laws were at the heart of England’s success in world trade and 
commerce under Queen Elizabeth I.170 They argued that the imposition of a 
protective tariff along with rigorous navigation laws, which prevented free trade in 
shipping and compelled English colonies to trade in English ships, had made 
England “the great workshop of the world.”171 Protectionists, such as McColl MP, 
argued that just as England was “built up under protection”, Australia’s 
manufacturing industries could prosper in the same way under “moderate, 
reasonable, and discriminating protection.”172 Yet, they continued to object to any 
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high protective duties which were “unreasonable and unwise”173 because they would 
tend to discredit protection and could diminish the revenues of the States.174 
 Still, there continued to be some resistance175 against protection, generally 
by those176 on the Liberal or Labor177 sides who advocated a free trade policy. There 
was also an ongoing contentious dialogue between various stakeholders about the 
issue of granting preferential tariffs to Great Britain.178 Preferential treatment had 
been afforded to English trade by various Australian colonies prior to 1850 in 
accordance with the principles of imperial monopoly whereby colonial trade was 
directed and monopolised by England.179 However, the Australian Colonies 
Government Act 1850 (Imp) abolished all preferences, even to Britain.180 
It would not be until August 1906 that Sir William Lyne, then Minister for 
Trade and Customs, proposed a Tariff resolution in the House of Representatives 181 
concerning approximately thirty British products,182  with a view to giving Great 
Britain or “the Mother Country”183 favourable or preferential treatment as against 
similar products from other parts of the world.184 The proposal was to leave the tariff 
untouched for these British goods and to increase the duties against all other 
countries by 10%. Such favourable treatment was conditional upon the goods being 
produced or manufactured solely in the United Kingdom and they should be 
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imported direct in British ships.185 As a result of hostile criticism from the Free 
Traders and the problems relating to the demand for amendment to the tariff Bill by 
those who wanted the Bill to contain even stricter racially-based conditions186 to be 
placed on these favourably-treated British goods, the British Preference was 
postponed. 
 
4.7 New Protection, 1905-1908–protectionism and wages 
 
The old protection contented itself with making good wages possible. The new protection 
seeks to make them actual.187 
 
This part of the chapter examines the second Deakin government’s attempt to 
attract labour to its protectionist ideology by linking protection with the provision of 
‘fair and reasonable wages’ for workers. Whilst this project failed, it still had, as we 
will see in Chapter 5, some lasting effects for workers, particularly as regards to the 
definition  of what constitutes a ‘worker’s normal needs’.188 
Between 1905 and 1908189 ‘The New Protection’ permeated Commonwealth 
legislation.190 Plowman argues  that: 
[i]n essence, it was major plank of that Parliament’s social engineering platform. In 
common with other newly formed countries, the Commonwealth of Australia sought 
to determine the type of society it wished to be and to implement policies towards that 
end. The society envisioned was that of an affluent, white society. 191 
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Acts of Parliament,192 such as the Customs Tariff Act 1906 (Cth) and the 
Excise Tariff Act 1906 (Cth)193 encouraged and protected certain industries 
“contingent upon fair and reasonable wages being paid.”194 Deakin, an ardent 
protectionist, actively promoted195 ‘New Protection’ by linking tariff protection to 
workingmen’s wages196 via providing assistance to the manufacturer to “that degree 
of exemption from unfair outside competition which will enable him to pay fair and 
reasonable wages without impairing the maintenance and extension of his industry, 
or its capacity to supply the local market.”197 The concept of ‘New Protection’ thus 
envisaged was that protection would walk ‘hand-in-hand’ with employers in 
protected industries. To avail themselves of the enormous benefits of protection 
policies, these employers had to provide superior conditions of employment, 
including higher wages to their employees.198 
What were ‘fair and reasonable wages’ was to be decided by a Board of 
Trade199 and once done, the Board would then be in position to determine, with some 
degree of precision, the question whether the measure of protection given to a 
particular industry was sufficient to pay those wages. 200 The government declared its 
intention to also protect the consumer against the charging of unduly high prices.201 
At the same time that this new centralised form of tariff and wage board were being 
proposed, Justice Higgins,202 also began considering in the Arbitration Court, what 
                                                 
192 These acts related to bounties, customs excise and manufacture. 
193 However, this legislation was challenged as being unconstitutional. The High Court declared the 
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R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41. See also Ex parte H V McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (‘Harvester’). 
194 Reitsma, above n 4, 18. 
195 Plowman, above n 78. Plowman says that this doctrine was articulated by Deakin in the Victorian 
Parliament as early as 1895. He also suggests that Syme used his newspaper, The Age, to popularise 
the term and notion of ‘New Protection’: at 48. 
196 Reitsma, above n 4, 16. 
197 Commonwealth, New Protection: Memorandum, Parl Paper No 11 (1906) 1887-1889. 
198 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 46. 
199 It appears that no such board existed at this time. 
200 Reitsma, above n 4, 17. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid 18. It seems that it was as a direct result of the ‘New Protection’ policy. 
 
125 
 
was “fair and reasonable remuneration”203  for “the normal needs of the average 
employee, as a human being living in a civilised community.”204  In developing his 
principle of a basic ‘living wage’, which was to be based on frugal and reasonable 
comfort, he took into account the average worker’s needs205  for basic commodities 
such as food, shelter and clothing.206 
Reitsma suggests that this ‘New Protection’ was an attractive wage policy 
because it “caused the complete conversion of Labor to trade protection.”207  The 
Labour Party’s newly found belief in the popular policy of protection, coincided with 
the basis of its co-operation with the Deakinites in passing the 1907-1908 tariffs208 
that projected increases in duty far in excess of the 1902 tariff. The increases were 
the result of recommendations of a Parliamentary Tariff Commission which took 
nearly two years to complete its reports.209  This new tariff, known as the Lyne 
Tariff,210 proposed that over 440 articles attract duties which very nearly double 
those fixed in 1902.211 For instance, the rate on wool and silk ‘apparel and attire’ was 
set at 45% compared to 25% in the 1902 tariff.212 The new Tariff schedules also 
contained much higher duties on woollen piece goods.213 The 1907 Tariff was to be 
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“the first really protectionist tariff”214 that sought to protect certain industries from 
“unfair outside competition.”215  It was also the first Federal tariff that provided for 
preferential treatment for the United Kingdom.216 However, its glory was short lived: 
the Excise Tariff Act 1906 was challenged as being unconstitutional and the High 
Court declared it to invalid in 1908.217 The High Court comprising of Griffith CJ, 
Barton, O’Connor, Isaacs and Higgins JJ held that the Excise Tariff Act 1906 (Cth), 
which attempted to indirectly regulate the working conditions of workers, was not a 
valid exercise of the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. The 
majority (Isaacs and Higgins JJ dissenting) held that the Act was not in substance an 
exercise of the power of taxation conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament by 
the Constitution; that the Act was invalid as being in contravention of s 55 (taxation 
laws only to deal with taxation), and that even if the term ‘taxation’, uncontrolled by 
any context, were capable of including the indirect regulation of the internal affairs 
of a State by means of taxation, its meaning in the Constitution is limited by the 
implied prohibition against direct interference with matters reserved exclusively to 
the States. 
However, there was a positive legacy for workers that arose from this failed 
New Protection paradigm.218 As we will see in Chapter 5, Justice Higgins 219 
continued In the Arbitration Court to develop and consolidate his rules relating to 
arbitration and wage determination. So whilst the new Protection failed to 
successfully link protection with the workingman’s wage, Higgins’ principles and 
methods for determining what was a ‘fair and reasonable remuneration’, with 
margins for skill,220 became the bedrock  for future legislation221 and arbitration 
                                                 
214 Reitsma, above n 4, 18. 
215 Ibid 16. 
216 Ibid. 
217 R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41: at 77-81.  
218 Reitsma, above n 4, 18. 
219 See Harvester (1907) 2 CAR 1. 
220 This meant that an extra amount was added to the wage if the tradesman was skilled. 
221 MacIntyre, above n 159, 104. Within a few years three States had legislated for the judicial 
determination of a basic wage; See also Plowman, above n 78. Plowman suggests that the 
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practices linking the minimum wage with the cost of living. This meant that 
protection, albeit without any statutory nexus, became a basis for Australian living 
standards.222 
 
4.8 Uniform Protectionism-sumptuary threads 
 
Consumers have always been a weak countervailing force against protection because of the 
free rider problem of collective action.223 
 
By the end of the first decade after Federation Australian politicians began to 
take a more uniform approach to protectionism.224 There are four main reasons why, 
after Federation, Australia became uniformly Protectionist.225 First, the strong legacy 
of protection in Victoria, and less populated states such as South Australia and 
Tasmania, had created numerous vested interests who sought to maintain the 
protection which they had enjoyed up until Federation.226 These interest groups, 
comprising of pastoralists and industrialists227 as well as various Chambers of 
Commerce 228 wanted to avoid the type of free trade policies that New South Wales 
espoused and to ensure this they vamped up their demand for a continuation of this 
protection.229 The voices of those who argued that the Tariff was only an artifice to 
                                                                                                                                          
complementary operations of tariff and wage tribunals resulted in the de facto operation of a New 
Protection wages policy: at 52. 
222 MacIntyre, above n 159, 104. 
223 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 117. 
224 Reitsma, above n 4, 13-14. 
225 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 47. 
226 Ibid 45. 
227 Ibid 47. 
228 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 October, 1901. There was a 
concern that the protective Tariff would bring into existence, or keep in existence, throughout 
Australia a number of vested interests as well as the “very evil which has grown up in Washington-a 
profession of lobbyists, men whose time is spent in interviewing Members of Parliament, and 
influencing them when a Tariff is proposed to be touched”: at 16 (Samuel Winter Cooke). 
229 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 45. 
 
128 
 
“protect and coddle the local producer”230  by placing the burden “on the shoulders 
of the consumer,”231 were drowned amongst the fervent rhetoric emanating from 
protectionists.232 The latter sincerely promised that a protective policy would provide 
a system that could regulate social conditions and was absolutely necessary to build 
up industries and “benefit equally every class of the community.”233 The widespread 
political and media234  support for protection, the diminution in support for the Free 
Trade Party and the successful lobbying of various interest groups all ensured that 
protection became more than a policy: it became “a faith and dogma.”235 
Secondly, the Braddon Clause236 meant that three quarters of federal revenue, 
raised by the imposition of customs and excise duties, would have to be returned to 
the States. To this extent the imposition of high import duties made it easy to 
introduce incidental protective effects into the current tariff regime.237 The third 
consideration,238 which also helps explain why protection became a widespread 
dogma, is that the exercise of ‘nation-building’ required economic and political 
compromise between the States.239 The compromise, which was eventually nutted 
out between the States lay between the high level of protection provided in Victoria 
and the free trade policies followed in New South Wales.240 When New Protection 
legislation was passed in 1906, the Free Trade Party had lost most of its appeal and 
was defeated decisively in the elections that year.241 
                                                 
230 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 Jun 1906, 57 (Bruce 
Smith). 
231 Ibid. 
232 Hancock, above n 24, 89. Hancock argues that behind this national fervour “there is the pressure of 
particular interests. These interests have to some extent created the fervour and to some extent 
exploited it.” 
233 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 October 1907, 27 (James 
Mathews). 
234 C M H Clark, A History of Australia, “The People Make Laws” – 1888-1915 (Melbourne 
University Press, 1981) vol 5, 281. 
235 Hancock, above n 24, 89. 
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Anderson and Garnaut argue that it was the fourth consideration that was 
decisive in the victory for protectionism.242 Those who led the protectionist 
movement in Victoria turned out to be very skilful in ‘wooing’ the support of the 
Labor Party with the promise of a share in the material benefits and “happiness”.243 
This alliance proved to be an ingenious tool to align Labor with protection.244 Until 
1906, when New Protection was given legislative force,245 Labor Party members in 
New South Wales and other states such as Queensland and Western Australia246 
repeatedly claimed that protection was only favourable to manufacturers in 
increasing their profits and that the burden of protection fell disproportionately on 
workers whose expenditure was in the main concentrated on mass consumption 
goods.247  
Labor also believed the only way workers could have improved working 
conditions and higher wages, which were needed by these workers and their families 
to face a significantly higher cost of living, was for the Federal Government to 
implement budgetary measures to effect a means of financial redistribution.248 The 
promise of higher wages and better working conditions for workers in protected 
industries dispelled the concerns of the Labor members, and the Labor Party then 
effectively resolved its own divided position to become more united behind 
protection.249 These government promises not only highlighted the rise in the relative 
importance of manufacturing in Australia since the 1890s but also reflected a direct 
correlation with rise of the Labor Party and its aim for a high wage economy. 
During this early post-Federation period of socio-economic development, 
when protectionists were “wooing” the working classes, protectionist rhetoric also 
                                                 
242 Ibid. 
243 C M H Clark, above n 234, 285. 
244 Anderson and Garnaut, above n 47, 46. 
245 Part of the ‘New Protection’ was subsequently ruled by the High court to be invalid. See R v 
Barger, Commonwealth v McKay (1908) 6 CLR 18. 
246 Anderson and Gaunaut, above n 47. Anderson and Garnaut suggest that Victoria, South Australia 
and Tasmania were pro-Protectionist and had created “many vested interests which wanted continued 
protection after federation”: at 45. 
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began to take on an even more noticeable semiotic engagement with the language of 
sumptuary regulation. Politicians such as Millen250 and Lynch251 directly spoke of a 
natural relationship between the Australian protective tariff and sumptuary 
regulation. For instance, during a debate in 1908 on the protective duties imposed on 
floorcoverings, Senator Lynch suggested that this form of duty was ‘a sort of 
sumptuary tax.’252 There were also numerous articles253 in the press, either 
highlighting the similarities between the rise of protection and sumptuary 
regulation254 or facetiously alluding to sumptuary law as a potential means to control 
extravagance and appearance.255  Even advertisements256 used sumptuary discourse 
glibly, and sometimes even perversely, to promote imported luxurious women’s 
apparel.257 
During this period of intense tariff debate we begin to see more tension about 
the dichotomous relationship between the rich and poor and their respective 
consumption practices.258 Tariff schedules specifically targeted many items of ‘lower 
end’ female apparel and accessories with high rates of duty, whilst ‘high end’ goods, 
such as velvets, silks, furs and gloves, which were usually purchased by wealthier 
women, attracted lower duties.259 The language of tariff and ‘luxury’ were frequently 
                                                 
250 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 February 1908, 8262 (Senator Millen). 
251 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 February 1908. During a debate on the 
protective duties imposed on floorcoverings, Senator Lynch made the comment: “[t]his is a sort of 
sumptuary tax”: at 100. 
252 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 February 1908, 100 (Senator Lynch). 
253 The Register, 9 August 1904, 4; Western Mail, 27 April 1907, 40-41. 
254 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 February 1908, 100 (Senator Lynch). 
255 “J S Mill on Dress”, Barrier Mail, 4 February 1908, 1. 
256 Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 1907 (furs); Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 1907 (veils); 
Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August 1907 (silks); Sydney Morning Herald, 29 February 1908 
(damask). 
257 Furs probably rank next to jewels in the affections of the gentler sex, and the pages of history 
indicate that "it was ever thus." Anne of Brittany, when married to Charles VIII of France appeared in 
a robe ornamented with 160 sable skins. In those days sumptuary laws prevented the "masses" from 
gratifying their taste for furs, to say nothing of the prohibitive cost. But to such perfection has the 
dyeing and preparation of furs been brought that for rich or poor, tile few or the millions, there are 
cosy AND BECOMING; FURS AT MODÉRATE PRICES. FARMER'S FAR-FAMED FÜRS. See 
Advertisement, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 1907 (emphasis in original).  
258 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 February 1908, 27 (Senator Clemons). 
259 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 August 1907, 25 (William 
Hughes). 
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coupled in Parliamentary debates260 and in the press.261 Often, the polemic was 
whether high tariffs, even in a prosperous period,262 should impinge on the rights of 
the poorer classes to be able to enjoy the same luxuries as the rich, especially if these 
luxuries were now regarded by the poor as their ‘new necessities’.263 Senator 
Clemons, in arguing against protection, stated that he “should like to bring some of 
the luxuries of rich… within easy grasp of the poorer classes of the community.”264 
Further, it was claimed that under a policy of indirect taxation most of the revenue 
was provided by the poor;265 for “it is the poor who have to pay the Customs 
duty.”266 Others sought to placate these concerns by arguing that protection, although 
not “a panacea for all the ills of humanity,”267 was absolutely necessary because it 
was linked to desirable labour conditions and had flow-through benefits for the 
consumer.268 
During this period there was also much moralising rhetoric269 about the ‘evil’ 
of imported fashion apparel and women’s extravagance of dress,270 fickleness in 
women’s fashion271 and women’s desire and demand for “ever-changing fashion” 
                                                 
260 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 February 1908, 27 (Senator Clemons). 
261 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 6 November 1907, 29 (Sir 
George Reid). 
262 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 October 1907, 27 (James 
Mathews). 
263 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 February 1908, 100 (Senator Millen); House 
of Representatives, 29 October 1907, 92 (Mr Liddell). 
264 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 February 1908, 27 (Senator Clemons). 
265 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 July 1907, 28 (Josiah 
Thomas). 
266 Ibid. 
267 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 October 1907, 27 (James 
Mathews). 
268 Ibid. 
269 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 6 November 1907. Mr Wilks 
suggested that a “thumping big duty” should be imposed on imported ostrich feathers.  He says “[i]t is 
interesting to observe that whilst a duty of 40 per cent has been imposed upon apparel and attire-an 
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that ostrich feathers used for the personal adornment of those who could afford to pay a high duty 
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Wilks). 
270 “In Fashions Realm: What to wear; Hints for Women”, Western Mail, 27 April 1907, 40-41. 
271 “The Coming of the Mammoth Hat”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 16 August 1907. 
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fabrics. 272  Some even argued that “the old [sumptuary] laws” needed to be revived 
to address these issues.273 The implementation of the ‘old laws’ was not necessary as 
the protective tariff was having the same effect as sumptuary regulation; but only for 
the poorer classes. Poorer women had to depend upon cheap imported apparel, 
including corsetry, because they could not pay for the locally-made item.274  Yet, 
cheap apparel was denied to them 275 and they had few, if any, alternatives.276 A 
working girl employed in a factory at a wage of 10s a week could not afford the 
luxury of a locally made pair of corsets, at prices that ranged from four guineas to 
thirteen guineas, with an additional charge of 6d for suspenders. 277 This was 
especially because of the strain of her work, which was so great that the life of the 
corsets was no more than three months. There was no relief for “the great masses of 
people”278 who had a “natural craving for cheap articles.”279 During this period of 
high protectionism not only was there a widespread obsession with luxury and 
extravagance in women’s dress, but we also see other sumptuary signifiers making 
an appearance. There was also an increased hostility to the importation of alien 
products 280 and a preoccupation with the placing of a metaphorical “ring fence 
around Australia”281 which we shall see in Chapter 6 becomes later more 
pronounced, especially during the war years. 
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4.9 The establishment of the Inter-State Commission-the new scientific 
approach towards Protectionism 
 
There shall be an Inter-State Commission with such powers of adjudication and 
administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execution and maintenance of this 
constitution relating to trade and commerce and of all laws made thereunder.282 
 
This part of the chapter will briefly describe how government continued to 
increase tariffs on clothing after the failure of the ‘New Protection’ to link protection 
with “fair and reasonable wages’. It will also provide an overview of the functions of 
the Inter-State Commission which the Federal government established as part of its 
continued experimentation with trade protection. 
The Tariff was further amended in 1910, 1911 and 1914. Most of the 124 
amendments in 1911 were to remove anomalies, to assist in interpretation and to 
remove difficulties of classification.283 However, there would be no further general 
revision of the Tariff until 1920-21; although the schedules of rates, particularly in 
relation to preferences,284  were varied regularly before then. The 1911 and 1914 
tariff increases specifically targeted clothing.285 The duty on felt hats (per dozen) in 
1911, for instance, was increased to 16s (12s as British preferential rate) and in 1914, 
duties on these hats were further increased to 20s per dozen (15s preferential rate).286 
                                                 
282 Australian Constitution s 101. 
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The 1914 the tariff increases reflected the recommendations made by the Inter-State 
Commission that was established pursuant to s101 of the Constitution.287 
It seems that the authors of Federation feared that the exercise of its powers 
over trade and commerce would be so overwhelming and difficult that parliament 
would “need an organ of adaptation to unforseen changes, a board whose rulings 
might be more flexible than the decisions and precedents of the law-courts.”288 By 
August 1913, the Inter-State Commission was appointed with functions which were 
similar to those later attached to the Tariff Board pursuant to the Tariff Board Act 
1921 (Cth).The only difference was that the Commission’s recommendations were 
based on pre-war ‘normal’ circumstances, and as we will see in Chapters 9 and 10, 
these considerations became largely irrelevant in the greatly changed post-war 
situation.289 
The Cook government set up this Commission and authorised it to formally 
investigate claims for increased tariff protection.290 Not only did the Commission 
have the power to investigate any industries in urgent need of tariff assistance but it 
also had the power, which it did not ever exercise, to scrutinize the “lessening, where 
consistent with the general policy of the Tariff Acts, of the cost of the ordinary 
necessities of life, without injury to the workers engaged in any useful industry.”291 
Shann suggests 292 that the instigation of this Commission resulted from the natural 
anxiety of a government, having committed itself to protection, that industry would 
then take advantage of the consumer and that the lack of competition would result in 
inefficiencies.293 
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The Commission’s “scientific” investigations proved that this anxiety was not 
without foundation.294 The Commission found that the 1908-1911Tariff prompted, 
amongst manufacturers, a widespread neglect of accurate costing, and a lack of 
attention to what their rivals in other countries were doing.295 The Commission 
suggested that there was a waste of power, a waste of by-products, and a lack of 
applied science which could enhance the cost of manufacturing.296  It considered that 
the failure to use efficient modern standards in manufacturing meant that higher 
duties were sought by inefficient industries and these duties were then being passed 
onto the consumer.297 The Commission recommended that the greatest assistance be 
given to those industries which used the greatest amount of skilled labour.298 In 
Chapter 9 and 10 we see similar concerns being expressed by the Tariff Board in the 
mid-1920s. 
In formulating their recommendations to government, the Commissioners took a 
practical and reasoned approach about the need for increased protection.299  Not only 
did they venture to remind Parliament that every burden of trade is paid for by 
someone, but they also predicted that it may be an economic advantage to withdraw 
Tariff encouragement from certain subordinate300 industries because such 
encouragement might become more of a hindrance than an aid to the whole scheme 
of industrial development.301 Despite the fact that the Commission’s term was short-
lived it only continued into existence until 1920 when the Commissioners’ terms 
expired, the Commission lapsed and no other Commissioners were appointed. There 
was much legal and political controversy about the Commissioners’ terms of 
appointment and their role. It appears that the Commissioners worked extremely hard 
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and took their role seriously302 in determining the efficacy of increased protection for 
local industries. At the same time, they appeared to be fully cognisant of the possible 
repercussions of this new, more formalised method of “scientific protection.”303 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that echoes of sumptuary regulation were evident in 
Australian taxes from the earliest colonial taxes through to the restrictive and 
onerous protective tariffs of the first two decades after Federation. The chapter began 
by showing that the early Australian colonial taxing regime had much in common 
with the sumptuary paradigm. Not only were they both consumption-based but they 
were, to a large extent, also both dependent on regulating the ingress and egress of 
foreign luxuries. Both legislative regimes were also based on a plethora of ad hoc 
and often inconsistent legislation. 
 The chapter also provides an overview of the move towards a more 
formalised colonial taxation policy, which was then followed by a shift of taxing 
powers from the colonies to the Federal Government. In the course of the transition 
to this centrally-directed taxing regime, there was an increased growth in the ‘strong 
symbiotic relationship’ between taxation and protectionism. This chapter also shows 
how Australia’s tariff policies after Federation became more uniformly protectionist. 
Not only did numerous vested interests seek to maintain the strong legacy of 
protection,  existing in Victoria and other less populated states,  but those who led the 
protectionist movement in Victoria proved skilful in ‘wooing’ the support of the 
Labor Party for their protectionist policies, by the promise of increased wages and 
better working conditions for workers. In addition, massive surges in imported cheap 
apparel triggered an increased protectionist response from the Australian 
government.  
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Whilst the government’s rationale for this response was the need to protect 
local manufacturers and the nation’s economy, this chapter illustrates how this 
protectionist response also placed an unfair burden on poorer consumers. 
Correspondingly throughout this period, protectionist and taxation discourse also 
began to take on an increased semiotic engagement with the language and objectives 
of sumptuary regulation. As a result, sumptuary threads began to be woven even 
more tightly into the fabric of taxation and protectionism. 
Chapter 5 briefly digresses from the topic of protectionism and its sumptuary 
effect on imported clothing. Instead, it follows another thread that was briefly 
alluded to in Chapter 4, namely the relationship between arbitration and wage 
determination. Chapter 5 will suggest that the imposition of prohibitive tariff on 
imported clothing was not the only form of sumptuary regulation that surfaced 
during the early decades following Federation. The Chapter will examine the 
sumptuary effect of the female ‘living’ wage determinations made by Australian 
Arbitration Courts and Tribunals immediately before and after World War I.
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5 THE SUMPTUARY IMPULSE IN ‘LIVING WAGE’ CASES 
 
We are developing a system of continual supervision of everything. 1 
 
5.1 Purpose and Structure of this chapter 
 
This chapter explores the emergence of a different kind of sumptuary impulse  
in the contestation over female dress in female labour cases during the first two 
decades after Australian Federation in 1901. It argues that male hegemony was 
reinforced through discrimination against working women. Moreover, the work of 
Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, and his fellow Arbitration Court and Board of Trade 
judges, reveals the establishment of  prescriptive sumptuary standards for these 
women based on dress.2 The chapter will focus on two female ‘living wage’ cases, 
the Fruitpickers in 19123 and Archer in 1919,4 as well as other wage cases and 
inquires that took place during this period. The chapter reveals that judicial officers,5 
imposed normative ideas about ‘appropriateness’ in female dress. As men of 
authority and power, they positioned themselves to determine issues such as whether 
£1/7/10 represented a reasonable amount for a female factory worker to spend on a 
hat6  and whether “women wage earners” should make their own dresses.7  
                                                 
1 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 December 1916, 118 (Mr 
Glynn). 
2 “The Fruit Drying Industry and the Wages Question: Discrimination on the Basis of Sex” Renmark 
Pioneer, 19 July 1912, 14. 
3 The Rural Workers’ Union and South Australian United Labourers’ Union v The Employers, Parties 
to the Temporary Agreement referred to in the Order of the President, dated the 1st December, 1911 
(1912) 6 CAR 70 (‘Fruitpickers’). 
4 The Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer (1919) 13 CAR 647 
(‘Archer’). 
5 This term includes Judges of the Federal and State Arbitration Courts as well as those sitting on  
State Boards of Trade. 
6 “Those Dress Bills: Mr Parsons Talk Economy, What Should Women’s Hats Cost?” Recorder, 2 
August 1919, 1. 
7 “Women and Wages”, The Register, 1 September 1919, 6. 
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During this period, the local and national media disseminated on a daily basis 
the more ‘interesting’ parts of the evidence heard in these living wage inquiries about 
the private lives of female workers. This material gave the public an unprecedented 
insight into the personal lives of those working-class women who were making their 
“demands for justice”8  in the new Arbitration Court and Boards of Trade. In 
particular, the press gave graphic and intimate accounts of female workers’ trials and 
tribulations as members of a national workforce where women continued to be 
treated as second class citizens.9  
 
5.2 Living Wage Inquiries: the ‘normal needs’ of the worker 
 
Higgins decided to seek a suitable measure of ‘the normal needs of the average employee, 
regarded as a human being living in a civilised community.’10 
 
Although the Arbitration Court had been established in 1905,11 it was not 
until 1912 that “the problem of female labour”12 was first considered by the Court; 
this was despite the fact that women made up over 20 per cent of the Australian 
workforce in that year.13 Higgins J, who had used the pioneering Harvester 
judgement14 to give practical expression to New Protection, now found himself with 
                                                 
8 Mark Hearn, “Sifting the Evidence: Labour History and the Transcripts of Industrial Arbitration 
Proceeding” (2007) 93 Labour History 4. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Mark Hearn, “Securing the Man: Narratives of gender and nation in the verdicts of Henry Bournes 
Higgins” (2008) 37 Australian Historical Studies 3. 
11 Pursuant to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). The first President of the Court of 
Conciliation, Mr Justice Richard O’Connor, was appointed February 10, 1905 and upon his 
resignation in September, 1907, Higgins was appointed his successor. See above Chapter 3. 
12 Fruitpickers (1912) 6 CAR 70. 
13 Hearn, “Securing the man: Narratives of gender and nation in the verdicts of Henry Bournes 
Higgins”, above n 10, 4. At the time Higgins had in fact handed down over forty judgements since 
1907.  
14 Ex Parte H V McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1; See above Chapter 3. 
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the task of grappling with the complex and problematic issues of a ‘living wage’ and 
equal pay for women.15  
Higgins J considered that a ‘proper’ family life was one based on “sobriety, 
health, efficiency, the proper rearing of children, morality [and] humanity”16 and that 
ideal could only be achieved if the male was the breadwinner and the female 
remained in the domestic sphere as wife and mother. Brown P agreed with Higgins J: 
“I look upon the maintenance of home life as of supreme importance to the 
community.”17 Moreover, Brown P argued that a man’s duty to maintain his home 
was a “part of traditional organisation of society”18 that Industrial Courts should 
recognise as a general ground for “differentiation in wages between men and women 
workers.”19 
Despite the claim that “the minimum wage could be found only in 
patriarchy”, the evidence of household budgets suggested that Higgins and his 
colleagues should make an award in male living wage cases based on women’s 
experience:20 
One of the two women stated that her husband had a cheap tailor-made suit, but he would have 
to wear it until it fell off his back, while as for her man’s working trousers, well, she had 
patched and patched until she didn’t know which were patches and which were trousers.21 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 See above Chapter 3.  
16 Henry Bournes Higgins, “A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial Peace through Minimum 
Wage and Arbitration” (Pt 1) (1915) 29  Harvard Law Review 13, 39. 
17 W Jethro Brown, “Judicial Regulation of Rates of Wages for Women” (1919) 28 Yale Law Journal 
236, 240. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hearn, “Securing the Man: Narratives of gender and nation in the verdicts of Henry Bournes 
Higgins”, above n 10, 8. 
21 “Random Ramblings”, People, 15 November 1913, 1. 
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5.3 “The principle of the living wage has been applied to women, but 
with a difference”22 
 
It is in Higgins’ resistance to the provision of equal pay for women workers that the 
contradictions and tensions of his notion of liberal citizenship in a civilised 
community were most sharply manifested.23 
 
Higgins, although a “cautious progressive”,24 struggled in his “great 
experiment”25 to offer Australian female workers the same consideration as male 
workers. He was reluctant to accept that women should be afforded the same 
opportunities for economic independence as men. Furthermore, Higgins J was 
disinclined to apply his masculinist test of ‘normality’ to them, and made only a 
tentative effort to seriously serve the needs of those female workers who appeared 
before him seeking equal pay.26  
He was evidently ill at ease when asked by the unions to apply the same 
‘justice’ for women that he had applied for men when fixing their basic wage.27 
Higgins J preferred to ignore any argument about the pressure of the conditions of 
modern life that Vida Goldstein28 claimed were “so fierce that women had to go into 
                                                 
22 Higgins, “A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial Peace through Minimum Wage and 
Arbitration” (Pt 1), above n 16, 20. 
23 Mark Hearn, “Making Liberal Citizens: Justice Higgins and His Witnesses” (2007) 93 Labour 
History 57, 57-8. 
24 John Rickard, H B Higgins: The Rebel as Judge (Allen & Unwin, 1984) 68. 
25 Henry Bournes Higgins, “A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial Peace through Minimum 
Wage and Arbitration” (Pt 3) (1920) 34 Harvard Law Review 105. Yet, Higgins saw himself as 
committed to “seeing both sides” in an industrial dispute. See Nettie Palmer, “Henry Bournes 
Higgins” (1929) 1 Australian Quarterly 30, 35. 
26 In Fruitpickers (1912) 6 CAR 70, Higgins established the principle that where women were 
engaged in typically female employment, the female minimum wage should be adequate for the 
support of a single woman, and less than the male minimum. Margaret Thornton suggests that the idea 
of women as competitors in the job market was “eliminated in the Fruit-pickers case (sic) when a 
barrier was erected between men’s work and women’s work”. When women were engaged in 
women’s work, they would be paid a woman’s wage. However, if they competed with men, they were 
to be paid the male rate “to prevent men being squeezed out of jobs”. See Margaret Thornton, 
“(Un)equal Pay for Work of Equal Value” (1981) 23 Journal of Industrial Relations 469. 
27 Archer (1919) 13 CAR 647. 
28 Janice N Brownfoot, ‘Goldstein, Vida (1869-1949)’ Australian Dictionary of Biography 
(Melbourne University Press, vol 9, 1983) <adb.anu.edu.au/>. Vida Goldstein (1869-1949) was a 
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the world.”29 For Higgins J, working-class women were supposed to live at home 
and, at best could only be expected to “incidentally ma[k]e a small contribution to 
the family income”.30 As women were not usually “legally responsible”31 for the 
maintenance of a family, their domestic and ‘biological’ work in the home, which 
had no ‘legal’ recognition in society, appeared to have no financial value.  Without 
external employment, women would continue to remain economic dependants who 
were “utterly dependent on men’s generosity,”32 especially when they wished to 
purchase the clothing they needed and/or desired. 
In Archer, Mr Carter, counsel for the unions, asked that Higgins J give 
women “fair play…and let them earn their living”.33 Moreover, Carter tried to 
convince Higgins, that “in these days”34 there was no reason why a stumbling block 
or hurdle should be put in front of women and that they should not be “shut out from 
an industry any more than a man.”35 Higgins J retorted: “I will not shut them out. I 
will let the employers shut them out if they think fit as a matter of judgement.”36 It 
seems that whilst Higgins J claimed that the Arbitration Court was for ‘the benefit 
for employees’, he would not risk eroding his keystone code of gender demarcation 
by extending the same rights to female employees in their battle for economic 
independence. This was particularly the case for those young girls who, because of 
their age, had to live on 15/- a week and who “eked it out by doing something for 
                                                                                                                                          
renowned Australian suffragist and early feminist. Her publications in the first decade of Federation 
were influential in the political and law-making processes of the day. See especially Vida Goldstein, 
‘Socialism of Today – An Australian view’ (1907) 62 Nineteenth Century and After 406.  
29 “Kooyong Election: Miss Goldstein at Box Hill”, Reporter, 23 May 1913, 10. 
30 Edna Ryan & Anne Conlon, Gentle Invaders: Australian Women at Work (Penguin Books 
Australia, 1975) 95-96. 
31 Henry Bournes Higgins, “A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial Peace through Minimum 
Wage and Arbitration” (Pt 1), above n 16, 20. 
32 Marilyn Lake, “The Inviolable Woman: Feminist Conceptions of Citizenship in Australia, 1900-
1945” (1996) 8 Gender & History 200. 
33 Transcript of Proceedings, Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer, 
(Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Higgins J, 1918, B1958/166/1918, National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra) (‘Archer Transcript’) 309 (Mr Carter). 
34 Ibid 310 (Mr Carter). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Archer (1919) 13 CAR 647. 
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their landladies in the way of housework or sewing.”37 He would leave the economic 
fate of these employees to the munificence or otherwise of their employers. 
 
5.4 Matrimony and Motherhood: the real life-work of the average 
woman 
 
It was an unpopular thing to state nowadays, but it was nevertheless broadly true that 
women’s true apprenticeship for her future career was to be found not in the workshop or 
the sales room but in some form of training or apprenticeship directly related to wifehood 
and motherhood.38 
 
Higgins J and other industrial judges, in their female labour determinations, 
strictly adhered to the traditional notion for the organisation of society where 
women “should be engaged in domestic duties”39 and where men were to be the 
sole  ‘breadwinner’ for his wife and children. These judges saw part of their task as 
industrial relations judges to “combat”40 those social “evils”41 that challenged this 
convention. For them, the supreme factor in the formulation of principles by the 
Industrial Court was “the good of the community”.42 
Higgins J adhered to the then popular middle class belief, that the substantially 
higher rates of female workers engaged in factory work was the root of the 
“increasingly important”43 problem of ‘domestic aid’ in Australia.44 Traditionalists 
argued that working-class women, if they had to work, should be engaged in 
                                                 
37 Fruitpickers (1912) 6 CAR 70. 
38 “No Equal Pay for Equal Work, Decided by President Jethro Brown: Ridiculously Low Minimum 
Fixed for Male and Female”, Daily Herald, 7 September 1918, 3. This quote is from an extract of the 
judgment made by President Brown in the Printing Trades Case (1918) SAIR 31, 42-43. 
39 Brown, “Judicial Regulation of Rates of Wages for Women”, above n 17, 243. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 243 (emphasis added). 
43 “No Equal Pay for Equal Work, Decided by President Jethro Brown: Ridiculously Low Minimum 
Fixed for Male and Female”, above n 38. 
44 Ibid. 
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domestic service rather than factory work.45 Brown P agreed and further contended 
that domestic help was of vital importance in “maintaining the rate of increase of the 
population”.46 Higgins J saw no reason at all why an employer should be told to pay 
a female employee “more because she happens to have parents and brothers and 
sisters dependent upon her”47 or to pay her less because she “merely wants some 
money for dress”.48 It was conceded that a single woman who could not afford to 
“dress nicely” would be seriously handicapped in regard to marriage.49 But this 
concession was countered by Higgins J and other industrial judges by Seerbohm 
Rowntree’s claim50 that a single woman who dressed expensively and above her 
position was also considered to be handicapped in regard to marriage.51 Rowntree 
also claimed that one who “dresses expensively and above her position is also 
handicapped in the matter of marriage”.52  He insisted that working women should 
therefore not be paid too much. Rowntree was a“[l]iberal-minded social 
investigator”53  and was a contemporary and correspondent of Higgins J. Higgins J 
and his successor Powers J both often quoted Rowntree in their ‘living wage’ 
judgments.  
The traditional hegemonic view was that marriage and motherhood were “the 
real life-work”54 for the average women.55 Furthermore, it was considered that 
society would be in a perilous position if female wage earners, with “easy means and 
                                                 
45 “Untitled”, The Argus 6 May 1919, 6. 
46 “No Equal Pay for Equal Work, Decided by President Jethro Brown: Ridiculously Low Minimum 
Fixed for Male and Female”, above n 38. 
47 Fruitpickers (1912) 6 CAR 70, 71. 
48 Ibid. 
49 “A Judge on Clothes”, The Daily News, 28 December 1918, 4. A reference to Rowntree’s ideology 
about women and clothes is found in this article.  
50 Ryan and Conlon, above n 30. 
51 “A Judge on Clothes”, above n 49. 
52 Ryan and Conlon, above n 30, 95-96. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Women and Wages”, The Register, 1 September 1919, 6 
55 Ibid; W Jethro Brown, “The Judicial Regulation of Industrial Conditions” (1918) 27 Yale Law 
Journal 432. 
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limited working hours,”56 found employment in the public sector “too attractive to 
relinquish for matrimony.”57 Brown P noted: 
The unchallengeable principle [is] that the living wage must have regard to what is necessary 
for the maintenance of a married man with wife and children to support. The adoption of any 
other principle would have placed a premium on celibacy and infecundity (sic).58 
 
It was reported that Heydon J was even more explicit in his account of the 
traditional dichotomous gender relationship of marriage which he used to justify his 
decision to fix the female living wage at 30/- in 1918: 
The industrial position of women is different from that of men, and is subject to a greater 
variety of influences and conditions, bringing about more difficult conditions. The boy, from 
his birth, is known to be destined to be the breadwinner… He knows that he must keep himself 
and his wife and children. There is never any doubt about this at all; that is his lot in life… It is 
different with women. When a girl is old enough to work, she learnt in all probability she will 
marry. Her work will be only an episode in her life.59 
 
 
5.5 Keeping women in their place at home rather than them “having to 
go out and seek employment in man’s realm”60 
 
The tendency of lower wages for women in jobs for which men and women were in 
competition, was to make the woman the wage earner, and to leave the man to look after the 
house.61 
 
Higgins J made it quite clear in his judgement in the Fruitpickers62  that the 
‘public good’63 would be better served if women stayed at home ‘protected’64 from 
                                                 
56  “Women and Wages”, above n 54, 6. 
57 Ibid. 
58 W Jethro Brown, “The Judicial Regulation of Industrial Conditions”, above n 55. 
59 “Women and Work: How they Differ from Men”, The Bathurst Times, 18 December 1918, 4. 
60 “Wages and Sex, Mr Justice Higgins’ Award…What Unionists think of it”, Daily Herald, 1 July 
1912, 3. 
61 “Clothing Trade: an Important Award”, Daily Herald, 15 October 1919, 3. 
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having to compete with men in the public workplace.  However, he argued that 
“[f]ortunately for society… the greater number of bread winners are still men. The 
women are not all dragged from the homes to work while the men loaf at home.”65 
Ruth Ford suggests that employment in the factories gave lower class 
women more personal freedom; they could even buy their own clothes and dress as 
fashionably as they wished.66 Ford argues that not only could women earn more 
than in domestic service67 but that they were also able to enjoy a work culture of 
companionship that was not otherwise available to them. These positive advantages 
to women made no difference to Higgins J:  
this exercise of choice was not viewed very sympathetically by Justice Higgins, who came 
from a class which was concerned about the ‘servant problem’ and feared working-class 
idleness.68 
 
Even though Higgins J acknowledged that the cost of living had risen 
everywhere during and after the ‘Great War’,69 he made no effort to accommodate 
female employees or recognise that women, for various reasons, were seeking 
personal and economic freedom in what he called “troublous [sic] and critical 
times.”70 He contended that it was not for the industrial court to “assume the 
responsibility of sanctioning social revolutions.”71 
                                                                                                                                          
63 Marilyn Lake, “‘This great America’: H B Higgins and Transnational Progressivism” (2013) 44 
Australian Historical Studies 173. This phrase had become Higgins’ mantra.  
64 Hearn, “Securing the Man: Narratives of gender and nation in the verdicts of Henry Bournes 
Higgins”, above n 10, 3. Hearn says that “[w]omen were held in ‘the private realm of protection’ as 
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65 Fruitpickers (1912) 6 CAR 70, 72. 
66 Ruth Ford, “‘I Am Not Satisfied’” (2004) 2 History Australia 1. 
67 Cf “The Political Situation: Women’s Wages and Appearance”, The Advertiser, 9 May 1919, 6. The 
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68 Ford, above n 66. 
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70 Ibid. 
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The formal regulation of the female minimum wage, at almost half of the 
male wage, was considered an effective tactic to discourage these women from 
exercising their choice to work in the public sphere even when working conditions 
were difficult.72 For instance, one newspaper reporting upon Archer contended: 
“[t]he award of 35/ a week is not unduly high, and it is well perhaps that this 
occupation should not be made over-attractive.”73 It was argued that a “false or 
inflated standard of wages,”74 which considered only the desires of the male 
employee, might imperil the nation’s whole economic and industrial structure. What 
would have been even more disastrous was that  if “an indiscreet or faulty 
judgement”75 upon the living wage was made for women, for this would have 
triggered “the most dangerous and injurious effect upon the social and domestic life 
of the community.”76  
Higgins’ J anxiety about women in the workforce was closely aligned with 
his apprehension about the decline in the family as a social institution, which he 
linked with the disregard of what Brown P called “the spirit of authority.”77 He 
considered women’s ‘desire’ to participate in the public area as undermining “the 
known and taken-for-granted gender order.”78 Brown P similarly argued that it was 
undesirable that women should be encouraged “to indulge in a standard of 
expenditure so high that marriage may appear to them an intolerable sacrifice:”79 
Modern legislation, by … sanctioning divorce has made marriage less sacred; and by 
protecting womankind has created a rival to marriage in the shape of a career for women.80 
 
                                                 
72 “The Political Situation: Women’s Wages and Appearance”, above n 67. The same reporter 
concedes that “[t]he life of these girls is apparently not easy” and finds it surprising “that they do not 
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73 Ibid. 
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76 Ibid. 
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78 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan 
Press, 1996)  
218. 
79 Brown, “Judicial Regulation of Rates of Wages for Women”, above n 17, 243. 
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Higgins J and other industrial judges, including Brown P and Heydon J, 
considered that this decline in the “traditional organisation of society”81 to be the 
main reason that the social order was in danger in a “transitional period”82 when “old 
faiths have lost much of their authority and power.”83 Brown P declared that the 
spread of knowledge and the growth of “plutocracy”84 were undermining the 
foundations of “class supremacy”:85 
Although we are far from social equality, although we still have classes, the power of class to 
train men to reverence is lacking. Envy, not reverence, is the plant that thrives in the soil of a 
plutocratic society.86 
 
Both Higgins J and Brown P were fearful that an increase of women in the 
workforce was not only having an impact on family life but it was, in fact, 
threatening the hallowed institution of matrimony. In turn this seriously affected the 
provision of domestic help that in turn impeded the population growth of the new 
nation.87 President Brown argued that women in the workforce were a direct cause of 
“the growing sterility of the population.”88 It was contended by Brown P of the South 
Australian Arbitration Court that if female factory worker’s wages were increased 
substantially then all domestic help would seek commensurate wages.89 He opined 
that, domestic help would then be a luxury only available to the rich.90 Other 
commentators suggested that the shortage of domestic help was also partially 
responsible for the introduction “of two new and undesirable phases into Australian 
domestic life”:91 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
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83 Ibid. 
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85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
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an increased demand for flats and apartments, with a corresponding lack of the 
valuable influence of real home life, and a marked decline in the birth rate.92 
Brown P considered that this decrease in the birth-rate would continue 
if there the traditional division of labour in a society such as Australia was not 
maintained Moreover, he argued that it was in women’s own interests and the 
interests of the community that they should foster and improve their domestic 
talents and virtues.93 They should be inculcated with the principles of “wise 
buying which are the essence of good housekeeping and the foundation of 
family comfort and security.”94 
 
5.6 Justice Higgins: The Cost of Dress is What Makes Women’s Needs 
Different from those of men 
 
It was significant that any little indulgence of vanity in dress was at the sacrifice of other 
things.95 
 
Judicial discourse in early female living wage cases became a powerful 
sumptuary regulatory apparatus that acted not only to regulate dress but also to 
regulate gender relations. The part of the chapter will in the main focus on Justice 
Higgins and his comments relating to female workers’ dress in Fruitpickers and 
Archer. 
Higgins P, in his role as President of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, took a very active and often intrusive role, in shaping 
the male-dominated Court’s processes, as well as in categorising and choosing the 
type of evidence presented to the court. Higgins J had privately conceded to Deakin 
that in the Harvester judgement he had engaged in ‘legislative work’, usually 
                                                 
92 Ibid. Brown P suggested that the decrease in birth-rate would not only continue but become more 
marked “unless there exist that division of labour involved in a system of domestic help-a possibility 
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considered beyond the bounds of the judiciary, but quickly justified his foray into 
‘legislative’ territory by adding that he had done so only after “carefully considered 
every possible aspect of the problem.’96 
Higgins J not only ‘suggested’97 the form and extent of the evidence he 
wished to hear98 but he also played a significant role in the direct examination of 
witnesses, especially in the ‘female labour’ cases.99  
At my suggestion, many household budgets were stated in evidence, principally by 
housekeeping women of the labouring class, and … [I] select[ed] such of the budgets as were 
suitable for working out an average…100 
 
Higgins J favoured a “forensic interrogative approach,”101 where sworn102 
witnesses, particularly female witnesses,103 were constantly challenged about the 
veracity and significance of their evidence concerning the reasonableness of their 
clothing ‘needs’.104 Whilst Higgins J used the same criteria for assessment to 
determine the minimum wage for both female and male packers in Fruitpickers and 
Archer, namely the cost of “their own food, shelter, and clothing,”105 he placed a 
skewed emphasis on gendered expenses for female workers. Whereas men were 
questioned mainly about food, board and lodging, women were primarily grilled 
                                                 
96 Hearn, “Securing the Man: Narratives of gender and nation in the verdicts of Henry Bournes 
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about the cost of their clothing.106 The interrogation in these cases about the clothing 
needs for the male wage earner was not nearly as intensive as for female workers.107 
Furthermore, the press coverage of the men’s claims in this case was almost cursory 
compared to the flood of coverage about female workers’ claims and their ‘dress 
needs’.108 
Higgins J made it quite clear in the Fruitpickers and Archer judgments that 
the factor that he considered distinguished the living costs of working women from 
working men was the latter’s expenditure on dress:109 “[t]here is considerable 
difference between males and females-say, from the age of fifteen onwards-in the 
expense of dress.”110 In both cases Higgins J had no compunction in actively 
criticising female workers’ expenditure on dress.111  On the contrary, his moral 
critique in regards to this expenditure enabled him to eventually justify his decision 
to discriminate against female workers by denying them the right of equal pay.112 For 
instance, in Archer he rejected the female workers’ claim of £2 and set women’s 
wages at 35s by making a discount for their clothing.113 He saw fit in this case to 
encourage “women wage-earners”114 to make their own dresses and suggested that 
“this extra work on their part in the time of their leisure should ensue to their own 
benefit.”115 He munificently assured these women that saving “effected thereby 
[would] not be taken into effect in assessing the living wage.”116 Deputy President, 
Powers J,117 on the other hand was not so confident about rejecting female workers’ 
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claims. He stated that he “found it to be a very unpleasant duty to criticise women’s 
claims and expenditure”118 and believed that it would be “much more pleasant to be 
able to grant the claims in full”.119  
Higgins J was not interested in what such women considered to be their 
‘normal’ dress needs, nor was he inclined to apply the masculinist ‘normal needs’ 
test in assessing women’s dress needs. For him, the test for women was one of 
‘reasonable necessity’. What was ‘reasonable’ was to be determined by the Court and 
not by the workers. For instance, in the Archer judgment, he contended that 
employers should not have to “pay for all that a girl may fancy.”120 Further, he 
argued that if “the girls”121 wanted their finery at the sacrifice of other things more 
necessary, such as charitable donations and lodge and church dues, then that was 
their business, but he was not about to make an allowance for clothing that was more 
than what was necessary for human requirements.122 It is notable that throughout the 
judgments and court transcripts in Fruitpicker and Archer, Higgins J consistently 
referred to the female workers as “girls” even though some were older women and 
some were married. 
In both cases, clothing became not only an indicator of social status, but also 
an unassailable mechanism by which Higgins J could criticise the mimetic ambitions 
of young female factory workers. He asserted that these workers were willing to 
spend a large proportion of their wages in their attempt to dress fashionably.123 He 
considered this preoccupation with dress and fashion as a form of social dissipation 
and exhibitionism that was socially harmful because it blurred the ‘natural’ structure 
and boundaries of gender and class.124  His focus on the type and cost of working-
women’s dress in the ‘female labour’ cases reflected his anxiety that ‘modern’ 
                                                 
118 “A Judge on Clothes”, above n 49. 
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working-women were publicly challenging the traditional hegemonic belief in the 
ascendency of men over women.125 
It might be argued that Higgins’s J focus on feminine dress in the female 
labour cases was in fact a cloak under which he hid his real anxieties about the social 
mobility of the female working class and their social aspirations. In the female wage 
cases, he sought to construct what Hearn calls a “plausible rationale”126 to 
discriminate against women workers who sought equal pay. Higgins J treated dress 
as a signifier or symbol of female personal freedom. When he contested the 
‘reasonableness’ of the amount working women were spending on their apparel and 
the ‘appropriateness’ of their dress, he was in fact contesting their right to enjoy new 
personal freedoms.127  
 
5.7 Judicial Interrogation  
 
Why this poking of judicial noses into the household affairs of the working class?128 
 
During the female wage cases, the ‘girls’ were put “through a humiliating 
examination as to how much they paid for their clothing.”129 These cases provided 
male judicial officers with the opportunity to expound their middle class views and 
criticisms as to how a young female working ‘girl’130 should spend her weekly 
wages, and to prescribe what they considered to be the ‘appropriate’ clothing that she 
should or ‘needed’ to buy. Moreover, female workers’ bodies became targets of 
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judicial power and the courtroom became a site of interrogation. Not only were these 
women subjectified but were exposed to the “normalizing gaze”131 of both the Court 
and the media in order to correct their consumer practices and to admonish them for 
transcending class boundaries. In early female labour cases, Higgins J and the other 
industrial judges became the authoritative ‘evaluators’ of ‘appearential’132 
‘appropriateness’ and arbiters of taste and style. In such cases, evidence concerning 
women’s clothing was ‘ferretted’133 out through a form of “inquisitorial probing”134 
of female worker’s personal lives.135  These judges then exercised their ‘institutional’ 
power to quantify and classify women’s apparel and to ‘judge’ the ‘reasonableness’ 
into female workers’ clothing ‘choices’. At the same time, they were able to 
‘discipline’ these women by berating and ridiculing136 them in open court for their 
alleged extravagance and lack of thrifty habits: “ [i]f the girls will have their finery at 
the sacrifice of other things more necessary… it is not fair to force employers to pay 
for all that a girl may fancy.”137 
The ‘superior’ role of these ‘judicial interrogators’ in the Arbitration Court’s 
‘ceremony of power’ was hallowed and undisputed. Initially, their alleged expertise 
on working women’s apparel was rarely contested. By 1918, however, there was a 
discernible demand that women should be appointed to assess the dress requirements 
of female workers.138 Court transcripts and press reports concerning the female 
living wages cases illustrate that these ‘inquires’ or “life evidence”139 of working 
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‘girls’ were supposed ostensibly to be about ‘fact finding’ or gathering evidence 
about the cost of living:  
The facts were not glibly volunteered but given piecemeal, as counsel sought, each in his turn, 
to draw from the facts of her life evidence in the enhancement or depreciation of a Woman’s 
Living Wage.140 
 
However, the judicial process also provided an opportunity for the judiciary 
and defendants’ counsel to cross-examine the female witnesses with a view of testing 
the accuracy of their figures,141 as well as to berate them for their ‘alleged’ 
extravagance and malign them for the ‘inappropriateness’ of their attire. For instance, 
Mr Scovell, counsel for the employers in Archer, confronted one witness, Miss 
Wootten, as to whether she considered herself to be “extravagant”142 by spending £6 
on hats in a single year.143 In the same case, Scovell had also rebuked Wootten for 
spending a “considerable”144 amount on her dress (£34.11.6) and the fact that she 
spent nothing on newspapers, journals or church fees for “furnishing the mind”.145 
Although Higgins J later adopted Scovell’s comments, he made no reference to the 
direct evidence of the seven female witnesses in his judgment.146 Following their 
gruelling interrogation of the callow female workers, Scovell and Higgins then 
attempted to controvert and disparage the girls’ evidence by the use of testimony 
from court-approved female ‘experts’ such as Margaret Cuthbertson147 and Brenda 
Sutherland.148 Miss Cuthbertson, for instance, was asked by Mr Scovell to comment 
on the girls’ testimony’ and their perceived’ extravagance: 
Would four hats yearly, costing a guinea each also be extravagant? 
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What do you think of twelve blouses in the year costing £8?149 
 
After hearing all the evidence, Higgins J, as an active ‘official’ interrogator, 
then sought to weed out what he considered to be ‘the waste’ from ‘the necessary’.150 
Once this was done, he would then proceed to place his own arbitrary value on “the 
necessary things of life rather than the desirable.”151 It was argued by Mr Considine 
MP that it was obvious during this interrogative and ‘averaging’ process, that 
Higgins J, with his middle class values, was approaching the evidence from the 
‘other side’ and with “no knowledge of the subject.”152  Considine argued that 
Higgins treated these female witnesses, as “small people,”153 and as “machines of 
toil”:154  
The working classes of Australia have reached the stage that they are no longer going to allow 
the other side to treat them like machines, to put them in the witness-box, and estimate how 
much coal and oil they will consume, to average up how much it will take to keep a family in 
good working order, just as in the case of a draught horse.155 
 
Despite his blatant ignorance about what was ‘essential’ clothing for female 
workers’ dress, the female living wage cases nevertheless provided Higgins J with a 
discursive apparatus to expound his own views on working-class women and also to 
prescribe a ‘reasonable’ standard of dress for them.156 For instance, in the Archer 
transcript, there are an inordinate number of probing questions directed to female 
witnesses about the precise “items of dress which an average young lady would 
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require”157 as well the cost of this clothing. Specifically, “the girls”158 were grilled 
about the number of blouses needed for a year, 159 the number of pairs of boots a girl 
might own,160 what was a “reasonable amount for a girl to spend on dress and 
adornment in a year”161 and whether they considered 21 shillings for a blouse was 
“fairly high price”.162  
The test set by Higgins J for female workers in Archer was one of ‘reasonable 
necessity’ rather than the Harvester male ‘normal needs’ test used in the male living 
wage cases. This ‘reasonableness’ test then acted as an exclusionary hierarchic 
norm163 which Higgins J and other industrial judges used to curtail the consumption 
practices of the female working class.164 They set out to ‘judicially’ determine what 
they believed to be a ‘reasonable’ maximum amount that all ‘factory girls’ should 
spend on their dress without concern for their individual needs or desires. One critic 
parodied this type of ‘judicial’ determination of women’s dress: 
Justice Heydon and the rest …got some girl to choose clothes for herself for a year so that they 
would have something to go on. Fancy giving any girl the chance of saying what clothes she 
would buy in a year-giving her free selection, mind you, and trusting to her to remember the 
limits of her income. You might as well expect a man to make a rational choice of his annual 
supply of drinks.165 
 
In Archer, after hearing evidence from “the [seven] girls”, Higgins J 
calculated that their average expenditure on dress and adornment was £25 13/4 a 
year.166 He decided that £25 was not an excessive estimate for dress even though 
Miss Sutherland,167 one of the expert witnesses suggested that the price of women’s 
clothing had increased substantially over the preceding six years. Sutherland’s 
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evidence pointed to the fact that the ‘girls’ were in reality ‘economical’ and spending 
a lot less on clothing than one would expect was necessary. Sutherland estimated that 
similar clothing to that which she had herself purchased six years before would cost 
£32/8/- at the time of the hearing:168 
Miss Sutherland throws light on the problem of clothing. Six years ago, her expenditure on 
clothing, when economy was a necessity, was £23 or £24 per annum; and she estimates that the 
cost of similar clothing at the present time would be 30 to 40 per cent. more. That is to say, 
adding 35 per cent. to £24, the cost is £32 8s.169 
 
Higgins J proceeded to ignore Miss Sutherland’s evidence by suggesting, 
fallaciously, that her situation was not “precisely parallel”170 as the factory girl who 
“makes many of her own clothes and has to go out more than this resident 
teacher”.171 Although the ‘girls’ were claiming £2 per week (£104 per annum), he 
fixed their new basic wage at 35/- a week, or £91 per annum. Higgins did not think it 
would be just to compel employers to pay 15/ for clothes alone, “as was urged”172 by 
Mr Carter for the Union.173 Counsel for the employers was also persistent in his 
scorn for the spending practices of the female workers. Mr Scovell high-handedly 
suggested to one female witness “[that] in regard to women’s dresses and adornments, 
boots, hats and all that sort of thing…every girl is a law unto herself in these matters?”174 
Scovell then officiously recommended to the Court that women could be more 
‘economical’ if they sewed their own clothes. He remarked: “[i]t seems instinctive 
that women should sew for themselves”.175  
Mrs Kate Dwyer, President of the Women’s Workers’ Union, protested 
against the Board of Trade’s decision in 1918 to award women only 30/ per week.176 
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She contended that this amount was based “on the two blouses and 5/11 skirt 
evidence”,177 and argued that the award only just put women on the bread line. 
Dwyer posed the question of how could a “business girl dress on 5/- a week?”178 She 
then argued that being well dressed was essential to gain employment: 
It doesn’t matter what position a girl is in, an employer is always looking for the best-dressed 
one, and with the best experience. To allow such a girl to live honestly she can’t live under 35/- 
a week; to enable her to buy proper clothes without the aid of the lay-by system which is a 
curse.179 
 
There were others who contested that whilst the judiciary might scoff at 
“so-called feminine vanity”180 that one must not forget the power of personal 
appearance because the world has no place for its “shabby citizens”.181 One 
critic argued that it was not vanity that prompted every woman to spend 
“perhaps more than she should”182 on clothes: 
It is the knowledge, learnt in a hard school, that in many instances, she will be judged 
on her face value. For this reason we find women sacrificing their food for the sake of 
saving money for clothes.183 
 
Whilst Higgins J may have argued that his probing and imperious questions 
in ‘female labour’ cases were underpinned with legal notions of fairness and societal 
and economic responsibility, his questions were nevertheless also heavily overlayed 
with what Hunt calls ‘common-sense conceptions of a natural order of gender 
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relations’.184  The female witnesses were not in a position to challenge the prejudiced 
manner of the interrogation, to which they were subjected, nor the subsequent 
misogynous vilification and scrutiny from the press. For instance, in Fruitpickers, 
Olive Gray was asked if she was “perfectly satisfied”185 with 4s 6d per hour, a rate 
considerably less than the hourly rate for male workers. When she hesitated in her 
response, Higgins J asked: “Is that a hard question to answer?”186 Although the 
employer’s counsel explained to him that the chairman of the Defendant Company’s 
Board of Directors was present in the courtroom, intimating that this might make the 
girl reluctant to respond, Higgins J pressed Olive: 
Why is it a hard question, (tell me frankly) whether you are perfectly satisfied with 4/6 or not. 
You have just promised to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.187  
 
When Miss Gray explained that she was not satisfied with the hourly rate 
because “it did not seem enough,”188 particularly as she had others to support, he 
retorted: 
I cannot fix wages for those who have others dependant on them and those who have not. By 
your father’s death you have to help your mother. At the same time is that your only reason?189 
 
Often, Higgins’ J inquiries were patronising. For example, in his haughty and 
“scientific”190 examination of Nellie Stoor, a coat machinist, he even went so far as 
to ask her the unrealistic question of whether she kept a log of her expenditures.191 
His question not only reflected his own class’s anxieties192 about the contemporary 
state of gender relations, social hierarchy, sexual equality and Christian values but 
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also pointed to his hegemonic belief that working-class women such as Miss Stool 
needed to be ‘judiciously regulated’ because they were naturally prone to waste and 
extravagance.193 This extrapolation is supported by the comments of one MP who 
contended that Higgins J was one of the members of an elite judicial fraternity who 
were regularly criticised because they were “always preaching thrift to the working-
class community”.194  
 
5.8 Judicial Probing  
 
The articles produced and described by the witness were handed round, and examined by the 
advocates, and the female witnesses; the corsets apparently attracting keenest interest. The 
knickers were put on the heap unnoticed.195 
 
The questions directed at “the girls” 196 were frequently overtly personal and 
invasive. Numerous, detailed, and often ‘delicate’, questions were asked by Counsel 
and Judges about their dresses, undergarments, hats, ribbons, boots and associated 
repairs.197 Mr. Considine, who, at the time was actively supporting industrial action, 
was prompted to assert that the Arbitration Court, as a vehicle of the upper classes, 
aimed to “fool the workers”198 and “insult their womenfolk by asking them the most 
intimate details with regard to their clothing, before [Higgins J] will give them a 
decent living wage.”199 Higgins J evidently understood, by his reference in Archer to 
a decision by Brown P in a South Australian female wage case, that arbitration 
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judges were venturing into sensitive ground when questioning female workers about 
their dress. He quoted Brown P: 
I refrain from giving precise details as to the way in which the amount (i.e. the bedrock living 
wage for women) is arrived at. There are obvious reasons for reticence on the part of a ‘mere 
man’ dealing with a problem so intricate and so delicate.200 
 
Other arbitration judges, such as Heydon J, were not as reticent as Brown P 
when delving into questions about the cost, quantity and quality of female workers’ 
clothing. It seems that by 1918, it had become common practice in female living 
wage cases for samples of various items of clothing, ‘usually’ or typically worn by 
female witnesses, to be tendered as exhibits.201 Sometimes this clothing was supplied 
by the girls themselves, but more often the Court or Board would direct that clothing 
samples be selected by a female shop assistant employed at a large retail shop.202 
Counsel and judges then had the opportunity to inspect and handle this clothing 
during the examination of the female witnesses. In the 1918 Board of Trade inquiry, 
many items of women’s intimate apparel were inspected, handled and liberally 
discussed.203 This ‘judicial’ process of handling of this apparel became infamous. In 
one living wage inquiry, the press sensationalised the manner in which the Board’s 
President, Heydon J, and advocates, ‘pawed’ over these personal items of female 
clothing.204  
Before the commencement of the inquiry in this instance, the Board of Trade 
had requested a large Sydney drapery store to arrange for one of their female 
employees “to choose from their stock wearing apparel suitable for a working 
girl.”205 It was expected that the Board would hear testimony from the “head”206 of 
the store about these ‘selected’ clothes, with a plan to compare them against the 
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clothing purchased by the female workers.207 Mr Cantor, Counsel for the workers, 
objected to this official giving evidence about the clothes and insisted that the girl 
who selected the apparel should be called.208 He was told by Counsel for the 
employers that the girl was ‘sensitive’.209 Mr Cantor retorted: “[m]y witnesses are 
also sensitive, but they have to give evidence all the same.”210 
Many women (and men) considered this ‘pawing’ practice to be both 
humiliating and embarrassing for the female witnesses and for women in general.211 
The poet and journalist Mary Gilmore expressed her disgust about this practice in her 
newspaper column: 
Can anyone imagine anything more absurd, more out of place than a lot of men pawing over 
women’s underwear, and holding it up to unclean public gaze per medium of supposed 
humorous remarks…It is an offence to all women that such a thing should be allowed; it is 
worse!- it is an obstacle to true and to the best evidence in such cases, because what woman 
would willingly face such an ordeal as that involved?212 
 
Gilmore pointed out that the living wage fora were conducive to both 
“shameful publicity”213 and to the “mishandling of a girl’s right to her privacies”.214 
She insisted that, although she had travelled the world and mixed with “all sorts of 
conditions of men and women”,215 she would be unable to face “the unpleasant 
publicity and the remarks of the men engaged in these inquisitions into the working 
girl’s private apparel”.216 Furthermore, she argued that these types of ‘judicial 
investigations’ were an insult to women because they were conducted by men.217 She 
suggested that it was unnatural and indecent for men to paw round “the boxes and 
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baskets where working girl’s wear is kept,”218 particularly as such men would not 
“paw around the cupboard where his wife’s or his daughter’s underwear is kept.”219 
She concluded that this sort of investigation was no place for a “man’s clumsy 
fingers”220 but it should be left to a committee of women.221 
Gilmore was not alone in her condemnation of the ‘judicial’ treatment of 
female witnesses and their choice of clothing. One journalist mocked this invasive 
inquiry:  
After weeks of inquiry, after pawing intimate articles of women’s dress, after questioning girl 
witnesses with indelicacy typical of the master, after portentously declaring that corsets at 2s. 
11d. are quite good enough for working girls- after all this and more, the New South Wales 
Board of Trade, through its President (Judge Heydon) has decided what is the living wage for 
women in Sydney.222 
 
The same journalist suggested that, although the Board of Trade “did not utter 
[any] word on the subject”, the “munificent”223 decision to award women only 30/- 
per week, including 1/6 for clothing, led to the inference that if female workers 
wanted more than the lowest level of existence that they would have to resort to 
prostitution: 
If they desire any of the ordinary sweets of life, such as good food, good clothes, pleasant 
residence, reading, amusement, etc., they can help themselves out by going on the streets.224 
 
One ‘official’ female witness was so chagrined with the manner in which the 
female workers were derided by the Court and the press because of their ‘alleged’ 
extravagance that she bravely challenged the court to examine the quality of the type 
of stockings that these workers were forced to purchase because of their low wage: 
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‘Just look at these stockings’ she said handling a pair of these articles to Mr Cantor, who 
examined them with a critical eye, and passed them to Mr Ferguson. The latter handled them 
tenderly. Mr Stuart Thom merely looked at them. 
The stockings were then returned to witness, who turned to the reporters, and invited them to 
pass judgement. The reporters looked surprised and blushed. 
Seeing the embarrassed state of the Press, the witness went up with her story. She said the 
stockings cost her 1/11 a pair. 
         ‘I put them on Saturday’ she added, ‘and my toes went right through them.’225  
 
5.9 What is a camisole?226  
 
We have a number of societies for spreading knowledge among the heathens, but not one 
which has for its aim the mitigation of the ignorance in which some poor benighted Judges 
move and have their being.227 
 
The issue of ‘reasonable necessity’ that Higgins J had earmarked as the test 
for assessing the appropriateness of female workers’ apparel became even more 
problematic when judges were discovered to be uninformed about the type of 
clothing women customarily wore. This was the situation in a 1918 cost of living  
inquiry before Heydon J in the New South Wales Board of Trade. A  female witness 
made reference to a camisole, whereupon His Honour asked innocently “[w]hat is a 
camisole?” These remarks triggered considerable public comment concerning how 
male judges were capriciously determining what female factory workers should 
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wear.228 One reporter sardonically questioned how could such men judge a woman’s 
dress needs when some did not even know what a camisole was?229  
The innocence of some learned Judges is amazing. A witness giving evidence regarding the 
cost of living before the N.S.W. Board of Trade, presided over by Mr Justice Heydon, made 
reference to a camisole, whereupon his Honor asked innocently: What is a camisole?”230 
 
Another reporter highlighted the problem with male judges determining the 
style and quantity of clothing that women should purchase: 
[t]he psychological niceties of the case are not judicable by the masculine mind, fed on mere 
facts. The joy and the love of fallals lies deep in the feminine soul. Yes, the list of necessities 
must allow ‘a little bit of ribbon, and a little scrap of lace.231 
 
It was suggested that, quite apart from their personal standing in society, it 
was apparent to anyone following the evidence via the press that members of the 
Board of Trade struggled to deal with the issue of women workers: 
As workers they are presumably not entitled to the good things enjoyed by those who live in 
happier circumstances…The Board was hopelessly at sea, especially when dealing with the 
question of clothing and other articles necessary to give women workers a decent 
appearance.232 
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5.10 Independent Evidence 
 
A lady doctor…said it is necessary for a girl to have frocks away from the clothes in which 
she goes to work…233 
 
By 1918, the presentation of evidence about female workers’ clothing ‘needs’ 
became more equitable and balanced. No longer were just the Court and/or the 
defendant employers calling ‘expert” female witnesses about the ‘appropriateness’ or 
otherwise of the female workers’ apparel. Employee unions began to call expert 
female witnesses, including the ‘unnamed’ witness mentioned above, to counter the 
expert testimony of the employers’ witnesses. This witness was an official of the 
Federated Clothing Trades Union and was particularly forceful in supporting the 
workers’ claims, notwithstanding the ridicule meted out by the press about her 
alleged brashness when presenting her evidence.234 She argued that “a girl absolutely 
dependent upon her own earnings”235 required for her wardrobe a minimum of a coat 
and skirt (£5), a frock (£3), two skirts (£4/4/6), six blouses (£3/15/3), four hats 
(£3/11/6), boots and shoes (£3/11/6).236 The witness “emphatically”237 argued that a 
girl “wants a little comfort”238 and that her clothing should be durable and that she 
should not have to waste her money on the “cheap kind”239 of clothing that the Board 
expected her to wear. Otherwise, she suggested: “[y]ou might as well throw your 
money into the streets.”240 This same witness also “vehemently asserted”241 that the 
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quality of the clothes that working girls were forced to buy was “shocking.”242 After 
Mr Ferguson, counsel for the employers, examined the samples of underclothes 
brought in by the draper, he expressed surprise at the absence of lace and then 
suggested that it was unnecessary. The expert witness “emphatically”243 exclaimed:   
“A girl might as well be dead without some trimming.”244  
In 1919, a similar scenario played out in a Board of Trade Inquiry when Mrs 
Blanch Singleton245 confronted Edmunds J and told him that she wanted to 
demonstrate the effect on women’s clothing after a “season’s working”.246 The judge 
declared that the members of the Board were “all married men”,247 suggesting that 
they knew all about such things. Blanch retorted: “I don’t care whether they are or 
not. They have to be shown”.248 She then asked him: “[d]on’t you want to hear 
me?”249 His Honour replied: “[o]f course we will hear you right through, but you 
know you show these things to men and they forget them immediately.”250 She 
quickly responded: “But I will put them to you in such a way that you will not forget 
them. You men have got to understand what we women want.”251 Blanch then 
proceeded to show the Board a garment that “to the male eyes of the court looked 
like something that might have been intended to clothe a good-sized doll”.252 She 
then proceeded to explain that the adult garment was a singlet that now only fitted a 
girl of ten and that it had shrunk to that size “after a season of washing”.253 
It is notable that the evidence sought by the Courts or Boards of Trade in 
many female wages inquires related only to clothing required for a woman’s 
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employment and this evidence rarely made mention of the women’s life away 
outside of her work: 
Was this good enough or that good enough for work? Not whether this or that was good 
enough for play. Nobody apparently was expected to pay anything for amusement. For 365 
nights every year the 30/- minimum wage worker is expected… to sew those serviceable 
garments or she may, except for the effect on her boots, take the recreation of walking 
abroad… she might sole and heel her own boots… spin her own wool, knit her own stockings 
and make her own corset.254 
 
In 1919, during a living wage case in New South Wales with Edmunds J 
presiding, an unnamed “lady doctor”255 was called by the claimants to give evidence 
about how clothes were not merely a medium for covering the body but were 
necessary for a girl’s health and happiness.256 The doctor suggested that shabbiness 
could affect a female worker’s health.257 After being questioned as to whether a 
working girl should have an evening dress (“not necessarily a low neck one but one 
to wear when going to a party or a dance”)258 she confirmed that she considered that 
it was necessary for a girl to have frocks “apart from the clothes in which she does to 
work.”259 The ‘doctor’ suggested that a girls’ nervous system was very delicate and 
sensitive and that it meant a great deal to a girl “to go out for recreation and 
amusement.”260 Furthermore, she argued that if a girl felt “shabby”261 she was 
mentally depressed and this would affect her health.262 
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5.11 Female Input 
 
Could this matter be referred to a committee of Matrons?263 
 
By 1918, some Boards of Trade had come to acknowledge the efficacy of the 
appointment of a committee of women to assist them in their determinations 
concerning the clothing requirements of working women. Whilst committee 
members were not always unanimous in their opinions regarding this issue, the 
creation of such a gendered committee was nevertheless a positive step towards 
providing women with a voice in an otherwise male-dominated judicial forum.  For 
instance, in the New South Wales 1919 wage inquiry, Edmunds J suggested that if 
the Board had to go into the cost of clothing “it might be advisable”264 to have a 
committee of housewives “of experience”265 to investigate that issue. Subsequently, 
a committee representing employers and employees was constituted to assist  
Edmund J and the Board in determining what articles of clothing were “deemed 
necessary”266 for working women.267 The committee’s task was to “advise on a 
number of subjects on which men, as a rule, were very poorly informed”268 and to 
come to a common agreement as to the standard and cost of this clothing.269 In 
regards to clothing, the committee was to meet and carefully consider “the 
requirements of a woman in regard to clothing, boots, and toilet requisites for one 
year”.270  
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The employees’ representatives271 provided a list of clothing that would 
require a “generous allowance” for dress.272 However, the allowance was specific to 
girls living in lodgings and doing their own laundry and mending.273 There was no 
allowance for “veilings or jewellery or articles of personal adornment”.274 The list 
only included clothing items “considered absolutely essential”.275 The employers’ 
representatives,276 on the other hand, only agreed to the list “on the assumption that 
the prices for the articles would be on the basis of the cheapest procurable.”277 Whilst 
the committee members agreed on a number of articles of clothing that could be 
deemed necessary and on the cost (normal not sale cost), there were a number of 
other articles that “one side claimed to be essential”278 and the other held to be 
“luxuries”.279 After Edmunds J examined the committee’s report he acknowledged 
that the committee of women “had rendered very valuable assistance”280 to the 
Board. He even admitted that it was “unfortunate in a matter of this kind”281 that the 
Board did not include some “representative women.”282 However, he confirmed that 
this form of representation was not within the power of the Board when he said: 
“[w]e are not in control of the situation.”283 The Report’s schedule showed that it 
was ‘essential’ that a woman should be able to procure certain articles as 
“necessaries” 284 every 12 months.285  
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5.12 The Press’s foray into working women’s wardrobes 
 
The [press] turned the courtroom into a daily spectacle by presenting a constant parade of 
young women witnesses and selecting abstracts from the court dialogue for the amusement 
and titillation of an assumed male audience.286 
 
In Archer and Fruitpickers, Higgins J’s comments about women’s dress 
effectively defined the standards of apparel that he sought to prescribe for female 
factory workers. The press was always keen to repeat Higgins J’s comments and to 
portray the personal details of the lives of these young women as “interesting 
sidelights”,287 which could be then held up for ridicule and derision. Not only did the 
arbitration process place these women’s personal consumption habits under a 
microscope to be examined and adjudged as fickle and wasteful, but the press 
unveiled their extravagant habits to the public as a moral polemic that needed to be 
further scrutinized and maligned.288   
For instance, an article entitled “Problem of Dress” made much of the fact 
that one girl, whose wages were 29/6 per week, spent £32 per year for dress.289 Her 
annual income was £70 and her total expenditure was £86.  The nation was told that 
she had purchased 12 blouses at an average price of 5/- each, 14 pairs of hose, four 
pairs of boots at £1/1/ each, five pairs of gloves and six hats. To make matters worse, 
it was also reported that the girl, in response to a question from Higgins J, had 
‘shamelessly’ admitted that “she could not afford newspapers, lodge fees, or church 
                                                                                                                                          
285 The list included winter costumes (to last two seasons), one summer frock, one winter skirt, one 
dark summer skirt, one white summer skirt, a sports coat for two seasons, a showerproof overcoat for 
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two pairs of winter hose, underclothing (corsets, camisoles, knickers, bloomers, singlets, underskirt, 
nightgowns) and incidental items (including an umbrella, aprons, handkerchiefs, gloves, a bathing 
costume, kimono, handbag, hair and clothes brushes, a comb, toilet soap and face powder). 
286 Gail Reekie, “Decently Dressed? Sexualised consumerism and the working woman’s wardrobe 
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contributions, and she was not able to allow anything for amusements.”290 This 
woman was thus depicted as being more interested in fashion to the neglect of her 
social and religious duties. 
In a related, but later article, the message was clothed in more the specific 
moralised language of sumptuary regulation: “[i]t was significant that any little 
indulgence of vanity in dress was at the sacrifice of... amusements, lodge, toilet 
requisites, and church.” 291 Despite the fact that there existed empirical evidence to 
establish that neither the increased cost of clothing, nor other living expenses, were 
in step with wages,292 this witness, in the eyes of the Court and the community, had 
clearly failed her social and moral obligations to balance the needs of “adorning the 
body and furnishing the mind.”293 
Not only was this girl’s consumer choices underscored by the Court and the 
press as a public example of ‘real’ female waste and fashionable excess, but she was 
also targeted because of her alleged failure to adhere to those moral and civil 
standards and duties that Higgins J and his class prescribed as ‘normative’ for the 
working class. Moreover, the girl was to be regarded with suspicion for she was 
unable to explain “how the remaining debit of £8 over income was provided for.”294 
All in all, she was portrayed in the press as an untrustworthy spendthrift who wasted 
an inordinate amount of her wages on clothes rather than using her money on self-
improvement and her religious responsibilities.295 
This form of moralising discourse that regularly emanated from the press 
proved to be a powerful tool for members of anxious upper classes who regularly 
proclaimed that the traditional social order was in danger and in need of regulation. 
At the same time, there were few who challenged the sexist diatribe and moral 
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indignation, which the press disseminated about working class women and their 
circumstances.296 
Often the wage case evidence was shamefully restructured to capture the 
attention of voyeuristic readers.297 Denigrating titles were used to catch public 
attention. For instance, in the “telephony”298 case, the press carried an article, 
entitled “Nothing to Wear: Tragic Tales of Telephone Tarts”,299 which introduced 
readers to these particular female claimants’ quest for a pay rise. The body of article 
continued in the same vulgar vein and contained a large amount of scurrilous ridicule 
in the form of offensive ditties and suggestive cartoons of women in their 
underwear.300   
Not only did the press use the girls’ personal and intimate testimonies to 
deride the ‘girls’ for their profligacy but also, at times, used it as a “little bit of 
fluff”301 to entertain their readership: 
When Counsel expressed the opinion that it was not essential for a jam factory girl to have kid 
gloves at 6/6 a pair, he did the rash thing. He was met with a real old lecture which wound up 
with an indignant protest of ‘Because a girl works in a jam factory is there any reason why she 
should be less human than any other girls?’ Counsel subsided: and all concerned in cross 
examination made a note that care should be taken in framing questions. 302 
 
This type of media coverage, which subjected female witnesses to 
unwarranted voyeuristic public scrutiny and mockery, occasionally generated some 
concern and admonishment about this public invasion into the girls’ private lives: 
Can anyone imagine anything more absurd, more out of place than a lot of men pawing over 
women’s underwear, and holding it up to unclean public gaze per medium of supposed 
humorous remarks…It is an offence to all women that such a thing should be allowed; it is 
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worse! - it is an obstacle to true and to the best evidence in such cases, because what woman 
would willingly face such an ordeal as that involved?303 
 
Demands made by the dominant classes and institutions for economy and 
thrift amongst the working class women generally reflected a wide-ranging and 
persistent anxiety about luxury and extravagance that early sumptuary law had 
commonly associated with personal and national ruin.304 During the war, this same 
concern with ruin was a polemic that was regularly discussed in the press305 and 
within organisations such as the National Council of Women, particularly when lead 
by such exponents of austerity as Ivy Brookes.306 Single working women, 
‘indulging’ in the freedom of buying luxuries and fashion clothing were especially 
targeted by the press and those in authority, for being economically irresponsible and 
profligate.307  
Moreover, there was a widely held fear that if such women were paid higher 
wages they would become accustomed to an ‘unrestrained’ lifestyle and consumer 
habits that were at odds with the expected privations and frugality usually associated 
with a family surviving on a basic ‘family’ wage.308 In the press, many considered 
that it would be untenable for single female workers to be in a better economic 
position than the average married woman who had to ‘make do’ on her husband’s 
income:  
From every standpoint it is obvious that the ‘normal and reasonable needs’ of the woman 
wage-earner must be as strictly assessed as those of the men, and considered always in just 
relation to the basic family wage. To do otherwise would not only be economically unsound 
and socially unjust, but would react deleteriously upon the women themselves by unfitting 
them for their future, and accustoming them to a standard which it would be impossible for 
them to maintain.309 
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Furthermore, it was argued that if women’s wages were fixed as high as those 
of the opposite sex “they would be too much for women’s needs.”310 In some 
instances the press provided a censorious  forum for thrift campaigners who 
demanded that women’s wages should be curtailed so as to instil thrift and economy 
“into the woman,”311 at the earliest stage, for she would ultimately be in charge of 
the domestic economy:312  
Thrift and economy cannot be too early instilled into the woman who will ultimately control 
the family purse-strings; and no worse training for wifehood and motherhood could be imaged 
than a wages system which makes no demands for such virtues from the single women.313 
 
One “significant and by no means pleasing”314 anxiety ‘highlighted’ by the 
press was that female witnesses had in some ‘living wage’ cases admitted that they 
had done no sewing since school.315 These ‘confessions’ presumably suggested that 
this class of female worker were indolent during their ‘brief’ leisure hours. Such 
indolent behaviour was to be condemned; it had an injurious effect on the natural 
order of things as these young women were “unfitting”316 themselves for their future 
and becoming accustomed to a standard of luxury or freedom which would be 
impossible for them to maintain once they were married:317  
It may be presumed that women on the basic line will marry men on the same economic level, 
and to allow them a wage which permits luxuries and extravagances impossible to the 
industrial wife and mother would unfit them for what, after all, is the real-life work of the 
average women.318 
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In the past, the social ‘sins’ of laziness and intemperance had been associated 
with the sumptuary impulse,319 and were considered serious impediments to 
gendered requirements of female respectability and familial responsibility.320 Society 
needed to put a check on such social sins: 
In their own interests, and in the interests of the community, their economic position as wage 
earners should foster and develop their domestic talents and virtues, and inculcate in them the 
principles of wise buying which are the essence of good housekeeping and the foundation of 
family comfort and security.321 
 
Some members of the press insisted that it was incumbent on industrial 
judges such as Higgins J and Brown P to ensure that female factory workers were 
only paid sufficient wages to meet their ‘normal and reasonable needs’.322 This 
would be a sum that would allow a “decent livelihood”323 with a margin for 
emergencies but which would not encourage idleness or waste.324  
 
5.13 Style and Taste: the exclusive domain of upper class women 
 
It is for women who could afford it, to show the way of simplicity and good taste.325 
 
The female ‘living wage’ awards effectively ensured that working women 
would continue to remain passive and marginalised by the industrial relations process 
that bonded male capital and male labour in what Reekie refers to as “a validation of 
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men’s experiences”.326 These women were not just discriminated against on the basis 
of gender; they also suffered discrimination because of their class.  
Although Higgins J suggested, when prescribing the basic wage for female 
clothing workers, that he could not forget “the important social function of girls’ 
dress as a bulwark for self-respect,”327 he would not countenance an award that 
would allow them to purchase anything but the most basic apparel. The living wage 
awards made by the Arbitration Court and The Boards of Trade effectively denied 
these women the right to choose the type of clothing they wanted to wear. Yet, this 
approach demonstrated a gendered double-standard, with Higgins’ contending in the 
“Badge Case” that there is a “common law right for every man to dress as he 
pleases.” 328 
Furthermore, at the time Higgins J and his fellow judges were denying 
working women the right of equal pay and consumer freedom, they were also 
disparaging their choice of dress by comparing their fashion style and taste with that 
of middleclass women. Similarly, Mr Parson KC, in a wage case before President 
Brown, compared the extravagance of working class girls who would spend between 
£1/7/10 and £2/5/- on hats with the admirable economy of “one of the most beautiful 
women in Adelaide”329 who only paid 8/- for her hat.330 
These types of comments reflected the then current hegemonic view that only 
women of means and class were innately endowed with good taste and style as well 
as a thrifty disposition.331 These ‘women of means’ would no doubt take the advice 
of Brown P and have forgone fashionable boots and worn “plain strong boots [from 
which] they would get much better wear for their money.”332 Obviously, the female 
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factory worker could not be trusted to develop the characteristics of simple good 
taste without guidance from the upper classes. 
 
5.14 Conclusion 
 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to explore the manner in which Justice 
Higgins J and other industrial court judges, during the first two decades after 
Federation, used the female ‘living wage’ cases as an opportunity to prescribe what 
they considered to be ‘appropriate’ standards of dress for working-class women. 
Notwithstanding their middle class stance on gender relations, Higgins and other 
industrial judges were forced, in this period of social and economic flux, to 
reluctantly deal with ‘the complex question of woman labour’. 
This chapter also illustrates how Higgins and other industrial judges in these 
female labour cases encouraged their judicial forums to become sites of inquisitorial 
interrogation and normative regulation. In particular, they focused on the 
‘contentious’ gendered issue of female dress in their castigation of those ‘gentle 
invaders’333 who dared contravene traditional norms by seeking work in the public 
sector and having the audacity to ask for equal pay. These judges embraced dress as 
a means to justify their gendered intervention in the female wage cases and to award 
female workers lower wages than men who did the same work. Moreover, they 
alleged that women, particularly young women, wasted an inordinate amount on 
fashionable clothing. It was argued by the judiciary and the press that it would be 
better for society if these women were to curtail their extravagance in dress and 
instead, equip themselves for marriage by adopting thrifty practices.   
Rather than applying the masculinist Harvester ‘normal needs’ test in 
assessing the wage that a female worker should be awarded in various industries, the 
Arbitration Court and Boards of Trade instead focused on the ‘reasonable necessity’ 
of these women’s expenditure on clothing. In doing so, these male judges, many of 
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whom were ignorant about the dress ‘needs’ of women, then became the self-
appointed ‘experts’ and institutional ‘arbiters’ of working-class women’s dress. It 
was not until 1919 that women began to have the opportunity to contribute to the 
‘judicial discussion’ about the appropriateness or otherwise of women’s dress.  
It was through these female ‘living wage’ cases that Higgins and his fellow 
judges began to perpetuate the institutionalised vision of what Hunt calls a “‘ideal’ 
hierarchical and instinctively male order.”334 Higgins’s nation-building mission was 
to create “a new province for law and order.”335 However, it proved to be a 
masculinist paradigm that exposed “gendered conceptions of work and citizenship, 
based in a recreation of patriarchy in national wage structures.”336 Working-class 
women in particular were expected to remain marginalised and closed off from the 
public sphere, notwithstanding their individual or personal aspirations or needs.337 
Women, who did work for whatever reason, were viewed with suspicion and often 
vilified in the courts and in the press for their alleged profligacy and adverse impact 
of the nation’s social order.338  
This chapter has also demonstrated the manner in which the press not only 
put these girls’ choice of clothing and their personal consumer habits on show to the 
public as interesting “sidelights,”339 but also how it frequently and widely chastised 
these working women for their alleged profligacy and fickleness.340 Female workers’ 
wage claims also provided a fresh opportunity for the press to disseminate moralising 
attacks on women’s dress. Often, female working class witnesses were admonished 
for their profligacy and fickleness, and it was often alleged that these ‘vices’ were 
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having an adverse effect on national prosperity and on public interests.341 This form 
of moralising commentary often sought to denigrate those female working women 
who dared to disrupt the natural order of gender and class relations by seeking equal 
pay for equal work.342 Furthermore, this gendered criticism of working women’s 
dress and appearance proved to be a powerful tool for the anxious upper classes 
anxious who proclaimed that traditional social order was in danger and in need of 
regulation.343  
Chapter 6 will demonstrate the level to which luxury excited moral 
condemnation and stimulated the sumptuary reflex during the War. The chapter 
focuses on the establishment in 1917 of the Federal Luxuries Board and explores its 
sumptuary role in serving the Hughes government’s moralised pattern of prescribed 
thrift and patriotic sacrifice. 
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6 THE PROHIBITION OF LUXURY – THE PLAN TO STITCH-UP 
AUSTRALIANS WITH A JINGOISTIC YARN 
 
The War has Wrought Great Changes.1 
 
6.1 Purpose and structure of this chapter 
 
In Chapter 4, it was argued that by the end of the first decade after Federation 
the Federal government’s policy of imposing high tariffs on imported apparel had 
assumed a marked ‘sumptuary’ effect. Once the war commenced, this newly 
fabricated form of protectionism began to be laced with heavy supplementary threads 
of nationalism, patriotism, war precautions legislation and other forms of 
governmental intervention. The government, and in particular Hughes, became 
progressively obsessed with winning the war ‘at any cost’ and looked to the people 
to assist the war effort by providing not only men to fight at the front but also funds 
to pay for the war.2  
Both this Chapter and Chapter 7 suggest that the early years of the war were 
paradoxically prosperous ones for many Australians.3 Increased employment 
opportunities for the lower classes, for both men and women, meant that some had 
surplus funds to spend on those imported ‘luxuries’, particularly fashionable apparel 
and amusements, which had hitherto been denied or unavailable to them.4 There was 
also a general belief5 that there were many people living just as extravagantly as they 
had during peacetime and that these people were disinclined “to practise that 
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measure of economy which is declared to be necessary to the successful conduct of 
the War.”6  
This chapter describes how this sort of conspicuous consumption riled the 
government and those actively involved in thrift campaigns.7 It was suggested, both 
in the press and in Parliament, that there were thousands who could preserve the 
nation’s wealth by saving money “now spent on mere luxuries, excessive 
amusements, and comforts which could partially, at least, be quite easily done 
without.”8 All Australians were expected to be ‘patriotic’ by saving surplus funds for 
future exigencies or by investing in war bonds.9 They were also informed by the 
ruling class that it was their obligation to be morally strong in a time of sobering 
conflict by resisting the temptation of luxuries, and in doing so they would help to 
avoid economic ‘mischief’ for the nation.10  
Appeals to patriotism went unheeded11 and Prime Minister Hughes, in his 
quest to regulate the consumption of imported ‘luxuries’, sought to emulate Britain’s 
sumptuary regulations which aimed to encourage local industries12 and free up 
additional shipping space for troops and necessities.13 The Chapter argues that the 
keystone of Hughes’ sumptuary project was the establishment of the short-lived 
‘Luxuries Board’. Its role was to decide what ‘luxuries’ were to be prohibited for the 
Australian consumer for the remainder of the war.14 The Board’s creation was clearly 
a sumptuary project aimed at quelling traditional anxieties concerning waste, 
extravagance and mimesis.  
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This project not only had many of the markers of sumptuary regulation but, 
unlike the protectionist project discussed in chapter 4, it had a stated and unequivocal 
sumptuary objective – the regulation of what imported goods could be consumed- as 
well as a sumptuary effect. It was a true ‘sumptuary project’ in the traditional sense.15 
This chapter will focus on the establishment of the Luxuries Board and its role in 
serving the government’s moralised pattern of prescribed thrift and sober sacrifice. 
This chapter will also show how this pattern, although ostensibly drafted with the 
intention of doing ‘everything’ to win the war for the Empire, was spotted with 
slippages of class and gender and streaked by intrusions of idiosyncratic executive 
power. 
 
6.2 Twisting sumptuary threads around the notion of Luxury 
 
If those who ‘have more than they want for the ordinary needs of life squander their surplus 
on forms of expenditure unproductive and wasteful…they do a double injury to the nation. 
They reduce protanto the wealth available for spending on productive efforts, and they 
demoralize that part of the population whose lives are spent purely in ministering to the 
useless pleasures of the rich.’16 
 
Whilst the figure of Luxury has always “excited moral condemnation and 
stimulated the regulatory reflex”,17 its denunciation has always been magnified even 
more during periods of conflict.18 This was certainly the case in Australia during 
World War I.19 The notion that any Australian was “squandering” economic 
resources on the “indecent”20 importation of luxuries during the war was abhorred21 
                                                 
15 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (Macmillan 
Press, 1996) 3. See above Chapter 3. 
16 Bound Table, December 1916, quoted in Commonwealth, House of Representatives, 14 March 
1917, 106, (Mr Fenton). 
17 Hunt, above n 15, 77; See above Chapter 3. 
18 Ibid 78. 
19 “War Notes”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 16 March 1917, 29. 
20 “Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3, 4. 
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and reviled by both ‘patriotic’ individuals and organisations such as the National 
Council of Women.22 Anyone committing this social ‘sin’ was labelled, by “every 
right-minded person”,23 as disloyal and reprehensible.24 Contemporary moralising 
discourse depicting luxury as a ‘sin’ was further skewed towards the economic 
wrong of ‘extravagance’ which was considered as a waste of personal and national 
resources that could be more usefully and gainfully employed. Luxury was 
associated with economic ruin and wastefulness, particularly for the working classes. 
It was a time when people were expected to be frugal and live simply and without 
extravagance.25 The money ‘wasted’ on non-essentials such as furs, motor cars and 
alcohol was adjudged by many as weakening the nation.26 It was staunchly 
advocated that the money expended on such non-essentials should be devoted to 
‘prosecuting’ the war.27  
Much of this moralising discourse emanated from the ‘pro-war’ press, an 
anxious Parliament and those who were ‘the truly patriotic’.28 It was mostly aimed at 
the ‘lower order’ wage earners, particularly women, who were reprimanded for being 
“loath to deny themselves luxuries to which during prosperous periods they had have 
grown accustomed, and [having] come to regard [them] as being almost necessary to 
their existence.”29 This form of social censure carried with it the same strong traces 
of patrician disapproval that had been previously evident in the hierarchical paradigm 
                                                                                                                                          
21 “War Notes”, above n 19. The author decries the lack of thrifty practices in Australia and the 
manner in which Australians “run riot...in unparalleled and reckless individual and national 
extravagance.” 
22 Nance, “The National Council of Women”, Leader, 7 July 1917, 47-48. 
23 M A Blee, Letters to the Editor, “National Economy”, Examiner, 10 August 1917, 7. 
24 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
25 “The Simple Life Must Be Lived”, The Advertiser, 28 April 1917, 12. 
26 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3; “The Appeal to Economise”, Shepparton Advertiser, 1 
March 1917, 3. The author argued that “[b]y excess in frivolity and gaiety we are only paving the way 
to a condition of things that will press very heavily upon us in the future.” 
27 “Australia’s Part in The War”, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 1917, 12. 
28 Patriotism was often spoken in personified, gendered and class terms.  See “Ladies Letter”, Punch, 
16 August 1917, 32: “Patriotism turned out in force and its best evening duds to see Jo Smith blow the 
bugle for “Reveille” last Wednesday night…The Lady Mayoress sat enthroned over the Union Jack.” 
29 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
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of traditional sumptuary regulation of the early modern period.30 The hegemonic 
view was that the best the lower classes should expect, with careful economy, to 
make ends meets and maybe save a small amount for contingencies.31 Not only was 
it considered ‘appropriate’ for the nouveau riches32 to be circumspect in their 
consumption practices33 but it was presumed that they should not be allowed to rise 
above their status in life by being allowed to engage in “vulgar waste”.34 The 
conspicuous consumerism of the rising classes was regarded by some as uncouth and 
distasteful: “[t]he worst sections of the wealthy lower orders are squandering on the 
barbaric fineries which appeal to their crude taste.”35 
In their attempt to protect their privileged position, the dominant elite 
employed this salacious and derogatory form of ridicule to admonish the 
‘lower orders’ for their social insubordination36 and their tenacious pursuit of 
material goods. It would seem that such corrective discourses acted to soil and 
unpick those newly constructed subjectivities arising from social and political 
reforms, and to reinstate a consumption-based system of social distinction.  
 
 
                                                 
30 Hunt, above n 15, 49. 
31 “Curtailing extravagance”, above n 2. 
32 This term refers to those who have recently acquired wealth and thus tainted by vulgarity. Manning 
Clark called them “the bourgeois” and called the upper classes “Yarrasides”. See C M H Clark, A 
History of Australia: ‘The Old Dead Tree and the Young Tree Green’, 1916-1935 (Melbourne 
University Press, 1987) vol 6, 510. 
33 “Luxuries”, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1917, 20. The author says that in Australia and 
England “a considerable section of the people [have] never been so well off, and is spending 
accordingly.” He suggests that it was essential to conserve shipping space but “it is also essential  that 
the people should be forced to economise so as to enable us to finance the heavy war expenditure 
which is now upon us.” 
34 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
35 Ibid. 
36 During 1916, there was more industrial unrest and strikes in Australia than before the war. As a 
result, there was “bad feeling between employers and employees” which protectionists saw as 
“handicapping Australia”. See “Buy Australian Goods: We must restrict imports or be Bankrupt”, 
Geelong Advertiser, 8 March 1917, 4. It could be suggested that the Luxuries Board was another 
method to rein in (maybe even use it as a form of ‘payback’) the strident and growing independence of 
the lower classes who were directly affecting the balance of trade when purchasing their imported 
‘luxuries’. 
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6.3 Fashionable acquisition trumps self-denial 
 
It is most likely that it is in the hope of restraining the wild extravagance of these young 
people that a thought is being given to sumptuary regulation.37 
 
Soon after Australia entered the war, the nation was beset by demands to 
assist the British war effort.38 In addition, widespread appeals were made to “the 
people of the Empire”39 to voluntarily exercise the spirit of self-denial40 and all 
possible frugality.41 Not only was the Australian government seeking ‘patriotic’ men 
for the fighting line42 but it proclaimed that everyone else should be personally 
responsible to engage in thrifty and economical practices to support Australia’s 
contribution to the war effort and to alleviate the pressures on a “sorely-burdened 
Britain”.43  
Whilst thrift campaigns were reasonably successful in encouraging 
economies in dress, food and pleasure44 this level of success did not satisfy an 
anxious government and those alarmists who were ‘sanctimoniously’ obsessed with 
thrift45 and imagined future shortages. It was evident46 that many ignored these 
“exhortations to patriotism”47 and the frequent calls from the press and 
parliamentarians that Australians restrain from using their surplus funds on “useless 
luxuries.”48 For instance, in the nine months up to the end of 31st March 1917, there 
                                                 
37 “Notes and Notions”, above n 1. 
38 “Australia’s Part in the War”, above n 27. 
39 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 “Australia’s Part in the War”, above n 27. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Nance, above n 22. 
45 Ibid. 
46 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. The author contends that these appeals were 
“indifferently responded to.” He/she argues that “the failure of the people to comply with the repeated 
requests made in favour of economy is a sign that the gravity of the situation is not yet realised, and 
proves the correctness of the old aphorism that the tightness of the shoe is not flit until it begins to 
pinch.” 
47 “Australia’s Part in the War”, above n 27. 
48 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
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had been a steady growth in imported ‘luxuries’.49 The value of ‘apparel and textiles’ 
had increased in 1917 to £2 694 7250 as compared to £2 136 27951 in 1916. Similarly, 
the value of ‘jewellery and fancy goods’ had increased from £249 32352 to £265 
174.53 It was believed by many that some form of restrictive action had become 
absolutely necessary even though there was no compelling evidence that the money 
‘wasted’ on imported luxuries would instead be spent on war bonds54 or retained as 
savings. 
 
6.4 Ruling Australia from Downing Street: a sumptuary pattern drafted 
for the Empire 
 
Mr Lloyd-George officially asked the Commonwealth to cease the importation of luxuries 
and to make locally for its own use most of the manufactured articles which it had been in 
the habit of importing from Great Britain.55 
 
Because the early war years proved to be relatively prosperous for some,56 
Australian cities “were roaring with trade, big profits and amusements of every 
                                                 
49 “Fortunes Spent on Luxuries”, above n 4. 
50 “Importation of Luxuries: a growing scandal”, The North Western Advocate and Emu Bay Times, 24 
May 1917, 3. This is approximately $239, 8000, 000 (as at 2013). Between 1910 and 1966, the 
Australian currency was the pound. During the period under examination, the Australian pound was 
linked to British sterling. The most current conversion is from 2013 and amounts are approximate. At 
this point of the chapter, the author has used the real price tool available at Lawrence Officer and 
Samuel Williamson, Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of Australian Amounts, 1828 to the 
Present, Measuring Worth <measuringworth.com.>. 
51 This approximately $194 600 000 (as at 2013). 
52 This approximately $22 720 000 (as at 2013). 
53 This is approximately $23 560 000 (as at 2013). “Importation of Luxuries: a growing scandal”, 
above n 50. 
54 During the war years the press made numerous exhortations to the public to buy war bonds rather 
luxuries: “[l]uxuries and war bonds can be purchased for 5/- (approximately $22.22 as at 2013) a 
week. A luxury will not help Australia to win the war, but 5/- a week put into the War Loan will do 
so.” See “Avoid Luxuries”, Border Watch, 10 February 1917, 5. 
55 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
56 Randolph Bedford referred to this as “spurious prosperity”. See “Wealth of Australia: Unnecessary 
Importations, Adverse Balance of Trade”, Sunday Times, 6 May 1917, 9. There were those who 
suggested that some workers demanded frequent “higher rates of pay” to support their extravagant life 
style. It was argued that higher rates of pay allowed workers more deposable income which they could 
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description.”57 There was plenty of food and many enjoyed the kinds of luxuries that 
were being denied to people elsewhere. For example, in France and in Great Britain, 
people were living under food control58 and enduring other economic deprivations.59 
Of course, these people were living in a very different social and political 
environment to the one that existed in Australia. The poorest classes and women in 
the United Kingdom were still without suffrage and wages remained extremely low 
for some workers.60  
The Australian press, the self-appointed ‘guardian’ of morals and national 
duty, regularly castigated workers and clerks for spending their money freely “upon 
the most absurd excesses and extravagances of one kind and another, from motor 
cars and wearing apparel to imitation jewellery”.61 However, the lower classes 
seemed reluctant to deny themselves those luxuries to which they had grown 
accustomed and had come to regard as almost necessary to their existence.62 
‘Patriotic’ Australians condemned this behaviour as morally and economically 
‘improper’,63 especially when so many lives were being lost in conflict and when 
earnest campaigns were being waged to ‘conscript’ funds to pay for the war. It was 
not only the Australian press that castigated those ‘wasting’ the nation’s liquid 
                                                                                                                                          
spend on those luxuries that they had previously been denied. See “The Importation of Luxuries”, 
above n 3. One critic referred to the high wages as “stolen money”. See “The Importation of 
Luxuries,” Daily Observer, 30 May 1917, 4.  
57 “Australia and the War”, Wangaratta Chronicle, 25 July 1917, 2. The author suggests that the great 
mass of the population, especially in the cities in which they resided, regarded the war as “a far off 
event that [did] not touch their lives.” 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 “Lowering Wages: What Conscription can do”, Daily Herald, 24 October 1916, 8. 
61 “Melbourne Letter: The Rule of Law”, Upper Murray & Mitta Herald, 13 September 1917, 3. 
62 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. It mattered not that the prices of these luxuries had been 
affected by steep increases in tariffs during the early years of the war. Very few articles imported into 
Australia did not show at least a 20 per cent increase over their purchase value for the year 1915 as 
compared with the year 1916-17. See “Importation of Luxuries”, Albury Banner and Wodonga 
Express, 24 August 1917, 33. 
63 “Economy and Luxuries”, The Register, 28 February 1917, 6. The author suggests that the self-
imposed “severe sacrifices” of the British caused “heart-searchings among patriotic Australians” who 
recognised the unevenness with which the burden of war is being distributed among the peoples of the 
Empire”. Compared with Britain, Australians had been practically untouched and it was argued that 
they could no longer decline to alter their mode of life in order to bring it more into conformity with 
the conditions prevailing in the old country. 
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capital on luxuries. There were those in Federal Parliament, such as Dr Carty Salmon 
MP, who claimed that the money spent on ‘unnecessary’ luxuries was adversely 
affecting Australia’s financial stability. Moreover, they attacked those who had the 
‘audacity’ during a time of war to insist upon “having a number of articles for their 
daily use which are regarded elsewhere as luxuries, and as entirely unnecessary for 
either the comfort or convenience of mankind.” 64 
 
6.4.1 Prime Minister Hughes condemns wartime extravagance 
 
Prime Minister Hughes also considered such ‘wanton’ behaviour65 at odds 
with his ‘win the war at any cost’ ideology.66 In an attempt to counter this ‘wasteful’ 
behaviour he began to make more use of the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) and 
Regulations67 as a form of sumptuary law.68 Likewise, he increased customs duties 
on most imported goods to ensure that his government could raise sufficient funds to 
do whatever was necessary to aid the Empire to win the war.69 It is not surprising 
that he was enthusiastically supported by the press and by those ‘avowed patriots’ 
such as Herbert Brookes, who claimed that “indulgence”70 and “folly”71 was causing 
serious economic mischief to the nation.72 Some suggested that Protectionists (such 
as Herbert Brookes) had spurred Hughes into his rush to set up the Luxuries Board.73 
                                                 
64 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 March 1917, 98 (Dr Carty 
Salmon). 
65 “Melbourne Letter: the Rule of Law”, above n 61. 
66 There was criticism of the wasteful habits of all levels of Government:“[t]he other day I saw strong, 
healthy men, about half-a-dozen of them, transplanting a palm in Hyde Park [Sydney]. This is the sort 
of thing that makes the ordinary private citizen tired. On the one hand is a Government lending itself 
to this sort of thing, and on the other is the appointment of a Luxury Board, on which the members 
will have high salaries, no doubt. Isn’t it time we got to business?” See “Win-the War, “Write to the 
Mirror about it: Is it Charity?” The Mirror, 7 July 1917, 5. 
67 Bedford, above n 56.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Clark, above n 32, 54. 
70 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
71 Ibid. 
72 The ruling classes in the United Kingdom had same concerns and as a result strict sumptuary 
measures were imposed. 
73 Vindex, Letter to the Editor, “Luxuries Board”, The Argus, 29 June 1917, 9. 
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There seems that this view could be true, especially when it is remembered that 
Brookes was the ‘leader’ of the Protectionist cult and had, in 1916, already 
campaigned for the prohibition of imported luxuries:  
One cannot help remembering that the ball was set rolling by a deputation to M. Hughes of a 
small and interested body of protectionists, who want everybody’s business and profits for 
themselves.74 
 
The need for sumptuary regulation was never far from the minds of those 
who supported the scheme to curb imported luxuries. For example, Randolph 
Bedford, a well-known journalist and politician, publicly urged Hughes to “find a 
sumptuary law in the War Precautions Act. The craze for foreign luxury requires as 
many war precautions as anything.”75 The strict curtailment of wasted ‘luxuries’ was 
no longer to be left to the individual but became a national and imperial imperative76 
that was primarily driven by the British Prime Minister.77  
 
6.4.2 Lloyd-George demands the implementation of sumptuary regulation 
 
To avert the possibility of further78 ‘danger’ from the importation of ‘foreign 
‘luxuries’, the English Prime Minister Mr Lloyd-George officially asked the 
Commonwealth to cease the importation of luxuries and to ensure that it locally 
manufacture most of these same goods for its own use.79 He asked all British 
                                                                                                                                          
 
74 Ibid. 
75 Bedford, above n 56. 
76 “Melbourne Letter: The Rule of Law”, above n 61. 
77 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. The British Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer 
had admonished their countrymen and countrywomen “for the mischief they were unwittingly doing 
by squandering fruitlessly rather than saving their new accession of riches”. When the warning went 
unheeded there was legislative interference “to check the danger by inhibiting the practice.” Local 
manufacturer and makers had to convert their machinery and plant for the production of war 
necessaries. 
78 The indulgence and folly was not peculiar to Australia; “[t]hey were repeated in an enhanced degree 
in the old land and the sister dominions.” See Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 28 September 
1917, 26. 
79 “Luxuries Board”, Examiner, 8 June 1917, 7. 
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Dominions to do this.80 Even though Lloyd George made this an official request, 
more than likely the strategy was worked out together with Hughes who was a 
sycophantic Anglophile and ardent imperialist. Manning Clark suggests that Hughes 
was an “England to the last man and the last shilling supporter. He was a King and 
Empire man.”81 In 1916, Hughes visited London and went on a lecturing tour all 
over the country (except Ireland-he was very anti-Catholic) to promote his particular 
‘battle cry’ to the locals.82 He told them that the war was doing great things for the 
Empire and that victory must be achieved no matter the cost in men and money.83 He 
was well received and fawned over.84 Arthur Balfour called Hughes ‘the apostle of a 
great cause’ and Lloyd George “joined in the praise and thanksgiving”.85 No doubt, 
ebullient from this praise, he was willing to accede to any English interference in 
Australia’s freedom to make its own policies and legislation.86 
Lloyd-George also directed that a Luxuries Board be created to determine 
what articles should be restricted, and to consider “articles [that] should during 
wartimes pass out of consumption and use, save by express sanction and 
authority.”87 Canada was another country besides Australia that set up a Luxuries 
Board.88 However, it encountered problems implementing Lloyd George’s directives. 
Trade treaties with France and Italy meant that there were fixed customs duties on 
articles such as table luxuries, wines, embroideries, velvets, ribbons and 
manufactured silks.89 
                                                 
80 “Canada and Luxuries”, Daily Herald, 28 February 1917, 5. 
81 Clark, above n 32, 13-14. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 “Melbourne Letter: The Rule of Law”, above n 61. 
88 See “Canada and Luxuries”, above n 80. New Zealand was also involved in the prohibition of 
various luxuries in 1917. 
89 Ibid. 
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Lloyd George had already implemented sumptuary regulations90 in Britain. 
These regulations sought to render economy compulsory,91 to encourage local 
industry and to free up additional shipping space for troops and essentials.92 It was 
not only apparel that was targeted. On November 22 1917, the Food Controller 
prohibited the sale and use of cream, for luxury purposes) between December 8 and 
April 30.93 In March 1917, there were restrictions imposed on meals in British 
restaurants. Luncheons were limited to 2 course and dinner to three.94 It was also 
anticipated at this time that the Food Controller might impose a “meatless day”95 
every week and “war time bread” made with maize, oats and barley rather than 
“bleached flour.”96 
During this period, similar sumptuary restrictions were imposed by the 
French and American governments. In Paris, women who dressed “extravagantly 
[had] to pay dearly for their selfish folly.”97 The Luxury Taxation Board added 10% 
on dresses that cost more than £8. Expensive boots and gloves were regarded as 
luxuries and attracted tax.98 As one female correspondent wrote,  
everything that is desirable is to be taxed. This means that women must learn to do with less 
and take care of what they have. They must change the fashion of their clothes less often, and 
be content to look nice in the same clothes for more than one season.99  
 
There was also a sumptuary ordinance that prohibited the wearing of evening 
clothes to theatres that received a State grant. Opera goers were not to be admitted 
                                                 
90 “Sumptuary Law”, Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners Advocate, 10 January 1917, 6. The author 
suggests that there was nothing new with the restrictions that had reduced people to a fixed dress 
allowance and imposed food restraints. He suggested that exigencies of the day had driven the 
Government back to some of the conditions of feudalism. 
91 “England’s War Lent”, Kalgoorlie Miner, 3 March 1917, 4. 
92 The British had some unique problems with enemy submarines that had sunk many cargo ships. The 
British authorities prohibited the importation of fruit into the United Kingdom in order that additional 
shipping space “might be available for the needs of life.” See: “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 
3. 
93 See “No Luxuries: London”, The Register, 23 November 1917, 5. 
94 See “Food Restrictions”, Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners’ Advocate, 3 March 1917, 11. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See “For Ladies: Fashion Notes, The Uncounted Cost”, The Daily News, 10 August 1918, 6. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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into theatres “unless dressed in ordinary city clothes…Any other attire would be 
rigorously refused admittance.”100 In addition, in order to save power, all theatres, 
concerts, circuses, music halls, and cinemas were to be closed one night per week.101 
The prescriptive form of sumptuary legislation that was enacted in Great 
Britain during this period was not overtly directed at reinforcing and legitimising the 
pre-war hierarchical social order. However, it still had the same hierarchical effect. 
Female war workers who had become “dress-mad” on their vastly enhanced 
earnings102 were, for instance, restrained from further extravagance and in dressing 
as they pleased.103 Before such restrictions were imposed, these women had enjoyed 
new opportunities to purchase fashionable headgear, clothing and footwear, and were 
used to paying the sorts of prices for their “bijouterie” 104 “which had never entered 
into wildest dreams in pre-war days”.105 Even upper class Englishwomen, who were, 
at one time, the leaders of “haut ton” (sic),106 were forced by Lloyd George’s 
sumptuary regulations to discard their “fripperies of fashions for plain matter-of-fact-
attire.”107 The sumptuary regulations proved to be an effective tool to control 
important aspects of personal behaviour and represented a tangible expression of a 
hierarchical ideal. 
The Imperial Government had the same attitude to controlling the affairs of 
Commonwealth nations as they had toward leading Australian military campaigns. 
The era of British supremacy over the colonies had not yet ended and would continue 
throughout the war. Lloyd George maintained that what was good for the Motherland 
should also be obligatory for the dominions,108 and he set about spreading the 
                                                 
100 “Greater Economies: Official Action in Paris”, Border Watch, 10 March 1917, 4. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Many of these women worked in the ammunition and other war-related industries. 
103 “Official Labor’s Opportunity: Parliamentary Trifling”, Portland Guardian, 7 March 1917, 3. The 
author alludes to Lloyd George’s directives: “Men are not to eat or drink as they please, women are 
not to dress as they please. The luxuries of the rich are to be cut down with stern hand.” 
104 Trinkets. See “Notes and Notions”, above n 1. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 “Topics: Doing Without Luxuries”, Freeman’s Journal, 1 March 1917, 25.  
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‘gospel’ of enforced thrift109 throughout the Empire. It was suggested by one 
commentator that there was no doubt that Lloyd George was trying to rule Australia 
and that some Australians seemed to have more allegiance to England than to 
Australia. He sarcastically suggests that Hughes came back from his ‘pilgrimage’ to 
England “with a whole pocketful of instructions”110 and that he had become “a sort 
of diplomatic representative of the British Government. Otherwise why all the 
mystery, his secrecy, his refusal to take Parliament into his confidence?”111 
Lloyd George was primarily concerned with future shortages and economic 
hardship and ruin.112 In his ‘gospel’ of austerity, there was also an underlying 
condemnation of luxury with its strong association with moral weakness.113 He 
maintained that those who failed to resist the temptation of luxury goods in the 
‘sober’ days of war and would not exercise “a little rigorous economy”114 were to be 
condemned as selfish115 and unpatriotic.116  
 
 
 
6.4.3 Hughes ignores British interference in Australia’s domestic affairs 
 
Hughes, the ardent imperialist, with many other self-serving protectionists,117 
championed this imperial dogma and “clamoured insistently”118 for the prompt 
                                                 
109 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
110 “Topics: Doing Without Luxuries”, above n 108. 
111 Ibid. 
112 One “patriotic” critic suggested that there was a need for the taxation of luxuries or an enactment 
of sumptuary laws to warn the people that their continuance in their present extravagant courses 
“spells ruin”. Whilst he accepted that greater licence may be allowed in times of peace, he demanded 
that “the strictest supervision and discipline should be imposed and cheerfully borne in war-time.” See 
“The Unmilitary Mind: Cult of Pacifism”, Weekly Times, 3 February 1917, 34. 
113 There were calls to “high thinking and plain living” as opposed to extravagance and luxury. See 
“Preaching V. Practice: Rich Retain their Luxuries while Preaching Economy to the Poor”, Truth, 5 
September 1916, 4. 
114 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. The author calls them “prohibitive tariff doctrinaires… [who 
wanted to] seize so excellent a chance to further their sectional aims and policy.” 
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appointment of a Luxuries Board. Yet, there was little119 or no objection to Lloyd 
George’s direct intrusion into Australia’s trade and domestic policies.120 In this time 
of crisis, Hughes, with his “feet of British clay,”121 threw off the autonomous cloak 
of independence and nationalism, reverted to colonial dependency, and sought 
direction and succour in the arms of the ‘Motherland’. Hughes adopted this position 
despite the creation of the Nationalist Party in 1917 that was made up from his pro-
conscription followers and sympathetic conservatives. Clearly, the party’s nationalist 
platform did not necessarily mean it was to have an independent voice-it seems that 
deference to Britain was the true nationalist agenda for Hughes and his supporters. 
At the time, the Australian and British press bombarded their public with 
articles, often cautionary in nature, harking back to the salutary effects of sumptuary 
restraint on luxuries.122 This meant that many Australians began to anticipate that 
their own Government would force upon them similar forms of sumptuary 
legislation; they too might each week have to suffer “meatless “and “sugarless 
days”.123 The government appeared to be determined to intervene in the private lives 
of it people to ensure that Australia could “most effectively”124 play her part in 
helping to win the war: personal sacrifice in the service of the nation was expected 
from all.125  
                                                                                                                                          
118 Ibid. 
119 Some who argued that Hughes and other “ardent” patriots, who believed that England could be 
helped to win the war by introducing a “semi-system of starvation into the Commonwealth,” were 
misdirected. They condemned Hughes for his attempt to “curtail the self-governing powers of 
Australia and make it something like a Crown Colony.” See “Topics: Doing without Luxuries”, above 
n 108. 
120 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. The author suggests that “the urgency of the situation 
[was] not likely to provoke much dissent”. 
121 Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity; The Problem of Nationalism in Australian 
History and Historiography” (2001) 32 Australian Historical Studies 80. 
122 “Random Readings: To Restrain Luxurious Living”, The Wyalong Advocate and Mining, 
Agricultural and Pastoral Gazette, 18 April 1917. See also “Sumptuary Law”, above n 90. See also 
“Topics of the Day, Notes, The Tragedy of Dress”, The Catholic Press, 28 June 1917, 9. 
123 “Australia’s Part in the War”, above n 27. 
124 Ibid. 
125 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
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Just as the moralisation of luxury was at the core of discourses surrounding 
sumptuary law,126 Lloyd George made the moralisation of luxury a marker in the 
discourses of war and patriotism. In fact, what Lloyd George was proposing for 
Australia and “the sister dominions”127 was a sumptuary project that was to have all 
the semiotic and ideological markers of traditional sumptuary law: 
It is a sumptuary measure calculated to make the people more economical than might 
otherwise be, simply because they will no longer be able to gratify their desires along 
accustomed lines.128 
 
6.4.4 Hughes embraces Lloyd-George’s directive  
 
Hughes embraced this highly interventionist project and declared to the 
Australian public his intention to implement Lloyd George’s command to establish a 
Luxuries Board.129 In fact, it became an important part of his “win the war” platform 
leading up to the Federal elections in May 1917.130 In this speech delivered at 
Bendigo, Victoria on March 27 1917 Hughes made it clear that he had embraced 
Lloyd-George’s edict:  
The Government intends to follow the example of Great Britain in regard to the regulation of 
the importation of luxuries during war time. Such a policy seems to be dictated both by 
common prudence and circumstances in which we now find ourselves. It is obvious on the face 
of it that to send money out of this country and out of the Empire at a time when every atom of 
wealth is essential is a suicidal policy… [i]t is obvious that in so complex a matter we must 
proceed with great care. To prohibit the importation of luxuries, and so give employment to 10 
people, and at the same time throw 250 out of work, would be folly. The question is most 
difficult, but, having regard to all its difficulties and complexities, the Government will 
endeavour to achieve the end I have mentioned.” 
 
                                                 
126 Hunt, above n 15, 77. 
127 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
128 “Restrictions on Luxuries”, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1917, 6. 
129 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
130  See William Hughes, ‘Win the War’ (Speech delivered at the Nationalist Party Election Campaign 
Launch, Bendigo, 27 March 1917).  
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In the interim period,  and before Hughes could establish the Luxuries Board, 
Lloyd George, once more intruded into Australian foreign trade policy. He exerted 
imperial control and instructed his Controller of Shipping131 to effectively pre-empt 
the function of the Luxuries Board by taking “perfect control”132 of all goods being 
shipped to Australia from the United Kingdom133 whilst at the same time keeping a 
“tight grip” on the issue on the issue of permits; they were practically unobtainable 
for any but goods of prime necessity.134 Again Hughes made no objection to this act 
of paternal meddling or intervention from the ‘mother country’. 
 
6.4.5 Herbert Brookes supports the establishment of the Luxuries Board 
 
Protectionists, such as Herbert Brookes, welcomed the establishment of the 
Board as an additional boon135 to Australian industries.136 Local manufacturers were 
already receiving a large measure of protection “through high freights and war risks 
that was never dreamt of a few years ago. Many of them are already benefiting 
enormously through the war.”137 One journalist labelled the protectionists as 
                                                 
131 Sir Joseph Maclay was a member of Lloyd George’s Ministry, and during this period was 
“exercising a free hand in regard to all shipping. Not a package of goods can be shipped to Australia 
except by his permission.” See “Restricting Luxuries”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 27 
April 1917, 32. 
132 “The Importation of Luxuries”, The West Australian, 21 April 1917, 7; “Restricting Luxuries”, 
above n 131. On commentator noted that  “no Proclamations have been issued , neither have any 
regulations been made, but quietly and unobtrusively shipments of luxuries from the United Kingdom 
have been brought under such perfect control that for some time past it has been increasingly difficult, 
and from now on it will be even more so, for home shippers to obtain space for luxuries on vessels 
bound for Australia.” 
133 “Importation of Luxuries”, above n 132. 
134 Ibid. These early “precautions” were not expected to “militate” (sic) against the wider sphere of 
prohibition which was being contemplated. 
135 Local manufacturers were already receiving a measure of protection “through high freights and war 
risks that was never dreamt of a few years ago. Many of them are already benefiting enormously 
through the war.” See “Restrictions on Luxuries”, above n 128; See “Curtailing Extravagance”, above 
n 2. 
136 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. In March 1917, the Australian Protectionist Association 
passed a resolution “that public sentiment be stimulated in order to secure preference for Australian-
made goods.” See “Buy Australian Goods: We must Restrict Imports or be Bankrupt”, above n 36. 
137 “Restrictions on Luxuries”, above n 128. 
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“prohibitive tariff doctrinaires”138 who saw the establishment of the Luxuries Board 
as an “excellent…chance to further their sectional aims and policy.”139 However, the 
‘patriotic press’ was, in the main, extremely supportive of the edict that Australians 
must buy only Australian-made goods. One journalist even called for a decree 
“forbidding the unloading of cargoes of luxuries and stuff we can and should weave 
and spin and hammer and forge for ourselves.”140 There were, of course, those who 
took a more cynical view of the protectionists’ support for the Luxuries Board: 
One cannot help remembering that the ball was set rolling by a deputation to Mr Hughes of a 
small and interested body of protectionists, who want everybody’s business and profits for 
themselves.141 
 
At meetings and in the press, protectionists were constantly advocating the 
need for the Australian Government to protect Australian industries at any cost.142 
Much of their discourse was marked with xenophobic warnings. They insisted that 
the continued importation of foreign products, particularly those produced by nations 
who were not part of the Empire, could prove dangerous to Australia’s industries and 
to her way of life.143 They insisted that Australia should carefully maintain her 
‘social purity’ and national identity by protecting her borders from contagion by an 
influx of unwanted ‘aliens’.144 Moreover, she also needed to protect her ‘economic 
purity’ from the dumping of cheap imported goods.  One protectionist cautioned that 
if “somebody is not vigilant in the near future, Australia is going to be made a 
dumping ground, a spoiltip for the products of foreign countries not so good as this 
to whom we have no obligation.”145 Even though protectionist rates on most 
imported goods were already high, manufacturers continued to call for the urgent 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Geelong Advertiser, 16 March 1917, 2. 
141 See Vindex, above n 73. 
142 “Items of Interest”, The Argus, 18 July 1917, 10. 
143  “Advance Australia Fair! A Few Things She Doesn’t Need”, Blue Mountain Echo, 1 June 1917, 7. 
144 War Census Act 1917 (Cth); Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 (Cth); War Precautions Act 1914 
(Cth). 
145 “Advance Australia Fair! A Few Things She Doesn’t Need”, above n 143. 
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imposition of even higher rates that were allied with “the strictest penal laws against 
dumping.”146 There were some who even wanted tariff rates to be modelled on 
ancient sumptuary laws: 
and made so stiff that those who bought diamonds and furs would pay enough in duties 
for the upkeep of an efficient fleet of submarines; while those on silks, laces and 
millinery would maintain a complete aerial service.147 
 
6.4.6 Hughes forms an alliance with Brookes 
 
The Prime Minister relied on Brookes’ counsel and was in an ideal position to 
promote the latter’s protectionist interests. Rohan Rivett, Brookes’ biographer and 
brother-in-law confirms this close symbiotic relationship between the Prime Minister 
and the wealthy industrialist. He contends that by 1917-1918, Brookes was providing 
funds and giving platform assistance to the coalition that Hughes formed after 
leading his followers out of the Labor Party. Rivett also suggests that “Brookes was 
one of several outside Cabinet to whom Hughes turned on occasion.”148 
No doubt Brookes advised149 Hughes that prohibition of imported luxuries 
would help win the war, preserve Australian national life and maintain empire 
solidarity.150 In 1916, Brookes had apparently suggested a similar method of 
prohibition of luxuries to the Minister of Customs.151 Hughes was at the time deeply 
impressed with Brookes, who was then the National President of the Chamber of 
Manufactures. Hughes especially wanted Brookes to accept an appointment to the 
Luxuries Board and in early 1917, had asked him to place his services “at the 
                                                 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. The author argued that “modern necessities” such as skyscrapers, luxurious hotels, faster 
trains and quicker telephones were not really essential to peace and comfort. Rather, he suggested that 
isolation should be Australia’s strongest coast defence with universal training the safest domestic 
defence. 
148 Rohan Rivett, Australian Citizen: Herbert Brookes 1867-1963, (Melbourne University Press, 1965) 
85. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Clark, above n 32, 43. Clark says that Hughes and Brookes had formed a political alliance after the 
latter had invited the former to a weekend at his holiday home at Macedon. 
151 “Importation of Silk: Demand for Restriction opposed, Manufacturers’ Representation”, The 
Argus, 2 March 1917, 6. 
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disposal of the Government.”152 This relationship worked well for Hughes who was 
at the time looking for every opportunity to advance his popularity and political 
power153 leading up to the 1917 May Federal elections. He gained a great deal of 
positive media coverage154 about this proposal to limit the importation of luxuries155 
and his assurance that he would do everything to encourage local industries.156 Other 
stakeholders were not so certain about the efficacy of the Board. Whilst some 
predicted that there may be adverse effects upon revenue,157 the main concern for 
industry and the ordinary person centred on the question of what goods were to be 
defined as luxuries.158 This was to be a polemical question that the Board was to 
struggle with throughout its short life.159 
 
 
6.5 The establishment of the Luxuries Board: an ensemble of the Prime 
Minister’s making 
 
It is provided that three persons who are to comprise the board shall be appointed by, and 
hold office during the pleasure of the Prime Minister.160 
 
The Board, which was selected by the Prime Minister,161 first met on 7 June 
1917.162 Although the regulations163 under which the Board164 was appointed clearly 
                                                 
152 “Importation of Luxuries: Board to be Appointed”, The Argus, 28 April 1917, 18. For some 
unknown reason, Brookes did not take a seat on the Board. 
153 Hughes knew he had strong ally in the Protectionist Association. He stressed that “[t]he most 
scientific Protection is that which keeps rivals entirely out of our home markets: therefore I will raise 
the hedge skywards.” See Geelong Advertiser, above n 140. 
154 Randolph Bedford, above n 67. 
155 “Importation of Luxuries: Board to be Appointed”, above n 152. The media was continually awash 
with speculative announcements about the functions of the board and potential appointees. 
156 “Restriction on Luxuries”, above n 137. 
157 Ibid. 
158 “What are Luxuries?” The Register, 5 March 1917, 6. 
159 The Board’s activities seemed to fizzle out by August 1917. It seems that at this time the Board’s 
recommendations were not adopted by the Prime Minister. This reflects the situation with the Tariff 
Board in the latter part of the 1920s when the government began to ignore its recommendations. 
160 “Barring Luxuries: Federal Government’s Move”, Sunday Times, 20 May 1917, 1. 
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set out what it was expected to do,165 its activities were, from the beginning, always 
clothed in secrecy.166 The Board comprised of two nominees of the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce (Mark Sheldon of Dalton Bros., Sydney and J McIntosh of 
Ball and Welch Melbourne), two nominees of the Associated Chambers of 
Manufactures (W J Gibson, Vice-President of Victorian Chamber of Manufactures 
and Mr Hitchman of New South Wales), together with “a Member (sic) of the Inter-
State Commission as chairman” (NN Lockyer).167 These men were considered to be 
“some of the ablest businessmen in the Commonwealth”.168 
Not only were the Board’s meetings held in private but no indication was 
given to the public or Parliament169 as to the subjects discussed within these 
meetings.170 Whereas some welcomed the possibility that the Board would have 
scope “for useful action”171 to impose a judicious curtailment172 of luxuries, there 
was still much speculation and anxiety about the functions and scope of the Board.173 
The Chamber of Manufactures, of which Brookes was the President, warned Board 
members to “be alive”174 to their interests, their trade and the people generally.175 
                                                                                                                                          
161 On 5 May 1917 William (‘Billy’) Hughes was re-elected Prime Minister when his ‘win the war’ 
party (a coalition of the Commonwealth Liberal Party and the National Labour Party) defeated the 
Australian Labour Party (led by Frank Tudor). The Board Members held office during the pleasure of 
the Prime Minister. 
162 “Luxuries Board: Investigation in Camera”, Daily Herald, 8 June 1917, 6. 
163 War Precautions (Luxuries Restriction) Regulation 1917 (Cth). 
164 See Nicholas Lockyer, ‘Luxuries Board Report’ (Report, Luxuries Board, 20 July 1917, Luxuries 
Board Papers, CP 290/1, National Archives of Australia, Canberra). Mr Lockyer had previously been 
Collector of Customs and First Commission of Taxation in New South Wales and then Collector of 
Customs for the Commonwealth; See “Customs and Taxation”, Evening News, 30 January 1901, 7; 
See “What is a Luxury?” The Register, 12 July 1917, 4. 
165 “Luxuries Board: Investigation in Camera”, above n 162. 
166 Ibid. 
167 See Lockyer, above n 164, 2. 
168 See “What is a Luxury?” above n 164. 
169 “Luxuries Board”, Examiner, 6 June 1917, 7. The author says that “[t]he board has no connection 
with Parliament.” 
170 “Luxuries Board: Investigation in Camera”, above n 162. 
171 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
172 They were counselled by some to remember that some imports such as silks and motor cars “were 
really necessities” in Australia, and if the Board prohibited them, then many people would be thrown 
out of work. See “Commonwealth Luxuries Board”, The Register, 20 June 1917, 6. 
173 “The Letters of Vivienne”, Northern Times, 23 June 1917, 2. 
174 See “Commonwealth Luxuries Board”, above n 172. 
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One critic went so far as to compare in pejorative terms, the Board’s arbitrary and 
secretive methods with those of a Star Chamber.176 
 The Board’s reports were deemed provocative and “necessarily”177 
confidential.178 They were provided directly to the Prime Minister who, in a 
Leviathan manner, took on the conduct of the Boards’ activities as his own personal 
mission. The reports were never even seen179 or discussed180 by Parliament,181 
despite numerous requests that they should be made available to both Houses.182 
Hughes was on a singular mission to implement Lloyd George’s directives. At the 
time, Hughes appeared unconcerned that he was interfering with the free course of 
trade. More importantly, he seemed to be oblivious to the possibility that the 
prohibition of so many potential ‘luxury lines’ would seriously interfere with the 
                                                                                                                                          
175 Ibid. 
176  Letters to the Editor, “Luxuries Board”, The Argus, 20 June 1917, 13. The critic suggested that 
“Star Chamber methods are always undesirable, and in matters of this kind, doubly so.” He further 
suggested that the Board’s war time recommendations could be used as a “basis for concrete and 
permanent tariff alterations” in the future. 
177 “The Luxury Board”, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 1917, 15. On 13 June 1917, the secretary to 
the Luxuries Board sent the following missive: “The board is unable to disclose the nature of its 
recommendations to the Government, which are necessarily confidential.” 
178 When I arranged for the Luxuries Board material to be viewed I was noticed that the file was 
marked ‘confidential’ and that it was obviously Hughes’ personal file. All reports and correspondence 
by the Board’s Chairman, Nicholas Lockyer and letters from Stephen Mills and Perry Whitton which 
were also contained in the file were personally addressed to the Prime Minister. It was not until 17 
April 1973 that the decision was made to open the files. Attached to the archives records was a note 
that indicates that the Luxuries Board documents were part of “extremely varied collection of 
papers…Most of them appear to have passed backwards and forwards between the office of the 
Secretary and the Prime Minister’s office and to have been held eventually in the Secretary’s safe 
because of their extremely confidential character.” See Lockyer, above n 164. 
179 One critic suggested that “the policy being formed by the Cabinet [was] in direct opposition of all 
ideas of freedom and British Justice.” See: Fair Play, “Letters to the Editor”, The Argus, 22 June 1917, 
7. 
180 Lockyer said in an interview with the Argus that “the Luxury Board’s work was entirely distinct 
from that of tariff revision, which was the subject of discussion and decision by Parliament.” See 
“Luxuries Board: Question of Secrecy, Chairman’s Reply”, The Argus, 22 June 1917, 7. 
181 “Importation of Luxuries: First Meeting of the Board”, The Brisbane Courier, 6 June 1917, 7. It 
was made quite clear that “[t]he Board has no connection with Parliament”. 
182 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 80 
(Messrs Mathews and Kelly). 
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raising of Federal revenue and that it could prove to be a major threat to employment 
in Australia.183 
 
6.5.1 The Board’s powers 
 
The Board was given very wide powers184 to control the importation of 
luxuries into the Commonwealth.185 The Luxury Restriction regulations provided the 
Board and the Chairman with all the powers of a Royal Commission pursuant to the 
Royal Commission Act, 1902-12 (Cth). This meant that witnesses could be 
summoned and evidence taken on oath, particularly in those cases where there was a 
diversity of opinion amongst members about whether any commodity was to be 
regarded as a luxury. It appears that during the time when the Board sat, no witnesses 
were summoned nor was there any evidence presented to it.186 
This form of regulation ‘from above’187 was expected to control the 
extravagance “that must more or less hamper the efforts of those who are anxious 
that Australia shall render all possible assistance in the struggle for liberty.” 188 The 
Board’s duty was to make recommendations to the Prime Minister from time to time 
as to the goods or classes of goods the importation of which, in the opinion of the 
Board, should be prohibited or restricted.189 Once the recommendations had been 
approved by Cabinet they were then to take the form of a Proclamation and “would 
                                                 
183 Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 20 July 1917 (National Archives of Australia, 
Canberra, Luxuries Board Papers, CP290/1) 4. Lockyer informed Hughes that “it was not indicated 
[by Hughes] that the question of revenue, should in any way influence…[the Board’s] deliberations.” 
184 “Luxuries Boards’ Powers: It can encourage industry and stop imports”, Geelong Advertiser, 21 
May 1917, 4. See also the War Precaautions (Luxuries Restriction) Regulation 1917 (Cth). 
185  See War Precautions (Luxuries Restriction) Regulation 1917 (Cth). 
186 Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 14 June 1917 (National Archives of Australia, 
Canberra, Luxuries Board Papers, CP290/1). 
187 Alan Hunt, Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 5. 
188 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
189 Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 20 July 1917 (National Archives of Australia, 
Canberra, Luxuries Board Papers, CP290/1) 2; War Precaautions (Luxuries Restriction) Regulation 
1917 (Cth) reg 3. 
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have the force of law under the War Precautions Act.”190 These recommendations 
could be characterised as a form of ‘proclamatory’ law. They had much in common 
with the royal proclamations and edicts of the early modern sumptuary period; both 
took a negative form and both were issued by a supreme executive power. The Board 
had the exclusive power to determine what clothing and accessories to which the 
public could have access.191 There is some evidence that Hughes did not even 
consult with his Cabinet on these issues.192  
 Some parliamentarians felt so estranged from Hughes’ despotic193 and highly 
centralised methods of determining wartime policy and governance that they began 
to refer to Hughes and his Cabinet as a “super Parliament.”194 Macintyre suggests195 
that Hughes was law unto himself: he exploited his special executive power to the 
full and cut across the normal lines of administration. This was certainly the case 
with the Luxuries Board. Not only did Hughes personally direct the Board in both its 
scope and the procedural aspects of its activities, but he orally instructed its 
Chairman196 to investigate those issues which he considered as pertinent in 
conserving Australia’s ‘liquid capital’ by the restriction of all unnecessary 
expenditure on importations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
190 “Importation of Luxuries: First Meeting of the Board”, above n 181. 
191 War Precautions (Luxuries Restriction) Regulation 1917 (Cth) reg 3. 
192 Rivett, above n 148, 85. Rivett suggest that “[i]t was questionable whether, for any length of time, 
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193 “The Taxation of Luxuries”, Evening News, 6 July 1917, 4. The author suggests that the 
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Fenton). 
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196 Letter from William Hughes to Nicholas Lockyer, May 1917 (National Archives of Australia, 
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6.6 The Board to decide what was a ‘luxury’: not an easy task 
 
When will the Prime Minister take steps to prohibit the importation of luxuries, and how far 
does he intend to go in that direction?197 
 
The Board members faced enormous difficulties in their attempt to resolve 
what was to constitute a ‘prohibited luxury’. Despite the fact that the directions in the 
Regulations,198 which were issued on 19 May 1917, “were not accompanied by any 
qualification”199 Mr N C Lockyer, the Board’s Chairman, was able to identify three 
“comprehensive groups” of goods for the Board’s particular consideration:200 
1. Articles of luxury;  
2. Any articles the importation of which is not essential to the general comfort, 
health, or welfare of the community; and 
3. Any goods or class of goods, the production of which in Australia should be 
induced, encouraged or stimulated either by payment of a bounty upon such 
production or manufacture or by any other means. 
 
 
6.6.1 The Board’s role 
 
The Board, as a locus of power, wisdom201 and law, was expected to 
fabricate, with haste,202 a regulatory schema to control the wanton behaviour of those 
                                                 
197 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 July 1917, 14 (Mr 
Mathews). 
198 They set out the constitution and functions of the Board. 
199 Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 20 July 1917 (National Archives of Australia, 
Canberra, Luxuries Board Papers, CP290/1). 
200 Ibid 2. 
201 “Luxuries Restriction Board”, The Register, 21 May 1917, 6. Mr Cook, the Minister for the Navy, 
suggested that the Board’s task would “make a big call on the capacity and wisdom of the commission 
(sic).” 
202 “Importation of Luxuries: Board To Be Appointed”, above n 152. The Prime Minister indicated to 
the press on many occasions that once the Board was officially appointed that “no time would be lost 
in putting the scheme into operation.” The Board was appointed in May and set to work in preparing 
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who could or would not self-regulate their consumption of luxury or non-essential 
goods whilst there was “a world-wide struggle…raging”.203 It was for the Board to 
determine what was a luxury204 or a non-essential item. Although Mr Cook205 
suggested that “all sections will … be represented on the board-consumer, 
manufacturer, imported and Government”.206 Yet, in reality, consumers, particularly 
the working class, had no real input into this determination.207 Chambers of 
Commerce repeatedly asked the Board to give three weeks’ notice of its intentions to 
deal with goods that might be considered to be luxuries, in order that traders could 
submit objections.208 These requests were ignored, for the Board had already decided 
to make its own arbitrary decision about what goods were to be classified a 
‘luxuries’.209 
 
 
6.6.2 What is a luxury? 
 
It was not a simple task to define “a luxury”;210 according to a person’s social 
status, the question as to what constituted a luxury was seen to vary considerably.211 
                                                                                                                                          
their first report in early June, which was then followed by a second report in later part of June. It 
seems that the Prime Minister verbally gave the Board many of its directions. See Letter from Perry 
Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) 1. 
203 “The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3. 
204 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 June 1917, 80 (Mr 
Hughes). Mr Hughes claimed that “the word ‘luxuries’ has now a very wide meaning”. 
205 Cook was the Minister for the Navy at the time. 
206 “Luxuries Restriction Board”, above n 201. 
207 As early as March 1917, there had been the expectation that members of the public who were 
interested in the issues discussed by the Board would be given “an opportunity to put their views 
before the board.” See “Importation of Luxuries”, Examiner, 24 March 1917, 8. 
208 “What is a luxury?”, above n 168. 
209 Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 14 June 1917 (National Archives of Australia, 
Canberra, Luxuries Board Papers, CP290/1). 
210 One critic suggests that “superficially” the question is simple enough. One could say that a luxury 
“is something not necessary, but used for personal gratification”. He argues that, in reality, this is not 
the case. The further question arises as to what are necessities? He suggests that the needs of man in 
general have increased with the advance of civilianization. The luxuries of today are the necessities of 
tomorrow. See “What are Luxuries?”, above n 158. 
211 “What is a luxury?” above n 168. 
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There was no strict line of demarcation between raw materials and finished 
products,212 or between luxuries and necessities.213 It was a perplexing issue for 
merchants214 and the public; 215 how could the Board “legitimately”216 pick and 
choose between the ‘alleged luxuries’ consumed by the community: 
It cannot, of its own motion, differentiate between man and man, or class and class, or 
trade and trade. It cannot set up its necessarily arbitrary standard of use, taste, or habit 
just because it happens to be clothed with the large…though…as yet ill-defined powers 
of the War Precautions Act. It cannot rob the poor of their luxuries because they are 
poor; the poor, in fact need luxuries more than the rich; nor should the Government 
highhandedly interfere with the simple pleasures of the rich-the odds are those folks will 
spend the money on some other kinds of pleasure.217 
 
It was expected that the Board would include a large number of imported 
goods in its list of ‘prohibited luxuries’.218 There was no doubt that many expected, 
and some were even eager, that costly women’s apparel,219 fancy goods220 and 
alcohol would be the first targets in the Board’s sights.221 Imported furs,222 silks, 
satins, velvets and feathers were all considered by most to be luxuries and, as such, 
were also targets of prohibition.223 Furriers predicted that furs would double in price 
after the Board had made it determinations.224 It is clearly evident why such goods 
                                                 
212 “Luxuries”, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1917, 10. 
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215 Ibid. 
216 “The Taxation of Luxuries”, above n 193. 
217 Ibid. 
218 “Restricting Luxuries”, above n 131. 
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prices…are so high that nobody who is not able to afford real luxuries can indulge in them.” 
223 Ibid. 
224 FUR COATS. 
We still have a few of the wonderful 
line of 
FUR COATS. 
They will be worth nearly double the 
 
 
209 
 
were to be targeted. For the year ending June 30 1916, £1 616 211 was paid for silks 
and satins alone.225 For the same period £48 287 was spent on feathers; £158 424 on 
perfumery; £486 027 on trimmings for apparel and £100 568 on furs.226 
 
6.6.3 Silk: a perennial target 
 
Silk was a controversial subject and its classification was never going to be 
an easy task for the Board. During the early stages of the war, silk was regarded by 
the British Government as a luxury and thus its importation was restricted.227 In 
Australia, whilst its popularity228 was also on the rise during this period, silk was still 
regarded as a luxury item229 and its importation was considered to be a “sinful 
waste.”230 Hughes could see no justification for the importation of one and half 
millions’ worth of silks in six months.231 Others argued that it was a great mistake to 
assume that all silken goods should come under the heading of luxuries;232 certain 
kinds of silk were not only cheaper than linen but silk was the essential raw material 
from which a substantial number of dress goods were made up by Australian 
manufacturers.233  
Silk sold for about 2/- or 2/6 a yard compared to woollen stuffs which ranged 
from 3/6 to 15/- per yard. Silk was considered “economically and intrinsically the 
                                                                                                                                          
price next year, for the Luxuries Board 
is sure to prohibit their import. 
Now is your chance. 
The Mercury, 13 July 1917, 4 (emphasis in original). 
225 This was an enormous amount when you consider that only £1 488 987 was paid during this period 
for “ales, beers, spirits and wine”. See “Fortunes Spent on Luxuries”, above n 4. 
226 Ibid. 
227 “The Future of Silk”, Leader, 10 June 1918, 5. 
228 There had been £1 500 000 worth of silks imported into Australia in the six months prior to 
February 1917. See “Importation of Luxuries: Amazing Australian Figures”, Dominion, Volume 10, 
Issue 3013, 26 February 1917, 7. 
229 “Is Silk a Luxury? Interesting View Given”, Weekly Times, 3 March 1917, 11. 
230 “What are Luxuries?”, above n 158. 
231 “Importation of Luxuries: Restrictions Foreshadowed”, Marlborough Express, 27 February 1917, 
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best value in the textile trade”234 and much less of a luxury than woollen dress 
goods.235 Due to its scarcity the price of cotton was abnormally high236 and this 
tended to make silk a favourite for all classes, particularly because of the great utility 
of the material.237 It was not only used for women’s and children’s clothing but also 
for men’s shirts and suits.238 
Although Herbert Brookes, as a Protectionist and manufacturer, was totally in 
favour of the Luxuries Board,239 he took a different position to Hughes about 
classifying silk as a luxury. He reminded Hughes that the prohibition of the 
importation of silk would throw hundreds of young women who were engaged in the 
manufacture of silk clothing out of employment.240 The silk clothing manufacturing 
industry in Australia was so robust that some even suggested that Australia should 
have its own silk industry.241 
 
6.6.4 Jewellery 
 
Jewellery was another contentious item of apparel, and many expected that it 
should also be targeted by the Board.242 It was argued that jewellery, the ultimate 
ostentatious display of sumptuosity, needed to be controlled and that women of all 
classes should be restrained from buying imported precious and imitation 
                                                 
234 “Importation of Silk: Demand for Restriction opposed, Manufacturers’’ Representation”, above n 
151. 
235 Ibid. In Britain, as cotton and woollen materials became increasingly scarce, silk, despite its high 
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jewellery.243 One critic suggested that Australian women were capable “from a lofty 
patriotic thrift”244 of doing without such decorations, and that even “Eve’s poorer 
daughters”245 could sacrifice their “trumpery imitations”246 on behalf of the Empire. 
Jewellers were quick to rebuke247 those ‘patriotic preachers’ who demanded that the 
Board restrict the importation of unset stones and other raw materials that were 
considered necessary for the jewellery trade in Australia.248  
 
6.7 Women: the usual target 
 
Dress is the world over, a feminine speciality.249 
 
Wartime discursive moralising practices surrounding luxury mainly targeted 
women, particularly those in the ‘lower orders’. Not only were they condemned for 
wastefulness and their ‘unhealthy’ mimetic fashion impulses but were also 
denigrated for contributing to national ruin in a time when men were seen as the 
stalwarts of the nation and the Empire.   
In discussions about luxury, it was inevitable that the moralising discourse 
would concentrate250 on women and their desire for imported ‘female luxury’ goods 
such as furs and silks. During the war period, there were many profound social 
ambiguities and contradictions relating to mercantilism and consumerism. Whilst 
many men profited immensely from the increased trade in luxury items and were 
                                                 
243 “Jewels in Jeopardy: Brilliant Baubles Banned; Likely to be Listed as Luxury”, Truth, 14 July 
1917, 1. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 “The Jewellery Trade: Effect of the Luxuries Board”, The Advertiser, 23 June 1917, 9. Jewellers 
and watch makers were not “opposed to reasonable restrictions on importations” but wanted to devise 
means to counteract the possible effect of the thrift campaign on the jewellery trade. 
249 “War Economies and Female Fashions”, Kalgoorlie Miner, 7 March 1917, 4. 
250 Whilst there was some discussion in the press about male-gendered luxuries such as beer and 
spirits, most discussion was about feminine luxuries such as furs, silk and perfume. 
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esteemed for their business acumen, women were chastised for their profligacy251 
and their ‘fickle’ fashion choices. Women’s conspicuous consumption was easily 
detected and targeted for regulation.252 Censure of women’s new aesthetic autonomy 
came from all quarters; Archbishop Duhig253 suggested that nine-tenths of all 
imported “useless luxuries… were for the comfort and convenience of women.”254 
Another clergyman admonished those females in his congregation for wasting money 
on their “ducky little hats.”255  
Much of this public condemnation and desire to intervene in private lives was 
directed at working class women. They had more disposable income than before the 
war256 and were buying the type of fashionable clothing, albeit cheap versions, which 
had never been available to them prior to the war. These changing patterns of 
consumption produced anxieties in those who saw an inherent instability between 
what ‘they imagined’ working class women ‘needed’ and what they ‘wanted’.257 The 
war highlighted the fact that the world had been turned upside down; society’s 
system of relative consumption was no longer operating reliably to differentiate 
between various members of society. The governing classes in Australia, in an 
attempt to reverse these ‘unacceptable’ social changes, used various discursive 
moralising tactics to dissuade and admonish the lower classes from continuing to 
‘waste’ the nation’s wealth. Simultaneously, wealthy ‘fashion leaders’ were chastised 
by the press and others for leading the lower classes astray.258   
 
 
                                                 
251 “Specially for Women: Shutting Out Luxuries”, above n 219. 
252 “The Critic”, Truth, 18 August 1917, 1. The author suggested that the Board would make some 
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6.7.1 Imitation from below 
 
A persistent feature of this moralising discourse was the suggestion259 that the 
over-spending on luxury apparel by lower-class women was propelled by their desire 
to imitate the fashionable apparel adopted by the ‘respectable’ upper classes.260 It 
was further suggested that those women, who had “more money than they want, set 
the pace by dressing themselves in expensive clothing.”261 The result was that 
thousands of others “who cannot spare the money at all are dragged into an attempt 
to follow them which runs away with a great deal more of their income than they can 
really spare.”262  
Another critic reproached women by arguing that “the most unthrifty (sic) 
thing upon this earth is fashion”263 and that “[f]ashion is organised gigantic 
waste.”264 He contended that women who aspire to lead in dress, endeavour by every 
possible means to get ahead of other women both in appearance and in the cost of the 
garments they wear. He suggested that ‘fashion leaders’ only bought new clothes to 
excite envy.265 He claimed that:  
unthrifty people with full purses, and probably empty minds, spend so much of their money 
upon dress and appearance they impress others who have not the same ample means, and who 
ought to have larger minds, with the idea that to be fashionable is to be that which is most 
desirable.266  
 
This form of moralising discourse is analogous to the traditional sumptuary practice 
of viewing luxury through the metaphors of moral contagion and envy.267 Such 
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discourse continually raised the spectre of social and economic ruin that was 
expected to occur if the “natural and necessary social order”268 was not preserved. 
 
6.7.2 A censorious press 
 
The press heaped further spurious rebukes and pressure on lower class 
women by continually ridiculing their fashion choices and ascribing them with poor 
taste and vulgar tendencies.269 These women were considered to be easy targets of 
moral and economic regulation; their moral character was frequently called into 
question and they were told that they needed to be saved from their own folly.270 
They were scolded for daring to resist the ‘old’ social order in which only 
‘privileged’ or ‘refined women’ were entitled to wear displays of wealth and where 
lower class women should remain on the margins of society and wear what the 
dominant classes considered to be ‘proper’ for their station in life.271 It was argued 
that lower class women should not attempt to ‘disguise’ their status by wearing the 
traditional “indexical symbols of hierarchy”272 such as furs, jewellery and silks. It 
was suggested that they had not been ‘trained’ from birth, as superior ‘respectable 
women’ had, to be stylish, moderate and ‘classy’ in their choice of clothing and the 
manner in which they wore it. Moreover, when lower class women attempted to look 
fashionable273 their clothing was often chided as ‘absurd’,274 ‘freakish’275and 
‘barbaric’.276 Even their choice of jewellery was denigrated: “…in the matter of 
jewellery they have developed a taste as barbaric as an Ashantee (sic) chief.”277 
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This form of vilification harks back to the type of dichotomous tension 
between class and taste (refinement) that was so marked in those hierarchical and 
elitist manifestations of early sumptuary regulation that detailed the sites and forms 
of luxury display.278 When all classes dressed in the same manner and fashion it was 
“was impossible to distinguish the rich from the poor, the high from the low…from 
their appearance.”279 The vitriol spread by the Australian press during the war years 
sought to replace visual ‘luxury attire’, a traditional and tangible marker of status and 
hierarchy, with a more esoteric and aesthetic marker associated with taste, quality 
and refinement. 
Women, of all classes were encouraged to exercise their natural ‘womanly 
ingenuity’ to maintain clothing for longer than dictated by “fickle fashion.”280 One 
critic suggested that during the war, women should look past fashionable trends and 
be more interested in clothing that was well cut and properly fitted.281 The same 
critic considered that government intervention in the importation of clothing and 
fabric was a godsend to working class women who were ‘compelled’ to keep up with 
fashion: 
If the clothing materials permitted to be imported were restricted to plain serviceable 
stuffs of the most durable character, and with not too great a variety of colors (sic), this 
restriction would be welcomed with joy in nine-tenths of the workers’ homes.282 
 
Not only were women the main targets for sumptuary regulation but women, 
with their “comfortable but nevertheless reprehensible” consumption of luxuries, 
                                                 
278 Hunt, above n 15, 87. Hunt argued that the classic method used by the traditional elites to limit or 
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were also, as always, called283 to make the biggest sacrifice for the good of the nation 
and the Empire.284 Naturally, they had little opportunity to resist the regulation of 
those fashion items which was so dear to their hearts: 
’Minds me whilst writing of whispers, that the National Anti-Luxuries Board, has 
finished sitting, and as far as I can learn it’s made so many sweeping recommendations 
concerning women’s luxuries that it’s left us very little to wear in the future (until the 
war is over) ’cept our bones…The list has not seen daylight so far, but judging by hints 
heard, we women are in for a most chilly time. I can see Cissie, Flossie, Fannie and 
Ruby rushing to borrow overcoats from their Sunday-best male friend, such a course 
being necessary when all goods of attraction are set out on this very anti-female list.285 
 
Whilst some wealthy conservative women,286 led by such luminaries as Ivy 
Brookes,287 welcomed the Board’s findings and readily embrace the notion that 
patriotic women should give up all these luxuries,288 others could only make a 
perfunctory effort to alter their consumer practices.289 Some instructed their 
dressmakers to reduce the amount of fabric used in the construction of a costume’s 
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bodice and skirt,290 whilst others continued to wear their furs and frippery,291 for the 
prohibitions only aimed to prohibit future imports of luxury apparel items but not at 
the display of wealth itself.292 
 
6.7.3 Women of means (and taste) should show the way 
 
The National Council of Women targeted “women of position and means”293 
to set the example “of economy in dress, food and pleasure.”294 The Council then 
pulled the tension tighter by insisting that “any women buying luxuries of any 
description will be regarded by the community in much the same way as the slacker 
and shirker.”295 This was harsh condemnation, particularly as men who ‘shirked’ 
their duty to fight were at this time being treated so abominably by the ‘patriotic’ 
majority.296 Some critics believed that it would not be going too far if the authorities 
“should interfere with affairs so much to restrict the too frequent changes in 
fashion”.297 On the whole, many women felt that they had no alternative but to be 
‘loyal’298 and stoically accept the burden of these restrictions.299 Occasionally, some 
even tempered their loss with humour: 
Is it not very “warrible”? I am already dreaming of the forbidden imports. ‘Corse-with 
the exception of shells and love letters-man will miss but little. But women! Well just 
image! Hats, dear Mary, glove, and silks and perfumery! The unfortunate females will 
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soon be reduced to wearing---only our expressions. Wonder what our over-worked 
social prevaricators will do when they can only describe the dressing of their special 
pets in this way: “At Mrs S-D- party held last night Mrs W-looked well.”300 
 
6.8 The Board’s determinations: the thread quickly runs out 
 
The more one looks into this question, the more complex and difficult it becomes. At first 
sight nothing is more simple than to cut the Gordian knot with a sword, but its ramifications 
are such that one seems to be cutting into the very ganglia of the economic life of the 
country, and we must proceed with the utmost caution.301 
 
There was no such flippancy in the Board members’ interpretation of their 
objectives. Lockyer solemnly argued that the recommendations of the Board 
concerning the restriction of imported luxuries were based on four desired goals or 
principles:302 
1. The government desired to “conserve the liquid capital” of the 
country for “the prosecution of the war”303 by the restriction of all 
unnecessary expenditures on importations304 
2. The financial obligation of the Commonwealth and the “very 
grave economic developments arising out of the war”305 might be materially 
neutralised by the people being thrifty,306 which may in part be encouraged 
by restriction of articles of luxury and articles “which are not really essential 
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for general use, pleasure or adornment; or articles which may be reasonably 
met in Australia”307 
3. Industrial unemployment resulting from war conditions and 
the disorganisation of trade rendered it “very necessary, as far as practicable” 
that local manufacture and production should be stimulated308 
4. In view of the increasing diminution of shipping facilities, 
freight space should be reserved for the importation of raw materials for the 
purpose of Australian industry and “for other indispensable articles of public 
necessity”309 
The Board insisted that its activities were justified and were closely 
interrelated with the “campaigns for the encouragement of Thrift and in advocacy of 
the investments of savings in our War Loans.”310 Despite this, its members, 
particularly its Chairman, had attracted much adverse criticism in the press because it 
conducted its proceedings in private.311 However, the Board members would not be 
deterred in their desire to retain secrecy when making their determinations. Lockyer 
argued that publicity would give the public “a clear indication of the articles it 
proposed to deal with”312 and this would then inevitably be followed by speculation, 
additional disturbance to trade and by attempts to anticipate and thus nullify the 
effect of the prohibitions or restrictions.313 
The Board submitted only three reports to the Prime Minister, even though it 
had expected to submit an ongoing series of reports ‘in due course’.314 The Board’s 
first report,315 which was accompanied by succinct draft regulations,316 was 
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submitted to the Prime Minister on 14 June 1917, only seven days after its first 
meeting. The report was expected to “embrace imports that by stretch of imagination 
can be regarded as essential to the community.”317 The report targeted many 
domestic items such as blacking, bottles and flasks and writing paper. Lockyer 
advised Hughes that, in the attempt to save unnecessary delay in the issue of the first 
report,318 the members “avoided any procedure which might be safely dispensed 
with”319 and confirmed that they had called no evidence.320 The Board had devoted 
special attention to the possibility of extending a preference to the products of France 
“in recognition of her unexampled and heroic sacrifices in the cause of Liberty and 
Humanity.”321 However, the members declined to do this as this would have meant 
the importation of luxuries that “would only advantage the more affluent of our 
citizens.”322 
On 19th June 1917, a second report concerning the importation of 
pharmaceutical preparations was sent to Hughes and the Board recommended that it 
was unwilling to deal with these imported goods by means of prohibition.323 The 
Board suggested that the local production of the preparations would diminish the 
need for their importation.324 The third and final report was submitted to Hughes on 
22 June 1917. Its scope was much broader than the first 2 reports. The report 
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notable that prohibition would not apply to passengers’ personal affects and this would be advantage 
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324 Ibid. 
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recommended the absolute prohibition of such imported items as tobacco, most 
forms of liquor, feathers, furs, felt hats, caps and bonnets, parasols and perfumery. 
Partial prohibition was recommended for velvets, lace, gloves, millinery and dress 
nets and buckles and clasps.325  
None of the reports were released by the Prime Minister.326 When challenged 
about this non-disclosure, Hughes became evasive.327 He sought to justify the delay 
in the release of the reports by arguing that the issue of importation of luxuries was 
complex and full of difficulties and was “receiving the most serious consideration of 
the Government.”328 Even as the Board was in the process of making its 
determinations Hughes began to have reservations about the efficacy of the Board. 
He was realising329 that the prohibition of luxuries was not the simple exercise of 
curtailing the waste of “liquid capital” on luxuries by recalcitrant citizens, which he 
had so unreservedly foreshadowed in his press releases earlier in the year. At the 
same time, the Board members were being criticised for their partiality,330 their 
secrecy and failure to call evidence. It was becoming obvious that there were serious 
commercial ramifications concerning the schema to prohibit imported luxuries and 
that it now needed more consideration: 
Its ramifications are so extensive that it is not to be determined without due 
consideration of the effects of prohibition in all quarters. It would be foolish, and even 
suicidal, to shut out, by sort of guillotine procedure, goods which are essential to the 
industrial life of the nation, and, although it is a minor matter, there is also the question 
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of revenue to be considered in relation to the industrial and national welfare. Above all, 
we must keep in mind the effect on shipping of the prohibition of a not inconsiderable 
body of imports. The word “luxuries” has now a very wide meaning.331 
 
By 20 July 1917, Lockyer and the other members of the Board had become 
uneasy and very frustrated about Hughes ambivalence towards their 
recommendations. They were defensive about their assignment and were worried 
about Hughes’ lack of positive response to their reports.332 Moreover, they were 
vexed that their work seemed to have been met with disapproval by Cabinet.333 In 
addition, they were continuing to be bombarded with numerous petitions and 
representations334 about the scope of their determinations as well as receiving 
persistent “adverse criticism”335 from the daily press.336 Lockyer insisted that the 
Board members had conscientiously done their best despite having never been 
provided with any proper ‘qualifying directions’ and without being advised that the 
question of revenue “should in any way influence [the] Board’s deliberations”.337 In 
reality, the Board had become the scapegoat for Hughes’ hastily prepared and ill 
conceived ‘prohibition of luxuries’ policy, and its members were expected to wear 
most of the adverse criticism that was being directed towards this sumptuary policy. 
Prime Minister Hughes began to panic about his hasty decision to restrict 
luxuries. He sought advice from various quarters to assist him in determining 
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whether he should release the Board’s full reports and whether he should then 
proceed to prohibit the various items as recommended by the Luxuries Board. He 
sought advice from Stephen Mills,338 the Comptroller-General of the Department of 
Trade and Customs about potential lost revenue. He also verbally directed Perry 
Whitton, the Chief Prices Commissioner of the Commonwealth, to provide a 
“personal opinion”339 to him about the proposed “Prohibition of the Importation of 
Luxuries”.340 Only two days before the prohibited luxuries list was to be proclaimed, 
Whitton provided Hughes with a comprehensive statement. In most part, Whitton’s 
missive provided Hughes with a justification why the list of prohibited imports, 
which the Luxuries Board had so painstakingly prepared, should be reduced. Whitton 
confirmed the difficulty involved in defining what a luxury was. He suggested that 
all classes, except the very poorest, were making use of articles that were not wholly 
necessary to their welfare. He suggested that Hughes should adopt the following test: 
To decide what articles can be dispensed with with the least detriment to the general public 
and those, the restriction of which, would tend to increased activity in the labour class locally 
and thus provide employment to both male and female workers.341 
 
Whitton took a pragmatic view as to what should constitute the notion of 
luxury during the war period. He suggested to Hughes that it was important for the 
value of certain lines such as silk, cotton and woollen to be reassessed. In his 
correspondence with Hughes, he stressed that:  
[i]t is almost beyond doubt that silk for some considerable time will be a cheaper article than 
woollen piece goods and probably than many of the cotton piece goods, whereas prior to the 
war, silk was looked upon almost as a luxury.342 
 
                                                 
338 See Chapter 1. 
339 See Letter and Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) 1. 
340 Ibid. 
341 See Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) 1. 
342 See Letter and Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) 1. 
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Whitton identified furs, gloves,343 jewellery–including cameos, precious 
stones and imitation jewellery- as items “which may be regarded as 
extravagances”.344  He also recommended that clothing, including shirts, collars, ties 
and women’s and children’s clothing, that were “over a certain price,”345 be treated 
as luxury items. He claimed that perfume could be manufactured locally and this 
industry could provide employment for both sexes.346 Interestingly, the liquor trade 
was given a huge reprieve from sumptuary restraint. Whitton argued that the 
restriction in liquor lines would affect wine and spirit merchants, hotelkeepers, 
certain café proprietors, and certain houses in the grocery trade.347 
Whitton explored the arguments for and against the necessity for Australia to 
prohibit luxuries during the remainder of the war. In Britain, the problem concerning 
the lack of shipping space had been regularly raised as a justification for the 
prohibition of imported luxuries. However, he discounted this issue for Australia. He 
maintained there was there more than sufficient shipping available “to convey troops, 
foodstuffs and other necessaries.”348 Whitton also confirmed that, whilst the issue of 
revenue was hardly worth the consideration for Britain, this was not the case for 
Australia. Here the tariff was essential in raising revenue for the Commonwealth.349 
In addition, he suggested that the Customs administration, rather than a luxuries 
Board, was the best and fairest method to deal with imported luxuries for “the 
persons, who can afford to indulge in them, would appear to be those who are best 
able to pay the taxation on them.”350  
According to Whitton, Australia was in no danger of being deprived of 
essential supplies. He maintained that Australian producers could supply all 
                                                 
343 Other than winter and workmen’s gloves. See Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 
10 August 1917 (National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) sch 1. 
344 Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 10 August 1917 (National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, CP290/1). 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ibid sch 1. 
347 Ibid 1. 
348 Ibid 2. 
349 Ibid 1. 
350 Ibid 2. 
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necessary “foodstuffs, clothing, etc.,”351 for all local needs and still leave them a 
wide surplus for export.352 He did, however, caution Hughes that if “effect was given 
to general prohibition”353 then care would have to be taken to see that monopolies, 
leading to excessive prices and profits, should not be allowed to ‘rise” in 
Australia.354 
Eventually,355 a small list356 of prohibited luxuries was proclaimed on 10 
August 1917.357 As expected, fur apparel,358 perfumery and jewellery were included 
in the list.359 What is noticeable about the prohibited items is the items favoured by 
the lower classes were again expressly targeted. For instance, only “imitation 
precious stones”,360 and not “precious stones”361 as favoured by the wealthy, were 
                                                 
351 See Letter and Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1). 
352 Ibid 1. 
353 See Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, CP290/1). 
354 Ibid. 
355 See Letter and Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1). 
356 There were 10 items on the list: 
1. Ale and other beer, porter, cider and Perry, spirituous, in bulk or in bottle 
2. Potable spirits 
3. Perfumed spirits and bay rum 
4. Biscuits 
5. Confectionary 
6. Eggs, in shell or otherwise 
7. Fur apparel 
8. Perfumery 
9. Jewellery, imitation jewellery, and imitation precious stones (Obviously the jewellers’ 
petitions and lobbying had been successful). 
10. Bodies for motor vehicles, whether imported separately or forming part of a complete 
vehicle. 
 
357 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 August 1917, 39 (Mr 
Jensen). Bonded goods and goods in the course of transport were to be allowed to be delivered to 
Australia. 
358 The prohibition only covered made up articles and not raw materials. Jensen said that a large 
number of people in Australia found employment in making up imported skins. See “Importation of 
Luxuries: A Natural falling Off”, The Argus, 14 August 1917, 5. 
359 Jensen did suggest that representations might be made for certain jewellery to be allowed to enter 
Australia but gave no further explanation about this. See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 10 August 1917, 39 (Mr Jensen). 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
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featured on the list. When challenged with the question: “[a]re those all the luxuries 
that you intend to prohibit?” the Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr Jensen 
responded with caution: 
There are many things which might be deemed to be luxuries, but the Government have 
to take into consideration the effect of a prohibition on the revenue.362 
 
The brevity of the list proved to be controversial and disappointing363 to those 
protectionists364 and others365 who had insisted that Australians should be ready to 
sacrifice all creature comforts to eliminate waste and conserve the wealth of the 
community.366 One journalist pronounced it to be “a shallow and palpable counterfeit 
solution.”367 Another described the list as “a poor, almost laughable prohibition”.368  
After taking into consideration the budget figures Hughes and his Cabinet 
argued that there were three reasons why the list was so short.369 First, as mentioned 
                                                 
362 Ibid. 
363 “Announced List Disappointing”, The Argus, 14 August 1917, 5. The President of the Victorian 
Chamber of Manufactures argued that the question of the Customs revenue should not have entered 
into consideration in limiting imported luxuries. He also argued that, although some Customs revenue 
might be lost, “the country would gain more by the money being spent to better advantage on other 
things.” 
364 The Chamber of Manufacturers was so disappointed that, on 14 August 1917, it adopted a 
resolution that the short list of prohibited items “did not meet the national needs for economy, and the 
saving of waste in unnecessary imports.” See “Prohibition of Luxuries: Does not go far enough”, 
Warrnambool Standard, 14 August 1917, 5. 
365 One journalist suggested that “the strangely absurd list of ‘luxuries’ [was] evidence [of] some 
attempt at doctrinal compromise” between a War Cabinet which consisted of “every shade of fiscal 
opinion from fiscal atheists, to moderate protectionists and prohibitive tariffists (sic) and free-traders”.  
See “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. This journalist also argued that that “[t]here ought to be no 
doubt that the will of the people is that wanton folly in luxurious (sic), extravagance during the war, 
however created or stimulated, must be rigorously checked.” 
366 “Announced List Disappointing”, The Argus, 14 August 1917, 5. 
367 “Win-the-war Compliments”, Worker, 6 September 1917, 19. 
368 “Prohibited ‘Luxuries’”, Northern Times, 14 August 1917, 4. 
369 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. Jensen argued that the importation of luxuries had been 
checked naturally by the war and there was little need for legislation by the Government. He stated 
that for the 12 months ended 30 June 1917 the value of the total importations was £75 463 568 as 
compared for 1915-16 of a decrease of more than £2 000 000. See “Importation of Luxuries; A 
Natural Falling Off”, The Argus, above n 358. He is obviously overlooked the fact that Hughes had 
put into place an interim measure which had curtailed imports and also that many loads of luxuries 
had been held on the docks. 
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above, there was a question of lost revenue.370 Stephen Mills had advised Hughes 
that the prohibition of goods recommended by the Luxuries Board would result in a 
loss of revenue to the Commonwealth of £1 038 834. There would be £25 000 lost 
from imported fur apparel; £36 290 from perfumery and £44 463 from jewellery 
(rolled gold and jewellery under 9 carat as well as imitation jewellery). The biggest 
item affected was ‘Spirits and Spirituous Liquors’ which, if 25% was prohibited, 
would lose £450 000 in revenue.371 Secondly, it was argued that there was the 
complex problem as to what precisely should be embraced in the elastic term 
‘luxuries’. And thirdly, there was the issue as to whether such ‘luxuries’, whether 
they be imported or locally produced, when ascertained and gazetted, should be 
wholly prohibited.372  
By mid-1917, it had finally become clear to Hughes that he could no longer 
adhere to a sumptuary project which, despite its moral and thrift-based objectives, 
carried with it so many actual and potential economic problems for Australia.373 
Hughes had no alternative but to ignore Lloyd George’s intrusive imperialist edict 
that he had enthusiastically embraced in the early months of 1917. It had become 
evident to Hughes, his advisors and the press that the sumptuary restrictions imposed 
by Great Britain on her own people, were underpinned by different trepidations to 
those being experienced in Australia.374  
Great Britain was running short of foodstuffs and this meant that shipping 
space was one of the most important considerations when Lloyd George decided to 
implement restrictions on the importation of luxuries. This was not a problem for 
Australian shipping. The issue of lost revenue was also a different matter for each 
country. The effect on British revenue “was so small a matter that it was hardly 
                                                 
370 Mr Jensen, the Minister for Trade and Customs, stated that if the prohibitions went ahead there 
would be a loss of revenue to the extent of £1 750 000 on potable spirits alone. See “The Ban on 
Luxuries: Our Revenue Largely Depends on…Alcohol”, Geelong Advertiser, 14 August 1917, 6. 
371 Ibid. 
372 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
373 Ibid. 
374 See Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, CP290/1). 
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worth consideration.”375 Unlike Australia, there was practically no Tariff imposed on 
imported luxuries in Great Britain and the latter did not have to rely on customs 
duties for the raising of revenue to the same extent that Australia did. 
Despite the fact that Hughes and his supporters desperately wanted to use the 
British sumptuary regime as a sumptuary template to curtail waste and extravagance 
in Australia, the dire economic effects of such a regime in an Australian context 
could not be ignored.376 It was no longer a question of conserving Australia’s ‘liquid 
capital’ but rather a question of maintaining the important and substantial income 
that was being generated by Australians’ consumption of imported luxuries. Hughes 
could no longer allow the Board to proceed with its sumptuary task, as there was no 
feasible alternative way for the Australian Government to raise the money377 that 
would otherwise be lost in customs duty on imported luxuries.378 Although the 
Government promised that the 10 August proclamation would be “only a start”379 in 
the prohibition of imported luxuries, it became apparent by the end of August 1917, 
that the death knell had rung out for the Luxuries Board; without a report ever being 
released to Parliament or the public.380 The failure of the Luxuries Board as a 
wartime sumptuary project echoed the failure of the sumptuary laws of the early 
modern period.  
                                                 
375 Ibid. 
376 It appears from the Luxuries Board File that Stephen Mills, Comptroller-General of the 
Department of Trade and Customs, advised Hughes in July 1917 that the prohibition of goods 
recommended by the Luxuries Board would result in a loss of revenue to the Commonwealth of £1 
038 834 ($92 340 000). See William Hughes, ‘T&C Minute Paper’ (Prime Minister’s Department, 31 
July 1917, Luxuries Board Papers, National Archives of Australia, CP290/1). 
377 In an attempt to recoup the money lost due to Lloyd George’s interim actions to prohibit luxuries 
sent from Great Britain to Australia, the Minister for Customs sought to increase duty on imported 
alcohol by 30 shillings per gallon and to increase the excise on beer by a penny per gallon. This 
measure would provide the Government with additional revenue of £6000 000 which was almost 
equal to the amount lost owing to the prohibition of the importation of certain luxuries. See “Federal 
Items”, The Northern Miner, 14 August 1917, 4. 
378 See Statement from Perry Whitton to William Hughes, 8 August 1917 (National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, CP290/1). 
379 Mr Jensen, the Minister of Trade and Customs said the proclaimed list was “only the start”. See 
“Only a Start”, Leader, 18 August 1917, 39. It was also “the finish”. 
380 “Luxuries Prohibition”, The Richmond River Express and Casino Kyogle Advertiser, 25 September 
1917. It became obvious that the Luxuries Board was never to meet again when the Prime Minister 
informed the Protectionist Association that the list was not going to be added to.  
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6.9 Conclusion 
 
It may be argued that the sumptuary laws of the early modern era were 
unique in that they visibly protected and reinforced hierarchical access to items of 
dress and ornamentation that carried the symbolic expression of that hierarchy. 
However, this chapter suggests that the motives underlying the establishment of the 
Luxuries Board and its recommendations, albeit transitory, had the same objectives 
and effects as sumptuary law. By prohibiting the importation of cheap motors cars, 
imitation jewellery, furs and perfumery, “workers and clerks and others who before 
the war had been content with careful economies”381 were to be denied access to 
what were traditionally “indexical symbols of hierarchy.”382 Instead, they were 
limited only to those items that the dominant classes considered to be essential for 
their survival.  
It was not the object of the Board to restrict the wearing of luxurious 
apparel383 but rather to prevent ‘workers and clerks’ from imitating the wealthy by 
spending their money on ‘luxuries’ that were previously unavailable to them.384 The 
wealthier classes could continue to wear their ‘exclusive’ furs and jewellery whilst 
the poorer classes could only continue to dream of owning and wearing such 
luxuries.  
After this Chapter’s deviation into the war-time sumptuary project known as 
the ‘Luxuries Board’, Chapter 7 will briefly explore two other sumptuary projects 
that ‘erupted’ during the First World War. The chapter will argue that these projects 
also shared many discursive features of sumptuary laws of the early modern period. 
 
                                                 
381 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2 (emphasis in original). 
382 Hunt, above n 15, 119. 
383 “Melbourne Letter: The Rule of Law”, Upper Murray & Mitta Herald, above n 61. 
384 “Curtailing Extravagance”, above n 2. 
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7 SUMPTUARY IMPULSES TIED UP WITH FILM AND KHAKI 
 
A revival of the sumptuary laws, a heavy tax on all amusements and luxuries might help to 
check the extravagant tendencies of the times, but something severe will have to be done if 
the war is to be brought to a successful termination.1 
 
Mr Blacket is surely not blind to the teaching of history in all countries that sumptuary 
regulations may be easily invoked-as is the case in Australia at the present time-but are 
extremely difficult of enforcement. 2 
 
7.1 Purpose and structure of the chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore two ‘non-appearential’3 
sumptuary projects in the context of war time conditions in Australia: the proposed 
Anti-Shouting laws and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth).Whilst the main 
focus of this thesis is on the sumptuary regulation of women’s dress in Australia 
during the first three decades after Federation, one cannot ignore the presence of 
other forms of projects of sumptuary regulation that were manifestly present during 
this period. These ‘other’ sumptuary projects were particularly ‘alive’ during the war 
years; a period marked by comparable social and economic anxieties and 
preoccupations with national security and morality that prompted the creation of the 
original sumptuary laws.  
In the early modern period, sumptuary laws were not limited to just to the 
regulation of personal appearance through rules relating to dress.4 They also targeted 
the private consumption of food and alcohol, social ceremonies, entertainment and 
                                                 
1 “Monetry and Mining”, The Argus, 19 July 1916, 6. 
2 “The War and the Drink Traffic”, The Register, 22 February 1917, 9. 
3 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press, 
1996). “Appearential” is a term used by Hunt. It is a reference to those sumptuary laws that related to 
appearance, dress and clothing. I have adopted the use of the word for ease of expression.  
4 Ibid 1. 
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economic wealth. 5 Whilst these laws often aimed to limit or regulate the private 
expenditure of citizens,6 they were also was concerned with the social manifestations 
of consumption and always involved some combination of social, economic and 
moral regulation.7  
This chapter argues that the Anti-Shouting laws as proposed by the Australian 
government in the latter part of the war, and the Entertainment Tax Act 1916 (Cth) 
were clear sumptuary measures and analogous to those of the early modern period. 
These sumptuary measures focused on the wartime control of alcohol consumption 
practices and the taxing of public amusements. They were also entwined with an 
impulse for moral regulation that operated in response to wider governmental 
concern for Australia’s public well-being and economic future.  
The first part of the chapter will deal with the Anti-Shouting laws as proposed 
during the latter part of the war, and the second part will provide an overview of the 
Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth). Drawing on the various discourses that 
surrounded these projects, this chapter will reveal that whilst these projects were 
ostensibly focused on alcohol consumption practices and the taxing of public 
amusements respectively they were also clad with same impulse for moral regulation 
found in the early modern period. This chapter will also illustrate that this impulse 
for moral regulation was, in most part, a response to a wider concern which the 
government, in a time of crisis, had for the public well-being and economic future of 
the Australian population. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid 7. 
6 Ibid 2-3. 
7 Ibid 7. 
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7.2 Anti-Shouting Laws 
 
7.2.1 Drowning out the Shouting 
 
To “shout” or not to “shout” that is the question which is agitating the minds of many folk.8 
 
‘Anti-shouting’ or ‘no-treating’ laws that were promulgated in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, New Zealand9 and Australia to control alcohol consumption 
practices during World War I.10 This form of sumptuary regulation was encouraged 
in Australia to a large extent by the Australian Temperance Movement.11 This 
Movement, with its push for national sobriety and prohibition, sought to interfere 
with the private autonomy of the military and civilian populations by controlling 
their drinking practices.12 Numerous other temperance organizations and churches 
also sought to “protect outgoing and returned soldiers from temptation”13 by 
advocating the total prohibition of alcohol, particularly during the war and the period 
of demobilisation.14 At the same time, many anti-shouting campaigns were also 
instigated by individuals and other groups  concerned with the impact of shouting on 
the wellbeing and maximum efficiency of servicemen and the level of their 
contribution to the ‘win-the war’ project:15  
                                                 
8 “Untitled”, The Register, 1 June 1917, 6. 
9 There were regular reports in the Australian press about the enforcement of New Zealand ant-
shouting legislation (War Regulations Amendment Act 1916 (NZ) and War Regulations Amendment 
Act 1917 (NZ)). See “Anti-Shouting”, The Daily News, 16 June 1917, 4. One report stated that in 
North Auckland in 1917, five men were fined £195, plus costs, for breaking this law. The licensee was 
fined £75, the man who shouted £30 and each of the three men for whom he shouted £30. See also 
“Anti-Shouting”, Dandenong Advertiser and Cranbourne, Berwick and Oakleigh Advocate, 25 
January 1917. 
10 “Anti-Shouting”, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 1917, 9. The English Parliament had introduced 
their anti-shouting measures in 1915 when it enacted the Defence of the Realm Act (No 3) 1915, 5 & 6 
Geo 5, c 42. See “Anti-Shouting Campaign”, The Shoalhaven Telegraph, 16 May 1917, 7. The New 
Zealand Act was passed in 1916. See “Anti-Shouting”, The Daily News, 9 June 1917, 3. 
11 “War-Time Prohibition Urged in Sydney”, Leader, 25 May 1918, 39. 
12 Ibid.  
13 “Anti-Shouting”, The Braidwood Review and District Advocate, 3 July 1917, 7. 
14 “Congregational Union”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 1918, 8. 
15 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 9. 
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The evil effects of shouting are so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to stress them… 
Nowhere is the harm more apparent than among the soldiers in camp, or those who are 
outgoing or homecoming. At a time when they are particularly susceptible to the influence of 
alcohol, the recovery of our brave heroes is seriously menaced because their friends press upon 
them as a sign of appreciation of their bravery.16 
 
The Interim Select Senate Committee’s Report (Intoxicating Liquor-Effect on 
Australian Soldiers and best method of dealing with sale) was presented to the 
Senate on 1 May 1918 and recommended: “[t]hat there should be no discrimination 
between soldier and civilian in the matter of drink supply.” 
Although the Temperance Movement had achieved a major success in 
1915/1916 by forcing the government to bring about a mandatory 6 PM closure of 
hotel bars and public houses in the four southern States,17 it continued to zealously 
campaign for a drastic decrease in the liquor trade and the elimination of its 
associated ‘abuses’, including the practice of ‘shouting’,18 a practice that had become 
more widespread during the war years. ‘Shouting’ had become a popular social 
custom for many of those men who drank at hotels and other licensed premises. They 
sought to acknowledge and reward the ‘gallant’ efforts of returned soldiers by 
‘shouting’ or ‘treating’ these soldiers to gratuitous alcoholic drinks.19 Some critics 
argued that this type of largesse or bonhomie was a misplaced form of benevolence 
provided by “false patriots”20 who “persist[ed] in buying drinks for the man in khaki, 
[even though it was] not always for the good of the nation.”21 Although many 
considered that this sort of ‘matey’ largesse was a distinctive ‘Australian custom’, 
there were others who believed it to be an ‘evil’ curse or menace that adversely 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Walter Phillips, “‘Six o’clock swill’: The introduction of early closing of hotel bars in Australia”, 
(2008) 19 Historical Studies 250. This new closing time led to the notorious six o’clock ‘swill’ when 
customers would rush to consume alcohol rapidly and heavily in anticipation of the early closing time. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “How Anti-Shouting Works”, The Daily News, 2 June 1917, 4. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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impacted on the happiness of the family,22 the health of the community and the 
efficiency and wealth of a nation at war.23 
A more reprehensible custom centred on the practice of touting. Soldiers, 
after drawing their deferred services pay, were often targeted by “those who looked 
out for them, hotel touts, and all sorts of men who want to be treated.”24 Touts would 
‘shepherd’ vulnerable returned soldiers to specific hotels and encourage the latter to 
cash in their pay-cheques so they could then treat all their ‘new friends’.25 Soldiers 
would frequently not leave the hotels until all their money was gone26 and would 
often become so inebriated that they could hardly walk.27 The effects of such 
drunken behaviour had become very worrisome for the Australian Parliament and 
those authorities involved with recruitment and troop mobilisation.28 In its efforts to 
curb the ‘deplorable’ and ‘horrible’ scenes that were common when transport ships 
‘touched’ the Western Australian coast, 29 the government ensured that all harbour 
hotels within a certain radius would be closed whilst soldiers were in port.30 Whilst 
this strategy “resulted in a very great deal of good”31 it was not in itself sufficient to 
control the problems associated with the drinking habits of soldiers, particularly 
those who were invalided from active service.32 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 “Anti-Shouting”, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1917, 5. The reporter suggests that the ‘jolly good 
sport’ in the bar, ready with a smile and a slap on the back for all and sundry, and an invitation to 
‘have another’ “turns into a very sour and bad tempered specimen as soon as he gets on the inner side 
of his own front fence.” 
23 Chick, “Anti-Shouting”, Donald Times, 6 August 1918, 2. 
24 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas). 
32 Ibid. 
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7.2.2 A call to stop the shouting 
 
Here…in this our young Commonwealth we are allowing politicians to become dictators, 
and to impose upon us restraints and coercion …33 
 
The problem of shouting or treating was also seen as a form of extravagance 
and moral degeneration associated with the ‘wasting’ of economic resources in a 
time of crisis.34 Further, some argued that these practices that would be responsible 
for bringing about the moral and financial ruin of individuals and the nation.35 
Organisations such as the National Council of Women,36 which supported some of 
the temperance ideals,37 sought the cooperation of all national women’s councils of 
Australia in petitioning the Federal Government. They demanded that the War 
Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) and regulations be used to prohibit this allegedly 
pernicious practice of ‘shouting’.38 Senator Guy suggested that if amendments to this 
legislation were not passed, Parliament would have “criminally failed”39 the true 
interests of Australia.40 Reverend B S Hammond contended that there was “an urgent 
desirability”41 for establishing an anti-shouting policy that would considerably help 
the ‘win-the-war- movement.42 He used the familiar tropes and rhetoric of war to 
                                                 
33 “Coercion v Equity”, The Horsham Times, 27 November 1914, 4. 
34 “How Anti-Shouting Works”, above n 19. The reporter suggested that, as a consequence of the anti-
shouting laws in Britain, many a sixpence and shilling was saved and had “become available for 
national purposes.” 
35 Ibid. 
36 This organisation was so dedicated to the anti-shouting campaign that they appointed an organiser, 
Miss Grace Burrows, for the four weeks of the campaign. “Anti-Shouting”, Sydney Morning Herald, 
11 May 1917, 7. Volunteers, both men and women, were called to canvass the city, suburbs, and 
country districts to spread the campaign’s message. “Anti-Shouting”, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 
May 1917, 8. 
37 “Anti-Shouting”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 25 May 1917, 32. Organisers saw their 
anti-shouting campaign as neither a total abstinence nor a prohibition movement, but “simply a 
precautionary measure.” 
38 “Anti-Shouting”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 6 July 1917, 33. The petition contained 102 
000 signatures and measured two miles in length, and was rolled onto two garden rollers.  
39 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). 
40 Ibid. 
41 “Anti-Shouting Policy”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 4 May 1917, 31. 
42 Ibid. 
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impress the dangers of alcohol upon the general public and to castigate its 
interference with the efficiency of Australian troops: 
The time had come when a long suffering community had a right to demand that alcohol, 
which had so often proved itself a traitor to the Empire, be cast aside, and like alien traitors, be 
interned.43 
 
Many politicians44 responded to the demand for interventionist action, 
particularly those who already advocated the 6 PM closure of hotels, by arguing that 
effective legislation, similar to that of Britain and New Zealand, be passed to prohibit 
the ‘treating’ of soldiers. 45 It was argued that drink was “the worst enemy”46 to 
discipline and fitness of the soldier47 and that an anti-shouting law was a 
“necessity”48 because “the evil effects of drink”49 was preventing “the people from 
doing their best in the task before them.”50 It was further contended that soldiers 
fighting Australia’s battles “needed to be in the very pink of condition”51 and that 
alcohol had an adverse physical effect on outgoing and returned servicemen.52 
Furthermore, it was suggested that there was evidence that alcohol was the root of 90 
per cent of all trouble amongst servicemen; ‘crime’ and absence without leave were 
both attributed to this social ‘evil’.53 Alcohol was not just a problem at home; 40 per 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 There was some concern about whether ‘shouting’ was a Federal or State matter. See “Anti-
Shouting”, above n 13. 
45 “Anti-Shouting”, Western Age, 31 December 1915, 2.The Committee was given the authority to 
move from place to place and to obtain evidence from various witnesses, including officers who held 
high positions in military rank, representatives from some churches and temperance societies, some 
returned servicemen and four representatives of licensed victuallers. 
46 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 10. 
52 “War-Time Prohibition Urged in Sydney”, Leader, 25 May 1918, 39. 
53 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). Brigadier-
General Forsyth, State Commander of South Australia gave evidence that during one 6 month period 
there were 588 cases of absence without leave, some for short periods and some for months. The camp 
records showed that about 60 per cent of these cases were due to ‘drink’. At least 70 per cent of what 
the Army called ‘crime’ was due to ‘drink’. 
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cent of out-of-action soldiers who were returned to Australia as “undesirables”54 
were confirmed alcoholics even though authorities considered it to be an 
“unpardonable sin in a soldier, whether officer or man”,55 to be inebriated at the 
Front.56 
 
7.2.3 “Shouting” is an undoubted abuse, but whether it could or should be put 
down by an Act of Parliament is another question. 57 
 
Finally, in January 1918, a Select Senate Committee was appointed58 to inquire into 
the extent that intoxicating liquor was adversely affecting outgoing and returned 
soldiers, and to determine the best method of dealing with the sale of liquor during 
the period of the war, demobilisation and repatriation.59 In its interim report issued in 
May 1918, the Committee announced that from the start of the war over £70 million 
had been wasted in Australia on alcohol. 60 Senator Thomas, who was the Chairman 
of the Committee, stated that from the outset, the Committee was faced with a 
difficult problem:  
[i]n the view of the fact that Australia had, on two occasions, decided to carry on the war 
voluntarily, we felt that it would be unjust, and certainly somewhat unfair, to say to a man who 
decided to volunteer to go to the Front and risk his health and, perhaps, his life, should be 
denied some personal gratification, and, it be may be, some social pleasures, that were not 
denied to those who remained behind. 
 
The Committee made recommendations which had dual purposes: discipline 
and surveillance. Whilst the Committee acknowledged that there some inequity in 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. Senator Guy refers to  evidence that indicated that out of the 12 men who had been sent to the 
Inebriates Home, half had had been actually under fire and the other half were men who had a trip to 
Egypt and “did very little except to make a nuisance of themselves.” 
57 “Untitled”, above n 8. 
58 In January 1918. See “Soldiers and Drink: Senate Committee Reports”, Bendigonian, 28 November 
1918, 18. 
59 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas). 
60 “War-Time Prohibition Urged in Sydney”, above n 52. 
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denying “some personal gratification”61 to volunteer servicemen who risked their 
health and even their lives for their country, it recommended that no liquor should be 
supplied62 to invalided soldiers63 whilst under the care of the military.64 They 
deemed those men coming back from the war as sick and disabled, with “their nerves 
out of order”65 were not “normal”66 and had no will power.67 There was medical 
evidence before the Committee that, for the returned invalid soldier, particularly if he 
was suffering shell shock, drink was not to him a beverage “but practically an irritant 
poison, which had a maddening effect.”68 It was suggested that alcohol seriously 
retarded recovery and it was even suggested that for these soldiers “only one drink 
might possibly send them mad.”69 The Committee also recommended all invalided 
soldiers be identified by having to “wear a distinguishing badge on the arm”70 during 
the period that they were under medical care.71  
The Committee recommended that an “anti-shouting” law be passed.72 
During its hearings, it accepted evidence that ‘shouting’ contributed to the ‘unduly’ 
and immoderate drinking habits of many of the soldiers.73 It was suggested to the 
                                                 
61 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas). 
62 By any hotelkeeper or any other person, except under the direction of a recognised military medical 
officer. See “’Anti-Shouting’ Regulations: Federal Action Demanded”, The Advertiser, 2 May 1918, 
6. 
63 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas).  
64 Ibid. The Committee recommended that hotel keepers should not be permitted to supply liquor to 
any invalid soldier until he had been discharged from the Forces. 
65 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 37. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas). Of course, 
there was the question of what was the definition of an “invalid”. See “Anti-Shouting”, Port 
Macquarie News and Hastings River Advocate, 1 June 1918, 4. 
69 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). It was 
suggested by one reporter that the “the law as it stands” could deal with those returned men, who, by 
reasons of shattered nerves, had a tendency to over-indulge in alcohol. See “Anti-Shouting”, above n 
68. 
70 “Anti-Shouting Regulations”, above n 62. This was the practice in England. See “Drink to Soldiers: 
Stringent Recommendation”, Examiner, 2 May 1918, 6. 
71 “Anti-Shouting Regulations”, above n 62. 
72 “Liquor and the Soldier: Select Committee’s Report”, Western Argus, 14 May 1918, 29. 
73 Ibid. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator 
Guy). Evidence was given to the Committee that drink had interfered with “the Tasmanian quota” 
when 1 191 men who enlisted in Tasmania failed to embark. 
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Committee that an ‘anti-shouting’ law would confer a “great benefit”74 upon both 
soldiers and the civilian population.75  The restriction, which was analogous to the 
English law,76 meant that it would be illegal for an individual to be ‘shouted for’ or 
to ‘shout’ for others.77 In addition, it was proposed that licensees would assist with 
the enforcement of this sumptuary regulation.78 Any licensee who permitted the law 
to be broken could risk the loss of their liquor licence.79 It was argued that this form 
or sumptuary regulation would not only benefit the invalided soldier but would 
especially be an advantage for those very young recruits who had enlisted when the 
enlistment age had been lowered.80  
Of course it was to be expected that the churches81 and temperance societies, 
particularly the abolitionist Rechabites82 would be heavily involved in the anti-
shouting campaign and that they would provide evidence before the Senate 
Committee.83 These organisations sought the total prohibition of liquor traffic in an 
attempt to force uniformity of habits and tastes upon all members of the population 
even though Australians exhibited variations in personal characteristics “to an 
                                                 
74 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. Senator Thomas advised Parliament that there was stricter alcohol prohibition in Canada, USA 
and New Zealand. He  argued “that it may be said that [the restrictions] are less in Australia, perhaps, 
than in any other English-speaking country engaged in the war.” 
77 Ibid. 
78 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 9.  
79 Ibid. 
80 “Anti-Shouting”, The Tumut Advocate and Farmers and Settlers’ Advisor, 4 June 1918, 4. 
81 “Congregational Union”, above n 14. Reverand A Deans BA, convenor of the Church’s public 
morals committee, moved the following resolution: “[t]hat this assembly heartily approves of the anti-
shouting campaign in the interests of national efficiency and economy, especially relating to our brave 
soldiers. That we ask the Federal Government to issue a minute under the War Precautions Act 
forbidding shouting in the matter of alcoholic beverages during the war and for a year after peace is 
proclaimed.” 
82 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). The 
Reschibites are members of an organisation whose objectives are to promote voluntary total 
abstinence from alcohol through temperance education and other activities in the community. See 
Independent Order of Rechabites Fraternity (New South Wales) Inc, Rules for an Incorporated 
Association (13 October 2007) Independent Order of Rechabites Salford Unity < 
australianrechabites.org.au/>. 
83 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas). Senator 
Thomas was a member of this  Committee. He claimed that despite being a well-known advocate for 
temperance, he “never endeavoured to pack the witness-box” with other temperance supporters. 
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infinite degree”.84 As it was doubtful that they would convince the Government to 
adopt a strict moralistic prohibition to protect men against the temptation of drink, 
they accepted anti-shouting legislation as the next best measure. They considered 
that it would do much to protect the returned soldier “who, in his weak, nervous, and 
shell-shocked condition”85 was so easily tempted.86 
Prime Minister Hughes was very cautious about supporting this type of 
interventionist legislation, even though the Select Senate Committee on Intoxicating 
Alcohol in their preliminary report had recommended that all invalided soldiers 
should be prohibited from having any intoxicating alcohol whilst under the care of 
the military.87 Whilst Hughes insisted that his sympathies were with those who were 
against shouting, he nonetheless argued that the State “should interfere with the 
individual only when society would derive benefit from such interference.”88 As we 
see in Chapter 6, this stance is strangely incongruous with his desire to interfere in 
the private lives of Australian when, in the same year, he pressed for the 
establishment of the Luxuries Board and the prohibition of imported luxuries. 
 
 
7.2.4 Sumptuary laws are frequently broken that they are apt to bring all law into 
contempt. An “anti-shouting” law would be more honoured in the breach than in 
the observance.89 
 
Anti-shouting campaigners who advocated for this type of ‘sumptuary 
regulation’ were not without their critics. Their call for total national abstinence 
caused them to be lambasted as being “cold-tea cranks”90 and accused of ‘shrieking’ 
                                                 
84 “Notes and Queries: The War and The Drink Traffic”, The Register, 22 February 1917, 9. 
85 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 “Anti-Shouting: Monster Petition to Prime Minister”, Daily Observer, 29 June 1917, 2. 
89 The Register, above n 8. 
90 “The Same Old Whine”, Truth, 16 June 1917, 4. These anti-shouting campaigners were collectively 
called “the cold-tea coterie”. See “Anti-Shouting”, The Sunday Times, 15 July 1917, 8. 
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moralistic rhetoric.91 They were branded as “wowsers”92 and were blamed  for 
working up war-time hysteria in their attempts to further restrict “the liberty of the 
subject”93 in the name of national economy and wartime efficiency.94 At best, the 
proposal to prohibit ‘shouting’ altogether was considered by some commentators to 
be well-meant, a “grandmotherly”95 proposal that was easily evaded and “as 
practicable as trying to hold water in a sieve.” 96 Supporters argued that ‘shouting’ 
was a civilised custom that, unless carried to the extreme, was neither detrimental to 
private nor public good: 
Shouting is a social custom of hoary antiquity, and like every other social custom it has some 
human instinct or need underlying it. It is an act of goodwill and a sealing of friendship and 
serves a legitimate purpose, and it is difficult to suggest a satisfactory substitute for it.97 
 
Many considered believed that if an anti-shouting law was passed, it would 
be resisted, for most people would treat it as a joke98 perpetrated to satisfy the 
“whimsies of a few dyspeptic wowsers”.99 In Britain, ‘innumerable ruses’ had been 
used by the public “to defeat the new [anti-shouting] order”.100 Customers evaded the 
intention of the order by exchanging money when entering and leaving the bars.101 
Whilst ‘treating’ was permitted with meals, there was hopeless disagreement with the 
owners of lunch bars as to what constituted a meal.102 It was argued that no power on 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 68. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 “Anti-Shouting”, Western Mail, 13 July 1917, 28. 
98 “Anti-Shouting”, The Richmond River Express and Casino Kyogle Advertiser, 15 October 1915. 
There was the suggestion that this type of law was inconsistent with the practice of serving soldiers in 
the trenches with a ration of rum before and after battle. To debar them from procuring alcohol on 
their return home was regarded as “pretty inconsistent”. See “Anti-Shouting”, above n 68. 
99 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 90. 
100 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 98. There were those who were under the impression that “no one in 
England seriously kicked (sic) when men were told that they would no longer be allowed to shout for 
each other…the public knuckled down to this [win-the-war measure] without a murmur.” See “How 
Anti-Shouting Works”, above n 19. 
101 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 98. 
102 Ibid. 
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earth could prevent a man from being hospitable to his friends “if he wants to be 
hospitable.”103 The proposed anti-shouting law was clearly a ‘sumptuary law’ which, 
like the sumptuary laws of the early modern period, would easily be invoked but it 
would be difficult to enforce.104 One critic suggested that whilst such sumptuary law 
may be well-intentioned, it was probably doomed to fail: 
Sumptuary laws may remain on the statute books of the country, but, unless they are broad 
based on the people’s will, they will lamentably fail of effect.105 
 
The same critic suggested that there was a need for the education of public 
opinion, without which, all remedial or restrictive laws “must be ineffectual.”106 
Further, it was argued that any attempt to threat returned Australian soldiers as third 
class citizens, in regard to the liquor laws “would rightly be strongly resented”:107  
No man should be reduced to the status of an aboriginal as far as liquor is concerned by reason 
simply of the fact that he has been a soldier.108 
 
In September 1918, the Liquor Trade Defence Union representatives gave 
evidence before the Committee109 about the effects of total prohibition of alcohol.110 
They insisted that prohibition would seriously affect the loss of revenue for the 
Commonwealth and that it would foster a black-market trade in liquor that would 
then tend to create greater social “evils”.111 Unionists argued that Australian soldiers 
were on the whole “exceptionally temperate”112 and that the sale of liquor did not 
prejudice recruitment.113 Furthermore, they contended that prohibition would 
                                                 
103 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 90. 
104 Ibid. The reporter suggested that a period of laxity was the inevitable sequel to sumptuary laws. 
See also “Notes and Queries: The War and The Drink Traffic”, above n 84. See also “The Liquor 
Question”, The Register, 10 August 1916, 7. 
105 “Local Option in Victoria”, The West Australian, 25 October 1920, 4. 
106 Ibid. 
107 “Anti-Shouting”, above n 68. 
108 Ibid. At the time, there was a law which “heavily penalised” those who supplied liquor to “blacks.” 
See “Anti-Shouting”, Bunyip, 191 September 1919, 2. 
109 “Soldiers and Drink: Senate Committee’s Enquiries Closed”, Daily Herald, 19 September 1918, 7. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
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interfere with the personal liberties and profits of “well-balanced citizens”114 who 
had entered the industry in good faith.115 
On 28 November 1918, almost three weeks after the war had ended, the 
Select Senate Committee tabled its final report.116 In the report, four117 of the seven 
Senators argued that prohibition was not necessary.118 They claimed that any 
problems with over-indulgence in drink could be remedied with anti-shouting 
legislation. On the other hand, the minority119 urged the adoption of total prohibition 
during the wartime and repatriation period.120 However, by this time, the 
Committee’s recommendations to establish a wartime anti-shouting law had lost 
much of their relevance and urgency. Eventually, the proposal to impose an 
Australian ‘sumptuary law’ restricting the practice of ‘shouting’ or ‘standing treat’ 
became another in a long list of interesting wartime legal curiosities. However, the 
anti-shouting issue was to raise its head again during the Second World War; but this 
may be the subject for future scholarship. 
 
  
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 “Soldiers and Drink: Senate Committee Report”, Chronicle and North Coats Advertiser, 29 
November 1918, 4. See also “Pinch for Stale News”, Punch, 5 December 1918, 3.The commentator 
suggested that the Committee of seven Senators had broken a record by bringing in their report after 
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117 The Committee members in the majority were Senators Foll, Grant, Rowell and Buzacott. 
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7.3 Sumptuary law at the movies: Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) 
 
Picture shows are becoming a cancer which is eating into the very vitals of our national, 
domestic, and religious life, and poisoning the whole.121 
 
In 1916, it cost an ordinary family of four as little as threepence (3d)122 each 
to be seated in the stalls to watch The Floorwalker, the latest Charlie Chaplin 
movie.123 In this movie, Chaplin adopting his traditional ‘Tramp’ persona, attempts 
to leave a shopping establishment with half the lace counter in his pockets. When a 
store detective (the eponymous floorwalker) attempts to apprehend him, chaos breaks 
out and this results in the inevitable comedic chase on a “running staircase”124 and a 
hilarious ‘mirror scene’. This kind of light-hearted movie was the most popular and, 
in most cases, the only form of amusement for working-class families during the war 
years.125 Although the national standard of living had improved slightly over the last 
30 years,126 this social class did not have much disposable income.127  However, 
many could afford to scrape together just enough pennies to attend the movies once a 
week “to get a little relaxation from the humdrum course”128 of their every-day lives 
and enjoy a break away from war time anxieties.129 The ‘well-to-do’ had a wider 
choice of entertainment:  they had the luxury of being able to afford to attend live 
theatre, concerts, opera and “legitimate drama.”130 Moreover, they could also pay an 
                                                 
121 “Picture Shows Condemned”, Illawarra Mercury, 3 March 1916, 1. 
122 For an explanation of currency during this period, see Lawrence Officer and Samuel Williamson, 
Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of Australian Amounts, 1828 to the Present, Measuring 
Worth <measuringworth.com>. 
123 “Entertainments”, Geelong Advertiser, 15 August 1916, 5. If the family wanted more comfortable 
seats they could spend up to a shilling each for seats in the dress circle.  
124  Ibid. 
125 There was some suggestion that “formerly” there used to be a lot of dancing but this type of 
amusement was considered not to be suitable for families. See Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 147 (Mr Mathews). 
126 Ibid 148 (Mr Archibald). 
127 Ibid 132 (Mr Kelly). 
128  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 December 1916, 55 (Senator Guy). 
129 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 134 (Mr 
Fenton).  
130 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 December 1916, 68 (Senator Bakhap). 
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extra booking-fee to reserve their seats in theatres.131 They could enjoy tax-free 
entertainment in their homes;132 “they [had] their balls and parties, with bands 
playing; they have their pianos and pianolas”.133 Unlike people of ‘small means’, the 
upper classes generally did not patronise “picture entertainments”134 and, if they did, 
they would not purchase the 3d or 6d tickets for the stalls.135 They could afford to 
pay for the more expensive seats. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the American movie 
industry flourished and there was a corresponding growth in the importation of 
American movies into Australia.136 This new form of entertainment was considered 
to be mainly working man’s entertainment and to accommodate it, thousands of 
picture theatres appeared in both urban and rural areas throughout Australia.137 For 
instance, in Sydney and in its surrounding suburbs there were 113 picture theatres, 
with an average weekly attendance of 427 000.138 Allowing for an average charge of 
sixpence for admission, this attendance meant that approximately £11 000 was spent 
each week on this form of entertainment.139 These theatres provided evening sessions 
on most nights and there were various sessions during the day for families with 
                                                 
131 Ibid 68 (Senator Findley). Senator Findley suggested that many of the lower classes were willing to 
suffer the inconvenience and discomfort of waiting outside places of entertainment because they were 
not in a financial position  to pay for a higher-priced seat. The richer classes, on the other hand, only 
occasionally patronized “picture entertainments” because they preferred to go to the theatre and could 
“usually pay a booking-fee in addition to the price of the ticket in order to engage their seats 
beforehand.” 
132 Ibid 44 (Senator Stewart). 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid 68 (Senator Bakhap). 
135 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 148 (Dr 
Maloney). Another MP (Mr Hannan) advised the House that, as a well-paid politician, he could, with 
his wife and children, visit “picture shows, the drama, musical comedies, and the vaudeville”. He 
stated that he could afford “to pay any price that [was] put on as a result of this taxation.” However, he 
pointed out that five years before he came to the House, when he was working for 8 s 6d per day just 
“as the biggest section of [the community” was now doing, he could not afford to pay for this type of 
entertainment. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 
December 1916, 159 (Mr Hannan). 
136 “Picture Shows”, The West Australian, 3 May 1916, 8. In May 1916, the average number of 
pictures “released” in Perth annually was about 40. 
137 “Picture Shows”, Northern Star, 29 April 1916, 3. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
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younger children.140 However, despite attendance numbers rising dramatically after 
the advent of ‘moving pictures’ in Australia, the high costs of movie importation,141 
advertising and theatre hire, meant that many picture show proprietors only made a 
bare living.142 Proprietors feared their income would be further curtailed after the 
State and Federal Governments decided to impose a tax on the price of admission.143 
 
7.3.1 War Games 
 
This is not the time to play games, for we are engaged in a life and death struggle for the 
existence of the Empire.144 
 
During the war, Australian governments were anxious to find all possible 
opportunities to raise revenue and in most circumstances they tended to follow the 
austerity measures implemented by the British Government. An amusements or 
entertainments tax was one such measure.145  
War conditions have brought about a change of circumstances in taxation, as in everything 
else, and we are quite justified in adopting every available source of income.146 
 
In 1916, the British Government had imposed an inflexible147 entertainments 
tax148 on ‘amusements’ as part of its policy to raise revenue to fund the war effort.149 
                                                 
140 One critic suggested that “the picture shows” were running all day and “practically all night”. See 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 December 1916, 75 (Mr 
Corser). 
141 There were 50% customs duties imposed on imported films. See “An Amusement Tax”, The 
Register, 11 September 1916, 4. 
142 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 139 (Mr 
Mathews).  Mr Mathews said he doubted whether many proprietors made more than 8% on the money 
they had invested. It was also suggested that attendance numbers had dwindled since the beginning of 
the war because many who had patronised these shows “had gone to the Front”. 
143 This was not a concern for many politicians who argued that this level of profit was due to 
mismanagement rather than the loss of patronage. See Ibid 148 (Mr Archibald). 
144 “Lord Robert’s Warning: No Time for Games”, The Register, 31 August 1914, 9. Whilst Lord 
Roberts was specifically referring to cricket and football, this exhortation was used as part of the 
rhetoric used by those who opposed many forms of amusements during the war. See Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 December 1916, 55 (Senator Lynch).  
145 Ibid 44 (Senator Stewart). 
146 Ibid 49 (Senator De Largie). 
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Surprisingly, it seemed to work well and “the people [in the Old Land] were 
cheerfully putting up with it.”150 Following Britain’s lead, and expecting the same 
success, the Australian Government resolved to impose a similar sumptuary tax, and 
at short notice the Entertainments Bill was brought before Parliament.151 The 
legislation did not have an easy passage. When the Bill failed to pass through both 
Houses, Senate and House Committees were appointed to examine the viability of 
this proposed tax.  The Senate Committee originally proposed that it would be ‘just’ 
for the government to impose 1d tax on a 6d entertainment ticket and that the 3d 
ticket, usually favoured by children and very profitable for theatre proprietors, should 
be exempted from tax.152 By December 1916, the government had dropped the 
proposal to tax sixpenny tickets.153 This was mainly as a result of the strong pressure 
on government and on the Prime Minister, in particular, from picture show 
proprietors who contended that there was “a well-defined and limited sum”154 that 
the public was prepared to spend on the price of admission.155 The government had 
characterised the entertainments tax as a “temporary tax”156 that “would not have 
                                                                                                                                          
147 The British tax had practically no exception and there was “certainly no exemption on a sixpenny 
admission fee”. See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 
1916, 144 (Mr Burchell). On all prices from 6d upwards, there as a graduated scale of tax. 
148 See Finance (New Duties) Act 1916, 6 Geo 5, c 11 and Finance Act 1916, 6 Geo 5, c 11, s 12. In 
England, the tax was levied on every form of entertainment, with practically no exemptions. See Ibid 
144 (Mr Burchell). 
149 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 144 
(Mr Burchell). 
150 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 December 1916, 53 (Senator Newlands). One 
politician argued that this assertion was questionable. He contended that “we often get information 
[about what is happening in Britain] that is not correct.” See Ibid 139 (Mr Mathews). 
151 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 132 (Mr 
Kelly). 
152 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 December 1916, 79 (Mr 
Sampson). The original proposal included a tax on the 3d tickets.  However, there was a strong protest 
about a tax that appeared to target ‘kiddies’. There were some exemptions, such as when no admission 
fee was charged. See Ibid 145 (Mr Page). 
153 “Federal Entertainments Bill: Tax on Sixpenny Tickets Dropped”, The West Australian, 19 
December 1916, 6. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. This proposed change in the taxing threshold would mean a drop of £100 000 in anticipated 
revenue. 
156 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 December 1916, 46 (Senator Findley). 
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been heard of but for the war.”157 It was anticipated that people would “rather 
welcome [this] taxation”158 or at least “not seriously oppose it.”159 In the 1916 
Federal Budget statement on 27 September 1916, the Government predicted that this 
new tax could be expected to yield £1 000 000 in a half year.160 
It was proposed that the tax be paid on all payments for admission to 
‘entertainment’, which included “any exhibition, performance, lecture, amusement, 
game or sport”.161 Some forms of entertainments were to be exempted from the 
tax.162 An exemption was also allowed where the Tax Commissioner was satisfied 
that the takings would be devoted to philanthropic, religious or charitable purposes or 
if the entertainment was of a wholly educational character.163 There would also be no 
tax on entertainment that was intended for children and where the charge was less 
than sixpence per person.164 
The Federal Government decided not to tax the proprietors controlling the 
entertainments, because it presumed that proprietors would, in all likelihood, just 
pass the tax onto their clientele.165 Instead, the tax was to be directly added to the 
price of admission to picture shows, theatres and sporting fixtures.166 A number of 
                                                 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid 51 (Senator Turley). 
159 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 143 (Mr 
Massy-Greene). 
160 “Federal Budget: Heavy New Taxation”, Wodonga and Towong Sentinel, 29 September 1916, 3. 
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States had already passed this type of legislation,167 with the result that many 
consumers were facing double taxation on their entertainments.168 Proprietors of the 
various entertainments also expected to experience “manifest inconvenience”169 as 
well as additional responsibilities with the introduction of the tax.170 Proprietors were 
obliged to exhibit a notice at each entrance to the venue stating the amount of charge 
for admission and the amount of Federal tax payable on the charge.171 They were not 
only to act as collection and enforcement agents for the Government,172 but would 
also incur heavy fines if they did not comply with these duties.173 In March 1917, 
Frank O’Dowd, the proprietor of Prahran “Pops”, was charged with failing to 
forward,  by 19 February 1917, all stamped tickets to the Deputy Commissioner of 
Taxation. He was also charged with failing to cause all persons purchasing tickets 
above 6d to pay the relevant stamp duty. On each charge, he was fined £5, with £1/1/ 
costs. Mendel Saider, the proprietor of the Armadale Picture Theatre, was charged 
with two similar offences and on each charge was fined £10 with £2/2/ costs.  
                                                 
167 These included South Australia and Tasmania. See Amusements Duty Act 1916 (Tas) and Stamp 
Act Further Amendment Act 1916 (SA). 
168 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 135 (Mr 
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170 Ibid. 
171 “Entertainments Tax: In Force on January 1”, above n 162. 
172 “The New Taxes: How They Will Affect the Picture Shows”, The Bathurst Times, 3 October 1916, 
3. Tickets, with no stamp duty attached, had to be purchased from the government at an increased 
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proprietor was accused of being guilty of behaviour that amounted “almost to a swindle in the 
manipulation of tickets”. See “Amusements Tax Evaded”, The Argus, 13 December 1917, 4. See 
Entertainment Tax Assessment Act 1916 (Cth) ss 14–18. The offences included forging of die and 
stamps (14 years imprisonment); making paper in imitation of stamp paper (imprisonment for seven 
years); unlawful possession of stamp paper (imprisonment three years); and fraudulent acts 
(imprisonment for one year). 
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An entertainments tax had the potential to be used by government to raise an 
enormous revenue from social activities which had not been previously taxed.174 As 
seen in Chapter 6, some people had, to varying degrees, a little more surplus income 
than before the war. 175 By 1917, a large amount of money was changing hands in 
Australia “in connexion (sic) with outdoor and indoor entertainments.”176 Some 
attempted to justify the imposition of this tax by arguing that people were inclined to 
forget that Australia was at war.177 It was argued that those who had such “surplus 
cash,”178 after “the ordinary demands of life [had] been met,”179 and used it to 
patronize places of amusement, should be expected to “cheerfully acquiesce”180 to a 
tax that would meet the extra demands of the war.181 It was suggested that whilst 
some Australians were doing their patriotic duty by ‘going to the front’, others 
should be equally patriotic by “finding the money for the prosecution of the war.”182  
 
 
7.3.2 A Class Tax  
 
I am quite sure that people who patronize picture shows and sports of different kinds will be 
quite prepared to pay their share of taxation for the conduct of the war.183 
 
An entertainments tax was ostensibly “one of the easiest methods possible”184 
to raise revenue for the war effort. Those who supported the creed that the war 
                                                 
174 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 December 1916, 79 (Mr 
Sampson). 
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176 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 December 1916, 79 (Mr 
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should be won at ‘any cost’ thought that it was only fair that everyone should make 
some form of sacrifice “to carry on the war”.185 The Treasurer, Mr Poynton, argued 
that this platitude alone justified the imposition of a form of consumption tax.186 He 
maintained that if people could not afford to pay the tax, they should go less 
frequently to these places of entertainment.187 This uncompromising policy was not 
welcomed by some pro-tax politicians who believed  that, as a consequence of the 
combined operation of both the Federal and State amusement taxes, there might be a 
danger that the anticipated revenue from this tax might ‘dry up altogether’.188 This 
position might be further exacerbated if the tax were to dislocate “that branch of 
industry”189 and close up many places of amusements.190  
This form of “justificatory discourse”191 became a strong validation for a 
sumptuary tax that, in most part, was considered a “special class tax”192 that mainly 
targeted the working classes. Whilst this consumption tax was to apply to many types 
of entertainment, it would, according to some parliamentarians, mainly “clip”193 the 
                                                                                                                                          
184 Ibid 46 (Senator Findley). 
185 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 December 1916, 79 (Mr 
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186 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 December 1916, 148 (Mr 
Poynton). In October 1916, the Treasurer Mr Higgs resigned because of the split in his party over 
conscription. Mr Poynton was then appointed Federal Treasurer. 
187 Ibid 147 (Mr Mathews). See also “Federal Finances and New Taxation”, Daily Herald, 29 
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amusements of the very poor whilst “allowing those of the very rich to go free”.194 
The tax in effect, was considered by critics as a “levy upon a luxury”:195 a simple 
luxury enjoyed by the poorer classes. 
This was not a concern to Mr Archibald MP, who held that the working 
classes were in a much better position than they had been in previous years: 
One has only to look at our working classes, and especially our women folk, and to note the 
way that they dress, to satisfy oneself that this talk of poverty amongst the workers is all 
claptrap…196 
 
Mr Higgs, a former Federal Treasurer, suggested that if people wanted 
entertainment, they need not necessarily go to a picture show or a theatre: 
Following the advice of Buskin (sic), they might sit on a hill and watch the clouds on a 
beautiful afternoon, or spend the evening in watching the stars. If they prefer a theatre, what is 
to prevent their coming to this House, admission to which is free.197 
 
However, he described the tax as indirect taxation “of the worst kind”198 
because it was mainly targeted at one class.199 Others described it as a ‘class tax’ on 
one section of the community “which believed in having some form of social 
enjoyment”.200 Mr Fenton MP criticised the Federal government who he said 
appeared to have no compunction about “continually heaping [tax] on the shoulders 
                                                 
194 Ibid. Others disputed this contention. Mr Archibald MP, for instance, claimed that “the cost of war 
comes largely out of the revenue obtained from the income tax and the land tax”. Mr Burns challenged 
this claim, suggesting that such taxes were “passed onto them”. See also comments made by Dr 
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Lord Mayors’ banquets and other large dinner parties. 
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of those least able to bear it”201 even when the State governments were doing the 
same.202  
However, other State and Federal politicians disputed that the tax was a ‘class 
tax’ because it would apply to all forms of amusements (including racing, cricket and 
football). Yet, for many there was no doubt that the tax primarily targeted those who 
patronised picture show movies:203  
[this is] an irritating class levy which has proved to be exceedingly unfair in its incidence, even 
in London and other large cities, where places of amusement are attended by tens of thousands 
of a floating population upon whom-as well as the resident population- the burden of the tax 
falls.204 
 
It was thought by some to be a “miserable tax”205 upon the ‘working man’.206 
Mr Mathews MP condemned those who advocated that there should be no enjoyment 
during the war period and intimated that everyone should “be in sackcloth and 
ashes”.207 Mr Fenton maintained that ‘the picture show’ was “the working man’s 
entertainment”208 and that, before the ‘pictures’ came into existence, it was rare for 
workers to enjoy any leisure activities.209 He pointed out that movies were a new and 
rare luxury for working families and that the relative low admission price to the 
movies meant that “father, mother and children could go at least once per week.”210 
It was argued that taxation of sixpenny (6d) tickets would mean a great deal of 
hardship to a working man with a family211 and that this type of an impost had the 
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potential to “farther and farther remove”212 any sort of luxury of life from the 
masses.213  
Matthews pointed out that the working classes had already been savagely hit 
by large increases in the cost of their furniture, food and rent, and the proposed tax 
sought to squeeze them even more by increasing the cost of the only cheap form of 
amusement they had been able to afford.214 Matthews even went so far as to suggest 
that the Entertainments Tax was only a subterfuge to compel the closing down of 
places of entertainment, thus forcing male employees to enlist.215 
The proposal to tax amusements was met with an enormous amount of 
hostility and criticism from both theatre proprietors and movie goers despite the 
flood of nationalistic sentiment from Parliament and the press about the need to raise 
wartime revenue whilst also protecting public morals from the salacious effects of 
the movies.216 There was concern that the imposition of this type of tax was short-
sighted. It was argued that it would not only adversely affect patrons but it would 
discourage those involved with the entertainment industry from continuing to 
gratuitously provide their services and facilities in raising funds for the war effort.217  
It was also suggested that the tax would adversely affect “tens of thousands” of 
people who were, directly and indirectly, engaged in the theatre, and show business 
in Australia; the tax would “strike a blow”218 and could mean the “absolute 
ruination”219 of this section of the entertainment industry.220  
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7.3.3 Movies and morals 
 
We should tax a man, not for what he does, but for what he has.221 
 
There were others who considered that the tax could also be regulatory and 
target extravagance, luxury and the erosion of morals in the Australia.222 There were 
pessimists who were fearful that the hegemonic order was increasingly being 
challenged by new forms of popular culture and leisure activities, particularly those 
enjoyed by the ‘profligate’ lower classes: “[a]s all people of a non-saving disposition, 
having money in their pockets will do, they will naturally go out and try and get the 
best they can out of life.”223 Movies were particularly beleaguered as being an ‘evil’ 
or a ‘vice’ that caused a “dreadful effect”224 on the young mind.225 It was argued that 
the quality of the subjects presented in popular movies was not conducive “to the 
best results of the juvenile mind”226 and that the increased popularity of movies was 
threatening to become a kind of “national disease” that needed to be excised.227  
It was argued by some alarmists that picture shows pandered to lust by 
depicting incidents that bordered on the indecent, or at least encouraged “an inane 
mirth,”228 which they considered was quite inconsistent with the gravity of the war 
years.229 They argued that only a class of movie, that was imbued with convincing 
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moral lessons or those movies which were “clean, sweet and wholesome,”230 should 
be shown to the public. 231  
When the entertainments tax was being proposed, much of the economic 
discourse surrounding its introduction was coupled with moralising critique 
analogous to that expressed by reformers of the early modern age who pressed for 
sumptuary laws.232 Both critiques invoked concerns about ‘present’ moral danger in 
times of national crisis and appealed for urgent government intervention to help 
alleviate these anxieties: 
No sensible man would approve of this method of raising revenue in normal times, but it is 
necessary to meet a special emergency.233 
 
As seen in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, the post-Federation Australian government 
was already predisposed to intervene in widening spheres of social and economic 
life. As anxieties intensified about wartime spending, so did the attacks on luxury 
and extravagance, which were seen as the ‘enemy’ of all righteous Australians who 
valorised both thrift and self-sacrifice as crucial patriotic virtues.234 For such people, 
an amusement was a luxury, and they demanded:  “why should not people pay [tax 
on] a luxury?” 235  
Even though the government insisted that the tax was introduced as a war 
measure to assist with ‘prosecuting’ the war, there was no doubt that the morals of 
‘the masses’ were the main target of this tax.236 Dr Maloney MP made it very clear 
that he resented the actions of the ‘wowser’ element who he considered to be 
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members of an “aristocracy of religion,”237 who having no regard for the pleasures of 
others, found their only pleasure within “the narrow limits of the churches.”238 Mr 
Hannan MP, argued that the tax was pressed by ‘wowsers’ who did not go to any 
‘entertainments’ but sought, through their letters to the press,239 to condemn and 
penalise “tens of thousands of young Australians”240 who went to the movies, 
football matches and plays.241 He contended that ‘wowsers’ who did not “believe”242 
in theatricals or pictures shows would eventually seek the closure of such places of 
entertainment.243 Hannan suggested that these ‘wowsers’ were the same sort of 
moralists who considered that a woman who took her children to a picture show was 
not ‘respectable’ and the sort who wrote letters to the press about the ‘immoral’ 
practice of “mixed bathing.”244  
Movie aficionados such as Dr Maloney, argued that movie-making should be 
celebrated because it had enormous potential as an uplifting educative tool for the 
community.245 He maintained that ‘movies’ could display to audiences the scenery 
and “manufactures”246 of many lands as well as demonstrate to them the devastating 
effect of war on life and property:247  
Patrons…have…learnt more of history, geography and science, more of the arts and mysteries 
of trade and manufacture, more of the manners and customs of other peoples, more of the 
world in which they live, than they have learned from books and all other sources of 
information.248 
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Senator Findley argued that in earlier years, the lower classes had had few 
opportunities for ‘mental improvement’ or the ‘privilege’ of the sort of pleasures 
“which fell to the lot of a certain favoured section of the community.”249 One 
journalist argued that the government should not deny “harmless pleasure”250 to the 
younger generation. He maintained that it was far better for them to attend pictures 
than for them to “be walking the streets and hanging around hotels till all hours”.251 
Mathews suggested that the Government should sponsor amusements in the country 
“in order to give people in isolated portion of [the] continent an opportunity of seeing 
some life instead of having their lives restricted.”252 Similarly, Mr Page MP insisted 
that the movies provided the opportunity for audiences to participate in palpable 
forms of emotional release, particularly in times of personal disquiet: 
When an amusing picture is shown on the screen, the theatre is filled with that sweetest sound 
on earth…the rippling laughter of children. I never hear it without feeling myself a better man; 
and those who think that the human heart cannot be touched by pictures have only to look 
round when a sad play is being shown to see the handkerchiefs raised surreptitiously in the 
darkened hall.253 
 
Whilst many movies were not always considered educational, some argued 
that they were, nevertheless, very interesting and enjoyable.254 Even if they were at 
times ‘suggestive,’ they were according to some politicians, considered no more 
‘suggestive’ than live stage shows and what was seen in every-day life.255 
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Eventually, on 21 December 1916 the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) 
gained assent and came into operation on 1 January 1917.256 A flurry of deputations 
from the entertainment industry and an huge backlash from the public concerning the 
possible imposition of tax on 3d and 6d tickets,257 forced the Government to alter its 
original proposal and to declare that the tax on admission tickets over 6d was to be as 
follows: 
• Tickets costing more than sixpence, but not exceeding one 
shilling would attract 1d tax 
• Tickets costing more than one shilling, the rate of tax was 1d 
for the first shilling, and one half-penny for every sixpence or part of 
sixpence by which the payment exceeded one shilling258 
This tax, although originally purported to be a war time measure, continued 
to be a source of government revenue for the following 17 years until it was repealed 
in 1933.259 Over that period, the rates of tax were varied260 and some further 
exemptions and exceptions were provided. These included exemptions for 
entertainments that funded the erection, maintenance or furnishing of halls for public 
purposes or memorial halls for the use of returned servicemen.261 It is interesting to 
note that a similar form of tax was imposed on entertainments during Wold War II, 
but again this is a topic for future research.262 
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7.4 Conclusion 
 
Sumptuary regulation has never been limited to the regulation of appearance; 
at various times it also extended to the regulation of other aspects of social life 
including food, alcohol and entertainment. This chapter explores the proposed 
wartime Anti-Shouting laws and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth), both 
legislative projects which, although not concerned with the regulation of appearance, 
were nevertheless distinctively marked by sumptuary characteristics. Both projects 
were advocated by the state in response to perceived threats of social disorder and 
moral laxity, and were proposed as a particular ‘imagined social order’ during a 
period of uncertainty and anxiety.  
The discourse that surrounded the creation of these sumptuary projects was 
discursively linked with wartime discourse concerning the notions of luxury, 
morality and national duty. This chapter has illustrated that the Anti-Shouting laws 
and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) were also disciplinary sumptuary projects 
that targeted the choices made by individuals about their consumption practices. 
Furthermore, the chapter also demonstrates the manner in which these projects were 
intimately linked with wider concerns that government had for national well-being 
during a period of social and economic crisis. 
After our digression into other areas of war-time sumptuary regulation, 
Chapter 8 takes us back into the realm of ‘appearential’ sumptuary regulation. In the 
post-war period we begin to see, in discourses surrounding the importation of 
inexpensive clothing, a discursive shift from a persistent emphasis on the 
moralisation of luxury to an increasing focus on national economic well-being. 
However, Chapter 8 demonstrates that this discursive shift was less apparent when 
the ‘problem’ of women’s fashion was being discussed in Parliament or the press. 
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8 WOMEN AND MORALISATION V MEN AND RATIONAL 
PROTECTIONISM 
 
The fickleness of that symbolical lady [Dame Fashion] has been blamed by the boot 
manufacturers, milliners, clothing manufacturers and others for many of the trade 
depressions that have taken place at various times.1 
 
8.1 Purpose and structure of this chapter 
 
As was shown in Chapter 4,2 during the first decade following Federation 
there was a preponderance of moralising rhetoric within Parliament and throughout 
the press attacking women and their alleged extravagance in dress.3 In that chapter it 
was argued that this type of rhetoric took on a noticeable engagement with the 
language of sumptuary regulation. Chapter 6 contends that during the war years this 
type of gendered moralising rhetoric was zealously linked with a critique of luxury 
and that there was a constant demand for government, already increasingly 
concerned with economic waste and national ruin, to impose sumptuary regulation.4 
Whilst moralising invective was directed largely against general female extravagance 
it seems that during this period the lower classes became the primary target of 
government sumptuary interventionist policies. 
By the early 1920s, the influx of low-priced imported apparel had increased 
enormously. As a result, the sumptuary impulse became even more manifestly 
apparent in the vigorous attempts by protectionists to suppress the importation of 
such goods. However, by the mid-1920s, it appeared that the sumptuary focus was 
beginning to shift from a moralising critique of luxury and extravagance to a 
                                                 
1 “The Cost of Fashion: The Brush Trade Suffers”, Gippsland Times, 3 August 1925, 6; “Dame 
Fashion and Tariff Duties”, The Bathurst Times, 8 August 1925, 5.  
2 See above Chapter  4. 
3 See above Chapter 4. 
4 See above Chapter 6. 
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protectionist discourse that focused more on the well-being of the national economy. 
However, this chapter and what follows will illustrate that whilst excessive 
consumption of imported goods, including women’s felt hats, corsetry, hosiery and 
men’s underwear, was increasingly linked with economic protectionism and national 
interest, there still nevertheless remained during this time, strong threads of 
sumptuary moralisation intertwined with protectionist discourse.  
What becomes apparent from this chapter is that these threads of sumptuary 
moralisation only remained evident in discourses associated with women and 
‘fashionable apparel’. Women’s fashion persistently continued to excite general 
moral condemnation and it was clear that it stimulated the sumptuary reflex to a 
much greater extent than any matter concerning imported male apparel. This 
disparity will become more apparent later in the chapter  when we see that discourse 
concerning imported men’s underwear was driven not by a desire for moral 
regulation but by purely protectionist motives.  
The Chapter is comprised of two parts. The first part explains how 
‘fashionable’ women during the war years and in the 1920s were persistently blamed 
for all manner of social and economic ills. Not only were ‘fashionable’ women 
vilified for their alleged fickleness and profligacy but they were also accused of 
being responsible for the destruction of many fledgling Australian industries and for 
causing a dramatic increase in the cost of living. Critics linked women’s ‘obsession’ 
with fashion with national ruin and moral decay.  During the war, concerns about 
women’s fashion were indicative of broader national anxieties about the need to 
protect the national economy during times of economic distress. The critique of 
luxury, patriotic duty and protectionism thus became even more discursively 
interwoven with moral regulation. This part will also reveal how the Tariff Board 
was called upon to intervene by increasing tariffs on gendered items of apparel.  
The chapter will also demonstrate that ‘fashionable women’ were not only 
constantly under attack from masculinist institutions but also from prominent women 
such as Ruth Beale who took it upon herself to guide women towards a parsimonious 
ideal of gendered patriotism. This chapter will illustrate that, during the latter stages 
of the war, the activist Ruth Beale labelled ‘fashionable women’ as unpatriotic 
because they were squandering national resources on trivial and inappropriate 
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fripperies. As a self-appointed female agent of protectionism and moral duty, she 
sought government intervention to retard the economic effect of rapidly changing 
women’s fashions. At the same time she sought to encourage Australian industries by 
advocating the standardisation of female workers’ dress. 
This chapter will also demonstrate that whilst post-Federation women had 
been accorded new public freedoms and visibility as a waged workers and 
consumers, they were excluded from public debate. They were denied the 
opportunity to formally participate in masculinist decision-making processes that 
were constantly denouncing women’s fashion and penalising female consumers by 
initiating high prices on gendered ‘necessities’. 
 As a counterpoint to this form of hegemonic female marginalisation, this 
chapter will describe an occasion when members of the Housewives Association 
cleverly overcame their exclusion from the public domain by deploying collective 
strategies to subversively challenge these same masculinist processes. These 
rebellious women, who were denied the opportunity to sit on boards such as the 
Tariff Board, effectively thwarted the Board’s objectionable tariff policies by 
exercising the only power which a masculinist hegemonic society afforded them: 
their ‘spending power’. 
Although a collective of militant women may have successfully challenged 
hegemonic practices on this one occasion they nevertheless continued to be mostly 
excluded from the public tariff debate concerning female apparel. This chapter will 
describe how the issue of female fashion was to continue to remain exclusively with 
the male members of the Tariff Board.  
          The second part of the chapter deals with the prohibitive protectionist 
measures associated with the importation of workingmen’s underwear into Australia 
in the 1920s. The chapter will reveal that these measures were prompted by pure 
‘unashamedly’ rational economic motives rather than those moral anxieties that 
usually triggered sumptuary measures towards women’s fashion apparel and 
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‘luxuries’.5 This part begins with an examination of the prohibitive effect of those 
tariff duties imposed on men’s underwear during the period from 1921 until 1926. 
During this period, local underwear manufacturers persistently demanded that 
government increase tariffs on imported men’s underwear. Some even demanded that 
the male consumers be forced to relinquish their right to wear what they chose and be 
compelled by government to support local industries by wearing only Australian-
made underwear. Furthermore, it will describe the role the Tariff Board played, as 
the ‘institutional voice of protectionism’, in restricting the choices of working class 
consumers. This part also looks at the xenophobic anxieties that prompted Australian 
manufacturers to demand that Australian workers be forced to eschew the more 
practical and inexpensive imported cotton underwear in favour of the more costly 
Australian-made woollen underwear. Finally, this part examines how the working 
man was afforded no opportunity to voice his concerns about an impost that had such 
a drastic impact on his consumer choices. 
 
8.2 Women’s Fashion excites moral condemnation  
 
8.2.1 Women attack fashion 
 
She produced [a standard costume]. It was suitable for women of all ages, and could easily 
conform to the passing fashions by slight alterations to cuffs and collars.6 
 
Throughout the early decades after Federation, there a noticeable and 
persistent7 discursive emphasis  within media reports and in Parliamentary debates 
                                                 
5 See above Chapters 4 and 6. 
6 “Notes and Notices”, The Australasian, 13 July 1918, 33. 
7 It interesting that some articles denigrating women and fashion were regularly recycled in the press, 
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on the alleged social and economic ills created by the ‘problem’ of women’s 
fashion.8 During this period, the vagaries and the apparent extravagance of fashion 
apparel appeared to have disturbed sensitive moralists and ‘patriotic’ protectionists 
and activists such as Ruth Beale and Ivy Brookes, in the same manner as it disturbed 
the governing classes in the early sumptuary epoch.9  
In July 1918, Miss Ruth Beale, the Secretary of the Women’s National 
Economy Association, which had been inaugurated just after the outbreak of the war, 
pressed for all Australians to demand home products and manufacturing.10 During 
this time, Beale had close links to Ivy Brookes, who was President11 of the Empire 
Trade Defence Association, a “sister”12 organisation, with similar social objectives, 
which was established in Melbourne.13  Both women were heavily influenced by the 
protectionist dogma espoused and enforced by the male members of their families.14 
When giving evidence before the Commonwealth Inter-State Prices 
Commission, Beale, defined herself as a ‘patriotic’ agent of protectionism. She 
forthrightly declared her ‘patriotic’ allegiance to protectionist ideology by 
demanding that the Commission prohibit the importation of feminine luxury products 
such as furs, fur skins, fancy goods, perfumery and trimmed millinery.15 
Furthermore, she positioned herself as a feminine ‘traitor’ by scorning the trappings 
of a fashion industry that at the time seemed so dear to the hearts of her fashion-
                                                                                                                                          
taste, are not the purchasers of the showy fabrics and misfit hats…A refined woman never dresses 
loudly”. 
8 “The Cost of Fashion: The Brush Trade Suffers”, above n 1; “Women to Women: Problems of the 
Day”, The Argus, 31 March 1920, 4-5. 
9 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press, 
1996) 273. 
10 “Extravagance in Female Clothing’ Prohibition of Sumptuous Gowning: Over-Dressed women 
Bleed the Wounded”, Border Morning Mail and Riverina Times, 11 July 1918, 2. 
11 “Empire Trade Defence Urged”, Weekly Times, 16 March 1918, 9. Ivy was elected as President of 
the Empire Trade Defence Association in March 1918.  
12 “Home Products to the Fore”, Sunday Times, 13 October 1918, 13. Beale visited and addressed this 
“sister body” in October 1918. 
13 “Empire Trade Defence Urged”, above n 11. 
14 Both Beale and Brookes had male family members who were staunch Protectionists. 
15 “Extravagance in Female Clothing’ Prohibition of Sumptuous Gowning: Over-Dressed women 
Bleed the Wounded”, above n 10. 
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conscious sisters; the mannequin parades, special advertising and window dressing.16 
It is not surprising that Mr Piddington, the Chairman of the Commission, agreed with 
Miss Beale. However, in his response he was not confident that this form of 
gendered intervention would be successful: “[m]y own opinion is that this is an 
abominable absurdity to operate in war times, but can you stop it?”17 
Beale, concerned about need for severe wartime rationing, used the 
Commission hearing as a public forum to denounce fashionable women because of 
their hedonistic attachment to consumerism, as being unpatriotic. In her call for 
government intervention towards women’s extravagant spending habits, she 
maligned over-dressed women for “bleeding the wounded”.18 Whilst Piddington, 
again concurred with her, but he appeared to be more realistic about the curtailment 
of these activities:19 “I am with you, but, to put it bluntly, are these matters which 
could be stopped by government exacting penalties?”20 
Undaunted, she then proceeded to tread on “tenderer corns”21 by advocating 
the standardisation of women’s clothing.22 Her recommendation that standard 
uniforms be adopted in certain industries in which women were employed appeared 
to be underpinned her preoccupations with protectionism, the moralisation of luxury 
and by traces of sumptuary hieratic impulse.23 In terms of sumptuary intervention, it 
has been argued that uniforms were often used as instruments of social control 
imposed on working class employees.24 Whilst Beale’s uniforms might signify 
uniformity, patriotism and frugality, they were also antithetical to women’s freedom 
of self-expression and independence: “[t]o-day everybody is free to dress and live 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 “Standard Dress”, The Richmond River Express and Casino Kyogle Advertiser, 19 July 1918, 6. 
18 “Extravagance in Female Clothing’ Prohibition of Sumptuous Gowning: Over-Dressed women 
Bleed the Wounded”, above n 10. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Nance, “The Home: Standard Dress”, Leader, 27 July 1928, 43-44. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Standard Costumes: A Woman Advocate”, The Argus, 11 July 1918, 6. Beale sought this form of 
uniform for factory, shop and office girls. See “Boots and Shoes” Women Give Evidence”, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1918, 12. 
24 Donna Crane, Fashion and its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity Clothing (University of 
Chicago Press, 2001) 94. 
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according to personal taste so far as the purse permits.”25 For working class women, 
uniforms would act as a symbol of discipline, subjection and stereotypical 
conservatism. It is notable that Beale’s proposed form of collective regulation of 
identity exhibited similarities with the normative and codified regimen that we see in 
Chapter 5 when Higgins J and other arbitration judges prescribed ‘appropriate dress’ 
for working class women. 
By trying to enforce explicit dress codes for female factory and shop workers, 
Beale sought to reaffirm an earlier social order that had been marked by clear class 
distinctions. Before the war, many of these female factory workers would probably 
have been employed as domestic servants. They would have been traditionally 
clothed in ‘appropriate’ uniforms that submerged ‘the personal’ and identified them 
as submissive and as part of a codified hierarchical order. Without a uniform, the 
same women and their ‘status’ were no longer so easily identifiable and this caused 
anxiety for some people. As one critic later suggested that: “[i]t is becoming more 
and more difficult every day to tell to what station in life a woman belongs by the 
clothes she wears or by the way she wears them.”26 
Beale also suggested to the Commission that wholesale and retail 
standardisation should cover the nature of the fabric, colour and pattern of clothing.27 
Beale claimed that standard locally-made fabrics such as serge, worsted and tweed be 
produced locally and sold with a government-fixed price.28 She insisted that this 
Australian-made fabric would be cheaper by reason of its increased output, and 
claimed that its reduced cost would then enable women to clothe themselves and 
their children more “suitably and economically”.29 
Beale declared that her motives for proposing this intrusive form of 
prescriptive gendered intervention were based on her patriotic desire to “keep the 
                                                 
25 “Dress Extravagance in the Olden Days”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 3 May 1918, 14. 
26 “Women’s World: Clothes and the Woman”, Frankston and Somerville Standard, 13 November 
1925, 5. 
27 Nance, “The Home: Standard Dress”, above n 21, 43-44. See above Chapter 6. 
28 “Standard Cloth”, Moree, Gwydir Examiner and General Advertiser, 18 June 1918, 2. 
29 Ibid. 
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industrial fires burning”30 for returned soldiers. She insisted that she wanted to 
eliminate the prejudice against local textiles, and keep prices down by compelling 
Parliament to fix the price of the cloth at the mills.31 She sought to legitimise this 
proposed form of sumptuary intervention by contending that standardisation of dress 
had been successfully adopted as a wartime measure in England, and also in 
America, where Lady Duff-Gordon was supposedly responsible for the successful 
introduction of a form of standardised female costume.32 Beale was severely 
censured by some critics for her proposal.33 In endeavouring to fend off criticism 
about the harshness of this form of state intervention, she argued that, whilst the 
wearing of the standard costume would disclose that the wearer was practising 
economy, the costume itself was in no sense a uniform.34 
It is noteworthy that Commissioner Piddington remained loath to endorse an 
extreme form of social intervention that would require compulsory state action to 
force women to adopt standard uniforms.35 He contended that even under the War 
Precautions Act, he could hardly see the Federal Government “laying down” 36 that 
the State Governments compel their employees to wear certain uniforms.37 
 
 
                                                 
30 “National Economy Campaign”, The Argus, 13 September 1918, 8. 
31 Ibid. 
32 “Standard Costumes: A Woman Advocate”, above n 23. One critic disputed Beale’s suggestion that 
Lady Duff-Gordon had introduced a ‘standard’ dress for women. “I do not know where she got her 
information from”, she said.  It may well be that Beale was referring the ‘apron’ named after Herbert 
Hoover, who was the Head of the US Food Administration in 1917. The apron could overlap in either 
direction and could be worn twice before it became too dirty to wear. It became a popular garment 
during the latter days of the war.  See Linda Przybyszewski, The Lost Art of Dress (Basic Books, 
2014) 4. Hoover also introduced the “Hoover costume” or “uniform”, a patriotic outfit won by women 
who ‘pledged’ to join his Wartime Food Administration which espoused sumptuary food regulation. 
The uniform was of blue chambray and had a pointed collar and cuffs of white pique and a cap of 
white lawn. The uniform” server as “an active signifier of a woman’s commitment to her country… 
and a powerful tool for exerting peer pressure on others.” See Marlis Schweitzer, “Patriotic Acts of 
Consumption: Lucille (Lady Duff Gordon) and the Vaudeville Fashion Show Craze” (2008) 60  
Theatre Journal 607. 
33 “Standard Costumes: A Woman Advocate”, above n 23. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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8.2.2 Women attack tariffs on ‘necessities’ 
 
These kinds of things, gloves, stockings, boots and shoes etc., the prices asked and paid are 
enormous, but to a large number of the community they are almost prohibitive. Goodness 
only knows how mothers of large families feed and clothe their offspring these times.38 
 
After the war, many women became increasingly concerned about the high 
cost of living and the prohibitive tariffs on imported ‘necessary’ items such as food 
and clothing.39 Numerous women’s associations held meetings that specifically 
addressed such issues. Their members were particularly concerned that women 
continued to be omitted from tariff decision-making processes,40 and they frequently 
urged the government to appoint women to those boards that decided issues relating 
to the family budget. 41  
Whilst women were denied the right to formally participate in institutional 
decision-making processes, they were, nevertheless able to exercise some level of 
collective influence over government policy. In 1919-20, there transpired an 
extraordinary instance of female collective revolt against a tariff regime that was 
forcing them to endure increased prices on imported apparel occurred.42 What was 
even more notable was that this example of gendered insurgency specifically targeted 
a masculininst taxing decision-making process from which they were persistently 
excluded.43  
In 1919, the Melbourne branch of the Housewives’ Association met to 
discuss possible solutions to current problems concerning “the prevailing high prices 
for necessary commodities.”44 Members argued that women should have to pay no 
                                                 
38 “General Items”, Western Mail, 12 February 1920, 35. 
39 “Prices and Profits: Women Discard Gloves”, The Argus, 9 October 1920, 21. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 “Housewives’ Boycott”, The Mercury, 13 October 1920, 4. 
43 “Women and the Tariff”, The Mercury, 27 June 1925, 8. 
44 “Influence of Fair Sex on Problems of the Day”, Daily Herald, 15 October 1920, 4. 
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more than “reasonable prices”45 for mere ‘necessities’ such as gloves and stockings, 
particularly at a time when the cost of living was so much higher than it had been six 
years previously.46 The Association freely acknowledged that luxuries were a 
different matter, and that people should expect to pay much more for them.47 
The members resolved, as part their proposed campaign against profiteering 
and the high cost of living, to do without articles of attire that were not “absolutely 
indispensable”48 to them. The Association, as a collective, had had some measure of 
success with previous boycott campaigns in relation to the local price of potatoes49 
and price of shoes.50 The boycott on high-priced shoes, for instance, was effectively 
introduced when some parents in various districts in Melbourne sent their children to 
school barefooted. 51 The aim of such a boycott was to force down prices on essential 
food and clothing: 
They simply boycott the article; the members leaving it severely alone and either do without it, 
or in the cases of resourceful women (and what woman has not this quality who thinks at all?) 
makes a substitute do for the time being.52 
 
In October 1919, the Association decided that the first line of attack was 
against the wearing of gloves.53 At the time, women’s gloves were invested with 
                                                 
45 “General Items”, above n 38. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 “Influence of Fair Sex on Problems of the Day”, above n 44. 
49 It seems that the Housewives Association had adopted a successful policy advocated by the 
Housewives League in the Unites States of America. See “General Items”, above n 38. The boycott 
against the price of potatoes was very effective. The members saw that “the word was passed round” 
and they took off potatoes from the daily “bill of fare”. Pumpkins and Marrows were substituted. (See 
“Producers, Consumers, and Prices”, Northern Star, 20 January 1920, 4.) Not only was there a big 
drop from five pence per pound to twopence per pound for old potatoes and to threepence per pound 
for new potatoes, but the change happened within a short space of time. 
50 “Women to go Gloveless”, The Register, 6 December 1919, 8. In October, “an indignation meeting” 
of the Housewives Association was held at the Sydney Town Hall in protest against the wholesale 
exportation of eggs and other foodstuffs. The mover of the resolution called upon every women to 
revolt by declaring not to bear children until “the men makes this country a safe place to live in by 
seeing they were provided with sufficient supplies of nourishing food at a reasonable price”. See 
“Here, There, and Everywhere”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 15 October 1920, 19. At this 
time, there were other feminine collective campaigns targeting the price of sugar and other essential 
commodities. 
51 “Women to go Gloveless”, above n 50. 
52 “General Items”, above n 38. 
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cultural meaning. They were part of a socially approved form of femininity and 
social custom. They were an ‘essential’ accoutrement for respectable and genteel 
women, and were regarded as a cultural signifier that communicated with other 
women as a part of an idealised form of fashion. An ‘un-gloved’ woman was 
considered by other women to be ‘unladylike’ and in some cases, risqué.  
The Association formally adopted a recommendation that all women should 
wear gloves “as little as possible”54 in an attempt to force down the high price of 
imported gloves.55 Its members were determined to challenge tariff policies that 
targeted what was an ‘essential’ part of feminine dress. They were willing to forgo a 
normative item of cultural feminine apparel to publicly contest the inequity of a tariff 
regime that targeted women’s clothing.56 Gloves, as a gendered item of dress thus 
became invested with political significance and gestured towards women’s desire to 
intrude into the male-dominated public arena. This form of protest was not only a 
sign of defiance but it acted in symbolic opposition to what these women considered 
to be oppressive forms of institutional power. 
In pursuing their ‘fight’ against high prices, the members’ main concern was 
whether they would find sufficient numbers to make their action effective.57 To 
forego the wearing of gloves was not an easy task for many middle class women, 
especially as it was generally acknowledged that “all women loved good gloves and 
boots.”58 Yet, it was decided that if women would sacrifice these things for three 
months, then the country would see the level of their sincerity that underpinned their 
campaign to lower prices.59 
There was an enormous positive response to this new form of gendered direct 
action and self-regulation.60 It was so popular that the women’s section of the Public 
                                                                                                                                          
53 “Influence of Fair Sex on Problems of the Day”, above n 44. 
54 “Women to go Gloveless”, above n 50. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 “Influence of Fair Sex on Problems of the Day”, above n 44. 
58 “Prices and Profits: Women Discard Gloves”, above n 39. 
59 Ibid. 
60 “Price of Gloves: Movement Spreading”, The Daily News, 29 October 1920, 6. 
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Service Association joined the movement.61 The Sydney branch of the Association 
also recommended to its members that they should refuse to wear gloves until “they 
came to a reasonable price.”62 It was reported that ten thousand Sydney women 
resolved to discontinue wearing gloves until the prices came down from “sky-high 
level”.63 The boycott proved to be very successful, and was only lifted in January 
1921 after the prices of gloves had dropped considerably.64 As a result of their 
actions, the Housewives’ Association was considered by some to be a guiding light 
in the fight against profiteering and the high cost of living:65 “[t]he Housewives’ 
Association had struck one of the most serious blows at the high cost of living yet 
struck in Australia.”66 
 However, this gendered boycott encountered criticism from some merchants 
who were concerned that the boycott could adversely affect their own vested 
interests.67 For instance, one “leading Adelaide merchant”68 suggested that only 
“fanatics”69 would support the boycott of gloves, which he contended were 
“absolutely essential to the appearance of a well-dressed lady”.70Another critic 
suggested that to carry out this boycott successfully, women would need “backbone 
and determination.”71 He challenged their tenacity and authority by asking what form 
of retribution could be applied against those “fair ladies”72 who sought to ignore the 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 “General Items”, above n 38. 
63 “Producers, Consumers, and Prices”, above n 49. 
64 “Melbourne Women May Wear Gloves”, National Advocate, 10 January 1921, 3. 
65 “Prices and Profits: Women Discard Gloves”, above n 39. 
66 This is part of speech delivered by Professor Meredith Atkinson to the Housewives Association 
meeting in Melbourne on 8 October 1920. See “Prices and Profits: Women Discard Gloves”, above n 
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significant political achievement. For instance, it was reported that some ladies who saved money by 
not wearing gloves were spending this money on expensive veils for Melbourne Cup functions. 
67 “Gloves Essential”, Gippsland Times, 14 October 1920, 4. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 “Influence of Fair Sex on Problems of the Day”, above n 44. 
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directive or “scab”73 on their sisters.74 The Association had a ready response: those 
women who were disloyal would be “shamed”75 into doing their duty.76 
Following the Association’s successful boycott on the price of gloves, the 
Chairwoman of the Housewives’ Association moved a motion in October 1920 
seeking that the Association demand that women be appointed to all boards and 
commissions that deal with questions affecting the interests of women and 
children.77 However, her demand was dismissed by authorities who considered 
women as economically untrustworthy.78 Moreover, they continued to accuse every 
woman of profligacy and spending “every penny she [could] wring from her 
unfortunate spouse” on dress.79 
 
8.2.3 The move to formal regulation: the Tariff Board and fashion 
 
Crises, strikes, and riots may ruin their thousands, but Dame Fashion ruins her tens of 
thousands!80 
 
In the post-war period, Australian manufacturers continually sought increased 
protection against the barrage of imported fashion clothing, which was designed and 
produced in Europe and America.81 Manufacturers were anxious that they could not 
compete with overseas manufacturers, either in price or in the variety of fabric and 
design, unless they could be provided with a higher enough tariff that would 
guarantee the security of the Australian market.82 
Australian manufacturers were also concerned about the apparent parochial 
prejudice against locally manufactured goods. This prejudice was to some extent 
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78 “Women and the Tariff”, above n 43. 
79 Ibid. 
80 “Victims of Fashion: Industries that suffer through shorn tresses”, Huon Times, 21 August 1928, 4. 
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countered by the proliferation of jingoistic ‘buy Australian-made’ campaigns and 
propaganda slogans established during and after the war.83 Many of these campaigns 
and associated propaganda, although often instigated by masculinist interests, were 
steered by women’s associations and auxiliaries, and were often led by eminent 
social advocates and civil luminaries such as Ruth Beale and Ivy Brookes.84 
It was a time when wages in Australia were reasonably high.85 Some sections 
of society were not only accused of spending “lavishly and ostentatiously”86 but also 
blamed for aggravating “the trouble of poorer people”.87 It was often argued that 
‘thoughtless’ people were making the hardships of those more hard pressed seem 
“bitterer”88 by contrast, by creating a demand for unnecessary and expensive 
clothing.89 Of course, throughout the 1920s, women continued to be the especial 
target for this form of public disparagement and gendered moralising discourse:90 
“[t]here was a tendency to brand as luxuries, and place high duties on, things worn 
by women and children.”91 For instance, in an article in the Advocate in August 
1924, the whole gambit of sumptuary ‘sins’ were laid against contemporary women 
for their “fantastic extravagance …over dress.”92 The author used the text as a 
vehicle to disparage all female consumers; they were branded as shallow, weak, silly, 
vain, capricious, fickle, spendthrift, insincere, flighty, pitiful, vulgar, contemptuous, 
wasteful and reckless.93 The subtext underpinning this gendered invective implied 
that women’s consumption habits were a social disease that was weakening society 
and was in need of intervention or cure:94 
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90 “Feminine Extravagance”, Advocate, 19 August 1924, 2.  
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92 “Feminine Extravagance”, above n 90.  
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Fashion dictates; women follow, with no reason apparent to ordinary observers. It matters 
nothing how hideous the apparel or head-dress may be, how unsuited to slim and stout, small 
and large women - if that ‘deformed thief fashion’ dictated, his decrees will be obeyed.95 
 
In contrast, men in the article were prized for their ‘masculine’ virtues. They 
were portrayed as conservative, rational, careful and measured in their choice of 
clothing.96 The author characterised men as being almost ‘without sin’, and thus 
maintained the traditional paradigm of men being positioned as socially and 
culturally superior to women:97 
Fashions still change in the garments of men, but with so mild an ebb and flow that male vanity 
may be said to have ceased, except in that interesting freak the dude. This fact makes a striking 
contrast to the development of feminine absorption in personal vanity.98 
 
During the 1920s, the fashion/luxury debate continued to excite moral 
censure and to stimulate the sumptuary impulse especially amongst thrift 
campaigners and those concerned with national waste and extravagance. Working 
class female consumers were regularly targeted for sumptuary intervention. They 
were condemned and ridiculed for over-dressing and for wasting both their 
husbands’ and the nation’s resources by indulging in extravagant ‘fashion apparel’.99  
But woman has ears only for Fashion’s latest edict. With admirable courage, fat women make 
themselves look fatter and thin women thinner. So long as it is new and fashionable they are 
satisfied. Tomorrow it will be discarded as old and they will be eagerly awaiting the ephemeral 
new.100 
 
These women were also derided for being ‘unpatriotic’ because they 
eschewed the limited range of Australian-made ‘conservative’ woollen serges and 
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tweeds promoted by Beale, in favour of fashionable imported weaves and fabrics that 
included gabardines, marocain101 and those with fancy checks and stripes.102 
In the 1925 and 1927 Tariff Board apparel hearings, the Board received 
complaints about the capriciousness of Australian women and the manner they were 
‘ruining’ Australian industries.103 Women were blamed for the general depression 
“throughout every branch”104 of the women’s clothing trade, chiefly because they 
were not in the habit of favouring Australian-made clothing.105 It was alleged that the 
future of industries, such as the Australian woollen apparel industry, was in a 
precarious position because fickle fashion-conscious women were demanding 
artificial silks and other ‘chic’ fabrics rather than choosing the less fashionable 
woollen apparel that was currently being produced by Australian manufacturers:106 
At her will the clash of machines is stilled, kings of commerce bemoan a debit balance, new 
factories rise in brick and concrete, tariff walls are capped with a few more bricks, fortunes are 
made and lost on the Stock Exchange. And all because of a woman’s clothes.107 
 
Many of the applicants seeking increased protection insisted that the 
depression in the industry was due to changes in women’s fashion. 108 They pleaded 
that increased level of tariff protection was necessary to protect their industries from 
the importation of cheap clothing.109 They insisted that many Australian factories 
had closed their doors, and workers were put off, because they could not compete 
with the enormous influx of imported apparel from Japan, England and USA.110 
Often their complaints were couched in the same kind of xenophobic and alarmist 
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rhetoric that sumptuary law proponents had adopted in proclaiming their grievances 
about foreign imports in the early modern period: 
So far as Japanese goods are concerned, we have nothing to fear from them in Australia. They 
had their chance during the war, and I defy any honourable member to prove to my satisfaction 
that anything good ever came from Japan. Their productions are the cheapest and the shoddiest 
that have ever come into this country. 111 
 
One witness explained to the Tariff Board in the 1925 Apparel Hearings that, 
“owing to the trend of fashion,”112 Australian women were currently wearing “25 per 
cent less clothing”113 than they had worn three or four years previously, due 
principally to simplicity in fashions .114 This meant that women were wearing 
garments made from only three to four yards of material compared with the six or 
seven yards used for women’s costumes in 1921.115 This comment suggests that 
current women’s fashions were not only affecting the profits of manufacturers but 
were also to be considered to be rather scandalous and immoral. This witness 
suggested that “[t]hat since Eve appeared in Eden never have civilised women been 
more scantily dressed.”116 The same witness predicted that this fashion trend would 
continue to have an ongoing adverse effect on the profits of Australian 
manufacturers.117 Tariff Board member, Herbert Brookes, was concerned about this 
situation and sought qualification from the witness: “[t]here must be limit to that of 
course?”118 he asked. The witness responded: “[o]ut of decency’s sake probably 
there is”.119 In this exchange, both men intimate that women were pushing the 
boundaries of traditional morality towards future social and cultural degeneration. 
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During the same period as the Apparel hearings were conducted, Mr Pratten, 
the Minister of Trade and Customs, reprimanded “many thoughtless women”120 for 
the large importations of apparel, and reproached them for never inquiring into the 
country of origin of their purchases.121 Later, Mrs Eleanor Glencross,122 in an 
exchange with Pratten, again called for the government to appoint a woman to the 
Tariff Board, claiming that “the mere man”123 had given up in despair attempting to 
estimate what it cost a woman to dress.124 Pratten sniped that he thought that “the 
persons most concerned [with the cost of women’s dress] are the husbands, who earn 
the money for the women to spend.”125 
Mrs Glenross advised Pratten that, when the Board considered articles of 
women’s apparel and domestic use, a women’s advice was imperative.126 When 
Pratten challenged her to name some articles that called for a women’s expert advice, 
she immediately responded by saying “corsets.” 127 She reminded him that when the 
Board had considered the tariff on imported corsets, it had to obtain its information 
by “attending a display of mannequins wearing them”.128  
 Pratten indicated that he was rather inclined to believe that if women wanted 
to “do their share of work in connection with the tariff”129 they might start by buying 
Australian-made goods. 130 He even sought to pit woman against woman when he 
counselled the Victorian Housewives’ Association to educate their “denser sisters”131 
into buying Australian–made goods.132 Similarly, he suggested that women could be 
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as effective as any tariff, if they “thought in making their purchases to keep work in 
Australia and encourage Australian goods.”133  
 
8.2.4 The continuing spectre of moral regulation 
 
Some of the worst evils now confronting civilised nations may be laid at the door of the 
feminine craze for indecent dress.134 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the spectre of moral regulation 
continued during the 1920s to hover around discourse regarding women who 
‘followed’ fashion trends.  “Moralists and ecclesiastical authorities”,135 
protectionists, the media and women’s organisations regularly called upon the state, 
and women themselves to initiate some form of corrective action.136 In the media, 
there were frequent pleas for the return of “old-time propriety”137 in women’s mode 
of life and conduct.138 Women were regularly counselled to stop “gadding”139 about 
and keeping late hours.140 Women were instructed to consider the nation’s interests 
and forego their fashionable attire, their artificial silk and cretonne costumes, in 
favour of the plainer and more serviceable Australian woollen garment.141 
It was even suggested that the Parliament should completely prohibit the 
wearing of all imported apparel, and to force Australians to wear only Australian-
made goods.142 However, this particular prohibitive sumptuary proposal was rejected 
by Pratten on the basis that such a proposal would be too difficult to introduce 
because it would need the acquiescence of all State Parliaments.143 Women were 
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constantly being reminded in newspaper articles and parliamentary debates of the 
privations experienced in the war; the need for post war-restraint and for 
‘consideration for others’:144 
The spenders must restrain their desire to spend, must resist the temptation offered by beautiful 
things in the shops and over-full purses. No woman who has a sympathetic nature or an 
understanding mind could appear extravagantly dressed or indulge in expensive amusements in 
these times.145 
 
It was not just male-dominated institutions that called for women to be more 
circumspect in their spending on imported fashion clothing. Women sought to 
closely juxtapose women’s dress and morality. For instance, the women’s section of 
the Victorian Farmer’s Union stirred the sumptuary instinct when it declared that 
morality demanded “a stricter supervision over women’s dress”.146 However, whilst 
modern ‘fashionable’ women were condemned by the clergy, the media and others as 
immoderate, immodest and immoral because of their short or slashed skirts, bare-
arms, low necklines, makeup and silk stockings,147 some changes in women’s 
fashion actually had a positive effect on the economy by stimulating the creation and 
growth of new industries.148 For example, the wearing of shorter skirts was openly 
accredited for the boom in Australian sales of domestically produced coloured and 
‘better class’ hosiery:149 
The fashion of a short skirt has been a blessing to the stocking dealers who have turned out 
such leg wrappings in all the tints of the rainbow, from sun-burst vermillion to moonshine opal 
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… hosiers have run to riotous designs, such as clocks and lace insects, and have made some 
select cobwebby stockings of a gun-metal chiffon that is a sartorial sonata.150 
 
Whilst many condemned women for causing society’s ills in the 1920s, they 
overlooked the fact that the unexpected high level of revenue raised from indirect 
taxation on imported fashion goods was not only welcomed by the Government but it 
ensured that the Government did not have to rely on direct taxation to pay for the 
costs of government.151 Whilst customs revenues had increased “very materially”152 
from £22 597 000 to nearly £31 832 000 in 1926-27, direct taxation, in comparison, 
had shown only a slight increase during the same period.153 
 
8.2.5 Women and the cost of living 
 
Women do not buy for quality: they buy for the sake of fashion, which means higher 
prices.154 
 
Fashionable women were blamed for increased living costs. It was often 
suggested by the media, various Boards of Trade and community organisations, that 
there was an undesirable link between the change in women’s fashion and the 
increasing cost of living.155 For instance, in October 1926, Mr W N Gillies, the 
Chairman of a Board of Trade Clothing Inquiry, maintained that the “rapid change in 
fashion”156 was one of the factors responsible for the high cost of living.157 The 
Board heard evidence from a number of witnesses about the phenomenon of rapidly 
changing fashion. They generally made the observation that fashion seemed to be 
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changing weekly and that ‘fashion apparel’ was becoming more extravagant every 
year.158 Furthermore, it was contended by some witnesses that the general public 
could not be protected financially against these sudden changes or ‘the tyranny of 
fashion’.159  
As usual, women were thought to be beguiled and blinded by fashion, and 
were targeted for sumptuary intervention because of their purported profligacy and 
folly:160 “[t]he [female] consumer is becoming more extravagant every year. Some of 
the expensive flimsy goods did not wear so well as some of the cheaper goods.”161 
Although women were considered to be largely responsible for the rise in the 
importation of luxuries and the resultant high prices for female apparel, patriarchal 
authorities nevertheless continued to deny them the right to participate in the public 
debate about the level of duty which should be imposed upon their own clothing.162 
Instead, women were counselled not to “rush so madly”163 into fashion and to 
manage and contrive their budgets as “cheerfully as possible”.164 They were warned 
that unless they were compliant in their own self-governance, the alternative might 
be that they would be subjected to a strict sumptuary regime; they might even be 
compelled to wear uniforms.165 
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8.2.6 An exemplar: Bobs and Hats 
 
An industry is affected by a change in fashion-in fact not only one but several.166 
 
When the fashionable ‘shingle’ and ‘bob’ were introduced into Australia in 
early 1925, the effect on merchants “was immediate.”167 As Australian women 
quickly began to adopt new hair styles, importers and local manufacturers of hair 
brushes, hairpins and hatpins became increasingly fearful that these radical new hair 
fashions would adversely impact on their businesses.168 By the end of 1925, sales of 
split horn and whalebone brushes was “practically nil.”169 Furthermore, there was no 
indication that women were switching over to other types of brushes,170 particularly 
as these new hair styles took less time to maintain and required fewer, if any, 
hairpins and hatpins:171 “[s]hingled heads knocked out the hairpin industry, on which 
millions of pounds had been spent for patents and plants.”172 
The level of anxiety amongst merchants was extraordinary, and it prompted a 
hasty call for Government intervention.173 By July 1925, the Tariff Board was 
hearing evidence in an application for increased duty on imported hair brushes.174 Mr 
Levy, who opposed the application, denied that importers were responsible for any 
slump which might have taken place in the Australian manufacture of brushes.175 
Instead, he blamed the latest fashion in ladies’ hair dressing.176 Similarly, a 
representative of one English firm of brush makers suggested that the sales of 
hairbrushes had fallen off greatly “since shingled hair had become popular”.177 In 
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contrast, Mr Anderson, an Australian brush manufacturer, insisted that the “bobbed-
hair argument”178 had no real significance because the demand for brushes was still 
sufficient to keep Australian factories employed if there were not excessive 
importation of brushes from overseas.179 
In 1927, Mr Edward Holland raised, as a justification for increased tariffs on 
imported hair brushes, the issue of women’s health before the Tariff Board.180 He 
advised the Board that the new trends in hair fashion had rendered the use of the 
hairbrush almost obsolete.181 Furthermore, he argued, that women’s heads were 
much less healthy because they did not brush their short hair “anything like the 
extent that was necessary when it was long”.182 He claimed that women were instead 
wasting an average of 2/- on a ‘shingle’ at hairdressing salons every three weeks.183 
His evidence gave the impression that the state of women’s health was being ruined 
because of their ‘sin of pride’ and intimated that this sin was in need of a cure.  
The Chairman of the Board, Mr Hall, had similar concerns about the effect on 
women’s health and paternalistically reminded women that their hair ‘required 
brushing’. His comments invoked the metaphor of disease when he suggested that 
the decline in the use of hairbrushes could be the harbinger of ruin and decline. Hall 
warned women that if this national ‘contagious’ ‘malady’ continued, they would 
become “bald like men”.184 Others suggested that the shingle was partly responsible 
for the formation in women of “solar ray blemishes”185 and “actual pre-cancerous 
conditions”.186 It is obvious in the 1920s, just as in other eras, that the sumptuary 
impulse was quickly stimulated whenever the ‘problem’ of women’s fashion was 
debated.  
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Whilst women’s hair fashions had an enormous negative impact on the brush 
industry, it had an even bigger sway on the sale of imported women’s hats, artificial 
flowers and millinery ornaments.187 In 1920/21, the Greene Tariff had increased 
protection for Australian manufacturers of hats, millinery hat ornaments, flowers and 
hairnets.188 However, it proved ineffective in stemming the volume of imported 
millinery that continued to pour into Australia during the 1920s.189 During the 1927 
Tariff Board inquiry into the importation of felt hats, it was contended that the 
increased volume of trade of imported women’s felt hats was directly “susceptible to 
changes in fashions,”190 and particularly to the ‘hair-shingling’ fashion that 
Australian women had adopted in the mid-1920s:191 
The ladies of Australia, for some reason, probably because of the fashion of shingled hair, went 
into in for close fitting felt hats in conformity with the straight lines of their costumes.192 
 
         Her cloche hat sits neatly on a cool, tidy, and hairpin-less shingled head.193 
 
Between 1922 and 1927, the rise of imported felt hats was phenomenal and 
was, according to Frederick Millin of the Retail Traders Association of New South 
Wales, directly related to the ‘dictates of fashion’. 194 In 1922, 1950 dozen wool felt 
hats were imported, with a value of £6 166. By 1927, 74 002 dozen hats, valued at 
£164 635 arrived in Australia.195 At the time, Australian hat manufacturers were 
unable to supply the type of hats that were demanded by Australian women.196 
Women were looking for variety, quality and a greater selection of colours.197 Most 
of the hats popular with Australian women were designed and manufactured in Italy 
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and France.198 From 1925, Italy’s hat trade with Australia had increased by 17 per 
cent and the trade with France had increased by 92 per cent.199 Australian hats were 
regarded by women and merchants as inferior to the imported brands.200 It was said 
that the reason Australian manufacturers were unable to compete with the overseas 
market, was because Australian manufacturers were “most unenterprising”201 and 
“lacked designing ability”.202 
In the early 1920s, there was growing alarm about the increased importation 
of winter and summer headwear from Europe, South America and Asia, as well as 
the ostensible prejudice against the locally made article.203 In 1925, it was predicted 
that the importation of felt hats for winter wear and Javanese and imitation Bankok 
(sic) “hoods”204 for summer wear, would cause a “great deal of unemployment”205 in 
the Australian hat and millinery trades.206 Not only was the extent of importations 
criticised, but the processes, materials and producers were also derided.207 For 
instance, it was reported that the “hoods” were made from Bankok (sic) straw, tree 
shavings, plaited grass and flax and were woven “by mere children”208 in a 
“mysterious water-weaving process”.209 These cheap hoods arrived in bales, “soft 
and shapeless,”210 from Northern Italy, South America, Java and Japan.211 The only 
work remaining for Australian machinists and milliners was to block and trim the 
hats.212 
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In 1925, the Tariff Board heard evidence about the languishing state of the 
Australian women’s hat industry.213 Those in favour of increased protection for the 
Australian hat trade argued that Australian manufacturers could not compete with 
overseas industries, where wages and conditions were far below those in Australia.214 
It was alleged that employees of foreign competitors did not work under an award, 
and that overseas factories used cheap female labour to a greater extent than in 
Australia.215 Furthermore, applicants seeking increased duty claimed that Australian 
manufacturers had invested £1 000 000 in the industry and this investment was at 
dire risk because of the large extent of imported women’s hats.216 Mr G A Carter, 
secretary of the Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union, censured the Tariff 
Board for its lack of intervention and suggested that it was “probably asleep”217 
when allowing such importations.218 He argued that it was the Board’s duty to make 
a public statement on the matter before “hundreds of hands were put off”. 219 
Unfortunately for the Victorian and New South Wales felt hat 
manufacturers’, their application for increased duties on wool and fur and felt hats 
failed.220 The Board’s disinclination to provide further industry assistance was due to 
a large extent to the fact that it had become increasingly critical of, and less 
compelled to strictly adhere to the ‘settled policy of protectionism’. Manufacturers 
could no longer expect the Board to routinely rubber stamp their applications for 
increased protection.221 The Board began to appear more objective in its stance and 
more critical of those industries seeking protection:  
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It meant that applicants for tariff assistance have had to do more than merely ask for 
protection. They have had to present some sort of reasonable case and to bring definite 
evidence before the Board.222 
 
The Board even began to call for balance sheets and other evidence of 
efficient manufacturing processes.223 Moreover, as the Board’s hearings were now 
open to the public, and closely scrutinised by the press and critics of protectionism, it 
seemed that the members were more clearly concerned with the appearance of 
transparency and objectivity in its processes and determinations:224 
The public ventilation of the proceeding was highly educational to the taxpayers, and 
has been largely influential in fomenting the present deep and wide popular 
resentment and distrust with our ‘Settled Policy’.225 
 
 By 1925-26, the Board appeared to be more reluctant to participate in 
protectionist intervention, particularly in cases where it considered that an increase in 
tariff was unwarranted or undeserved.226 The Board became increasingly focused on 
the efficacy of a protectionist policy that seemed to foster unproductivity and 
inefficiencies.  For instance, in the felt hat hearings, the Board decided that it could 
not recommend an increase in duty because the current duty was “sufficiently 
high,”227 and that the trade in both States was in need of reorganisation to cure the 
“excessive”228 internal competition or infighting, which the Board considered was 
“responsible for so many of the factories being unable to get sufficient trade to keep 
them busy”.229 The Board was of the opinion that the locally made hats had not 
reached the standard of the best imported hats.230 The Board  also recommended that 
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the quality and price of locally-made hats could be brought “before the notice of 
Australian users” more prominently,231 if the industry adopted “better selling 
methods”,232 regulated output, increased efficiency and promoted their products 
through an “intensive advertising campaign”. 233 The government was displeased 
with the Board’s refusal to increase protection for hat manufacturers, and its apparent 
‘loss of faith’ in its ‘settled policy’ of protectionism.234 However, after some short 
delay, the Minister of Trade and Customs eventually tabled the Board’s Report and 
its recommendations were adopted by Parliament.235 
During the 1927 felt hat inquiry, the Board was provided with further 
evidence concerning the Australian felt hat industry’s struggle to compete with the 
“hurtful”236 competition from British and Italian Borsalino hats.237  The Board was 
warned that the industry seemed incapable of functioning efficiently, as it was unable 
to coordinate the various opposing interests of nine mills that were, at the time, being 
merged into 2 combines.238 Moreover, each factory, “pitted against one another”,239 
was displeased with the mergers.240 The Board declined to provide any further 
assistance to the industry as it considered that an extra duty on imported hats would 
not be in the interests of the public.241 Furthermore, the Board declared that 
manufacturers’ claims regarding the severe overseas competition had not been 
substantiated, and that Australian manufacturers had not made “the best efforts”242 to 
cater for, and capture, the trade from foreign made articles.243 The Board decided that 
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Australian manufacturers were generally unable to meet the demand, “either in 
variety or quality,”244 of Australian consumers.245 The Board received some support 
from the press: “[w]e do not need an increased tariff: we are spoon-fed enough at 
present. We need more brains and enterprise.”246 The Board, in its 1929 report, again 
refused the request to increase duties on imported hats. The Minister, became even 
more displeased with the Board’s, and declined to table its recommendations for a 
number of months after they had been submitted to him.247 
Other industries associated with the hat trade were also severely affected by 
changes in millinery fashions.248 For instance, the “very peculiar”249 artificial flower 
trade was a fashion trade that was dependent entirely upon the frequent and 
capricious edicts emanating from the fashion centres of Paris, London and New 
York.250  After the sober war years, Australian women had become more interested 
in wearing fashion hats and had no qualm in “follow[ing] the dictates of the creators 
of fashions in those centres”.251 Those Australian importers who supplied milliners 
with flowers, ornaments and trimmings for women’s hats, were especially devastated 
by changes in hair fashions and promptly supported the application for an increased 
tariff on imported felt hats.252 Others considered that there was no future in this 
industry and advised those importers, left with surplus and redundant stock, to 
‘scrap’ their stock and move into a “more profitable occupation”.253 
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In the next part we see that the rhetoric surrounding the regulation of 
imported men’s apparel in Australia during the 1920s was increasingly linked with 
economic rationalism and national interest. The anxieties that triggered the 
sumptuary response were not moral ones but were instead those associated with the 
establishment of internal markets and the fear of ‘cheap’ overseas competition. 
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8.3 Men’s Underwear: a sumptuary impulse sparked by rational 
protectionism  
 
My company is confident that if the proposed duties are granted there will be no shortage of 
underwear, and the price to the consumer will not be increased.254  
 
 
8.3.1 A Poor Man’s Tariff 
 
The public should be able to buy Underwear (sic) at a low price since many working people 
and their families will otherwise be forced to go without it.255 
 
Whilst almost every other form of taxation had been reduced in Australia 
after the end of the war, customs duty had steadily increased.256 In the 1919-20 
financial year, customs revenue was £21 576 559 and by the 1925-26 year it was 
estimated to be about £40 000 000.257  One journalist suggested that the prohibitive 
customs duty on the “necessities of life in the humblest homes”258 was like taking 
“the shirt off a man’s back without his knowing who has taken it”.259 He maintained 
that, not only were the duties on textiles prohibitive, but they kept prices high, and 
made “living difficult”260 for the lower classes.261 
Before the war, most Australian workingmen generally wore imported 
underwear made of fabric called “merino,”262 which was also the trade name for a 
poorer class of article. Traditionally known as “a working man’s article”,263 it was an 
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English-manufactured underwear line either made of pure cotton or containing up to 
ten per cent wool. It attracted no duty and retailed at 2s 11d per garment. 264 These 
garments were serviceable and practical for working men and for others who 
favoured cotton garments. In 1925, one importer told the Tariff Board that these 
‘merino’ garments were “decently smooth”265 garments and similar to those which 
he wore himself, as he was unable to wear wool next to his skin.266 He considered 
them to be “a very nice class of cheap stuff,”267 but lamented that such garments 
were no longer available because of the high tariff on their importation. “These days 
are gone forever” he told the Board.268  
During the war, Australian clothing manufacturers were ‘blessed’ with little 
overseas competition, and they “practically had the whole of the home market to 
themselves”269 for the higher grade lines of underwear. They also enjoyed 
“exceedingly high artificial aid”270 in the form of costly shipping overheads.271 After 
the war, the growth of tariff-assisted Australian manufacturing continued to be 
“phenomenal.”272 The cheap imported underwear then attracted a 25 per cent duty.273 
Despite the growth in locally-made garments, in 1921 Pratten maintained that it was 
essential for Australia to be more economically pragmatic in the face of changing 
global conditions:274 
Now the world is shaking down again … it seems to me that the time has arrived when we 
should consider what out permanent policy with regard to local industries is going to be. 
Notwithstanding the artificial protection during the war, the home industries of Australia are 
not even yet satisfying the requirements of Australian people in many directions. Plenty of 
                                                 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 15 July 1921, 31 (Senator Pratten). 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 October 1921, 40 (Senator 
Pratten). 
273 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 August 1921, 101 (Senator Payne). 
274 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 15 July 1921, 31 (Senator Pratten). 
 
295 
 
room exists for further development, not only in the establishment of new industries, but in the 
multiplication of old ones.275 
 
Pratten became enthusiastically involved in activities to educate Australian 
purchasers “to the merits of the goods made in their own country.”276 As President of 
the Chamber of Manufacturers of New South Wales, he inaugurated the movement 
“All Australian Manufacturers Week”277 that sought to advertise the expansion in 
Australian industries “of all sorts and descriptions,”278 and to promote the adage that 
Australian made goods were the “best”.279 His vision was for all Australian shop 
windows to be full of Australian goods in the not distant future.280 
In 1921, the Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr Massy-Greene, also 
attempted to control the flood of imported underwear by creating a new sub-item in 
the Tariff Schedule that included woven undershirts, combinations and underpants of 
wool, or those that contained wool, or consisted wholly of cotton.281 Greene justified 
this new formal classification on the basis that traders said they found it difficult to 
discriminate between goods made of cotton and those made wholly of wool.282 Mr 
Lazzarini MP dismissed this pretext as “absurd”.283 He pointed out that it was 
inequitable to protect cotton goods in favour of Australian manufacturers to the same 
high level as was afforded to the woollen industry. He argued that protection should 
not be provided until such time that cotton underwear manufacturers were able to 
obtain their raw material in Australia.284 He insisted that there were many parts of 
Australia where garments made wholly of cotton were far more comfortable than 
woollens during the summer months. Furthermore, he argued that in many inland 
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districts, “artisans and labourers”285 found it absolutely necessary to wear cotton 
garments.286 Mr Gregory MP, agreed and suggested that the cotton underwear 
industry should not be built up by spoon-feeding, but instead should be established 
upon “a sound and solid basis.”287 
The underwear debate was so contentious that it even triggered internal 
discord amongst protectionists themselves.  Senator Payne, although a protectionist, 
positioned himself as a champion for the working class consumer. He maintained in 
1921, that the working man had no choice and was compelled to wear imported 
cotton underwear because it was much lower in price than locally manufactured 
‘ordinary natural wool undergarments.’288 He reminded his colleagues that if the 
working man had no alternative but to choose clothing made in other countries other 
than Great Britain, he would be severely penalised because this clothing would 
attract the higher duty of 55%.289 Payne also insisted that such duties were unfair 
because they were ‘class based’,290 and that it was “almost impossible”291 for the 
bulk of the people to clothe themselves with suitable underwear, considering the 
“very high prices”292 that were presently being charged.293 He cited the example of 
the average working man, earning £4 to £4 5s per week, who had a wife and family 
to support, and who had difficulty clothing himself and his family comfortably, 
especially during the winter months.294 Payne suggested that even if the working 
man wanted an all-woollen garment he would expect to pay 50 per cent more than he 
would have normally paid before the war.295 Payne recommended that much lower 
tariff duties be levied upon those lines of imported cotton and light-weight woollen 
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underwear that were currently being manufactured in Australia.296 Whilst he 
acknowledged that such ‘lower’ duties might still represent a “fairly high Tariff”,297 
he considered Greene’s proposal to increase duty on imported underwear from 25% 
to 40%, as more than “he could swallow”.298  
Whilst politicians such as Payne, Gregory and Lazzarini were troubled about 
the impact that a prohibitive tariff would have on the working man, others appeared 
more concerned about Australia’s fiscal position. For instance, the Treasurer, Sir 
Joseph Cook, acutely aware that Treasury would receive “an enormous revenue” 
(sic)299 from Customs duties in 1921 on goods such as men’s underwear, contended 
that Commonwealth revenue would suffer if Australia reduced its Customs duties,.300 
Gregory took issue with Cook, and argued that if the duties were too high, then 
consumers would not be able to buy imported goods, and Cook would then not “get 
any revenue at all from that source”.301 Gregory claimed that whilst he would do 
nothing to injure Australian industries, but wanted to see “fair conditions for the 
people of this country”,302 as well as some assistance for the Motherland, who was 
experiencing severe post-war economic distress.303 
Further tariff increases were demanded in 1925 and 26 by Australian 
manufacturers who insisted that they were unable to compete in the face of the boost 
in imported apparel.304 Protectionists kept asking: “[h]ow are we to build [the 
underwear industry] up if we do not spoon-feed or shovel feed it?”305 Some critics 
maintained that the new 1925/26 tariff was a “rich man’s tariff”306 that victimised the 
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working class even more than the 1921 tariff had done.307 By 1926, the average 
working man, who had been able to previously purchase an undershirt or a pair of 
under-trousers for about 5s or 5s 6d, was “compelled,”308 after the application of new 
tariff rates on imported underwear, to pay anything from 7s 6d to 8s for each item.309 
It was argued that the subsequent increased financial burden would be largely borne 
by working men and their families310 because it focused on “indispensable articles of 
daily and general use.”311 In some cases, the tariff acted as a complete prohibition on 
many of the imported clothing lines purchased by working men, including cotton 
underwear and cotton tweeds.312 Parliament was told that Sydney traders had 
suggested that cheap underwear was “absolutely necessary”313 in the interests of the 
health of the community. They insisted that the public should be able to buy sound 
underwear at a low price314 or otherwise, many working people and their families 
would be forced to “go without these garments”.315  
Some importers suggested that if Australian workers were unable to afford 
the British “commoner grades of stuffs”316 then they would be forced to buy an even 
lower grade article.317 For instance, Sydney Neilson Rice, a representative of the 
Australasian Association of British Manufacturers, warned the Tariff Board that the 
workingman, unable to afford to purchase the cheaper grade of garment made in 
Great Britain or the locally manufactured “better class of underwear,”318 would be 
“forced to purchase the inferior Japanese article.”319 Rice endeavoured to convince 
the Board that if the tariff were increased, it would not act as “a protective duty but a 
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prohibitive duty”.320 Whilst the threat of the Japanese market seemed to be of some 
concern to the Board, it was not a sufficient ground for it to deny the application for 
increased duty.321 
 
8.3.2 Fear about national security and sustainability 
 
I want to see a self-sustained country with manufacturing industries which will furnish us 
with a large variety of occupations capable of keeping men fit, so that they will always be in 
a position to defend our country.322 
 
When endorsing this national protectionist project in Parliamentary debates, 
Pratten and Fenton and other committed protectionists, regularly used language that 
was imbued with traditional sumptuary notions of national independence and 
economic caution.323 Not only did they insist that Australia should be “self-contained 
and self–supporting”,324 by exporting heavily and importing lightly,325  but they 
frequently applied sumptuary tropes when voicing their fears about national security 
and economic ruination.326 There was also periodic anxiety about the need to build 
up Australian secondary industries in order that Australians would be in a position to 
“populate”,327 “defend”328 and “protect”329 their country. By 1921, this anxiety about 
national security and the need to encourage home industry was so palpable that it 
prompted Gregory to declare that Pratten and his cohorts sought to “build a tariff 
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wall around Australia akin to the Great Wall of China.”330 He argued that whilst they 
might preach peace, they in fact desired “a trade war against other countries.”331 Mr 
Killen suggested that this form of “extreme protectionism”332 would not only be 
detrimental to the Australian economy but would diminish Australia’s trade 
reputation:333 
The doggedness of the barrage of ‘buy only Australian-made goods’ 
propaganda which was being promulgated by protectionists during the 1920s even 
overburdened the common man. 334 For instance, Barney O’Mick, in a letter to the 
Editor of The Argus in September 1925, vented his irritation about the dissemination 
of such propaganda by manufacturers and their agents.335 Whilst acknowledging that 
everyone had the desire to be patriotic, he railed at the relentless message that one of 
the “greatest evidences of patriotism”336 was to buy in ‘a dear market’.337 He argued 
that this message was so firmly implanted in Australians that manufacturers, as 
“custodians of patriotism”338 forever sought to make the market dearer in order to 
“improve the quality of our patriotism”.339 For critics such as O’Mick, patriotism did 
pay: it paid the manufacturer.340 
            Others suggested that some members of the opposition, including Senator 
Payne, were actively engaged in a campaign of vilification against Australian-made 
goods.341 Senator Guthrie became affronted when Senator Payne suggested that the 
knitting mills which produced knitted goods, including underwear, were not properly 
equipped and that they turned out goods which wore badly and had a tendency to 
                                                 
330 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 22 November 1927, 97 (Mr Gregory). 
331 Ibid. 
332 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 March 1926, 73 (Mr Killen). 
333 Ibid. 
334 Barney O’Mick, “Does Patriotism Pay?”, Letter to the Editor, The Argus, 19 September 1925, 36. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 March 1926, 56 (Mr 
Blakeley). 
 
301 
 
shrink.342 Guthrie attacked Payne for his loss of faith in the ‘settled’ canon of 
protectionism, and for trying to “wreck”343 the Australian woollen industry.344  
Guthrie insisted that it was “pure humbug”345 to say that these mills were not turning 
out satisfactory articles.346 As a demonstration of his confidence in Australian-made 
apparel, he assured the Chamber that he had worn Australian-made underwear for the 
past four or five years and it had not shrunk.347  
 
8.3.3 The 1925 Tariff Board Apparel Hearings: men’s underwear becomes ‘a 
hot issue’ 
 
Articles of underwear and overwear are brought before the tribunal, and subjected to a 
searching inspection, with the object of ascertaining whether something inferior is not good 
enough for the working class.348 
 
Throughout the 1925 Tariff Board Apparel Hearings, the tariff on men’s 
imported underwear proved to be a significant issue. During these hearings the Board 
heard an application by an Australian underwear manufacturer for an increase in duty 
upon particular brands of imported workingmen’s cotton underwear.349 The Board 
was advised by various witnesses that the cheaper brands of underwear, including 
“Brown Cotton”,350 “Natural Merino”351 and “Balbriggan,”352 were not only popular 
with workingmen because they suited their occupations, but also because they were 
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“within the buying limit of working men’s income.”353 What seems absurd about this 
application was that Australian manufacturers, at the time, were neither producing, 
nor had any desire to produce this lower grade and less profitable class of 
underwear.354 Payne had earlier in 1921 pointed out the injustice of such an 
application. He told Parliament: “[i]t is a wrong attitude to impose a heavy Tariff on 
articles which people need, and must have, and which are not produced in 
Australia.”355 
If this application had proved successful then the Tariff Board would 
effectively be sanctioning an increase in tariff duty, to ostensibly ‘protect’ phantom 
or non-existent Australian manufacturers from overseas competition.356 In reality, the 
tariff on cheap imported men’s underwear was nothing but a purely prohibitive tariff 
and it exhibited all the marks of a sumptuary impost. Whilst it would significantly 
increase revenue, it would also severely affect workingmen because they would be 
no longer able to afford to purchase the cheaper British lower grades of 
underwear.357 
Although the Board heard ample evidence that workingmen had always 
traditionally purchased cheap lines of ‘brown cotton underwear’, its members, as 
‘committed Protectionists’, were determined to explore the issue of whether the 
working classes should be compelled to wear Australian made woollen underwear.358 
During the hearing, Herbert Brookes asked Robert Howard Morgan, a representative 
of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, “how essential”359 the cheaper garments 
were to the workers and whether any “loading up”360 of duty on them would “put 
such garments quite out of the range of working men’s pockets?”361  Brookes was 
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also keen to ascertain if extra duties would “force the working population of 
Australia”362 to use a better class of underwear.363  
However, the evidence presented did not support Brookes’ expectation that 
working men could be compelled to support the Australian underwear industry. 
Rather, it confirmed that working men would not be able to afford the better 
article.364 The extra charges sought by manufacturers would heavily penalise the 
workingman because he would have to “pay a higher price for the … same stuff he 
uses …, or he [would] have to take cheaper articles-[and] getting a poorer quality for 
the same outlay”.365 Nevertheless, Brookes and his fellow Board members ignored 
the evidence and recommended that there should be a significant increase in the tariff 
on imported British cotton underwear, even though Australian underwear 
manufacturers were not producing the cheaper line of underwear favoured by the 
working classes.366  
 
8.3.4 Protection as xenophobia  
 
The cheapest and nastiest labour one could imagine would be producing those goods, and 
we would be using them whilst our own people were turned into hewers of wood and 
drawers of water.367 
 
As already been noted in Chapter 3, the Board, by 1925, was hearing 
complaints from protectionists and manufacturers who were increasingly anxious 
about the increased incursion of foreign goods onto the Australian market. The 1921 
Greene Tariff schedule had proved to be ineffective in allaying this anxiety.368 
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During this period, Protectionism was becoming even more aligned with the 
expression of national duty and pride369 and there was also a corresponding surge in 
sumptuary protectionist rhetoric being uttered in Parliament and in the press.370 One 
protectionist politician declared: 
I am a protectionist because I am Australian, and love my country, because I believe that it is 
infinitely better to have one Australian working for good wages and under decent conditions 
than to have ten Japanese, Chinese, Germans, Frenchmen, Americans, or Britishers (sic) 
working on our behalf in their country. I believe that this is our job, and that no other country 
can do it half so well as we can.371 
 
As noted earlier, nationalistic sentiment continued to be voiced by those who 
feared that a low tariff would bring Australian workers “down to the level of cheap 
labour countries”.372 Whilst fervent protectionists abhorred the influx of all imported 
goods from all sources, there were others who desired to maintain a good trade 
relationship with Great Britain.373  Whereas some strict protectionists and 
manufacturers considered that trade with Great Britain was “dangerous 
competition,”374 there were, on the other hand, some merchants who insisted that 
nothing but good could come from “fair and healthy”375 competition with British 
manufacturers.376 More particularly, these merchants claimed that trade with Britain 
would ensure that the standard of Australian secondary industry would maintain a 
high standard of efficiency and “grade of production”.377  
Imperialists were particularly apprehensive about “cute Japanese”378 
manufacturers who had undercut their Australian counterparts379 because they were 
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“shrewd”380 enough to discover a way to “get around”381 the prohibitive effect of the 
1926 tariff on imported cotton underwear.382 It seems that Japanese manufacturers 
had found a loophole “through which they bought in piece goods knitted in tubular 
form, which only had to be cut into lengths, a few stitches inserted and the finished 
garment was produced.” 383 This fabric attracted much lower duty compared to the 
duty on the finished imported finished article,384 and with the expenditure of a little 
labour, it could be made into underwear in Australia.385 This novel method of 
underwear production caused a drastic effect on Australian underwear 
manufacturers:386  
While the textile Rome was burning, the Government fiddled away in recess … [w]e did not do 
it deliberately but we allowed a loophole which permitted the makers of garments from 
imported material practically to throttle the Australian industry.387 
 
It was even suggested that this tariff loophole388 was the main reason why 
George Bond and Co. Limited, of Sydney, the biggest hosiery and underwear 
spinners and weavers in Australia, went into voluntary liquidation in 1927.389  
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These alarmists contended that, whilst some Australian underwear 
manufacturers might be perturbed about competing with British imports, these 
manufacturers should be even more uneasy about competing with underwear 
manufactured in less ‘desirable’ low-wage countries:390 
Textiles can be produced in Japan and sold on the Australian market at a price with which 
Australians cannot possibly compete. The same remark applies to articles manufactured in 
China, Germany, France, Czecho-Slovakia (sic), and other European countries. We cannot 
compete against those low-wage countries, nor do we desire to do so if it means that our wages 
are to be reduced and our working hours increased.391 
 
 
8.3.5 No voice for the consumer 
 
 Little has been heard of one matter from which much was expected in 1921, namely the 
protection of the consumer where a manufacturer was shown to be taking ‘undue advantage’ 
of the tariff.392 
 
Whilst the Board provided a forum for tariff discussions and determinations, 
there was a noticeable absence in this forum of the person most affected by such 
discussions and determinations: the consumer. This omission was at odds with 
Hughes’ 1919 election promise, when he undertook that the Board would be 
established to provide a protective tariff, “coupled with security for the 
consumer”.393 Hughes insisted that the Board would be “charged with the duty of 
protecting the consumer”394 against manufacturers who might make use of the tariff 
to exact unduly high prices.395 Yet, in its early determinations, there was no evidence 
                                                 
390 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 March 1926, 56 (Mr 
Blakeley). 
391 Ibid. 
392 Mills, above n 222, 77. 
393 Ibid 59. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
 
307 
 
that the Board, took the interests of the consumer into consideration when it decided 
to increase the tariff on many imported items of apparel. 
Mr Duncan-Hughes MP argued that “very few people ever appear to think of 
the consumer.”396 He told the House that he was surprised that some members had 
not risen to “say a word for [the consumer]”.397 “Surely he has rights as well as the 
manufacturer and the primary producer”, he asked.398 Furthermore, he argued that he 
saw no compensating advantage in the future for the additional prices that the 
majority of the people would have to pay for cotton goods.399 Robert Howard 
Morgan made a similar comment when giving evidence before the Tariff Board on 1 
June 1925.400 Morgan noted that no evidence had been given “on behalf of the 
consumers”401 who, he said, were the people who were principally affected by any 
tariff increase.402 He told the Board that he was disappointed that there was no 
representation by retail distributors, who he believed were “nearer to the public”403 
than anyone else.404 He maintained that if evidence from distributors had been 
available, it “should undoubtedly be very helpful to the Board”405 about the effect 
that such an increase would have on consumers.406 Morgan nonchalantly explained 
to the Board, that the whole of his evidence was being given solely “to help the 
Board in coming to a decision over a very big question which is under inquiry”.407 
He contended that distributors, whether wholesale or retail, had “nothing to lose or 
                                                 
396 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 March 1926, 93 (Mr 
Duncan-Hughes). 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Commonwealth Tariff Board, ‘Apparel Hearings’ (Report, 1 June 1925) (Robert Howard Morgan).  
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid. 
 
308 
 
gain”408 by any increase in tariff duties on imported underwear, for the duties were 
passed on to the consumers “at a profit”:409 
We wholesale people really do not care twopence what the duty is. It does not make any 
difference to us because we merely pass it on. That is recognised in respect of both wholesale 
and retail distribution.410 
 
Morgan contended that the only people who would be affected by the 
increase in duty were those poorer consumers: 
whose circumstances will not permit [them] to buy the higher quality pure wool article, and 
who purchased merino-that is a garment containing less than ten per cent of wool.411 
 
Pratten sternly warned manufacturers during a discussion about the new tariff 
schedule in the early part of 1926, that “no shrift”412 would be given by the 
Government to those industries which unnecessarily raised their prices to consumers. 
However, for critics such as R C Mills, this warning was a hollow one for he 
maintained that the issue of consumer protection would, as far as he was concerned, 
continue to remain a “dead letter”.413 
In the 1926 Debates, the issue about the inappropriateness of woollen 
underwear in tropical climates was again raised.414 Senator Guthrie, advocated that 
the Commonwealth government should force all Australians to support the 
Australian woollen industry by compelling them to wear only woollen overwear and 
underwear garments, regardless of the climatic conditions which they experienced.415 
Senator Payne dismissed this demand, and declared that anyone favouring this 
attitude was likely to be regarded as a “real autocrat”.416 He argued that people must 
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have “light material”417 during certain periods of the year and, in some parts of 
Australia, throughout the whole year.418 
Payne, a Tasmanian, tried to impress upon his Victorian colleagues that the 
climate in Queensland was very different from that of Victoria.419 He maintained that 
a man in Queensland “would not attempt to wear the heavy garments that are 
required in the southern part of Australia.”420 Furthermore, he contended that the 
imposition of additional duty on underwear which was especially made for hotter 
climates, would not protect any industry, and would be purely a revenue 
duty.421During the debates there was much discussion about the extra duty imposed 
upon cotton singlets, which were especially made to suit residents in tropical and 
subtropical regions of Australia.422 It seems that the only reason these singlets 
attracted increased duty was because they were bound round the neck with a binding 
of ‘special material’ containing a little silk.423 Silk was, of course, traditionally 
considered to be a luxury fabric and constantly attracted sumptuary attention.424 
Payne claimed that this extra duty was an “unjust imposition”425 as it meant that 
workers were called upon to pay an additional 3s to 4s for this class of undervest.426 
Payne suggested that the addition of the silk binding gave a “nicer appearance”427 to 
the singlets, than if they had been made of cotton.428 Moreover, he argued that it was 
not the intention of Parliament to “penalize”429 the wearers of cotton garments by 
making them pay the heavier duty imposed on silk or woollen garments, “simply 
because the tape on the neck of a garment contain[ed] a little silk”.430 He maintained 
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that the imposition of this additional duty did not protect any Australian industry but 
was, in fact, only a revenue raiser.431  
             
 
Why therefore any increased protection is a mystery, except that some of the Victorian 
companies have pleaded to the Tariff Board for more baksheesh.432 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
By the 1920s, the quantity of various types of imported apparel had increased 
enormously and the presence of sumptuary impulse was still manifestly apparent in 
the vigorous attempts by protectionists to suppress the importation of such goods. At 
the same time, it appeared that the sumptuary focus was shifting from a moralising 
critique of luxury and extravagance to a protectionist discourse that focused on the 
well-being of the national economy. However, this chapter demonstrates that whilst 
excessive consumption of imported goods, including men’s underwear and women’s 
felt hats, was increasingly linked with economic protectionism and national interest, 
there still remained some threads of sumptuary moralisation intertwined with tariff 
discourse. What is apparent in this chapter is that this form of sumptuary 
moralisation was more markedly evident in discourses associated with women and 
‘fashionable apparel’.  
Chapter 9 considers the rise of two iconic Australian industries in the 1920s 
and continues to follow the shift in the sumptuary focus from a moralising critique of 
luxury to one that had an increasing emphasis on economic interests and national 
well-being. 
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9 A STRONG SHIFT TO A RATIONAL  FORM OF PROTECTIONISM   
 
Much money was spent by Protectionist organizations in propaganda and continual 
repetition of catch cries in appeal to the public to protect local industries-whether efficient 
or not-on presumably patriotic grounds.1 
 
9.1 Purpose and structure of this chapter 
 
This chapter will examine the manner in which sumptuary regulation 
manifested itself through prohibitive tariffs on imported hosiery and corsetry during 
the war period and early 1920s. This chapter will explore how economic concerns 
and national interest lay behind a more rational economic form of sumptuary 
regulation that developed during this period into a conscious promotion of local 
industries and an active discouragement of foreign imported goods. This new 
“eruption”2 of sumptuary regulation was one where the sumptuary ethic was focused 
more on economic regulation than on moral regulation. The moralising tones that 
accompanied discourse on luxury and women’s fashion were in these instance were 
subsiding and were being replaced with discourses of nationalism mixed with 
mercantilist preoccupations. 
The chapter specifically explores the establishment of two iconic industries: 
the hosiery and corsetry industries that were  managed by George Bond and Frank 
Burley, two ‘new-age’ businessmen, who had keenly embraced the unexpected 
opportunities opened up by the war. This chapter will also demonstrate how the 
government and the Tariff Board, as the “institutional voice of protectionism”,3 were 
both committed to protectionism, often to the detriment of the consumer. They 
                                                 
1 ‘Too Much Protection’, The Register, 14 February 1925, 10. 
2 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press, 
1996) 357. 
3 F Castles, Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988) 94. 
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considered that a high Tariff on imported apparel was essential to encourage and 
support emerging secondary industries and maintained that strong domestic industry 
underpinned the government’s plan to make Australia more independent and 
prosperous. They recognised that Australian manufacturers were working under 
difficult trading conditions that were peculiar to Australia, and that these conditions 
placed Australian manufacturers at a disadvantage so far as competition with 
imported goods was concerned.  
This chapter will also expose the presumptuous demands of many prospective 
manufacturers such as Burley and Bond who insisted that the government 
‘guarantee’ sumptuary protection for their industries even before they commenced 
production and before they had proved that they were ‘capable’ of satisfying the ever 
increasing Australian demand for corsetry and hosiery respectively. It was not 
surprising that an ‘avowedly protectionist’ government and a compliant Tariff Board 
both readily acceded to these manufacturers’ demands for such pre-emptive 
protection. They eagerly accepted submissions from these ‘heroic and courageous’ 
manufacturers that the newly-established hosiery and corsetry industries were 
‘entitled’ to absolute protection because they were industries necessary for the 
economic growth of the country. It was readily acknowledged that each venture had 
the potential to be “one of the greatest of Australia’s secondary industries.”4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Commonwealth Tariff Board, ‘Report and Recommendations on Socks and Stockings’ (Report, 
September 1925) 1. 
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9.2 Early Australian Hosiery Manufacturers: demand protection    
 
Some Australian manufacturers at present are having a ‘rough spin’ both in hosiery and in 
other woollen manufactured goods because material is being dumped in at prices which … is 
below what we know it has cost to manufacture in England.5 
 
As seen in Chapter 4, before the war, imported socks were considered a 
luxury because of the prohibitive tariffs imposed upon them.6 Whilst importations of 
hosiery continued throughout the war, they fell off quite dramatically by 1917-18 
because of the Trading with the Enemy Acts 1914-16 (Cth)  and with problems with 
transport and increasingly high tariffs.7 During the war years, tariffs on hosiery had 
become even more exorbitant than before, despite Australian hosiery factories 
fulfilling only a small portion of the country’s demands for these goods.8 Whilst 
manufacturers were extending their factories and substantially benefiting “by the 
abnormal conditions arising out of the war”,9 there were still only a small number of 
hosiery factories in Australia. Most of these were small concerns employing only 
about five to ten persons.10 In New South Wales, there were nine “establishments”11 
manufacturing knitted goods and hosiery, and these employed only a total of 371 
workers.12 Even though consumers in New South Wales was buying up to £301 166 
                                                 
5 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 October 1922, 62 (Senator Guthrie). 
6 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 February 1908, 27 (Senator Findley). 
7 Prices Investigations Committee, ‘Clothing’ (Report No 11, Inter-State Commission of Australia, 
1918) 39. The value of imported hosiery and knitting (sic) apparel from United Kingdom in 1916-17 
was £304 487 but this dropped to £103 219 in 1917-18. There were similar reductions in importations 
in goods from Japan (£138 794 to £39 935), United States of America (£116 066 to £38 122) and 
Switzerland (£41 116 to £6 970). The total value of these goods had dropped from £624 539 in 1916-
17 to £196 420 in 1917-18.  
8 Ibid 40. 
9 “Our Chance: More About Woollens”, Barrier Miner, 26 September 1914, 2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. Six of these establishments employed an aggregate of 91, whilst the other three employed an 
aggregate of 283 workers. 
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worth of imported socks and stockings, its hosiery and knitted goods industry was 
only paying out £16 226 in wages and £2 202 in salaries.13 
 
9.2.1 A new war industry 
 
The manufacture of hosiery in Australia might well be classed as a war industry. Previously 
to that it was infinitesimal.14 
 
Most socks and stockings worn by Australians in the pre-war period were 
ready-made and came from the United Kingdom and Germany.15 Before 1914, 
Germany had developed a profitable hosiery market within Australia.16 In 1912, 
Australia imported £549 446 worth of silk, woollen and cotton socks and stockings 
from the United Kingdom and £193 390 worth of similar hosiery from Germany.17 In 
particular, German hosiery manufacturers supplied £158 029 of the cotton socks that 
were so popular with working-class Australians.18 It was anticipated that, ‘but for the 
outbreak of the war’, German manufacturers would have eventually established and 
expanded hosiery factories within Australia to purposely avoid the incidence of the 
high Australian tariff on hosiery items.19  
The press was quick to counsel Australian manufacturers that the wartime 
prohibition of the trade in ‘enemy’ imported goods could be turned to an advantage: 
they could enlarge their factories20 and thus corner the market in hosiery sales.21 
Besides, it was predicted that the industry could provide “clean, healthy employment 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 “The Tariff : Slow Progress”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 May 1921, 13. 
15 “Our Chance: More About Woollens”, above n 9, 2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. Australia was “very far” from being Germany’s sole customer. Germany “ had a great export 
trade to other parts of the world in cotton socks and stockings.” The reporter suggests that Britain 
“would be out” to capture those markets. 
20 Ibid. The reporter suggested that the Australian stocking factories “we want, must be bigger” than 
those which employed 5-10 persons. 
21 Ibid. 
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for female labour.”22 Both the press and manufacturers were confident that Australia 
would ‘eventually’ be in a far better position than Germany had been in to 
manufacture cotton goods such as stockings.23 At the same time, they were actively 
coveting German “ocean possessions”24 such as Samoa, which Australia might “hope 
to keep after [her] conquest of them.”25 It was proposed that if there were such an 
acquisition, that the whole cotton sock industry, “from the cotton field to the 
salesman,”26 could then exist independently within Australian territories.27  
This scheme appeared expedient at the time, as the leading hosiery 
manufacturers in Leicester and Nottingham were unable to fulfil orders for shipment 
to Australia because of the pressure of an enormous local demand.28 Moreover, it 
was suggested in 1920, that there was no reason why the Australian cotton industry, 
with proper cultivation and management, “should not be in a flourishing position in 
Australia in the near future.”29 To achieve these goals a propaganda campaign was 
recommended to promote the growing of cotton in Australia:30 
What is needed is a propaganda (sic), not a mere Gazette notice of the offer of the Government. 
The people of Australia, particularly those living in localities suitable for growing cotton, 
should be told that the Government are ready to stand behind them in any effort to grow 
cotton.31 
 
                                                 
22 “The Tariff: Commission’s Report”, The Maitland Daily Mercury, 1 July 1915, 7. 
23 “Our Chance: More About Woollens”, above n 9. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Hosiery Scarce: British Mills Cannot Supply”, The Argus, 9 July 1920, 6. 
29 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 March 1920, 11 (Senator Foll). There had been 
a cotton industry in Queensland at the time of the Civil War in America. During this period  Australia 
was called upon “to help make good the world’s shortage”. When the Civil War was over, the price of 
labour fell considerably and “coloured labour” was called upon for the greater part of the work. See 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 May 1920, 45 (Mr Corser).  
30 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 March 1920, 107 (Mr 
Fenton). 
31 Ibid. 
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Of course, securing labour was a problem. 32 Whilst some politicians were 
not deterred by the “old idea that cotton growing is a black labour industry,”33 others 
realised that it was not the growing of cotton that was the trouble, but, rather the 
gathering of it.34 However, despite insistent rhetoric from the press that there were 
‘potential’ opportunities to establish a ‘holistic’ cotton industry in rural areas 
favoured with good soils and a good cotton-growing climate, Parliament was advised 
by the Inter-State Commission in 1915 that no amount of assistance, whether by 
bounties or by import duties could possibly lead to “any reasonable development of 
this industry in Australia.”35 The Commission stressed that a cotton industry was not 
viable in Australia until the invention of a “successful picking machine”36 could 
overcome the cost and difficulties with hand picking.37 
Hosiery manufacturers were also keen to increase the production of woollen 
hosiery, especially as Australia was so well endowed with the ‘raw materials’, and 
because, in some cases, they already had the necessary machinery to cater for aspects 
of its production and distribution.38 But this was not enough for some manufacturers: 
“we want more [protection]”39 was the persistent catch cry that continually echoed 
through the corridors of Parliament40 and in evidence presented to the Commission.41  
 
 
                                                 
32 Ibid 107 (Mr Bowden). 
33 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 March 1920, 10 (Senator Foll). Foll pointed 
out to Parliament that “in America today the most satisfactory results have been obtained from cotton 
growing carried out entirely by white labour.” In 1916 it had been suggested that child slaves were 
used in the woollen industry in the United States, and this  cheapened the production of goods which 
could be dumped into Australia. See “The Textile Industry: Higher Duties Asked”, Weekly Times, 6 
May 1916, 34. 
34 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 March 1920, 10 (Senator Rowell) (emphasis 
added). 
35 “New Industries: And Old Ones Capable of Expansion”, Daily Herald, 30 November 1915, 3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 “Our Chance: More About Woollens”, above n 9, 2. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 “Claims for Tariff Help” Wire Rope, Socks, and Cement”, Geelong Advertiser, 18 November 1914, 
4. 
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9.2.2 Increased importation of hosiery 
 
Notwithstanding the impetus given to this industry during the war, and by the protection 
under this Tariff, we have imported into Australia during the past nine months no less than 
£2 368 000 worth of hosiery.42 
 
Despite these ambitious wartime plans to enlarge the Australian cotton 
hosiery industry in Australia, little advancement occurred for many years43 because 
of the difficulty with obtaining the necessary machinery to produce such hosiery. In 
the meantime, the tariff duty on imported cotton socks and stockings became “almost 
prohibitive”.44  Mr Tudor MP, a former Minister of Trade and Customs45 who had 
had experience in the cotton industry,46  advised Parliament in 1920 that it was 
impossible to get machinery for the manufacture of hosiery47 because overseas 
engineering firms were attempting to fulfil orders to replace machinery that had been 
destroyed in the war.48 Although Tudor supported protectionism, he objected to the 
proposed duty on cotton hosiery lines that were not even being manufactured in 
Australia.49  
                                                 
42 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 1921, 19 (Mr Greene). 
43 “Hosiery and Knitted Goods for All”, The Argus, 22 September 1937, 34. In 1937, it was stated 
that, by the end of the war, there were 68 knitting and hosiery factories in Australia with a total of 2 
176 employees.  
44 “The Tariff: Higher Duties Imposed”, The Argus, 25 March 1920, 7. The price of cotton hose had 
advanced in price from its pre-war price of about 15/ a dozen to 72/. The price of silk anklets hose had 
risen from 16/ to 84/- per dozen. However, because of the current enormous demand for these goods, 
it was suggested that a “substantial increase’ in price appeared inevitable. See “Hosiery Scarce: 
British Mills Cannot Supply”, above n 28. 
45 Tudor was in this position from 1908-09, 1910-13 and 1914-16. 
46 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 July 1920, 139 (Mr Tudor). 
Tudor advised Parliament that he had been employed “in connexion with the cotton industry in 
England for four years”. 
47 Ibid 138 (Mr Tudor). 
48 Ibid 138, 140 (Mr Tudor). It appears that the Institute of Science and Industry (later called CSIRO), 
which was set up in the 1920s, had “nearly invented a machine for picking cotton”.  
49 Ibid 139 (Mr Tudor). 
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Whilst some hosiery manufacturers, especially Bonds50 may have been 
actively proclaiming their message to some Parliamentarians  that they were capable 
of producing a large amount of cotton hosiery, they were at the time only  producing 
a small number of samples that they touted around to interested politicians.51 Senator 
Payne was so aghast at the colour of one sample that he exclaimed to the Chamber: 
“[t]he colour is execrable”.52 Despite the manufacture and circulation of these 
samples, it seems that local manufacturers had not yet “got into the wholesale 
market:”53 
They claim they can now produce a certain output of cotton hosiery, that is socks and 
stockings, but where are the visible signs of its attempted completion in the local markets, in 
view of their statement that they can turn out 42 000 pairs weekly? Their advertisements do not 
mention cotton socks or stockings. Why do they not utilise the yarn they state they have on 
hand and begin operations at once, instead of contenting themselves with an assertion that 
‘they can produce’ not ‘they do produce’?54 
 
Even though it was obvious to many, including Tudor and Gregory, that the 
cotton hosiery manufacturing industry had “not got much beyond the sample 
stage”,55 George Bond would not going abandon his demand for full protection 
without a fight. He publicly berated Tudor for providing an ‘incorrect inference’ to 
                                                 
50 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 August 1921, 161 (Senator Russell). It seems 
that the firm known as Hughes and Mayor of Sydney also intended to manufacture cotton hosiery. 
Senator Russell says that Fay and Gibson made 40 000 dozen pairs of cotton hose during 1919. Other 
Victorian firms which were supposed to be engaged in manufacturing cotton hosiery included Lincoln 
Knitting Mills and L H Mellor and Company. The writer has found nothing to collaborate these 
assertions. It was more likely that these factories considered that they could produce cotton hosiery if 
given sufficient tariff protection. The Bond’s Redfern hosiery factory was later referred as “the 
pioneer” of the hosiery industry. See “Hosiery and Knitted Goods for all”, above n 43. 
51 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 1921, 17 (Mr 
Gregory). See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 August 1921, 161 (Senator Payne) 
(emphasis added). 
52 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 August 1921, 161 (Senator Payne). 
53 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 1921, 17 (Mr 
Gregory). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1921, 125 (Mr 
Gregory). 
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Parliament that cotton hose could not be made in Australia.56 He even delivered a 
sample pair of cotton hose, made at his mills in Redfern, to sympathetic 
parliamentarians, as “practical proof”57 that such Tudor’s inference was “absolutely 
and unreservedly untrue”.58 Furthermore, he vowed that his machinery was suitable 
to economically and efficiently produce cotton hose. He explained that he had only 
desisted from commencing production because of the “huge quantities of cotton 
(imported from Japan and The United States of America)”59  that were in bond and in 
warehouses at the time.60 He complained that the market for this class of goods was 
being “greatly over supplied.”61  
Bond claimed that his company had, ‘in good faith’, invested over £3 000 000 
in hosiery production within Australia with an expectation that the proposed new 
Tariff would give his business protection.62 He sought to sway parliamentarians by 
proclaiming that his new factory in Redfern employed 300 hands and that additional 
buildings were currently being erected.63 He warned Parliament that if the protective 
tariff was removed, then Australia would become the dumping ground for “foreign-
made hosiery.”64 Moreover, he maintained that this would not only have an adverse 
impact on his expansion of operations and cause the loss of employment to “some 
hundreds of Australian men and women,”65 but it would also seriously jeopardise 
national security.66  
Bond had many supporters in Parliament and they were all clearly impressed 
with his vision to establish a cotton hosiery industry in Australia.67 Some even 
                                                 
56 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 1921, 18 (Mr 
Charlton). Mr Charlton read a letter in Parliament from Bond addressed to Mr Tudor. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. Bond stated that “unfortunately, work on the extensions had been held up pending the outcome 
of the current tariff discussions and the possibility of importing interests prevailing. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1921, 125 (Mr Riley). 
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accepted his invitation to visit his new factory at Redfern.68 Later, they 
enthusiastically praised Bond for his commercial acumen and insisted that Bond and 
other Australian hosiery manufacturers could produce cotton hosiery “much cheaper 
than the imported article.”69 Furthermore, they suggested that “if sufficient 
inducement”70 were provided to Bond and other hosiery manufacturers, they would 
be in a better position grow their own cotton to manufacture hosiery.71 In contrast, 
Senator Payne, after visiting hosiery factories, concluded that Australian hosiery 
manufacturers had not reached the stage at which “it pays to make cotton hosiery”.72  
 
9.2.3 Resisting the sumptuary directive 
 
Payne and Tudor were part of a small group of parliamentarians who were 
concerned about the right of the consumer to choose apparel that was affordable or 
suitable to his/her needs.  Payne explained to protectionist Senators that there was a 
fairly large quantity of cotton hosiery in bond because “a great many people find it 
necessary to wear it”73 for economical and health reasons.74 He pointed out that the 
foot “is perhaps the most sensitive portion of a man’s anatomy”75 and many men 
could not wear worsted or woollen socks.76 Others, he said, could not wear cotton 
socks.77 Moreover, he suggested that the proposed prohibitive tariffs on imported 
cotton hosiery would force everyone in Australia to wear woollen or Australian-
                                                 
68 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 1921, 20 (Mr 
Charlton). At least two members of Parliament inspected the factory. It appears that Senator Payne 
might have visited Bonds or some other similar establishment and was impressed with the range of 
silk hosiery being produced there. When he asked to see samples of Australian-made cotton hose, the 
manager told him that they did not have any and that “we can make them, but there is no demand for 
them”. He noticed that they had no cotton hosiery in stock. Further, he was told that they had such a 
demand for cashmere and silk hose that the factory was not making any cotton goods. 
69 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1921, 125 (Mr Riley). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 November 1921, 77 (Senator Payne). 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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made silk (artificial or real) hosiery.78 In Chapter 8, we see that Payne expresses 
similar concerns about the prescriptive nature of prohibitive tariffs on workingmen’s 
underwear. 
Tudor contended that, in certain parts of northern Australia woollen hosiery 
could not be worn.79 Whilst he saw no problem imposing an extra duty on silk 
stockings, which were considered by most to be a luxury, he couldn’t accept that 
women would wear “merino hosiery.”80  
 
9.2.4 A new Greene Tariff expecting to ‘dam’ the flood of imported hosiery 
 
If we are protectionists let us give protection.81 
 
By July 1920, there had been a marked increase in the value of imported 
hosiery in comparison for the same month in 1919. Socks and stockings had 
advanced from £185 978 in July 1919 to £235 557 for July 1920.82 The new Greene 
Tariff proposed to target socks and stockings in an extremely prohibitive manner 
even though only 5% of the supply of socks and stockings was made in Australia and 
that “practically the whole of the remainder [came] from the British mills.”83 
Formerly, these cotton items had been duty-free under the British preferential tariff, 
but  imported English cotton hosiery was to become dutiable at 30%, whilst 45% was 
to be imposed against other foreign imports.84 Greene continued to maintain that the 
cotton hosiery industry was “peculiarly adapted to establishments in country 
                                                 
78 Ibid (emphasis added). 
79 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 July 1920, 138 (Mr Tudor). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 August 1925, 132 (Mr 
Riley). 
82 “Imports Increase: Australia’s Trade grows”, Daily Herald, 21 September 1920, 3. The total 
imports for July 1920 was £12 864 915 as compared to £7 321 562 for July 1919. 
83 “Hosiery Scarce: British Mills Cannot Supply”, above n 28, 6. It is notable that by 1920, George 
Bond’s hosiery/underwear manufacturing business was flourishing. During the war, he had set up his 
hosiery manufacturing business in Redfern. However, whether Bond and other hosiery manufacturers 
had been successful in lobbying for this early massive increase in tariffs on hosiery is pure conjecture. 
84 “The Tariff: Higher Duties Imposed”, above n 44, 7. 
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districts”85 and that there was no reason why 90% of the country towns should not 
have their own mills supplying the requirements of the districts.86 He repeatedly 
vowed that plant was not costly and the manufacture was simple.87 
It was not just cotton hosiery that was problematic for politicians and the 
population. There been an “enormous rise”88 in the price of Australian-made hosiery 
and the Australian woollen hosiery factories were unable to keep up with demand.89 
Moreover, much of the woollen hosiery produced in Australia was often considered 
to be below standard.90 For instance, Mrs Glencross, the Chairwoman of the 
Housewives Association, claimed that frequently “purchasers found that a pair of 
stockings would come in two at the first time of wearing”.91 Nevertheless, it was 
proposed that the duty on English woollen socks and stocking be raised from 25% to 
35% and that the duty on ‘foreign’ woollen hosiery be raised from 30% to 50%.92 
Despite these proposed increases, the demand for British-made socks and stockings 
continued to be so great that the leading manufacturers in Leicester and Nottingham 
were unable to fulfil orders for shipment to Australia.93 The situation was so dire for 
the ordinary housewife, that Mrs Glencross suggested at a National Housewives 
Association Conference that the duty on woollen stockings should be suspended 
“until the [Australian] manufacturing plants were improved”.94 
After the war, there was an enormous dissatisfaction amongst politicians 
about the fact that Australia was exporting 95% of its wool crop overseas and 
                                                 
85 “Tariff Debate: Stockings’ Importation”, The Daily News, 30 May 1921, 7. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 “Housewives in Conference: Australian-Made Stockings and Socks”, Northern Star, 19 October 
1920, 2. 
89 The value of imported woollen socks and stockings in 1920-21 was £604 477.The 34 woollen mills 
in Australia were highly profitable. In 1920-2, there were 9 mills in New South Wales employing 
1650 hands; 9 mills in Victoria employing 3343 hands; 2 mills in Queensland; 2 mills in South 
Australia; 4 mills in Tasmania. There were 33 hosiery and knitting factories in New South Wales and 
115 in Victoria. The total output of Australian woollen mills during this period was £2 888 172. See 
“Woollen Mills: Australia’s Opportunity”, The Brisbane Courier, 7 November 1922, 8. 
90 “Housewives in Conference: Australian-Made Stockings and Socks”, above n 88. 
91 Ibid. 
92 “The Tariff: Higher Duties Imposed”, above n 44. 
93 “Hosiery Scarce: British Mills Cannot Supply”, above n 28. 
94 “Housewives in Conference: Australian-Made Stockings and Socks”, above n 88. 
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“bringing it back again in the shape of underwear, hosiery, jerseys, and cloth.95 They 
argued that Australia “should see that all the wool that can be used in Australia is 
made up here”.96 Tudor considered that this type of ‘tariff tussle’ was detrimental to 
the Australian working class:97 
It is no wonder that there is so much industrial unrest when people realize that articles 
manufactured from raw material which we produce are constantly increasing in price. Instead 
of the position improving it is becoming worse.98 
 
Nevertheless, many protectionists including Sir Robert Best continued to 
demand that high tariffs be imposed upon imported cotton hosiery.99 Best argued that 
he wished to give his fullest support in encouraging “our own industries”100 and to 
encourage, “so far as we may,”101 the wearing of woollen hosiery in Australia.102 
Tudor disagreed, and reasoned that it was useless to place a duty on cotton hosiery 
“in order to compel people to wear woollen hosiery.”103  
During 1921 tariff schedule debates, Greene announced that he was 
‘staggered’ to see the “enormous”104 current level of imported hosiery.105 Despite the 
provision of earlier protection for the Australian hosiery industry,106 in the nine 
months up to May 1921, £2 358 000 worth of mostly cotton hosiery was imported 
and there was £500 000 worth of cotton socks in bond.107 Furthermore, Greene was 
                                                 
95 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 April 1920, 34 (Mr Tudor). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 2 September 1920, 41 (Senator Payne). 
98 Ibid. 
99 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 1921, 21 (Sir Robert 
Best). 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 July 1920, 138 (Mr Tudor). 
104 “Federal Parliament: The Tariff”, Daily Herald, 28 May 1921, 5. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 “Tariff Debate: Stockings’ Importation”, above n 85. In other reports, it was contended that the 
importation of cotton socks and stockings in 1919-20 was valued at £632 682, of which goods to the 
value of £201 608 were dutiable under the United Kingdom tariff, and goods to the value of £420 810 
were dutiable under the general tariff. See “Senate Powers: The Tariff”, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 
July 1921, 12. 
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perturbed that the charges for the importation and distribution of such imported 
hosiery had reached a level “that was entirely unwarranted,”108 especially 
considering that he believed that the industry was one that could easily be adapted to 
Australia.109 Nevertheless, Greene remained hopeful that Australian manufacturers 
“would soon be able to produce all [the hosiery] that was required in Australia.”110 
At the time, the government was making extraordinary efforts to encourage and 
protect this budding Australian industry. 111 For example, Stirling Taylor, the 
Director of the Bureau of Trade and Industry, was sent on a ‘whistle-stop’ trip 
throughout rural Australia to promote the establishment of country mills:112 
He went up and down the country making people believe that, even in relatively small towns, 
they could run mills successfully. The craze extended to this Parliament.113 
 
As a direct consequence of these promotional campaigns, many small country 
mills were established.114 However, after a short period, many failed to prosper. 115 
The problem was that the government’s “new-born zeal” 116 to transfer people from 
the cities to work in the country mills failed to produce results.117 This meant that 
many small newly established mills lacked the manpower, organisation and 
machinery already available in the bigger and more efficiently-equipped concerns.118  
However, it is notable that mills such as The Australian Knitting Mills and the 
Onkaparinga Mill, which did not require “the artificial aid of even the existing 
                                                 
108 “Federal Parliament: The Tariff”, above n 104. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 March 1926, 77 (Mr 
Foster). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
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duties,”119 proved to be successful and were praised nationally for their efficiency 
and productivity.120 
 
 
9.2.5 The problem of ‘dumping’  
 
Unfortunately … British manufacturers are dumping hosiery into Australia at such a price 
that the Australian manufacturers are unable to sell their product at a profit, and many of 
the factories are practically at a stand-still, and will at an early date be dismissing a number 
of employees.121 
 
Sawer says that after Federation, manufacturers were constantly lobbying Parliament 
about the practice of ‘dumping’ goods on the Australian market to the detriment of 
Australian-produced goods.122 Mr Jowett MP was so concerned in 1921 about the 
problem of ‘dumping’, that he proposed a further 5% increase on items on top of the 
already Greene prohibitive Tariff.123 As an active member and representative of the 
Australian sheep-breeders Association,124 it was not surprising that Jowett argued 
that “the cheap imported cotton article”125 from Britain and the America was the 
most serious competitor of Australian-made woollen socks and stockings.126 He 
contended that whilst the manufacture of hosiery in Australia might be claimed as a 
                                                 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 October 1922, 60 (Senator Reid). 
122 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1921 (Melbourne University Press, 
1956) 42. Often the ‘dumped’ goods were poorly made clothing lines (sometimes called shoddy) 
which were being produced in other countries, particularly Britain and Japan, at a cost that was far 
less than Australian manufacturers could achieve. The Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 
(Cth) was enacted to penalise those who engaged in this practice. 
123  “Federal Parliament: The Tariff”, above n 85. 
124 “Half Cotton ‘Pure Wool’ Socks”, Camperdown Chronicle, 3 March 1936, 1. 
125 “Jowett’s Jerky Judgment”, Construction and Local Government Journal, 7 June 1921, 6. 
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“war industry,”127 current competition with imported hosiery meant that 90% of the 
machines in Australian woollen factories were idle.128 Others suggested that the 
Japanese were the greatest threat to the Australian hosiery industry.129 Mr Foley MP, 
however, was not troubled with the Japanese goods, for he considered the Japanese 
manufacturers had “missed the boat”130 and “had not delivered the goods”:131 
So far as Japanese goods are concerned, we have nothing to fear from them in Australia. They 
had their chance during the war, and I defy any honourable member to prove to my satisfaction 
that anything good ever came from Japan. Their productions are the cheapest and the shoddiest 
that have ever come into this country. 132 
 
Jowett reasoned that cotton socks and stockings were not really ‘cheap’ to the 
consumer because woollen socks lasted ten times longer than cotton socks.133 One 
commentator pointed out that whilst Jowett resided in Victoria and had no problem 
wearing woollen socks, this would not be the situation if he was expected to wear 
woollen socks in Queensland during the summer months:134 “[m]embers of 
Parliament are inclined to get parochial and inconsiderate of the wants of others in 
their enthusiasm to establish factories and pile on duties.”135 
Foley maintained that the duties proposed by Greene were “a direct impost on 
the working classes.”136 He stressed that cotton stockings and socks were not made 
in Australia137 and that “there is no industry to encourage”.138 Likewise, Mr Gregory 
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MP protested against the imposition of high duties purchased by the poorer sections 
of the community.139 One critic argued that members of Government, by piling 
tariffs high on imported hosiery, was receiving enormous amounts of revenue whilst 
at the same time taking “their people down”140 in a shocking fashion,141 especially 
when “the local factories [had] contributed very little to the supply.”142 It was not 
only the government that was condemned for its misuse of the tariff.143 Textile 
manufacturers were often accused of profiteering144 and it was suggested that rather 
than using the Tariff to build up Australian industry they were using it as means of 
rapidly increasing their own wealth. 145 
The issue remained contentious in parliamentary debates. For instance, Foley 
insisted that the poorer paid workers in his division were obliged to wear cotton 
stockings and demanded that duties on cotton hose to be made cheaper.146 He argued 
that the lower-paid men had no choice but to clothe their wives and families in cotton 
hose, as the price of woollen goods was “almost prohibitive”.147 On the other hand, 
Mr Considine MP objected to Foley’s proposal on the basis that he wanted the 
standard of living raised so that the workers would not need to wear cotton socks:148 
He told Parliament: “I would prefer that they should wear the woollen article. I want 
to see every worker in this country in a position to wear the very best material that is 
obtainable.”149 
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As some Australian manufacturers were having a “rough spin”,150 there were 
calls for the newly established Tariff Board to make “further inquiries”151 as to 
whether Australian hosiery industries should be provided with more protection 
especially as British imported hosiery was being sold for less than the cost of the raw 
material.152 Protectionists such as Senator Guthrie was confident that the tariff would 
be increased and saw no difficulty for Australian manufacturers to “submit a good 
case”153 to the Tariff Board.154 However, when the question of hosiery came before 
the Tariff Board in 1922, ardent protectionists submitted that existing prohibitive 
tariffs on hosiery were not sufficiently high to protect the hosiery industry.155 The 
Board heard complaints about Australian manufacturers who were constantly faced 
with “unfair competition”156 from countries that were suffering depreciated 
currencies. This meant that German and French makers were able to undersell British 
and Dominion markets with both finished and unfinished goods.157 There were also 
numerous allegations of hosiery and knitted goods being manufactured in Great 
Britain from yarn ‘dumped’ from Continental countries, and then sent to Australia. 
Manufacturers were constantly looking to the Board to enforce penalties, 
pursuant to the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth), against those who 
were engaging in these alleged practices.158 It was also alleged that when goods were 
being imported wholesale to England in cartons from Germany, they were 
‘disguised’ and falsely marked “English Make”159 before being sent directly to the 
Australian markets.160 This form of “malpractice”161 was condemned by the unions 
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who were anxious to “dam up”162 the flood of German textiles.163 Australian 
manufacturers were, on occasion, encouraged to pool their resources to wage a 
publicity campaign in favour of Australian textiles.164 
 
9.2.6 The Board takes flack for the failure of the Australian hosiery industry  
 
If something is not done speedily to check the importations of hosiery and knitted goods 
there will soon not be a mill in the county.165 
 
 In its 1925 Annual Report, the Board clearly acknowledged that Australian 
secondary industries were “more or less in a developmental stage”166 where the 
conditions and needs of the various industries were constantly changing.167 However, 
the Board advised Parliament that it was not possible to provide a Tariff that would 
make provision “for all the needs that might arise.”168 It acknowledged that the 
industry was “suffering severely”169 from overseas competition from Great Britain, 
Europe, the United States and Japan170 and was also very mindful that some 
Australian hosiery manufacturers, who had invested   £4 000 000 in capital171 in 
establishing and maintaining the industry, were ‘anxiously’ awaiting its 
determination about an increase in tariff on imported hosiery.172 Furthermore, 
manufacturers had warned the Board that there were 6 000 employees who would 
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not be assured of their employment if higher duties were not imposed on imported 
duties.173  However, the Board was to receive an enormous amount of criticism from 
hosiery manufacturers and the press when its members “reluctantly”174 declined 
manufacturers’ request to take action pursuant to the Act.175  
The Board heard evidence from many interested parties. For instance, Mr 
Rupert Neil McLean, a director of George A Bond Limited gave evidence that his 
company had sold thousands of dozens pairs of hose without profit in its endeavour 
to develop mass production.176 He sought to convince the Board that his company 
aimed to protect consumers by “[stopping] the importation of shoddy goods”.177 The 
manager of Bond’s hosiery department also submitted samples to the Board of 
imported stockings that were introduced at prices lower than it cost to produce them 
in Australia.178 For example, one sample submitted was an imported line that sold at 
12/6, but could not be produced by Bond’s for less than 28/6.179  
However, the Board “reluctantly”180 determined that this evidence was not 
sufficient to justify a recommendation from it to the Minister for the imposition of 
dumping duties.181 The Board advised the Minister that it would continue “to watch 
the situation closely”182 with a view to recommending more immediate relief than 
could be given by a revision of the tariff, should further evidence be obtained that 
would justify such a recommendation.183 The use of the word “reluctantly”184 points 
to the Board pro-Protectionist bias. This prompted one critic to suggest that the 
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Board, in its determinations, was always thinking of the manufacturer and that it had 
no concern for the consumer.185 In spite of its bias, it was suggested that the 
“determining factor”186 that moved the Board to decline the request to impose 
dumping duties was that it had apparently ‘discovered’ that “some makers”187 in 
Australia were able to earn substantial profits under the exiting duties.188 It was 
conceded that the Board’s disinclination to impose dumping duties in this case 
produced a practical and an ‘enlightened effect’ upon other manufacturers:189 
It is understood that a good deal of reorganisation is going on in several mills in order to 
increase efficiency. Advance in this direction may enable further reference by some of them to 
the Tariff Board to be avoided.190 
 
The Board was blamed for the ‘depressing’ state of affairs existing in the 
Australian hosiery industry, and in particular for the closure of a number of mills.191 
It was suggested that between 32 to 34 smaller hosiery mills had been “obliged”192 to 
close their doors because they had had difficulty with securing trade.193 In October 
1924, Gold’s Hosiery Mills Ltd., with mills at Redfern, Alexandria, Erskineville and 
Homebush, ceased operations,194 even though the company had made “excellent 
profits”195 during, and for a few years following the war.196 However, in 1922 and 
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1923 the business had been conducted at a loss197 even though considerable 
reconstruction work had been carried out at the mills.198 The company’s directors 
blamed both the high price of wool and the “inaction of the Tariff Board”199 for not 
providing the relief that it had expected when faced with a high level of imported 
hosiery.200   
The unions criticised the Government’s ‘apathetic’ failure to apply the 
provisions of the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1916 (Cth) to help the 
hosiery industry, which they insisted had been “badly hit”201 by wholesale 
dumping.202 They also declared that thousands of workers had been thrown out of 
their jobs and warned that unless dumping was prevented, “a valuable industry”203 
would inevitably perish. The Australian Worker accused the Board of being 
disinclined “to give effect to Australia’s fiscal policy”204 because of the “sinister 
influence”205 exercised on it by the “wealthy importers of Flinders-lane” (sic).206 The 
newspaper claimed that the Board’s “glaring dereliction of duty”207 was the cause of 
this textile industry being in a “very critical condition”:208 “[i]t would be a disaster, 
very far reaching in its evils effects, if the business which has been built up were to 
be broken down.”209 In contrast, the Register suggested that the Board was not at 
fault in declining to “recommend action”210 pursuant to the Australian Industries 
Preservation Act 1906 (Cth).211 It was alleged that the Board was directed to do so 
by the Minister of Trade and Customs: “[b]odies like the Tariff Board are usually wise to 
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the desires of a Minister, and it is not impossible that the weakening of Mr Chapman is at the 
back of this decision.”212  
The Board was also criticised for not being more transparent in its evidence-
gathering processes and for holding its hearings “behind closed doors”.213 There 
were calls that these hearings should, “in the interests of the consuming public”,214 
be opened to the public and that notice of the Board’s intention to hear applications 
ought to be given through the press.215 The Minister of Trade and Commerce 
endeavoured to justify the Board’s closed hearings by arguing that most of the 
evidence presented before it was contained in correspondence and departmental 
reports. He argued that to take oral evidence was not practicable and would result in 
long delays and “that would make the Act a dead letter”.216 The Adelaide Chamber 
of Commerce rejected the Minister’s explanation.217 The Chamber’s representative 
stated that there was no means of knowing when the Board was conducting an 
enquiry on any particular class of goods. Further, he claimed that importers had no 
opportunity of placing evidence before the Board, even though the Minister had 
assured the Chamber that the Tariff Board was “quite ready at all times to consider 
representations made in regard to any case.”218 
Even the notion of ‘scientific protection’, which was advanced as an intrinsic 
part of the Federation process, came in for intense criticism.219 Whilst it was 
conceded that the ‘scientific tariff’ had worked fairly well before the war when there 
was some stability in wages, hours worked and social conditions in competing 
overseas countries,220 this form of economic stability disappeared with the onset of 
the war. It was also alleged that the Greene Tariff, with its “small scientific 
                                                 
212 Ibid. 
213 Anti-Dumping Duties: Chamber of Commerce Protest”, The Register, 12 January 1924, 7. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 “Fallacy of ‘Scientific’ Protection”, Sunday Times, 4 May 1924, 12. 
220 Ibid. 
 
334 
 
protection,”221 proved to be useless in the face of the constantly changing conditions 
in competing countries.222 It was claimed that disturbed industrial conditions and 
depreciated rates of exchange in these countries were at odds with the upward trend 
of wages and standard of living in Australia.223 And it was suggested that all these 
circumstances had had a disastrous effect on local industries:224 
Many of our industries that in 1920-21 were considered to be prosperous, or promised to be so, 
are now placed in a very precarious position by the flooding of our markets with goods from 
cheap labour counties.225 
 
9.2.7 Anti-Australian sentiment 
 
Many honourable senators … have no use for Australian made goods.226 
 
Whilst some politicians, such as Mr Stirling Taylor,227 preached that 
Parliament should “ordain”228 that Australians should only wear clothes made in 
Australian factories, others contended that there was a “distinct prejudice against 
Australian goods”.229 As an illustration, James G Hare, the managing director of 
Dominion Knitting Mills advised the Tariff Board that the firm had frequently been 
requested by Flinders Lane firms to leave off the brand ‘Made in Australia’.230 
Senator Payne suggested that Australian manufacturers would find a “ready sale”231 
for their goods if Australian hose was consistently of a better quality and free of 
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imperfections.232 Payne, who himself had had a bad experience with some lines of 
Australian-made hosiery, insisted that he and other consumers in the same position, 
would make every effort in the future to “carefully avoid purchasing certain brands 
of Australian made clothing.”233 It was argued by many protectionists that ‘effective 
protection’ should be full and unconditional protection and should be provided for all 
Australian industries.234 As noted in previous chapters,235 this type of protectionism 
was considered by many to be inextricably linked with nationalism and patriotism.  
 
9.2.8 The Gospel of National Self-Reliance…Government Affirms Principle of 
Protecting Local Industry236 
 
We have emerged from the tradition that imported goods are better than those made here… 
The surest way to keep secondary industries inefficient is to inadequately protect them.237 
 
In August 1924, the Prime Minister, Mr Stanley Bruce, promised that the 
government would give many secondary industries further assistance to relieve the 
“ever-increasing”238 strain of the “excessive importations”239 of manufactured 
goods.240 Many manufacturers were still facing difficulty keeping their hands fully 
employed, and often new “large up to-date plants”241 were working far below their 
full capacity.242 The owners complained that they had been “buoyed up”243 with the 
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hope that the Government would fulfil its promise to “give them protection against 
the manufacturers of cheap labour and low currency countries”.244  
On 2 September 1925, the Minister of Trade and Customs, Mr Pratten, 
introduced a new a tariff Schedule that he said represented a “thoroughly Business 
proposal”245 and which would assist in encouraging Australia’s “own 
productions,”246 and thus make it more self-reliant.247 To this extent, Pratten was 
encouraged by the many “most estimable leagues”248 that were educating the people 
“in the direction of a sound national sentiment.”249 Protectionism had become the 
settled policy of the country and a religion in which the government placed its trust 
and belief:250 “[t]here can be seen sermons in windows. The Government is in full 
accord with the gospel of self-reliance and national sentiment.”251 
The government also used various strategies and ‘propaganda’ to encourage 
Australians to purchase only Australian–made goods.252 In addition, various 
‘protection’ leagues and associations, including the Australian Industries Protection 
League and the Australian Natives Association, began to actively disseminate fresh 
“public propaganda”253 concerning the need for increased protection for Australian 
industries, and about the “folly”254 of sending overseas for articles which could be 
made quite efficiently “at home”.255 This ‘buy-Australian’ rhetoric become rampant 
and powerful. During the parliamentary tariff debates in March 1926, the call to 
protect local industries was couched in explicit terms using religious nomenclature 
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and ‘patriotic” propaganda.256 This protectionist dogma was elucidated in a 
moralising epistle called the “Ten Commandments for Good Australians.”257 Every 
‘patriotic’ Australian was expected, for their own good, to comply closely with this 
edict in the same manner that was expected in traditional sumptuary laws. For 
instance, the 9th Commandment declared that the manufacturer was to be given 
special treatment by the Australian consumer: 
The manufacturer has a special claim to support. He is to a great extent a pioneer. He is a man 
of courage. He has faith in his country and his people, and every Australian should try to prove 
to him that his faith is justified.258 
 
Any Australian who was found to be reluctant to wear Australian boots, or an 
Australian hat, or an Australian suit of clothes made of Australian cloth was to be 
branded as “really ashamed of Australia”.259 
 
9.2.9 Protectionist dogma  
 
Most of the applications for increased duties had been presented by manufacturers whose 
works were inefficient, whilst those working on efficient methods did not need protection.260 
 
It was argued that if Australians were loyal to Australian industries then it 
would not be necessary to impose many customs duties.261 One parliamentarian even 
claimed that the main purpose of duties was “to protect Australians against 
themselves”.262 However, by 1926 some protectionists, such as Senator Hayes, 
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advised Parliament that they were losing their ‘faith’ in very high protection.263 They 
maintained that the Australian hosiery industry was struggling because 
manufacturers were inefficient,264 inexperienced and because they were using 
outdated machinery and processes. Mr Seabrook MP argued that if the Australian 
hosiery industry could not ‘carry on’ with a protective duty of 35 per cent and was 
asking for 55 percent, then the only conclusion he could make was that either the 
industry was “inefficiently managed”265 or because the workers engaged in it were 
inefficient.266 Others argued that inefficient management was causing factories to 
produce an ‘unsatisfactory’ hosiery article.267 Complaints often were directed at 
workers because they lacked industry experience and training causing customers to 
be unhappy with socks and stockings that shrunk considerably after a couple of 
washes.268 It also had marked impact on customer satisfaction and sales:269 
Owing to inexperience in the manufacturing of hosiery some Australian factories at their outset 
of their operations produced socks and stockings which, when washed, shrunk considerably, 
and that was responsible for a reduction in sales.270 
 
It was suggested that the large increase in revenue that accompanied the high 
rate of imported goods was a financial boon that the Government could not ignore.271 
For instance, the revenue collected from July 1923 until the end of January 1924 was 
£21 150 529 which was £3 855 529 larger than expected for the period.272 Others, on 
the other hand, suggested that the higher the tariff, the higher the cost of living.273 
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Unionists declared that it was unfair for Australian manufacturers of hosiery 
to compete against importations from foreign countries where workers worked 
longer hours and were paid much lower wages than Australian workers.274 Yet, the 
Board acknowledged, in its Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1925, that 
Australian manufacturers faced many conditions that put them at a disadvantage “so 
far as competition with imported goods is concerned”. 275 The Board listed higher 
wages, shorter hours, payments for holidays, high cost of material, limited markets 
for products and “consequent restricted production”276 as conditions that were 
problematic for Australian manufactures.277 
 
9.2.10 Hosiery Mills Fail 
 
The relief anticipated from possible action by the Tariff Board did not eventuate. The 
position of the company, therefore, has gradually become worse.278 
 
In February 1925, Mr Henry York, managing director of Lustre Hosiery Mills 
gave evidence to the Board that the largest woollen hosiery mills in New South 
Wales were struggling to compete with cheap foreign importations.279 Yet, it seems 
that those mills producing silk and artificial silk hosiery were busy supplying the 
popular coloured hosiery that was in “heavy demand”,280 even though importers 
could bring in similar goods from overseas and land them in Sydney at a lesser 
price.281 In this case, transport time and the fickleness of fashion were in their favour. 
Wholesale customers were happy to purchase from local mills and pay a higher price 
because they would “not risk their judgement in regard to colours” four months from 
                                                 
274 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 4 June 1926, 27 (Senator Guthrie). 
275 “Federal Tariff: The Board’s Report”, The Daily News, 5 September 1925, 9. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 “Hosiery Mills Fail: 500 Employees Thrown Idle”, above n 194. 
279 “Tariff Board: Duty On Hosiery. Increase Urged”, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1925, 11. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
 
340 
 
the date of purchase.282 However, it was suggested that hosiery manufacturers could 
not be complacent, because “the moment fashion decided”283 to embrace the 
ordinary standard shades, such as black, white, “nigger”,284 and tan, the bulk of the 
business they were enjoying would again be “placed overseas”.285  
The Board suggested to Parliament in September 1925, that as it had already 
recommended an increase in the duty on wool yarn by 10%, that a corresponding 
increase should be made on the duty on socks and stockings of all other material 
other than cotton.286 However, it endorsed a smaller increase in duty on silk socks 
and stockings because Australian manufacturers of these articles were already 
competing well against imported goods.287 In fact, the “better classes” practically 
held that business.288 Eventually the new tariff changes were lauded by the press as 
“an honest effort”289 to protect Australia’s “Infant factories”290 against foreign 
competition.291 Not all parties were so pleased with the new tariff. When the Board 
recommended a new tariff on hosiery in 1925, Leicester hosiery manufacturers 
decided to cable the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Bruce, protesting against its 
application on their ‘on-route’ shipments of hosiery to Australia.292 They also sought 
a concession on goods in transit which were ‘on order’.293 
However, by 1926, the Board began to take a more conciliatory attitude 
towards the consumer. At the same time, it began to question the “declared policy”294 
of the Commonwealth to routinely and absolutely protect local industries against 
overseas competition.295 In its 1926 Annual Report, it attempted to reassure 
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consumers that when making it determinations, it constantly sought to ascertain what 
the effect of any proposed increase in duties would have upon prices to the public.296 
Furthermore, it became critical about abuse of protection, particularly when it 
appeared to have an adverse impact on the consumer:297  
There are times when the local manufacturer desires the superior article he is making at a far 
greater cost to be protected as to force the cheaper one off the market, and there are on the 
other hand instances known to the Board where he is making an inferior article and asks that it 
be protected against a superior one.298 
 
It had become very obvious that the Board was no longer the stalwart face of 
protectionism in Australia and that it was at times ‘at odds’ with Mr Pratten, the 
Minister of Trade and Customs. As a result, the Board’s comments and reluctance to 
recommend increase in tariff protection for mismanaged and inefficient industries 
were neither embraced nor appreciated by the Minister.299 By 1926, the Minister 
began to purposely fail to table the Board’s reports even though they should have 
been laid before the House within seven days of their presentation.300 Previously, it 
had been the practice of the Minister to always table the Board’s reports forthwith on 
their receipt. The Board began to retaliate, and in its 1928 Annual Report openly 
criticised Minister for his failure to table its reports.301 Without the benefit of 
‘absolute’ protection, some companies began to struggle to meet their overextended 
financial obligations. For instance, in November 1927, the directors of George A 
Bond and Company Limited, considered entering into voluntary liquidation.302 Not 
only had the Company’s bank overdraft limit been exceeded but it was predicted that 
it was unlikely that its “heavy stocks”303 could be realised.304 Its annual report listed 
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the increase in the importation of hosiery as a factor contributing to the company’s 
difficulties.305  
In the next part we see another example of a post-Federation fledgling 
industry, led by the iconic Frank Burley, which expected an ‘avowedly’ protectionist 
government to provide unlimited protection even though such protection tended to 
increase the prices of both imported and locally-produced goods, particularly for 
female consumers.   
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9.3 Cossetting Australian Corset-Makers     
 
Before the war, the Australian corsetry industry was mostly comprised of 
small enterprises that employed only a handful of staff that only made hand fitted 
corsets.306 By 1921, the industry had grown to include twenty four small 
manufactures in various capital cities, as well as four major “wholesale houses”:307 
Berlei Limited, the Australia Corsets Limited, Messrs Robert Paxton, all of Sydney, 
and the Elasco Corsets and Tie Company of Melbourne.308 The bulk of their output 
was children’s corsets and brassieres, which Mr Lister MP told his colleagues that a 
brassiere was a “form of bust bodice”.309 Even though corsets “continued to 
dominate notions of female beautification”,310 less than five per cent of the corsets 
worn by Australian women in 1920 could be manufactured locally.311  
The wearing of female corsetry had not been abandoned in the 1920s with the 
onset of the ‘new era’ of “modish”312 slim form flapper silhouette.313 However, many 
of the traditional “stiff-boned”314  or rigid corsets purchased up to and during the war 
went out of fashion and were replaced with shorter and slender corsets that sat 
“barely above the waist”.315 These new types of corsets were more comfortable to 
wear and were generally “supple garments marked by dainty trifles of silk and satin 
that few women could resist.”316 All forms of corsets, including medical and surgical 
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corsets, continued to remain in high demand during this period: in 1921 there were 
“some 2 000 000 women in the Commonwealth requiring these articles of 
apparel.”317  
 
9.3.1 Small beginnings for the Australian corset industry 
 
Until 1920 the industry was not very successful in Australia, although there have always 
been a few persons making corsets to order.318 
 
In 1914, £262 000 worth of corsets were imported and Australian 
manufactures only supplied 10% of the market.319 Although all the raw materials for 
corset-making had to be imported, none of these materials, except for lace and 
embroidery, attracted customs duty.320 England supplied the cheapest lines, being the 
bulk of trade, and America supplied the higher class of corsets.321  
Whilst the issue of tariffs on imported corsetry was dealt with in the 1908 
Tariff Schedule, it was not until 1914 that tariff protection was more fully explored 
for Australian corset-makers.322 The question of protection for a nascent and 
struggling Australian corsetry industry was first investigated by the Inter-State 
Commission in 1914, when an application was made by W. Zander and Co., of King 
Street Sydney, for an increase of the duty on corsets from 10% (British preference) 
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and 15 % (general) to 20% and 25% respectively.323 Mr Wilhelm Zander argued that 
whilst his business of selling corsets and corset accessories had increased since 1913, 
and was profitable, he was concerned that he was not receiving a “satisfactory 
profit.”324 He told the Commission that he was alarmed with the increase in the 
number of imported corsets from Britain,325 Germany326 and America.327 He  
claimed that he continually struggled with high labour costs and with a prejudice 
against locally-made corsets.328 He pleaded that if the duty were increased 
sufficiently, he would be able to compete with the imported articles in other 
grades.329 
Others in the corset industry, such as Frank Burley of Unique Corsets asked 
for even higher tariffs than Zander on imported corsetry.330 Burley, who employed   
30 to 40 hands, pointed out that American corsets sold well in Australia because they 
were “so well advertised”.331 He explained that the only reason why local corset 
industry existed at all was because of the early tariff imposed on imported 
corsetry.332 This view was later verified in 1921 when Senator Payne advised the 
Senate that the Australian corset-making industry had made good progress during the 
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war even though it had been initially developed under a 10 per cent preference tariff 
and 15 per cent foreign tariff.333 
In July 1915, the Commission recommended that the duty on corsets should 
be not less than on general apparel, and that corsetry should be included under the 
classification of apparel and attire,334 which at the time attracted 35 % preferential 
and 40% general tariff.335 The Commission advised Parliament336 that it considered 
that the corset industry was an industry that, “with fair encouragement”,337 should 
succeed in Australia.338  It was extolled as an industry with “great variety of design, 
shape and size,”339 which could provide a wide avenue of employment. Whilst the 
proposed increase in duty was to ostensibly assist Australian corsetry manufacturers, 
it would also potentially have a significant economic impact on female consumers. 
Women were already facing significant increases for these ‘essential’ items of 
feminine attire because of higher freights on “the most sought after corset”340 from 
America and the cost of extra bone in the modern style of corset.341  
 
9.3.2 The War opens up opportunities for Australian corset makers 
 
The idea … is to make Australia not only one of the greatest producing countries of the 
world, but self-supporting so far as the manufactures are concerned.342 
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The war began not long after the Commission took evidence from Zander and 
Burley. This event, of course, had an enormous impact on the importation of all 
corsetry, especially with regards to German lines.343 The prohibition of German 
imported corsetry was considered to be a boon for a small Australian manufacturing 
industry that had previously struggled to compete with inexpensive German 
products.344 During the war, Australians were cautioned that German manufacturers 
were in the process of secretly planning a post-war trade campaign that would 
‘dazzle’ Australian consumers with bargains they could not refuse.345 During this 
xenophobic campaign, the “minds of thoughtful people”346 were also actively 
engaged in developing strategies and campaigns to foster the development of 
Australian industry and overseas trade.347 Australian manufacturers were urged to 
seize the commercial opportunities that the war, with its associated problems with 
trade, freight and isolation, had opened up.348 They were especially encouraged to fill 
the gaps left in the supply of German commodities that before the war had been so 
vital to the Australian importer, and so popular with the consumer.349  
Yet, despite all of this patriotic rhetoric, the corsetry industry failed to 
advance during the war because it lacked the necessary skilled workers and imported 
materials for manufacturing corsets.350  Furthermore, just as it was impossible during 
this time to obtain machinery for the hosiery industry, it was “absolutely 
impossible”351 to obtain machinery to manufacture corsets within the 
Commonwealth.352 Yet, this obstacle did not hinder Australian manufacturers 
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lobbying for additional tariff protection to protect an industry that was still in its 
embryonic stage and as yet remained untested. 
By 1921, the issue of increased protective tariffs on imported corsets had 
become a significant, and a strangely incongruous topic of passionate debate within 
the Australian Parliament.353 Senator Payne, who had been engaged in the corset 
trade,354 called the issue one of the “most important items in the Tariff from the point 
of view of the general community.”355 The topic was so hotly and emotively debated 
that it even warranted all-night sittings.356 The hostility in the debates was palpable, 
with some senators being accused of being unpatriotic, and for having “no use for 
Australian-made goods”.357 
An avowedly Protectionist Government proposed to raise the tariff 
appreciably on corsets to 40 per cent (preferential), 50 per cent (intermediate) and 55 
per cent (general).358 This meant that a particular line of corset that retailed before 
the war for 5s 11d, and then sold during the war at 9s 6d, would be sold under the 
new increased rates for 12s 6d; this was an increase in price of over 100 per cent.359 
Opponents were concerned that the imposition of this proposed tariff increase was a 
purely revenue raising-exercise and that the revenue “thus raised … [would come] 
out of homes which can ill-afford to pay it.”360 Others361 pointed out that the corset 
industry was asking more than most other clothing industries and it was 
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“anomalous”362 for it to receive different treatment from that extended to ordinary 
apparel.363  
Payne insisted that a tariff increase would be an incentive for Australian 
manufactures to substantially increase the price of their corsetry.364 He told the 
Chamber that after the previous tariff increase, the price of corsets of Australian 
manufacture was put up by “several shillings”.365 Gregory agreed and insisted that an 
increase in tariffs on corsets would be the “same old story as during the war”366 when 
the local manufacturer, once safely secure “behind protection,”367 would put up his 
prices as near as he could to the cost of the imported article.368 Importers of corsetry, 
including Sir Horace Bayer, were indignant about the increase of tariff on corsetry, 
particularly as the new tariff would adversely affected thousands of corsets that were 
currently on route to Australia and those held in bond.369 Bayer labelled the new 
tariff as “Bolshevik laws”370 and characterised himself as a “victim of legalised 
robbery.”371 He threatened to retaliate against what he considered to be a “gross 
dishonesty”372 of Custom procedures by using his connections in Ireland and 
Scotland to “prevent anyone of the farm immigrant types from coming to 
Australia.”373 
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In August 1921, the Senate was advised that D & A Co of America374 and 
Warmer Bros of America were intending to establish factories in Australia.375 This 
expansionist plan caused alarm with protectionists such as Senator Pratten who 
recommended that the only way that American capital could be kept out of the 
country was if there was a rapid development of the Australian industry.376 Some 
politicians actively encouraged the nascent industry.377 They suggested that 
Australian-made corsetry would not only be equal in quality to corsetry made in 
America but they could be made and sold more cheaply378 because of the added 
packing and freight costs of imported corsets.379 Senator Elliott even glibly 
recommended that the industry could be started without “great expenditure of 
capital”380 and in a “small room containing a few sewing machines”.381 He was naïve 
when he suggested that by extending this ‘simple’ enterprise to a dozen country 
centres that it would “soon bring down the price of the article to the Australian 
buyer”.382  
Others such as Gregory, Lazzarini and Payne were more pragmatic and were 
clearly cognisant of the impact that prohibitive tariffs would have on the ordinary 
consumer.  Gregory stressed that the Australian corsetry industry was still in its 
embryonic stage.383  He advised the House that the statistics for 1919 showed that 
imported corsets, principally from America and Great Britain, were worth £876 000, 
as opposed to Australian-made corsets that were worth only £36 000.384 He argued 
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that until Parliament had “concrete evidence”385 that the corset industry was large 
enough to be profitably conducted ‘in the Commonwealth’, then Parliament should 
avoid imposing ‘heavy duties’ on the imported article.386 Gregory maintained that 
women should be able to buy the corset of her choice and not be forced to buy the 
potentially second-rate Australia item:387 
Every lady wishes to buy the style of corset that suits her best, and undoubtedly the American 
manufacturers, having paid more attention to hygiene than their British rivals, have won 
popularity for their goods which insures them a more ready sale.388 
 
Although Payne would not denigrate the Australian product, he took the 
trouble to remind his fellow Senators that the corset-making industry was “a 
specialized industry.”389 He claimed that skilled corset-makers in Europe and 
America were, with their superior knowledge of the industry,390 at a “stage of 
perfection”391 that could not be achieved by the Australian industry for many 
years:392 “no matter what facilities are given in Australia, it [would] be many years 
before we can possibly hope to supply the whole of the needs of Australian users of 
corsets.”393 
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9.3.3 The Tariff targets women 
 
How women of slender means are going to provide themselves with good corsets of good 
quality and design I do not know.394 
 
It was obvious to politicians such as Gregory that the increased tariff would 
have an enormous impact on the female consumer. Yet, Mathews strongly denied 
that the increased tariff on imported corsets was a “sex tax”.395 He claimed that the 
tariff was clearly a protective duty which, unlike the “old Tariff,”396 was merely a 
revenue duty.397 He was an avowed protectionist who went so far as to declare that 
he would place a duty of “1,000 per cent” on every corset that could be manufactured 
in Australia.398 Richard Foster, who like Payne, had been in the “trade,”399 
considered that protection on corsets was a “heavy tax upon the womenfolk in … the 
community”.400  
Some members of Parliament were more informed and pragmatic than others 
when articulating the corsetry needs of women. For instance, Gregory emphasised to 
the members of the House that “[a]lmost every woman in civilised communities 
[wore] corsets, and [had] done so for generations”401 and that there was evidently 
“some natural and physical reason for their universal adoption.”402  Senator Payne 
instructed his ‘brother’ Senators, that “proper shaping”403 was needed for each 
individual corset in order to make them comfortable for women to wear.404 
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Furthermore, he recommended that a large amount of care and attention would have 
to be applied by Australian manufacturers in order to supply appropriate corsets that 
had to be “moulded to a great variety of forms”.405 At the same time, Payne warned 
his colleagues that it was important to remember a gendered truism, for it could 
seriously impact on their own personal happiness: “every man knows how essential it 
is to a woman’s comfort that her corsets should fit well.”406  
Payne suggested that many women preferred the French or American corsets 
because of their “peculiar shape,”407 and claimed that the British manufactures had 
gone “leeward”408 because of their inflexibility in providing ‘lines’ that met “the real 
needs of the people:”409 
We are not all built alike. Fortunately there are varieties of feature, and in the same way there 
are varieties of form. Every woman cannot wear the same kind of corset. It is essential for each 
woman to wear whatever corset suits her form, no matter where it may be made.410 
 
Payne claimed that women before the war could purchase a good British, 
American or French corset for 7s 6d or 8s. However, after the 1921 Tarff increase, 
the cost was 10s a pair.411 On the other hand, Foster pointed out that it was not 
possible to compare the pre-war and post-Greene Tariff prices on corsets.412 He 
suggested that corsetry fashions had changed over this period and that there was “a 
marked change in the character”413 of corsets that had much to do with “hygiene.”414 
He suggested that women in 1921 were generally asking for “a very much superior 
article”415 to the “old style”416 of corsets of pre-war days.417 Furthermore, Foster 
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maintained that the Australian corset industry was only producing about 3% of 
Australian demand and that the more expensive locally-made corsets were lower 
grade articles that were not popular with Australian women who were only able 
afford a reasonable quality imported article.418 Payne insisted that the only options 
for consumers were to do without or to continue to purchase the imported items, even 
though they attracted prohibitive duties.419  
It was clear to many that the increased tariff on corsetry was not only a ‘sex 
tax’ but was also a “class tax”,420 as the woman who possessed a “large purse”421 
could continue to have her corsets made to order in the “expensive salon.”422 
Lazzarini suggested that there were some women who would be willing to pay 42s 
for a pair of corsets and who would not care if there was “a duty of 200 per cent 
imposed”.423 It was suggested that the majority of women with little money were, 
however, forced to wear Australian corsets, even if they were unsuitable “on account 
of the prohibitive price.”424 McWilliams contended that the small manufacturers 
were being “coddled in the big cities of Sydney and Melbourne,”425 and as a result, 
women were being compelled to pay “an enhanced price”426 to protect manufacturers 
against overseas competition.427 He branded the new Tariff as “a monstrosity from 
start to finish”428 and cautioned the House that the burden of the tariff on corsets was 
one which was squarely on the shoulders of the lower classes: “[r]ich people do not 
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care what they have to pay. The working people are the real sufferers. It is not a fair 
deal.”429 
During the war and early post-war period, some parliamentarians sought to 
invoke the sumptuary critique of luxury to justify their protectionist position. They 
insisted that corsets were luxury items and should ‘naturally’ attract high tariffs. 
Some were aghast at the notion that when Australia was in the “grip of a titanic war 
struggle - a struggle for national existence,”430 that luxuries such as corsets and 
feathers still poured into Australia at “an alarming amount”.431 It was pointed out 
that during the year ended 30 June 1916, £259 479 worth of corsets “to encircle the 
graceful [female] forms”432 were imported into Australia.433  
In the 1920s, the critique of corsets as luxury items was often given short 
shrift by others who vehemently argued that corsets were a necessity to women. 
They maintained that it was unfair to impose excessively high duties and “thus 
penalize the womenfolk of Australia”.434 Mr Jowett MP was so confused about the 
issue that he sought guidance from Mr Greene, the Minister for Trade and Customs, 
as to whether corsets were luxuries or necessities.435 Receiving no response, Jowett 
“turned, as a last resource, to the information supplied in the daily press”.436 It turned 
out that this polemic, which tested men’s “intelligence and judgement”,437 could only 
be answered by a woman. Mrs Glenross, President of the Housewives Association 
sought to confirm men’s ignorance about women’s personal clothing when she wrote 
to Greene and asked whether he knew the difference between “corsets and 
brassieres”.438 Needless to say, she also received no reply.439 She was reported to 
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have told a meeting dealing that: “[m]en do not seem to see the necessity of corsets. 
They do not seem to care a button whether we wear them or not.”440  
 
9.3.4 Women in Parliament: who better to advise what corset a woman ‘needed’ 
 
Mrs Glenross admitted that not every woman was fitted for Parliamentary duties, but not by 
the wildest flight of imagination could it be assumed that every man who was there was fitted 
for the position.441 
 
As seen in Chapter 8, there was an increasing demand in the media and 
elsewhere for institutions such as the Arbitration Courts and Board of Trade during 
the post war period to allow women a voice about their clothing needs: a subject 
which they alone had intimate knowledge and experience. This demand for female 
participation was amplified in 1921 because of comments made by Federal 
Parliamentarians and the press during the tariff debates about imported corsetry. This 
was particularly the case when it was reported that male parliamentarians were prone 
to much entertainment when viewing and handling samples of corsetry, of which 
they knew so very little:442  
A pair of Australian-made corsets was produced, much to the amusement of many members of 
the House. There was a great deal of joking of the self-conscious kind. A member had only to 
handle the article to raise a laugh, and the older the member the greater the mirth.443\ 
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Mr Lister MP, a progressive politician, suggested that there should be 
“representatives of the opposite sex”444 in the Parliament to assist men in the 
discussion of “matters of this kind.”445 Dr Maloney made an “impassioned 
declaration”446 for female representation. He argued that it would be a very good 
thing for the House if there women members who could instruct “the mere males”447 
on matters affecting “the corset-wearing sex”.448 He maintained that women were 
quite capable of making important decisions and that it was time that there were 
some women in Parliament, particularly to speak on gendered issues such as the 
importation of corsets:449 
If there were women here to speak for their sex, there would not be so much foolishness 
spoken on their behalf as we hear now. Thirty years ago I moved in this Chamber to separate 
women from the criminals and lunatics with whom they were classed in being deprived of the 
right to vote. Woman has since obtained some of her rights, but she is not yet the political 
equal of man. This Parliament is not at civilised as that of Finland, which has twenty-two 
women in a House of 200 members. On one occasion, when there was some labour trouble, the 
care of the principal city was intrusted to a committee elected from these twenty-two 
women.450 
 
It was pointed out that women knew what type of corset they wanted and that, 
over time, they had been “well educated on the subjects of corsets,”451 and would 
never by choice wear one which was “ill-fitting or badly cut”.452 Yet, women 
continued to be denied a voice in those Parliamentary debates that deliberated on 
their most personal and feminine forms of apparel.  
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9.3.5 Frank Burley’s Castle of Dreams 
 
This is a story of dream and its fulfilment: the story of one who dreamed big dreams and 
then worked, night and day, with heart and brain and hand, to make his dreams come 
true.453 
 
Just as cotton hosiery was considered by many to be a great opportunistic 
wartime industry and very suitable for Australian conditions, the establishment of an 
Australian corsetry industry was similarly endorsed by Parliament and the press.454 
Greene argued that an Australian corset industry could provide employment for 
many hands,455 and he predicted that the industry could quickly satisfy Australia’s 
demand for corsetry.456 Furthermore, just as George Bond and other hosiery 
manufacturers were championed by the press and some parliamentarians as 
entrepreneurial visionaries leading the development of a new cotton hosiery industry 
in Australia, there was a parallel anointment of Frank Burley457 as a heroic visionary 
who led the Australian corsetry industry.458   
Like George Bond, Burley was the consummate salesman and political 
lobbyist. He vigorously bragged to politicians and the press that his business was 
‘capable’ of “turning out over 600 000 pairs of corsets per annum”.459 Prompted by 
his own self-interests, when describing his products he continually spruiked the 
                                                 
453 “Young Man’s Castle of Dreams Houses Berlei Ltd.”, Sunday Times, 8 May 1917, 10. 
454 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1921, 106 (Mr Riley). 
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fashionable axioms about female health, beauty and comfort.460 He doggedly 
criticized the low tariff on corsets and proclaimed that the industry was “scarcely 
protected at all.”461 He also advocated that it was the duty of the Tariff Board to 
protect “a certain class of persons…against themselves”462 by the imposition of a 
protective tariff that would remove the temptation from women to buy imported 
corsets:463 “[t]he Australian corset should be insisted upon, and that can only be 
brought about by the operations of the Customs House, or better still, by drastic 
legislation.”464 
Furthermore, Burley insisted that the Australian woman “should be taken in 
hand”465 by her menfolk, who he said were expected to pressure her to buy only 
Australian-made corsetry.466 He declared that a protected corset-industry, which 
concerned itself with “the health, beauty and physique” 467of Australian women, was 
at the core of the future development of “the Australian race”.468 Burley maintained 
that Australian women “must be educated”469 and forced to visit his factory, so they 
could appreciate that only Australian corset makers knew how to make corsets for 
Australian women. He insisted that a woman who wore the French or American 
corset470 was either guilty of “thoughtlessness or ignorance:”471  
The danger and absurdity of the Australian women wearing in the month of February in 
Australia a corset made for a woman in the north of England in December must be apparent to 
anybody.472 
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By 1926, it became obvious that some protectionist parliamentarians were 
becoming increasingly sceptical about the type of artificial protection that many 
Australian manufacturers continually expected from government.473 They began to 
oppose proposals to increase tariffs on imported clothing because they were 
conscious of the adverse effect such duties were having on consumers.474 Even those 
members of the Tariff Board who were committed protectionists, were becoming 
concerned about the level of protection being accorded to those emerging industries 
that made every attempt to “shelter plant, machinery and methods which have 
passed, or are passing out of date under stress of modern development.” 475 These 
Board members maintained that such practices should not be encouraged and urged 
Parliament to ensure that opportunities for the abuse of the protectionist system be 
eliminated.476 
By 1930, the Board, despite considerable criticism from the authors of the 
Brigden Report and other quarters, was more realistic about the reasons for 
stagnating industries and government debt. The Board was “inspired by “a kind of 
gloomy wisdom”477 and began to regularly reject unwarranted manufactures’ claims 
for increased protection and dismiss exhortations that every national misfortune and 
economic difficulty should be blamed on “greedy trade unionists and cunning 
foreigners.”478 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 9 examines two fledgling Australian clothing industries that sought, 
with the assistance of government, to expand their control over the Australian 
domestic market.  During the early post-war period private business interests were 
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enthusiastically encouraged by governments that insisted Australia’s future 
development was dependent upon a robust manufacturing sector. This meant that 
during this period the tariff continued to remain the major instrument of economic 
policy. For protectionists, the tariff was a populist regulatory technique that 
government was obliged to use to achieve its ideals of national wealth and 
prosperity. It helped create employment, protected the cost of living and encouraged 
‘appropriate’ immigration.  
In Chapters 4, 6 and 8 we see that during the first two decades following 
Federation the sumptuary impulse was stimulated by both protectionist aims and 
concerns about morality. In Chapters 8 and 9 we see that  by the early 1920s, 
sumptuary discourse had shifted its discursive emphasis from this mixed 
protectionist/morality focus to one that was increasingly preoccupied with national 
economy. In chapter 9, there is little evidence of the anti-luxury, moral regulation 
discourses of the earlier period even in those industries that were concerned with 
basic women’s apparel.479 Instead, sumptuary discourse is increasingly underpinned 
by ‘nationalistic’ demands that Australians should be forced to support local 
industries by wearing only Australian-made apparel. This chapter also demonstrates 
that whilst government was giving manufacturers their unreserved support, the Tariff 
Board was beginning to doubt the efficacy of providing unlimited support to 
industries that were clearly inefficient and mismanaged.    
Chapter 10 will present the final conclusion for this thesis, initially 
summarising the key findings from each chapter, and then providing some examples 
of how the sumptuary ethic has today had lingered in different forms. 
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10 CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 The purpose of this chapter 
 
This thesis had provided an interdisciplinary analysis concerning the 
‘eruption’ of sumptuary regulation in Australia in the early decades following 
Federation. It demonstrates that sumptuary law did not disappear with the passing of 
time as generally believed. Rather, it surprisingly resurfaced in new guises in 
Australia after Federation.   
This chapter draws together the threads of sumptuary regulation that surfaced 
during this period: the moralisation of luxury and extravagance, the hierarchical 
ordering of appearance and the protection of domestic industry. The interlacement of 
these threads reveals a fresh sumptuary narrative shaped by those atypical social, 
economic and political conditions that prevailed in Australia during its early years as 
a fledgling nation.  
Whilst Australians are not currently subject to specific sumptuary hierarchical 
laws that control the type and quality of clothing that is worn by Australian people, 
this chapter briefly demonstrates that, nonetheless, traces of the sumptuary ethic 
persistently underlie some contemporary legislation and government policy.  
 
10.2 Structure of this chapter 
 
The chapter begins by discussing the themes and observations in each chapter 
of this thesis. The chapter then moves to remark on the presence of the sumptuary 
ethic in modern day legislation and policy. 
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10.3 Drawing together the threads 
 
At the outset, this thesis proposed to demonstrate manifestations of 
sumptuary regulation in Australia during the first three decades following Federation. 
This period was one that was marked by momentous social, technological and 
political anxieties and vicissitudes. Australia was in the process of trying to define its 
new subjectivity as a fledgling Federated Commonwealth, whilst at the same time, it 
sought to position itself economically and culturally as an essential but isolated 
member of the British Empire. The war brought forth further unparalleled political, 
economic and social difficulties that challenged the freedoms and choices of ordinary 
Australians. 
To cope with these challenges, authorities sought to implement a wide range 
of social and economic policies. In many instances, these policies sought to strictly 
regulate the private and public behaviour of certain sections of the Australian 
population to more closely reflect traditional hegemonic values and expectations. 
This thesis argued that in many instances these interventionist policies, many of 
which were exercised as wartime measures, closely reflected the interventionist 
nature of the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. 
This thesis had a particular focus on the regulation of dress. Whilst post-
Federation Australian interventionist tariff policies may not have aimed to regulate 
dress, it was in their effects that we saw clear evidence of the sumptuary ethic.  
Whilst most of the research focuses on the regulation of dress, Chapter 7 highlighted 
the presence of other targets of sumptuary regulation during these first decades after 
Federation.   
Chapter 2 drew on the research of Hunt and Baldwin and provided an 
opportunity to deconstruct the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. This 
deconstruction revealed those warp threads that underpinned the sumptuary ethic: its 
moralising tendencies, its hierarchical paradigms, its implicit nationalism and its 
desire to protect local industries. During the deconstruction process, supplementary 
weft threads of class and gender were also exposed. 
 This chapter explained that the sumptuary laws of this period sought to 
control the type and cost of clothing that was worn by various ranks in society. These 
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laws were often complicated edicts that provided meticulous hierarchical dress codes 
that were based on rank, income, position and wealth. Furthermore, the chapter 
revealed how the moralisation of luxury was at the core of discourses surrounding 
the demand for sumptuary laws.1 However, at times, the sumptuary reflex was also 
stimulated by economic motives, especially when authorities sought to protect local 
industries from overseas imports. Often, authorities employed sumptuary regulation 
as a ‘paternal’ interventionist regimen that aimed, with mixed motives, to ‘guide’ and 
protect both the moral and economic lives of their people. 
Chapter 3 provided a contextual cache that can be drawn upon in 
understanding the motivations and influence of Australian individuals and 
institutions that figured prominently in later chapters played in the revival of 
sumptuary regulation in the early 20th century. 
A large part of this thesis dealt with the sumptuary effect of prohibitive 
taxation (in the form of tariffs) on clothing in the first few years following 
Federation. Chapter 4 was a foundational chapter that served to illustrate the shift in 
taxing policies on goods from 1788 until 1914. By 1914, government no longer 
relied upon taxation just for the provision of revenue. The chapter argued that 
government began to use taxation as an interventionist tool to modify the 
consumption practices of its people to reflect its favoured economic policy of 
protectionism.  
Chapter 4 demonstrated that, by the end of the first decade, a strong 
symbiotic relationship had developed between this type of taxation and 
protectionism. Whilst the express purpose and primary effect of tariff policy was the 
protection of local industries, at the same time, the effects of protectionist policies 
began to bear a striking resemblance to the aims and effects of sumptuary laws of the 
early modern period. This chapter exposed the sumptuary threads that began to 
resurface in protectionist discourse. It also illustrated that prohibitive tariffs on 
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imported goods, such as clothing, were beginning to have a clear sumptuary 
influence on the consumption practices of many Australians, especially those of the 
lower classes. In particular, prohibitive tariffs on imported clothing could effectively 
regulate the type and quality of clothing that certain people could wear.  
The research in Chapter 4 also demonstrated how the figure of Luxury 
excited moral condemnation and stimulated the regulatory reflex in post-Federation 
Australia. Chapter 4 showed that Parliament and the press were anxious about the 
‘evil’ effect of imported luxuries and women’s extravagance in dress. Lower class 
women were particularly targeted for regulation. There were even calls for the 
revival of ‘the old sumptuary laws’ as a way to control extravagance and women’s 
desire for ever-changing fashion apparel. The chapter revealed that Australia’s 
particular brand of protectionism was revitalising the sumptuary ethic long after the 
disappearance of the English sumptuary legislation of the early modern period.  
Having established the sumptuary effect of early post-Federation protectionist 
policies affecting imported clothing, the thesis shifted to Chapter 5 to demonstrate 
that the imposition of prohibitive tariffs on imported clothing was not the only form 
of sumptuary regulation that surfaced in the post-Federation period. This chapter 
examined the sumptuary effect of female ‘living wage’ determinations made by 
Australian arbitrations courts before and after the First World War.  
In cases such as Fruitpickers2 and Archer,3 arbitration judges posited 
themselves as both official arbiters of taste and as adjudicators of ‘normative’ dress 
for working class women. This chapter explained how these judges, when assessing 
the minimum wage for female workers, placed a skewed emphasis on the cost and 
‘appropriateness’ of their apparel. Judges sought to curtail the alleged fickleness and 
extravagance of female workers by denying them a sufficient wage that would allow 
them to afford to purchase the clothing of their choice. Furthermore, they arbitrarily 
                                                 
2 Rural Workers’ Union and South Australian United Labourers’ Union v The Employers, Parties to the 
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3 Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer (1919) 13 CAR 647 (‘Archer’). 
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set prescriptive standards of dress for these female workers whilst at the same time 
taking the opportunity to chastise them for their profligacy and to encourage them to 
better equip themselves for marriage by adopting thrifty practices.  
During the war, governing classes became even more anxious about the 
increased demand for imported clothing and the problem of squandering national 
wealth. They were concerned that many Australians, particularly the lower classes, 
were wasting their money on luxuries and fashionable apparel, at a time when they 
should be saving their money for future exigencies or ‘patriotically’ investing their 
surplus funds in war bonds. Chapter 6 demonstrated that it was during this period 
that the demand for sumptuary regulation to control extravagant spending on 
‘inappropriate’ luxuries reached its apogee in Australia.  
This chapter revealed the extent to which luxury became a focus of moral 
critique and a target for regulation for Australian governments during the war years. 
After appeals for self-regulation had been ignored, Prime Minister Hughes, in May 
1917, introduced a modern manifestation of sumptuary regulation when he 
established the Luxuries Board to determine the categories of luxury goods that were 
be denied to Australian consumers until the end of war. Chapter 6 suggested that the 
establishment of the Board could be characterised as a unique interventionist 
sumptuary scheme that sought to quell wartime anxieties about economic waste, 
extravagance and mimesis; the same kind of anxieties that prompted the sumptuary 
laws of the early modern period. 
It was revealed in Chapter 2 that sumptuary laws of the early modern period 
were not limited to the regulation of dress and that at times sumptuary laws targeted 
the consumption of food, alcohol, social ceremonies, entertainment and wealth. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated the pervasiveness and malleability of sumptuary regulation 
in Australia during the post-Federation period. In particular, this chapter argued that 
the sumptuary impulse that surfaced in Australia during the early decades following 
Federation was similarly not limited to the regulation of dress. In fact, this chapter 
argued that the sumptuary impulse became evident in all manner of guises of 
interventionist policy. This was especially the case during the war when 
governments, beset by issues concerning national security and morality, made use of 
the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) to constrain personal freedoms. The chapter 
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foregrounded two such wartime ‘non-appearential’ projects: Anti-Shouting laws and 
the Entertainments Tax Act 1916  (Cth). 
As shown in chapter 2, luxury and extravagance in dress in the early modern 
period persistently excited moral censure and stimulated the regulatory reflex. 
Chapter 8 demonstrated the robustness of the perennial treatment of luxury and 
female dress in an Australian context. The chapter showed how ‘fashionable’ 
Australian women in the early decades after Federation were labelled as ‘unpatriotic’ 
and viciously chastised by masculinist institutions, individuals and women’s groups 
for squandering national resources on trivial and inappropriate imported fripperies. 
The chapter revealed that war-time exigencies and governments’ ‘fervent’ devotion 
to protectionism further exacerbated these gendered attacks. The chapter 
demonstrated that these women were vilified for their alleged fickleness and 
profligacy and were also held responsible for the failure of various Australian 
industries and for increasing the cost of living. Manufacturers, protectionists and 
‘patriots’, such as Ivy Brookes and Ruth Beale, called for women to curtail their 
obsession with rapidly changing imported fashion apparel and to support local 
industries. They went so far as to demand that government force women to eschew 
imported fashion apparel in favour of Australian made clothing.  
Chapter 8 set up a contrast between the treatment by government and the 
press concerning women’s fashion and men’s underwear. It was argued that whilst 
moralisation persistently continued to underpin discourse concerning women’s 
fashion apparel into the 1920s, the regulation of men’s clothing via the imposition of 
prohibitive tariffs was sparked more by purely economic objectives than with a 
concern with moral regulation. It is in only the effects of these tariffs on working 
men and the self-serving demands of manufacturers that we see evidence of the 
sumptuary impulse. 
Chapter 9 illustrated the shift in the discursive context surrounding the 
incidence of sumptuary regulation in Australia during the 1920s. By the end of the 
First World War, protectionism had become Australia’s ‘settled’ economic policy. In 
1921, legislation was enacted for establishment of as the ‘institutional voice’ of 
protectionism and its role was to encourage and support emerging domestic 
industries that were facing enormous overseas competition. Sumptuary regulation 
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became more about economic intervention than about moral regulation. However, 
sumptuary regulation was not completely subsumed by protectionism during this 
period. The two case studies within Chapter 9 demonstrated that, at least in the case 
of the hosiery and corsetry industries, the sumptuary ethic remained unmistakably 
intact. In seeking to control the domestic market, hosiery and corsetry manufactures 
sought to increase the level of demand for their products by insisting that 
governments force certain sections of society to wear only Australian-made hose and 
corsets. Chapter 9 revealed how those involved with the establishment of two iconic 
industries took full advantage of opportunities opened up by the war as well as the 
generous protection offered by government and the Tariff Board.  
 
10.4 Remnants of the Sumptuary Impulse in present day consumer 
culture 
 
Hunt suggests, the sumptuary laws did not die but were transfigured into 
more modern regulatory projects.4 Despite this transformation, the sumptuary ethic 
has remained resilient and pervasive since the early modern period. It has been 
suggested that sumptuary regulation has been in the habit of making “many final 
curtain calls”.5 For instance, this thesis argues that the threads of sumptuary 
regulation were clearly visible in Australia in the interventionist projects in the early 
decades following Federation. These sumptuary threads were also evident in the US 
prohibitionist policies of the 1920s and 1930s.6 They again resurfaced in Germany 
before the Second World War when certain fashion clothing was forbidden by the 
Nazi regime in favour of Aryan national costumes and uniforms.7 In Australia, 
sumptuary regulation resurfaced during this war under the guise of rationing and 
austerity measures.8 During this period, economy was “arbitrarily forced upon 
                                                 
4 Hunt, above n 1, 361. 
5 Ibid 389-90. Hunt gives the examples of ‘Prohibition’ and anti-pornography ordinances. 
6 Ibid. 
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8 “Clothes Rationing: Echoes from the Past”, Glen Innes Examiner, 19 November 1952, 3. 
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[Australians]”.9  It was accompanying by the same moralising discourse that sought 
to chastise Australians about their extravagance and self-indulgence during the early 
years following Federation.10 The sumptuary ethic has continued to resurface 
occasionally in Australia in the press and in Parliament in discussions about the 
propriety of dress and the need for dress codes in certain social and business 
situations.11  
Whilst modern legal commentators may be hesitant to characterise or label 
current regulatory dress codes or consumption-based laws as sumptuary law, it is 
evident that many of the modern codes and laws concerning dress, luxuries and 
consumables are “built upon the foundations of early sumptuary laws.”12 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the modern dress standards for some 
industries and occupations provide in some instances, a “platform for interventionist” 
and such standards are often linked with the moralisation of gendered appearance.13  
Hunt suggests that the critique of extravagance has not entirely disappeared. 
He argues that it still lives on “with considerable vitality”14 in the moralisation that 
underpins the regulation of gambling.15 Furthermore, moralisation is also still present 
in legislation and government policies that seek to regulate the use and promotion of 
drugs, alcohol and tobacco.16 Hunt argues that this form of moral regulation has 
increasingly become associated with discursive medicalisation discourse.17 He 
contends that the state continues to play a decisive role in the sponsorship and 
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24 July 1942, 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 6 August 1961, 103 (Mr 
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15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 397-8. 
 
370 
 
coordination of what he calls these “medico-moral projects.”18 Hunt argues that it is 
only in the field of the governance of sexuality where “pure forms of moral 
regulation”19 still exist. He cites the continuing contestation over pornography as 
“the classic case”.20 
It is evident that the sumptuary ethic still lingers under various guises. In the 
last few years there had been a trend by some US academics to link current 
regulation “of attire or grooming”21 with traditional sumptuary law.22 For instance, 
Lucille M Ponte argues that there are clear linkages between the foundational tenets 
of traditional sumptuary laws and the proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
(US).23 She suggests that whilst the Act, which was to be introduced in a time of 
“great transition and flux”,24 ostensibly aimed at protecting the creative efforts of 
fashion designers from manufacturers who copy and sell replicas of designers’ 
creation to retailers, it is nonetheless underpinned by sumptuary imperatives.25 Ponte 
contends that the drafters of the proposed Act sought to shield the US fashion 
industry by promoting government control over social identity and by enforcing 
notions of public morality.26 She insists that the Act would not only assist the 
wealthy to use fashion to differentiate themselves from the general public but it 
would deny lower-status people from accessing cheap ‘knock-offs’ from overseas. 27 
A similar issue has arisen in Australia when local manufacturers and business 
retailers demanded that government protect their interests by the imposition of GST 
on overseas internet purchases.28 
                                                 
18 Ibid 398. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ruthann Robson, ‘Beyond Sumptuary: Constitutionalism, Clothes, and Bodies in Anglo-American 
Law’ (2013) 2 British Journal of American Legal Studies 478. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ponte, above n 12, 51. 
24 Ibid 75. 
25 Ibid 51. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 82-84. 
28 Crikey, Netflix Tax Well and Good, but it’s time to add GST to Overseas Purchases (12 May 2015) 
<http://www.crikey.com.au/2015/05/12/netflix-tax-well-and-good-but-its-time-to-add-gst-to-overseas-
purchases/?>. 
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Barton Beebe suggests that certain areas of intellectual property law have 
adopted a sumptuary role by seeking to provide a means to preserve “our 
conventional system of consumption-based social distinction”.29 Whilst he 
acknowledges that the express purpose of intellectual property law remains the 
“misappropriation and the promotion of technological and cultural progress”30 he 
argues that legislators have increasingly invested this law with sumptuary purposes.31 
Beebe argues that legislators have turned to intellectual property laws to protect 
forms of distinction from imitation and overproduction.32  
In conclusion, whilst the sumptuary laws on dress of the early modern age 
have been dismissed by many legal commentators as “dusty relics of pre-industrial 
societies”,33 this thesis has demonstrated that the sumptuary imperative is resilient 
and has continued to resurface unexpectedly in various transfigurations since these 
laws themselves have waned. 
                                                 
29 Barton Beebe, “Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code” (2010) 123 Harvard Law 
Review 2, 5. 
30 Ibid 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ponte, above n 12, 48. 
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